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This paper researches the effects of choice of payment (cash and stock) and M&A type (technological and non-technological) on bidders’ performance. We investigate 500 events in Swedish market between 2005 and 2015. Moreover, we also control the size of firms and the value of takeovers. In this paper, we conduct an event study in order to generate abnormal returns for the bidders at and around the M&A announcement. This research generates statistically significant and positive abnormal returns for the bidders especially when deals are financed by shares. Moreover, we also find that the technological M&A brings about lower abnormal returns than non-technological M&A. When we control for payment choice in technological M&A, the result shows that technological M&A paid for in shares generates higher abnormal returns than technological M&A paid for in cash.

In markets where suppliers experience learning by doing over time or, more generally, economies of scale in production, buyers are auctioning off longer-term contracts with an eroding price policy. Under an eroding price contract, the buyer initially competitively awards production to the lowest-bid supplier via an auction. Before the auction takes place, the buyer makes it clear to the suppliers that, if chosen, a sequence of price reductions will be mandatory in subsequent periods. In this thesis, we mainly study the design of the optimal eroding price contract in a two period setting under three different model settings : (1) Every supplier faces a new cost in each period (NLI model), (2) The supplier who wins the auction in the first period locks-in his cost for the future, and the buyer makes the future payment based on the winning supplier's current bid (LI1), and (3) The supplier who wins the auction in the first period locks-in his cost for the future, and the buyer makes the future payment based on the winning supplier's actual cost (LI1). Under NLI setting, the magnitude of the cost reduction due to learning by doing is common knowledge, while the magnitude is uncertain under LI1 and LI2 settings. We also study the optimal reserve prices in sequential independent auctions under NLI setting. We go on to compare the performance of the eroding price policy against sequential independent auctions (without or with the optimal reserve prices) under the above model settings. Via analytical and numerical comparisons, we find that even in the presence of learning by doing/economies of scale in production, a buyer is often better off running sequential auctions with a reserve price, rather than limiting competition and contracting with a single supplier in the hopes of extracting a better future price.

On the one hand, time-honored practices of open outcry, bazaar and other flea markets, as well as Sotheby's and Christie's, the traditional auction houses. On the other hand, the Internet technology quickly and cheaply connects people anywhere in the world at anytime. A true love story then began and gave rise to online auctions, which are undoubtedly one of the greatest successes of e-commerce. Thanks to the Internet, individual consumers, average people, generally used to posted prices, discover an efficient mechanism of price setting. The weak popularity of auctions until the dawn of the third millennium (auctions were intended to B2B transactions, or to B2C transactions but in specific markets, such as the art market) certainly justifies the lack of interest of researchers in marketing for this mechanism. On the other hand, economists made auctions one of their favorite topics, as this mechanism constitutes a wonderful application of game theory, which has been playing a preponderant role in economics for twenty-five years. Entitled “Essays on Online Auction Design and Bidding Behavior”, this doctoral dissertation helps enrich the traditional economic approach of auctions by a behavioral and dynamic approach. The original part of the research is structured in three main stages, which go deeper and deeper in the study of bidders' behavior and auction dynamics. The whole research is based on online auctions organized by the French airline company Air France and by the auction site eBay. In the first stage of the research, on the basis of hypotheses coming from the auction theory, the impact of auction rules on bidders’ participation and seller's revenue is econometrically studied, using simultaneous equations models and the 2SLS method. Does a high opening bid have a negative effect on the number of bidders and a positive one on the auction revenue, as predicted by the auction theory? Do sequential auctions of similar items lead to similar auction price? These are examples of questions that are investigated. While the auction theory literature typically takes the number of bidders as exogenously given, we chose to consider it as endogenous. Even though an increasing number of researchers acknowledge the endogenous feature of auction participation, no empirical study really takes this feature into account. Hypotheses from the auction theory turn out to be confirmed, as far as the minimum bid and the number of bidders are concerned. Interesting results are found regarding the performance of sequential auctions of similar items, since auctions in a sequence turn out to yield increasing revenues. Furthermore, the impact of the starting bid turns out to be moderated by the effect of these sequential auctions. In the second stage of this research, a disaggregated perspective (at the bidder’s level) is adopted, since a typology of bidding behaviors based on bidders' choices is built. This part is thus aimed at investigating whether heterogeneity exists in bidder’s behavior in online auctions, contrary to the longstanding assumption of homogenous, rational and strategic bidders made by the auction theory. A clustering analysis is conducted, based on decisions that bidders have to make during an auction, whose keywords are certainly: when? How? How much? For example: do bidders submit a small or a large number of bids? Do they react quickly when they lose auction leadership? When do they make their bids: at the beginning of the auction, at the end of it, or during the whole auction? What increment do they use? Results, based on two different samples related to Air France and eBay auctions provide a description of different bidding behaviors. The analysis focusing on Air France auctions highlights five types of bidding behavior: jump bidders, rational bidders, active bidders, bottom fishers and pioneers. Slightly different results are obtained for eBay auctions, since six types of bidding behavior are highlighted: snipers, evaluators, unmasking bidders, bottom fishers, pioneers and late pioneers. A closer look is given to the group of bidders who turned out to win an auction, in order to determine whether these bidders are characterized by specific bidding decisions, and thus, by specific bidding behaviors. The third stage focuses on the dynamic bidding process of an English auction, by specifically studying the impact of signals – namely, promotional messages – sent during an online auction on the final auction price. It proposes to test a model of the genesis and the impact of these messages aimed at informing current bidders and potential bidders about the item or urging them to submit a bid. This impact is modeled through a disaggregated and dynamic model. It exploits the recent behavioral view that each bid submitted by a bidder in an English auction is a particular decision that may be influenced by signals sent by the auctioneer during the auction, that is, between the decisions that the bidder makes. This model simultaneously takes into account the following three factors: (i) the direct impact of marketing messages on the auction price when messages affect bidders’ valuations, (ii) the indirect impact of messages on this price when messages attract a new bidder to the auction, and (iii) the possibility that the auctioneer’s strategy for sending messages depends on past events in the auction and on the timing of past messages. In this model, we thus propose that messages influence final auction prices through a dual-path system. The model also reflects an important feature of auction messages, which is the real time interactivity between the auctioneer and auction participants. The results, obtained through Bayesian inference, support the proposed model. This doctoral dissertation globally helps better understand bidders’ behavior in view of the rules set by the seller, and estimate how this seller can maximize his/her revenues. The main original aspects of this research consist in considering the English auction as a dynamic process and in focusing on bidders’ behavior, these two elements being ignored by economists. From a managerial point of view, this research can help online auction designers to better design their auctions in order to maximize their revenue.

