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"What Are Marines For?" The United States Marine Corps in the Civil War EraKrivdo, Michael Edward 2011 May 1900 (has links)
This dissertation provides analysis on several areas of study related to the history of the United States Marine Corps in the Civil War Era. One element scrutinizes the efforts of Commandant Archibald Henderson to transform the Corps into a more nimble and professional organization. Henderson's initiatives are placed within the framework of the several fundamental changes that the U.S. Navy was undergoing as it worked to experiment with, acquire, and incorporate new naval technologies into its own operational concept. Analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Henderson's programs are provided and comparisons drawn with those priorities established by his successor, Commandant John Harris. In addition, the operations undertaken by the Corps during the Civil War are evaluated in terms of their relative benefit for the national military establishment as a whole.
The Corps organization and operational concept is scrutinized and compared with that of similar military structures. In particular, the relationship between the U.S. Marine Corps and the Confederate States Marine Corps are compared. In the process, the South's Corps, born in part out of that of the North's, exhibited many distinct advantages that the USMC solidly resisted adopting during the war years. The influence of key leaders, both military and civilian, reveals many problems that continued to negatively affect the Corps' ability to meet operational requirements as defined by senior naval and Army commanders.
Yet despite these issues, the Corps' Civil War experiences served as a crucible for forging a new generation of leaders who earnestly fought for reforms and increased professionalization of the unit. Although the Corps suffered from several problems related to lack of institutional vision and leadership failings of some senior officers, at a small unit level the officers and Marines performed their duties in a competent, enthusiastic, and courageous manner. Therefore, Marines continued to be in great demand by naval commanders at all levels, who actively sought their service in a variety of operation.
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Lone Star under the Rising Sun: Texas's "Lost Battalion," 2nd Battalion, 131st Field Artillery Regiment, During World War IICrager, Kelly Eugene 05 1900 (has links)
In March 1942, the 2nd Battalion, 131st Field Artillery Regiment, 36th Division, surrendered to the Japanese Imperial Army on Java in the Dutch East Indies. Shortly after the surrender, the men of the 2nd Battalion were joined as prisoners-of-war by the sailors and Marines who survived the sinking of the heavy cruiser USS Houston. From March 1942 until the end of World War II, these men lived in various Japanese prison camps throughout the Dutch East Indies, Southeast Asia, and in the Japanese home islands. Forced to labor for their captors for the duration of the conflict, they performed extremely difficult tasks, including working in industrial plants and mining coal in Japan, and most notably, constructing the infamous Burma-Thailand Death Railway. During their three-and-one-half years of captivity, these prisoners experienced brutality at the hands of the Japanese. Enduring prolonged malnutrition and extreme overwork, they suffered from numerous tropical and dietary diseases while receiving almost no medical care. Each day, these men lived in fear of being beaten and tortured, and for months at a time they witnessed the agonizing deaths of their friends and countrymen. In spite of the conditions they faced, most survived to return to the United States at war's end. This study examines the experiences of these former prisoners from 1940 to 1945 and attempts to explain how they survived.
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Zadok Knapp Judd: Soldier, Colonizer, Missionary to the LamanitesJudd, Derrel Wesley 01 January 1968 (has links) (PDF)
Zadok's membership in the church directed the course of his life, and he contributed to the success of those movements of the church in which he participated.
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Förmågan till minröjning, en verklighet för framtidens jägargrupp : Ökad förmåga till problemlösning i dagens konfliktområden / Mine clearance capability, the Reality on the Future Ranger Squads : The increased ability to problem solving in today’s conflict areasHjulfors, David January 2009 (has links)
<p>I dagens konfliktområden är förekomsten av minor och oexploderad ammunition(OXA) ett vanligt förekommande problem för civilbefolkning samt de militära enheter som arbetar i området för att skapa stabilitet och säkerhet. Den här uppsatsen avhandlar möjligheten att lösa eventuella problem som har att göra med förekomsten av minor och OXA i ett missionsområde utan tillgång till stödresurser i form av min- och ammunitionsröjningsteam. Uppsatsens syfte är att undersöka om det är möjligt att tillföra minröjningskompetens på gruppnivå utan att tappa ursprunglig kompetens och fokus från huvudtjänsten. Uppsatsen tar även upp vilken lägsta nivå av utbildning som krävs för att kunna röja mineringar och OXA, samt hur man når upp till det målet. Uppsatsens frågeställning har varit: Går det att inom ramen för Jägarbataljon 09 utbilda en soldat som besitter kompetensen att kunna identifiera och röja mineringar samt OXA? Om ja, vilken utrustning bör tillföras? Mina slutsatser är att det är praktiskt möjligt genom att tillföra en min- och amröjledare på bataljons nivå. Min- och amröjledaren kan i sin tur utbilda och ge soldaterna den reella kompetens som behövs på enbart fyra veckor, ca 130h stimmar. Utbildningen som krävs är grundkursen Minröjning Manuella Metoder(MMM). För att fullt ut kunna nyttja förmågan krävs det att gruppen tillförs viss ammunitionsröjningsutrustning, bland annat extra tänd- och sprängmedel. Effekten man vinner på tillförsel av minröjningskompetensen är kopplat mot förbandets förmåga till okonventionellt uppträdande samt möjligheterna att ta ytterligare steg innanför motståndarens beslutscykel.