By the 1960s-70s, most Western commentators agreed that Japan had rehabilitated itself from World War II, in the process becoming on the whole a reliable member of the international community. From the late 1970s onwards, however, as Japan’s economy continued to rise, this premise began to be questioned. By the late 1980s, a new ‘Japan Problem’ had been identified in Western countries, although the presentation of Japan as a dangerous ‘other’ was nevertheless familiar from past historical eras. The term ‘Japan-bashing’ was used by opponents of this negative view to suggest that much of the critical rhetoric about a ‘Japan Problem’ could be reduced to an unwarranted, probably racist, assault on Japan. This thesis argues that the invention and popularisation of the highly-contested label ‘Japan-bashing’, rather than averting criticism of Japan, perversely helped to exacerbate and transform the moderate anti-Japanese sentiment that had existed in Western countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s into a widely disseminated, heavily politicised and even encultured phenomenon in the late 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, when the term ‘Japan-bashing’ spread to Japan itself, Japanese commentators were quick to respond. In fact, the level and the nature of the response from the Japanese side is one crucial factor that distinguishes ‘Japan-bashing’ in the 1980s and 1990s from anti-Japanese sentiment expressed in the West in earlier periods. Ultimately, the label and the practice of ‘Japan-bashing’ helped to transform intellectual and popular discourses about Japan in both Western countries and Japan itself in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, in doing so, it revealed crucial features of wider Western and Japanese perceptions of the global order in the late twentieth century. Debates about Japan showed, for example, that economic strength had become at least as important as military power to national discourses about identity. However, the view that Western countries and Japan are generally incompatible, and share few, if any, common values, interests or goals, has been largely discarded in the early twenty-first century, in a process that demonstrated just how constructed, and transitory, such views can be.

By the 1960s-70s, most Western commentators agreed that Japan had rehabilitated itself from World War II, in the process becoming on the whole a reliable member of the international community. From the late 1970s onwards, however, as Japan’s economy continued to rise, this premise began to be questioned. By the late 1980s, a new ‘Japan Problem’ had been identified in Western countries, although the presentation of Japan as a dangerous ‘other’ was nevertheless familiar from past historical eras. The term ‘Japan-bashing’ was used by opponents of this negative view to suggest that much of the critical rhetoric about a ‘Japan Problem’ could be reduced to an unwarranted, probably racist, assault on Japan. This thesis argues that the invention and popularisation of the highly-contested label ‘Japan-bashing’, rather than averting criticism of Japan, perversely helped to exacerbate and transform the moderate anti-Japanese sentiment that had existed in Western countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s into a widely disseminated, heavily politicised and even encultured phenomenon in the late 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, when the term ‘Japan-bashing’ spread to Japan itself, Japanese commentators were quick to respond. In fact, the level and the nature of the response from the Japanese side is one crucial factor that distinguishes ‘Japan-bashing’ in the 1980s and 1990s from anti-Japanese sentiment expressed in the West in earlier periods. Ultimately, the label and the practice of ‘Japan-bashing’ helped to transform intellectual and popular discourses about Japan in both Western countries and Japan itself in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, in doing so, it revealed crucial features of wider Western and Japanese perceptions of the global order in the late twentieth century. Debates about Japan showed, for example, that economic strength had become at least as important as military power to national discourses about identity. However, the view that Western countries and Japan are generally incompatible, and share few, if any, common values, interests or goals, has been largely discarded in the early twenty-first century, in a process that demonstrated just how constructed, and transitory, such views can be.