yes / This paper examines whether and how bidders' conservative tone in 10-K filings influences the subsequent mergers and acquisitions (M&A) investment decisions of these US firms from 1996 to 2013. Based on 39,260 firm-year observations, we find, consistent with behavioural consistency theory, that conservative bidders are less likely to engage in M&A deals. Further, those that decide to engage in M&As are likely to acquire public targets and within-industry firms. These bidders are inclined to employ more stock acquisitions than cash acquisitions. Our results also indicate that conservative bidders experience abnormally poor stock returns around the announcements of M&A investments. This provides new insights on the mechanism through which bidders' sentiments influence shareholders' wealth. Overall, these findings highlight the implications of the textual sentiment of corporate disclosure for the forecasting of corporate investment and financing decisions. Our results have practical implications, since they shed light on the value relevance of the information content of major Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)-mandated 10-K filings.

This thesis is a collection of three essays on inflation expectations, forecasting uncertainty, and the role of uncertainty in sequential auctions, all using experimental approach. Chapter 1 studies how individuals forecast inflation in fictitious macroeconomic setup and analyzes the effect of monetary policy rules on their decisions. Results display heterogeneity in inflation forecasting rules and demonstrate the importance of adaptive learning forecasting if model switching is assumed. Chapter 2 extends the analysis from Chapter 1 by analyzing individual inflation forecasting uncertainty. Results show that confidence intervals depend on inflation variance and business cycle phase, have a strong inertia, and are often asymmetric. Finally, Chapter 3 analyzes the role of uncertainty about the number of bidders for the behavior of subjects in a sequential auction experiment. Uncertainty does not aggravate price decline, but it changes individual bidding strategies and auction efficiency. / Esta tesis consta de tres ensayos sobre las expectativas de inflación, la incertidumbre de la predicción, y la importancia de la incertidumbre en subastas secuenciales. Todos ellos utilizan un método experimental. El capítulo 1 estudia cómo los individuos predicen la inflación en la economía ficticia y analiza el efecto de las reglas de política monetaria en sus decisiones. Los resultados revelan la heterogeneidad en las reglas de predicción de la inflación y demuestran la importancia del mecanismo de aprendizaje adaptivo si el cambio entre los modelos se supone. Capítulo 2 continúa el análisis del capítulo 1, analiza la incertidumbre individual de las expectativas de inflación. Los resultados muestran que los intervalos de confianza dependen de varianza de la inflación y la fase del ciclo económico, tienen una fuerte inercia, y son frecuentemente asimétricos. Por último, el capítulo 3 analiza la influencia de la incertidumbre sobre el número de oferentes en el comportamiento de los individuos en un experimento de la subasta secuencial. La incertidumbre no agrava la caída de los precios, pero cambia las estrategias de los oferentes y la eficiencia de la subasta.