</p> / <p>In today’s conflict areas the remnants of war, mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) is a common problem for the civilian population. These remnants also pose a great threat for the military units who work in the area to create peace, stability and security for the people. The purpose of this essay is to discover if and how it is possible to solve eventual problems associated with remnants of war in conflict areas, without the support of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams. My research has explored if it is possible to implement mine clearance and ammunition disposal on a squad without loosing additional competence and focus from the squad’s main field of service. Additional research has been carried out to ascertain the lowest level of competence necessary to work within the field of mine clearance and ammunition disposal, and what education is needed. My thesis aims to answer, if it is possible within the frame of the Army Ranger Battalion 09, to educate a soldier on a squad to have the ability and competence to do work within the field of mine clearance and ammunition disposal? If yes, what additional equipment should be added to the squad, to be able to perform that task? My conclusion is that it is possible to achieve by adding a mine clearance and ammunition disposal leader to the Battalion staff who can educate, train and give the soldiers the proper education in four weeks (approximately 130h). The education required to achieve this goal is the course, Mine clearance Manuel Methods (MMM). To use this ability it is necessary to equip the group with some additional and specific disposal-equipment (i.e. extra explosives.) The main effort gained from implementing this ability on a ranger squad is the Ranger Battalion’s overall ability to operate and appear in unexpected areas, and to get inside the enemy’s OODA-LOOP.</p>
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Förmågan till minröjning, en verklighet för framtidens jägargrupp : Ökad förmåga till problemlösning i dagens konfliktområden / Mine clearance capability, the Reality on the Future Ranger Squads : The increased ability to problem solving in today’s conflict areasHjulfors, David January 2009 (has links)
I dagens konfliktområden är förekomsten av minor och oexploderad ammunition(OXA) ett vanligt förekommande problem för civilbefolkning samt de militära enheter som arbetar i området för att skapa stabilitet och säkerhet. Den här uppsatsen avhandlar möjligheten att lösa eventuella problem som har att göra med förekomsten av minor och OXA i ett missionsområde utan tillgång till stödresurser i form av min- och ammunitionsröjningsteam. Uppsatsens syfte är att undersöka om det är möjligt att tillföra minröjningskompetens på gruppnivå utan att tappa ursprunglig kompetens och fokus från huvudtjänsten. Uppsatsen tar även upp vilken lägsta nivå av utbildning som krävs för att kunna röja mineringar och OXA, samt hur man når upp till det målet. Uppsatsens frågeställning har varit: Går det att inom ramen för Jägarbataljon 09 utbilda en soldat som besitter kompetensen att kunna identifiera och röja mineringar samt OXA? Om ja, vilken utrustning bör tillföras? Mina slutsatser är att det är praktiskt möjligt genom att tillföra en min- och amröjledare på bataljons nivå. Min- och amröjledaren kan i sin tur utbilda och ge soldaterna den reella kompetens som behövs på enbart fyra veckor, ca 130h stimmar. Utbildningen som krävs är grundkursen Minröjning Manuella Metoder(MMM). För att fullt ut kunna nyttja förmågan krävs det att gruppen tillförs viss ammunitionsröjningsutrustning, bland annat extra tänd- och sprängmedel. Effekten man vinner på tillförsel av minröjningskompetensen är kopplat mot förbandets förmåga till okonventionellt uppträdande samt möjligheterna att ta ytterligare steg innanför motståndarens beslutscykel. / In today’s conflict areas the remnants of war, mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) is a common problem for the civilian population. These remnants also pose a great threat for the military units who work in the area to create peace, stability and security for the people. The purpose of this essay is to discover if and how it is possible to solve eventual problems associated with remnants of war in conflict areas, without the support of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams. My research has explored if it is possible to implement mine clearance and ammunition disposal on a squad without loosing additional competence and focus from the squad’s main field of service. Additional research has been carried out to ascertain the lowest level of competence necessary to work within the field of mine clearance and ammunition disposal, and what education is needed. My thesis aims to answer, if it is possible within the frame of the Army Ranger Battalion 09, to educate a soldier on a squad to have the ability and competence to do work within the field of mine clearance and ammunition disposal? If yes, what additional equipment should be added to the squad, to be able to perform that task? My conclusion is that it is possible to achieve by adding a mine clearance and ammunition disposal leader to the Battalion staff who can educate, train and give the soldiers the proper education in four weeks (approximately 130h). The education required to achieve this goal is the course, Mine clearance Manuel Methods (MMM). To use this ability it is necessary to equip the group with some additional and specific disposal-equipment (i.e. extra explosives.) The main effort gained from implementing this ability on a ranger squad is the Ranger Battalion’s overall ability to operate and appear in unexpected areas, and to get inside the enemy’s OODA-LOOP.
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Insubordination, criminalité et cohésion militaire. Le cas du 41e bataillon (canadien-français) du Corps expéditionnaire canadien, 1914-1916Mailloux, Alex 08 1900 (has links)
Autorisé le 31 décembre 1914, le 41e bataillon (canadien-français) du Corps expéditionnaire canadien était voué à suivre les traces du désormais célèbre 22e bataillon et à combattre à ses côtés sur le théâtre européen. Sept mois après sa formation, cette unité composée d’un amalgame hétéroclite de francophones et de volontaires étrangers fut pourtant dissoute, succombant à une vague d’insubordination marquée par un nombre record d’infractions, des désertions par centaines, plusieurs délits de corruption, une épidémie d’ivrognerie et deux homicides. Aussitôt oublié, le dossier du 41e fut rouvert une première fois en 1974 par l’historien Desmond Morton, qui imputait l’échec de l’unité à l’incompétence de ses officiers. Nous jugeons cette interprétation recevable quoique limitée, car si Morton a prouvé de façon convaincante l’inaptitude des gradés du 41e, son approche traditionnelle à l’histoire militaire nous en dit peu sur les mécanismes qui permirent la propagation de l’insubordination parmi les hommes du rang. Ce mémoire, qui se réclame de l’approche microhistorique, vise à réorienter l’analyse du point de vue du simple soldat, en insistant sur les facteurs sociaux, culturels et circonstanciels qui provoquèrent la désintégration prématurée de l’unité. Reposant sur un corpus inédit composé, entre autres, des rapports de cour martiale et des dossiers de service du 41e bataillon, cet effort de réinterprétation révèle une absence généralisée de cohésion au sein de l’unité. Dans le cas insolite du 41e bataillon, la discipline apparaît ainsi comme étant fonction de la qualité des relations interpersonnelles de ses membres plutôt qu’uniquement liée aux qualités individuelles de leurs supérieurs. / Authorized on December 31, 1914, the 41st Battalion (French-Canadian) of the Canadian Expeditionary Force was destined to follow in the footsteps of the renowned 22nd Battalion and fight on the western front. However, only seven months after its formation, this multiethnic unit made up of French-Canadian and foreign volunteers was disbanded due to a wave of insubordination that included a record number of infractions, desertions by the hundreds, several corruption scandals, widespread drunkenness and the cold- blooded murder of two Canadian servicemen. Long forgotten, the case of the 41st Battalion was examined for the first time in 1974 by historian Desmond Morton, who attributed the unit’s failure to the shortcomings of its officers. We find this interpretation acceptable, albeit limited. While Morton convincingly demonstrated the incompetence of the Battalion’s officers, his traditional approach to military history fails to unveil the mechanisms by which indiscipline was allowed to spread among the rank and file. This thesis, grounded in the micro-historical approach, shifts the analysis from a top-down to a bottom-up perspective, emphasizing the social, cultural and circumstantial factors which played into the unit’s collapse. Drawing from unpublished sources including court-martial reports and personnel record files of the 41st Battalion, this study reveals a widespread lack of cohesion within the unit. In the strange case of the 41st Battalion, discipline thus depends not only on the individual qualities of the officers, but also on the quality of interpersonal relationships among the rank and file.
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The airborne concept in the South African military, 1960-2000 : strategy versus tactics in small warsAlexander, Edward George McGill January 2016 (has links)
Text in English / Restricted files have not been uploaded / The thesis commences by elaborating on the concept of vertical envelopment as a form of military manoeuvre and defining airborne operations as comprising parachute, helicopter and air-landed actions. It goes on to describe strategy and tactics as they apply to the discussion before briefly tracing the development internationally of vertical envelopment and the thinking of the South African military about airborne operations during the Second World War.
Events leading up to the decision by the South African military to acquire helicopters and to train paratroopers in 1960 are examined and the early operational employment of helicopters is analysed. The establishment of 1 Parachute Battalion is discussed in the light of the absence of a clear understanding of how it should be employed. Moving on to the commencement of the conflict known as the Southern African Thirty Year War, the issue of strategic versus tactical application of an airborne capability during operations in Namibia, Angola and Rhodesia is defined.
Strategic application is then illustrated by specific independent airborne strikes, and the requirement for an airborne brigade to plan and conduct such operations is highlighted. The establishment of 44 Parachute Brigade and the difficulties experienced in its development are reviewed before scrutinising the tactical use of airborne forces in support of other ground forces.
The high point in organisation and capability of the airborne forces of the South African Defence Force at the time of the ending of the Thirty Year War is appraised and the unfulfilled potential of the capability is elucidated. Faced with change and uncertainty, the employment of the paratroopers in urban operations during the height of the civil unrest is examined. This is followed by probing the response of the paratrooper organisation to severe budget cuts, enforced reorganisation and relocation, the ending of conscription and integration into the new South African National Defence Force following the country’s first democratic elections in 1994.
The thesis concludes with an evaluation of the airborne actions during the incursion by South Africa into Lesotho in 1998 and an assessment of the implications of the loss of a strategic airborne capability. / History / D. Litt. et Phil. (History)
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