By the 1960s-70s, most Western commentators agreed that Japan had rehabilitated itself from World War II, in the process becoming on the whole a reliable member of the international community. From the late 1970s onwards, however, as Japan’s economy continued to rise, this premise began to be questioned. By the late 1980s, a new ‘Japan Problem’ had been identified in Western countries, although the presentation of Japan as a dangerous ‘other’ was nevertheless familiar from past historical eras. The term ‘Japan-bashing’ was used by opponents of this negative view to suggest that much of the critical rhetoric about a ‘Japan Problem’ could be reduced to an unwarranted, probably racist, assault on Japan. This thesis argues that the invention and popularisation of the highly-contested label ‘Japan-bashing’, rather than averting criticism of Japan, perversely helped to exacerbate and transform the moderate anti-Japanese sentiment that had existed in Western countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s into a widely disseminated, heavily politicised and even encultured phenomenon in the late 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, when the term ‘Japan-bashing’ spread to Japan itself, Japanese commentators were quick to respond. In fact, the level and the nature of the response from the Japanese side is one crucial factor that distinguishes ‘Japan-bashing’ in the 1980s and 1990s from anti-Japanese sentiment expressed in the West in earlier periods. Ultimately, the label and the practice of ‘Japan-bashing’ helped to transform intellectual and popular discourses about Japan in both Western countries and Japan itself in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, in doing so, it revealed crucial features of wider Western and Japanese perceptions of the global order in the late twentieth century. Debates about Japan showed, for example, that economic strength had become at least as important as military power to national discourses about identity. However, the view that Western countries and Japan are generally incompatible, and share few, if any, common values, interests or goals, has been largely discarded in the early twenty-first century, in a process that demonstrated just how constructed, and transitory, such views can be.

By the 1960s-70s, most Western commentators agreed that Japan had rehabilitated itself from World War II, in the process becoming on the whole a reliable member of the international community. From the late 1970s onwards, however, as Japan’s economy continued to rise, this premise began to be questioned. By the late 1980s, a new ‘Japan Problem’ had been identified in Western countries, although the presentation of Japan as a dangerous ‘other’ was nevertheless familiar from past historical eras. The term ‘Japan-bashing’ was used by opponents of this negative view to suggest that much of the critical rhetoric about a ‘Japan Problem’ could be reduced to an unwarranted, probably racist, assault on Japan. This thesis argues that the invention and popularisation of the highly-contested label ‘Japan-bashing’, rather than averting criticism of Japan, perversely helped to exacerbate and transform the moderate anti-Japanese sentiment that had existed in Western countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s into a widely disseminated, heavily politicised and even encultured phenomenon in the late 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, when the term ‘Japan-bashing’ spread to Japan itself, Japanese commentators were quick to respond. In fact, the level and the nature of the response from the Japanese side is one crucial factor that distinguishes ‘Japan-bashing’ in the 1980s and 1990s from anti-Japanese sentiment expressed in the West in earlier periods. Ultimately, the label and the practice of ‘Japan-bashing’ helped to transform intellectual and popular discourses about Japan in both Western countries and Japan itself in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, in doing so, it revealed crucial features of wider Western and Japanese perceptions of the global order in the late twentieth century. Debates about Japan showed, for example, that economic strength had become at least as important as military power to national discourses about identity. However, the view that Western countries and Japan are generally incompatible, and share few, if any, common values, interests or goals, has been largely discarded in the early twenty-first century, in a process that demonstrated just how constructed, and transitory, such views can be.

Media construction of major terrorist attacks has received much attention ever since the 1970s in the field of Communication Sciences. Recently, investigations of media participation in the framing process of terrorist attacks have highlighted media’s role in the meaning-making of the attacks and the construction of identity, opposition and confrontation after the attack, indicating the relations of media to the attacked country, the authorities, the readership and terrorism. This thesis tries to analyze a specific discursive phenomenon “country-bashing” in a relational way with other discourses in terms of identity construction and value conflicts in media construction of the terrorist attacks in London (2005) and Paris (November 2015). The aim is to investigate how country-bashing is related to the core idea of media framing of the terrorist attacks. We start from identifying the emphasized frames with quantitative thematic analysis and cluster analysis on four British national daily newspapers, and the case studies of two terrorist attacks are conducted with a discursive approach of framing analysis.In this thesis, eight emphasized frames are identified, which consist a schematic model of media construction of terrorist attacks. The case study on London attacks reveals that country-bashing is focused on political actors and religious minority (suspected community), which facilitates the problem definition and responsibility attribution and finally promote the framing of “war provokes revenge”. In the case of the Paris attacks, France-bashing is a dynamic discursive system which contains an interplay of different types of bashing, shifting with the interpretative framework of event construction (from local context to European context).The thesis concluds that the phenomenon of “country-bashing” is a dynamic (re)construction of relations among the people, the country and the “other”. We summarize 4 types bashing within this discursive system, which are actor country- bashing, policy-bashing, negative branding (places) and systematic bashing. While the first two types of bashing can lead to a complete causality to terror attacks, the latter two provides a fragmented reading and open to further meaning-making. The results of the schematic model of media construction and the types of country-bashing can be used as an aid for further empirical investigation. / Doctorat en Information et communication / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Waterproofing membranes are one of the most commonly used waterproofing insulation materials. These can be found both in assemblies of roof constructions and substructures and are a key component for waterproofing systems. During design process it is necessary to select materials, elements and accessories so that mutual compatibility, waterproof effectiveness and reliability is ensured. In order to protect the main waterproofing layer a composition is therefore completed with construction protection elements, which are meant to prevent from a mechanical damage of waterproofing membrane. Mechanical stress and damage may become evident in variety of situations, which can be caused externally not only as an inappropriate ground bashing procedure but also as a consequence of improper waterproofing construction protection. In practice there are many cases of waterproofing system failures due to stress of elements with higher mechanical durability which affect elements with lower mechanical durability. The dissertation deals with an application of dimpled membranes protected by the layer of waterproofing membranes, which may due to stress and mutual compatibility result in waterproofing system failure and waterproofing reliability decrease. The dissertation is focused on mechanical durability of waterproofing membranes made of folio and modified bitumen membrane against damage from dimple membrane depending on stress category. First, possible waterproofing membrane damage from dimple extrusion is calculated and evaluated. The next part deals with verifying by experiment based on an effect of long-term static stress and short-term dynamic stress caused by ground bashing, where a measurement of ground bashing stress is performed. Experiment interpretation and an acquired knowledge provided the dissertation with an information what combination and order of particular layers results in higher risk of waterproofing system failure and waterproofing reliability decrease

La recherche portera sur la montée des vidéos de gay bashing depuis 2013. Par vidéo de gay bashing, nous entendons des vidéos documentant l’abus physique ou verbal d’individus perçus par les agresseurs comme étant gais, lesbiennes, bisexuels, transgenres ou queer, mais nous nous concentrerons spécifiquement sur des vidéos montrant des agressions envers des hommes. Ces vidéos peuvent être enregistrées par les agresseurs eux-mêmes ou par des témoins de la scène. Il s’agira de situer cette montée dans un contexte politique de retour de lois et sentiments anti-LGBT dans les pays d’où proviennent certaines des vidéos étudiées et par rapport aux différentes théories anthropologiques et socio-historiques concernant les sources et motivations derrière les actes de violence homophobe. Le corpus se composera de trois vidéos venant de Russie («Putin’s Crackdown on LGBT Teens un Russia»), de Lybie («Gay torture and violent in Lybia») et des États-Unis («Attack at gay pride event in Detroit»). L’analyse du corpus se fera en trois temps : d’abord l’analyse de la forme et du contenu des vidéos en tant que tels, ensuite, l’analyse de leur circulation et des différents utilisateurs qui distribuent les vidéos en ligne, et, finalement, l’analyse de la réception des vidéos en portant attention aux commentaires des utilisateurs. Il s’agira de montrer comment les vidéos de gay-bashing effectuent une rupture par rapport à une vision de YouTube, et autres médias sociaux, comme libérateurs et comme lieux d’expression de soi (particulièrement pour les membres des communautés LGBT) et les transforment en lieux d’une humiliation triplée par l’enregistrement de l’humiliation physique et sa diffusion sur le web. Il s’agira ensuite de voir comment la circulation et la redistribution de ces vidéos par différents groupes et utilisateurs les instrumentalisent selon différents agendas politiques et idéologiques, pour finalement se questionner, en s’inspirant du triangle de l’humiliation de Donald Klein, sur le rôle ambivalent du témoin (physique ou virtuel) dont la présence est nécessaire pour qu’il y ait humiliation. Finalement, nous nous intéresserons aux vidéos de témoignages de gay-bashing, vidéos faites par les victimes elles-mêmes, racontant leur traumatisme à la caméra, renouant ainsi avec les vidéos de coming out sous la forme de l’aveu et de la spectacularisation du soi. La présente recherche sera également l’occasion de développer des outils théoriques et méthodologiques propres aux nouveaux médias et aux nouvelles formes et contenus qui s’y développent. / This research will study the rise of gay bashing videos since 2013. We define gay bashing videos as videos documenting verbal or physical attacks against individuals perceived by the abusers as being gay, lesbian, bisexual, transsexual or queer. We will however concentrate our study on videos showing attacks against men. These videos can be recorded by the abusers themselves or by witnesses. This rise in gay bashing videos will be situated within a comeback or anti-LGBT feelings and laws in some of the countries where the videos come from and also within anthropological and socio-historical theories about the sources and motivations behind homophobic violence. The corpus will consist of three videos coming from Russia ((«Putin’s Crackdown on LGBT Teens in Russia»), Lybia («Gay torture and violent in Lybia») and the United States («Attack at gay pride event in Detroit») The analysis of the videos will be made in three steps: 1. The analysis of the form and content of the videos. 2. The analysis of their circulation and the different users circulating them online. 3. The analysis of their reception with a particular attention given to the users’ comments on YouTube. We will show how gay bashing videos are creating a rupture with a certain vision of YouTube and other social medias as liberating and sites of self-expression (especially for LGBT people) and how they transform them as sites of humiliations that are tripled by the recording of the event and its circulation on the web. We will then see how the circulation of those videos by different groups and users transforms them according to different political agendas and ideologies, to finally question ourselves, by following the Humiliation Triangle from Donald Klein, on the ambivalent role of the witness (physical or virtual) whose presence is necessary for a humiliation to take place. Finally we will focus on videos of gay bashing testimonies made by the victims themselves who narrate their trauma in front of the camera thus reviving the logic of avowal that we can find in coming out videos. This research will also be an opportunity to develop new methodological and theoretical tools for the study of new medias.

Le différend entre la France et les Etats-Unis sur le règlement de la question irakienne a provoqué une crise diplomatique majeure entre les deux pays, jugée par certains comme la plus sérieuse dans l’histoire des relations bilatérales. Le dossier irakien a cristallisé les positions diplomatiques des deux alliés et mis en lumière deux lectures d’une grande question internationale. Pour la France, il a été l’occasion de défendre des principes, de faire entendre sa voix et de partager sa vision d’un monde multipolaire fondé sur la quête d’un règlement pacifique des différends. Pour les Etats-Unis, cette question relevait d’un enjeu de sécurité nationale, dans une Amérique profondément traumatisée par les attentats de septembre 2001. La rupture franco-américaine a résulté de facteurs structurels anciens : la concurrence entre deux modèles politiques et diplomatiques qui se veulent universels et le déséquilibre entre une puissance française, déclinante, qui aspire à préserver ses sphères d’influence sur la scène internationale, et une puissance américaine, ascendante, devenue, depuis l’effondrement du bloc soviétique, l’unique superpuissance à la tête d’un monde unipolaire. L’affrontement bilatéral du printemps 2003 a ainsi révélé les caractères intrinsèques qui opposent la diplomatie française et la diplomatie américaine et dévoilé leur conception très éloignée qu’elles se faisaient du nouvel ordre mondial et de la place qu’elles aspirent à occuper sur l’échiquier international / The disagreement between France and the US over the Iraqi issue led to a serious diplomatic crisis between the two countries, considered by many analysts as the most serious one in the history of bilateral relations. The Iraqi case crystallized the diplomatic positions of both allies and revealed two different reads of this major international issue. For France, this case was the opportunity to defend its principles, to get itself heard by the rest of the world and to share its vision of a multipolar world, where disputes would be peacefully settled through international organizations. For the US, that issue fell under a matter of national security, in a country deeply traumatized by ‘9/11’. The split between thetwo countries resulted from historical structural causes : (i) the competition between two political and diplomatic models that present themselves as universal, and (ii) the imbalance between France’s declining power aspiring to preserve its spheres of influence over the world and America’s ascending power that has become, since the end of the Cold War, the only superpower. The bilateral confrontation of 2003 revealed the distinctive patterns of both French and American foreign policies and exposed their different views and models of the new world order, as well as their ambitions on the international scene