Tenaillé entre les logiques de la globalisation juridique, de l'intégration communautaireet les contraintes politiques, économiques et sociales propres aux Etats, le droit des contratsadministratifs en Afrique noire francophone s'est transformé. Ses sources se sont élargies. Sesfondements conceptuels et matériels ont connu une mutation. C'est dans ce contexte qu'émergele droit de la commande publique. Renouvelant les principes matriciels de transparence, deliberté et d'égalité, le droit de la commande publique apporte un noyau dur de règles communesaux marchés publics, aux contrats de délégation de service public et aux contrats de partenariatpublic-privée. Pour ce faire, il se fonde d'abord sur une nouvelle conceptualisation des notions àla base du droit des contrats administratifs. Dans un second temps, le droit de la commandepublique représente une refondation des procédures de passation, des mécanismes de contrôle etde règlement des litiges relatifs à ces contrats administratifs. L'émergence de ces nouvellesrègles fait suite aux réformes d'envergure des législations nationales relatives aux contratsadministratifs. Cette étude se donne comme objectif d'analyser les apports véritables desdispositions issues de ces réformes afin de voir si elles ont permis de garantir davantagel'effectivité de l'idéologie concurrentielle. / Caught between the new reality of legal globalization, community integrationrequirements and the political, economic and social constraints of each state, the regulation ofadministrative contracts in French-speaking African countries has changed. The sources of suchregulation have been expanded. Its conceptual and material foundations have changed. A newsystem of public procurement has emerged. Trying to renew principles of transparency, as wellas freedom of acces to public procurement and equality, the new public procurement regulationprovides a body of common rules for public procurement, public service delegation contractsand public-private partnership contracts.First, in order to achieve this, it relies on a new interpretation of the notions on whichAdministrative Contracts Law is based. Second, the new public procurement regulationrepresents a recasting of award procedures, control mechanisms and dispute resolutionmeasures. The emergence of these new regulations follows reforms of Administrative ContractsLaw in the respective countries.The objective of this study is to analyze the actual contribution of provisions flowing from thesereforms, in order to see if they are contributing to ensuring that competitive ideology isincreasingly effective.

La transparence, à travers ses multiples applications par le juge européen, est érigée en principe général du droit de l’Union européenne. Ses fondements juridiques retentissent sur sa portée, impérative et supplétive, son champ d’application matériel et personnel ainsi que sur son extension progressive et sa limitation aux seuls rapports verticaux développés entre les autorités adjudicatrices et les opérateurs économiques. La transparence est rattachée directement aux libertés fondamentales des soumissionnaires potentiels dont elles assurent la protection juridique et indirectement au principe de libre concurrence par la suppression des obstacles privés à la libre circulation des activités économiques. Ainsi, au service d’une finalité immédiate, la transparence garantit l’accès à la commande publique et, au service d’une finalité médiate, elle protège les structures du marché de la commande publique. Le principe général de transparence donne alors naissance aux contrats relevant de la commande publique qui prennent le relais des contrats publics. Instrument d’intégration et élément structurel du marché intérieur, cette nouvelle génération des contrats matérialise l’accès à la commande publique qui constitue un secteur d’activité économique faisant partie du marché intérieur. / Transparency, through its multiple applications by the european judge, has become a general principle of european law. Its legal basis resound its purview, imperative and suppletive, its personnal et material scope, as well as its progressive extension and its restriction to the vertical relationships developed between contracting authorities and economic operators. Transparency is attached directly to potential bidders fundamental freedoms whose its provides legal protection. It is attached indirectly to the principle of free competition by the elimination of private barriers to the free movement of economic activities. Thus, in the service of an immediate finality, transparency guarantees access to public procurements and, in the service of a mediate finality, it protects the market structures of public procurement. The general principle of transparency gives then rise to contracts of public order (contrats relevant de la commande publique) which take over public contracts. Instrument of integration and structural element of the internal market, this new generation of contracts materialize access to public order (commande publique), that constitutes a sector of economic activity as part of the internal market.