Suretyships given in favour of banks are being challenged in the courts on the basis of equitable doctrines of unconscionable conduct, undue influence, or statutory provisions dealing with unfair conduct or unfair contract terms. This thesis is an enquiry into a bank's duties of disclosure or advice to an intending surety. Such an investigation also necessitates a study of the relationship between banker and customer, as the surety is quite often a customer of the bank as well, and, as a surety's obligation to the bank is an accessory obligation, the obligation is dependent on a valid principal obligation between the bank and the principal debtor - the customer. The face of modern banking has, however, changed dramatically and most major banks have become multi-functional. As a result, the banker-customer relationship may often be seen as a fiduciary relationship. A major problem brought about my multi-functioning banks is that of conflicts of interest between the bank and its customer. Furthermore, the banker-customer relationship is providing much more scope for lender liability than in the past. Various factors are currently having an impact on the law of contract, and this is expected to affect the legal policy makers in their assessments of whether a duty of disclosure of material facts exits or not. A surety has long been a favoured debtor in the eyes of the law, and the courts have developed a plethora of technical principles on which a surety can be relieved of his obligation. The escape routes of the surety, especially if he is a consumer as well, on the new grounds of public policy, unconscionability, good faith or unreasonableness, are growing. The results of these trends is the expected demise of suretyship as an acceptable, cheap form of debt security in the banking sector. / Jurisprudence / LL.D.

Along this dissertation I propose to walk the reader through several macroeconomic<p>implications of information asymmetries, with a special focus on financial<p>issues. This exercise is mainly theoretical: I develop stylized models that aim<p>at capturing macroeconomic phenomena such as self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups,<p>the rise and the fall of securitization markets, and the creation of systemic risk.<p>The dissertation consists of three chapters. The first one proposes an explanation<p>to self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups. The second chapters proposes a formalization<p>of the concept of market discipline and an application to securitization<p>markets as risk-sharing mechanisms. The third one offers a complementary<p>analysis to the second as the rise of securitization is presented as banker optimal<p>response to strict capital constraints.<p>Two concepts that do not have unique acceptations in economics play a central<p>role in these models: liquidity and market discipline.<p>The liquidity of an asset refers to the ability for his owner to transform it into<p>current consumption goods. Secondary markets for long-term assets play thus<p>an important role with that respect. However, such markets might be illiquid due<p>to adverse selection.<p>In the first chapter, I show that: (1) when agents expect a liquidity dry-up<p>on such markets, they optimally choose to self-insure through the hoarding of<p>non-productive but liquid assets; (2) this hoarding behavior worsens adverse selection and dries up market liquidity; (3) such liquidity dry-ups are Pareto inefficient<p>equilibria; (4) the government can rule them out. Additionally, I show<p>that idiosyncratic liquidity shocks à la Diamond and Dybvig have stabilizing effects,<p>which is at odds with the banking literature. The main contribution of the<p>chapter is to show that market breakdowns due to adverse selection are highly<p>endogenous to past balance-sheet decisions.<p>I consider that agents are under market discipline when their current behavior<p>is influenced by future market outcomes. A key ingredient for market discipline<p>to be at play is that the market outcome depends on information that is observable<p>but not verifiable (that is, information that cannot be proved in court, and<p>consequently, upon which enforceable contracts cannot be based).<p>In the second chapter, after introducing this novel formalization of market<p>discipline, I ask whether securitization really contributes to better risk-sharing:<p>I compare it with other mechanisms that differ on the timing of risk-transfer. I<p>find that for securitization to be an efficient risk-sharing mechanism, it requires<p>market discipline to be strong and adverse selection not to be severe. This seems<p>to seriously restrict the set of assets that should be securitized for risk-sharing<p>motive.<p>Additionally, I show how ex-ante leverage may mitigate interim adverse selection<p>in securitization markets and therefore enhance ex-post risk-sharing. This<p>is interesting because high leverage is usually associated with “excessive” risktaking.<p>In the third chapter, I consider risk-neutral bankers facing strict capital constraints;<p>their capital is indeed required to cover the worst-case-scenario losses.<p>In such a set-up, I find that: 1) banker optimal autarky response is to diversify<p>lower-tail risk and maximize leverage; 2) securitization helps to free up capital<p>and to increase leverage, but distorts incentives to screen loan applicants properly; 3) market discipline mitigates this problem, but if it is overestimated by<p>the supervisor, it leads to excess leverage, which creates systemic risk. Finally,<p>I consider opaque securitization and I show that the supervisor: 4) faces uncertainty<p>about the trade-off between the size of the economy and the probability<p>and the severity of a systemic crisis; 5) can generally not set capital constraints<p>at the socially efficient level. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

<p>The primary aim of this thesis has been to analyse the transformation of the Swedish capital market from a household perspective. The investigation shows that the transition from a mostly private credit market to a more institutionalised credit market took place at the end of the nineteenth century. At this time there were several actors in the credit market that were able to fulfil the diverse needs of credit that different households might have. This need was very much correlated to the household’s particular stage in its life-cycle. In accordance with the life-cycle theory and the permanent income hypothesis, households displayed a savings and consumption pattern that was dependent on income and the burden of expenditure. Households also seemed to have particular difficulty meeting expenditures, so-called life-cycle squeezes, when the household was first started, when the household size was at its peak and when the head of family reached old age, which coincided with a declining capacity to work. The investigation also shows that household savings were meant for old age. Contrary to the assumption made in life-cycle theory, households seemed to intend to provide heirs with an inheritance. This finding is more in keeping with the permanent income hypothesis, which states that households were expected to maintain their assets intact over the course of a life-time.</p>

The primary aim of this thesis has been to analyse the transformation of the Swedish capital market from a household perspective. The investigation shows that the transition from a mostly private credit market to a more institutionalised credit market took place at the end of the nineteenth century. At this time there were several actors in the credit market that were able to fulfil the diverse needs of credit that different households might have. This need was very much correlated to the household’s particular stage in its life-cycle. In accordance with the life-cycle theory and the permanent income hypothesis, households displayed a savings and consumption pattern that was dependent on income and the burden of expenditure. Households also seemed to have particular difficulty meeting expenditures, so-called life-cycle squeezes, when the household was first started, when the household size was at its peak and when the head of family reached old age, which coincided with a declining capacity to work. The investigation also shows that household savings were meant for old age. Contrary to the assumption made in life-cycle theory, households seemed to intend to provide heirs with an inheritance. This finding is more in keeping with the permanent income hypothesis, which states that households were expected to maintain their assets intact over the course of a life-time.

Etude du rôle des banquiers piémontais au service des ducs de Brabant et de leurs rapports avec les différents pouvoirs: Prince, noblesse et villes.<p>Estimation de leur fonction économique et sociale au sein de la société urbaine brabançonne. / Doctorat en Histoire, art et archéologie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished