Au cours de la Première Guerre mondiale, les industries de la laine et du coton se retrouvent entraînées dans la mobilisation industrielle. L’intervention de l’État dans ces branches se révèle indispensable, et une nouvelle relation s’établit entre la puissance publique et les entreprises. La modification de la teinte de l’uniforme, sa large diffusion à près de huit millions d’appelés sur quatre ans et la perte des bassins industriels du Nord et de l’Est conduisent à la mise sous contrôle de l’État de presque toute l’industrie lainière, tandis que l’industrie cotonnière reste indépendante jusqu’en 1917. Cette relation s’étend jusque dans les importations de matières premières, avec une centralisation progressive qui exclut le commerce privé, mais associe négociants et industriels. En outre, la gestion de la main-d’œuvre constitue un défi quotidien pour les entreprises. Le besoin de travailleurs reste important, et les difficultés liées aux conditions de travail et au renchérissement de la vie entraînent des tensions sociales, malgré l’Union sacrée observée par les organisations syndicales. Dans le même temps, la perte des principaux territoires industriels représente une aubaine pour les autres régions, dont celles dont l’industrie textile est sur le déclin avant la guerre. Les fortes demandes de l’armée et les hauts prix du commerce privé entraînent des bénéfices importants, et conduisent l’État à adopter une fiscalité de guerre et réprimer les abus. Le retour des industries sinistrées à la fin du conflit, la question des dommages de guerre et la réintégration de l’Alsace-Lorraine mettent les industries textiles face à des changements radicaux. / During the World War I, the industries of the wool and the cotton find themselves pulled(entailed) in the industrial mobilization. The intervention of the State in these branches shows itself essential, and a new relation becomes established between the public authorities and the companies. The modification of the colour of the uniform, its wide distribution about eight million conscripts over four years and the loss of the industrial areas of the North and east lead to the putting under control of the State of almost all the wool trade, whereas the cotton industry remains independent until 1917. This relation extends to the imports of raw materials, with a progressive centralization which excludes any private business(trade), but associates traders and industrialists. Besides, the management of the workforce constitutes a daily challenge for companies. The need in workforce remains important, and the difficulties bound in working conditions and to the increased cost living trigger social tensions, in spite of the “Union sacrée” respected by labor unions. At the same time, the loss of the main industrial territories represents a chance of a lifetime for the other regions, among which those whose textile industry is on the decline before the war. The high demands of the army and the high prices of private trade yeld important profits, and lead the State to adopt a war tax system and to repress the abuses. The return of the stricken industries at the end the conflict, the question of war damage and reinstatement of Alsace-Lorraine put the textile industries in the face of radical changes.

L’industrie cimentière française possède une influence internationale considérable. L’entreprise Lafarge est aujourd’hui le numéro un mondial du ciment. Ses concurrents français sont tout aussi performants. On peut citer Vicat, entreprise familiale, ou la société Ciment Français, filiale du groupe Heidelberg-Italcementi. Ciments Français est une entreprise héritière du groupe Poliet et Chausson. En 1971, suite au rachat de la branche cimentière de Poliet et Chausson par Ciments Français, les départements des ciments des deux groupes fusionnent. Puis, Poliet et Chausson est transformée en société holding de distribution de matériaux de construction sous le nom de Poliet S.A. Elle est rachetée par Saint Gobain en 1996 et son nom disparaît. La firme a pourtant été la première entreprise française de ciment en 1930. C’est la monographie de cette entreprise que s’attache à retranscrire cette thèse. L’histoire de Poliet et Chausson au cours du XXe siècle est tortueuse. Par un effet d’aubaine, cette entreprise parisienne de matériaux de construction, profite de l’invention du marché du ciment pour devenir l’un des plus grands producteurs de ciment français au cours des années 1930. Sa trajectoire est parallèle à celle de l’entreprise Lafarge. Elle en diffère cependant par bien des points. Émaillée d’embûches, elle oscille entre des moments de succès considérables et des périodes plus troublées. Entre industrialisation et désindustrialisation, l’histoire de Poliet et Chausson s’écrit dans l’ombre de son concurrent plus brillant, Lafarge. Comment expliquer la réussite de l’un et la disparition de l’autre ? / The French cement industry has considerable international influence. Lafarge is now the world's largest cement company. Its French competitors are equally performing. These include Vicat, a family business, or Ciment Français, a subsidiary of the Italcementi group. Ciments Français is a company inheriting from the group Poliet and Chausson. In 1971, following the purchase of the cement sector of Poliet and Chausson by Ciments Français, the cement departments of the two groups merged. Then Poliet and Chausson was transformed into a holding company for the distribution of building materials under the name Poliet S.A. It was bought by Saint Gobain in 1996 and its name disappeared. The firm was, however, the first French cement company in 1930. This thesis attempts to transcribe the monography of Poliet and Chausson. The history of Poliet and Chausson during the twentieth century is tortuous. Through a windfall effect, this Parisian company of building materials, profits from the invention of the cement market to become one of the largest producers of French cement in the 1930s. Its trajectory is parallel to that of the Lafarge company. However, it differs in many aspects. It is fraught with obstacles, and oscillates between moments of considerable success and more troubled periods. Between industrialization and desindustrialization, the story of Poliet and Chausson is written in the shadow of its brighter competitor, Lafarge. How can we explain the success of the one and the disappearance of the other?

