This essay explores the question of what role does the public play in the operations of government, especially considering the bureaucracy of a democratic government.

The purpose of this research is to determine whether or not meaningful differences exist along these dimensions in the manner in which social workers view their work role, and whether or not any such differences are related to the bureaucratic and professional nature of the agencies and their employees. The analysis will attempt to define the points at which the bureaucratic organization conflicts with professional patterns of organization and attempt to discover the mode of accommodation which results from these conflicts.

In this research report, I question the moral justification of bureaucracy. After pointing out some arguments in favour of bureaucracy and some teleological, or result-based, arguments against bureaucracy, I pay particular attention to deontological, or process-based, moral arguments against bureaucracy. The two main arguments against bureaucracy that I address are (1) that bureaucracies constitute unfair decision making procedures in democratic societies, and (2) that bureaucracies treat their participants (both clients and workers) disrespectfully. I then give some suggestions of what a promising alternative to bureaucracy might look like, based on the two main arguments against bureaucracy that I consider. Ultimately, I conclude that it is still an open question whether bureaucracy is morally justified, but that my research brings to the fore some serious moral problems with bureaucracy that are worth taking note of. Even if it turns out that the results of bureaucratic organisation are so beneficial that bureaucracy is, all things considered, justified, the moral problems that I point out in this research are worth serious consideration.

Master of Arts / Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work / W. Richard Goe / This research examines if the U.S. Army has a problem retaining high performing junior officers, with a focus on officers with the rank of Captain. It is theoretically posited that officer retention is influenced by a contradiction that exists between the profession of being an army officer and the social context of the bureaucratic structures in which officers are embedded. Specifically, the formal, rational bureaucratic structures utilized by the army restrict the agency of individual officers in making professional career decisions. In turn, it is hypothesized that this serves as a disincentive for officers to remain in the army. A methodology is developed for categorizing the performance characteristics of U.S. Army Captains. Retention rates are compared among Captains with different performance levels. Logistic regression analysis is used to identify correlates between Captains' perceptions of army bureaucratic structures and their planned career decisions. The results of this study can inform the development of retention strategies or policies that target the retention of high performing Captains in the U.S. Army.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2003. / Adviser: Andrew G. Walder. Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.

This dissertation investigates representations of bureaucracy in early modern drama and culture. Focusing on a group of plays that feature bureaucratic figures among their characters, and reading those plays in the context of contemporary discussions of administration, this project attempts to understand the role played by the increasingly bureaucratic state in developing conceptions of individual subjectivity. Specifically, this dissertation seeks to show that bureaucratic administrative structures and the methods deployed to maintain them provide a conceptual space in which early modern writers could conceive of themselves as possessing a private, inscrutable interiority. Chapter Two argues that whereas the binary relationship of secretary and master is often characterized in contemporary accounts as intensely, and problematically, intimate, the multivalent bureaucratic relationship is characterized, for the most part, as impersonal. Chapter Three links bureaucratic labour with one product of that labour, the bureaucratic document, in order to analyze the way in which early modern representations and discussions of bureaucratic documents constitute a medium through which a form of bureaucratic identity is conceptualized. Chapter Four examines a problem inherent to the bureaucratic delegation of authority – the combination of a desire to see everything and an inability to trust in the observations of others to aid you in fulfilling that desire – and seeks to find a solution to that problem in the way in which Much Ado About Nothing presents a vision of a disciplinary surveillance that is diffused throughout society, rather than residing in one privileged figure. Chapter Five shifts the focus of inquiry from the bureaucracy and those in its employ to the subject of bureaucratic authority. The chapter reads Hamlet’s claims to inscrutable interiority in the context of the state’s desire to see, and document, its subjects. In it, I argue that, rather than deflecting questions, Hamlet’s assertions serve to align him with other targets of disciplinary surveillance. The dissertation ends by considering links between the representational crisis engendered by the growth of the early modern bureaucracy and the representational practices of the early modern theatre. / Thesis (Ph.D, English) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-30 12:50:35.596

No description available.

This thesis examines attempts to improve the efficiency of local authority bureaucracies during the 1980's. A number of significant policy initiatives such as the establishment of the Audit Commission, the pressure for local authorities to implement systems of performance measurement and the introduction of performance related pay schemes reflect this quest for improved value for money. The thesis reviews existing economic theories of bureaucracy which show how inefficiency arises in the public sector. Two major hypotheses within this literature are identified; bureaus are inefficient because it is in the interests of bureaucrats either to produce too much output (allocative inefficiency) and/or to produce output at above minimum cost (X-inefficiency). The policy prescriptions arising from this theoretical framework suggest that strategies to reduce inefficiency must aim to change bureaucratic behaviour. One strategy seeks to induce bureaucrats to produce efficiently, whilst the other seeks to provide sponsors with the necessary information on costs to enable them to force bureaucrats to produce efficiently. Performance related pay schemes, which aim to change bureaucratic behaviour, are concerned with eliminating labour X-inefficiency. Our research suggests that the diversity of current schemes reflects a lack of consensus over the definition of indicators of employee performance. The general result of the introduction of performance related pay has been increased salaries for senior officers. Our assessment of the work of the Audit Commission in the area of value for money audits and our empirical research on the impact of performance measurement in local authorities indicates that a wealth of information has been generated in the form of performance indicators (PIs). However, the use of this information as a control device is limited as these indicators are clearly biased towards measuring X-inefficiency as distinct from allocative efficiency.

Typescript. / Bibliography: leaves [149]-160. / vii, 160 l illus., graphs, tables