Between the 1850s to the 1960s, the department store emerged as a prominent retail format worldwide. As a retail format, the department store model broke away from pre-existing retailer and consumer conceptions of shopping and the shopping environment. Store leaders placed their focus on creating an uplifting mode of consumerism that perpetuated the department store as an ‘experience.’ However, behind the department store’s ‘magical’ façade, store management preplanned and manipulated consumer interactions with every part of the store. The managerial techniques managers used allowed these institutions to become an epicentre of consumerism and urban culture globally. The department store has lost its reputation as a vibrant shopping location in the digital age, and retailers and consumers alike have disregarded it as solely a monument of retail nostalgia. Nonetheless, today’s retailers still have much to learn from the ways department store leaders innovated. The management techniques used in department stores can provide insight into these institutions’ successes and pitfalls when navigating changing retail circumstances. If the department store is used as a tool of managerial know-how for retailers in the digital age, it could allow other retailers to sustain a semblance of the department store’s longevity, commercially and culturally. Hudson’s Bay, a remaining store in the Canadian department store industry, features as a case study to highlight the extent to which department store leaders designed and managed their stores. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This thesis examines the department store’s legacy as a tool of managerial know-how for retailers in the digital age. From the 1890s to the 1960s, department stores were an epicentre of consumerism and urban culture in locales worldwide. Department store management crafted store environments to create a ‘magical’ atmosphere for customers while calculating every consumer interaction with the store behind the scenes. Over the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, increased retail competition has forced many stores to close, often leaving visual façades as the sole reminders of some defunct stores. Yet, the extensive management techniques used inside and outside stores provide insight into how this retail format achieved prominence, how its leaders responded to competitors, and how department store management techniques can contribute to current retail discussions despite its continued decline.

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This research uses the ‘demand-side thesis’ to examine the decline of the Dundee jute industry. In particular, it examines the effect of international competition and the strategic response of the industry during the inter-war (1919-1939) and the post-war (1945-1960s) period to counter this challenge. The strategic response is studied by examining strategies employed at the firm and the industry level. Strategy at the firm level is studied in the form of capability development using the capabilities approach. The thesis also makes an attempt to redress the issue of determinism in the capabilities approach which suggests that the pattern of capability development is governed by path-dependency. By drawing on the techniques employed in the history literature, this research identifies strategic options that were being considered by firms at the time of capability development and examine why certain alternatives were not pursued. This will bring to light aspects other then those associated with path-dependency that played a role in the pattern of capability development. The capabilities developed by firms during the two periods are compared and contrasted in order to understand the pattern over this period. These findings are juxtaposed with the British cotton textile industry, a related sector, to examine the effectiveness of the demand-side thesis in explaining the decline of the jute industry in particular and the textile industry in general. This thesis makes contribution to three areas of literature: First, the thesis helps to further develop the demand-side framework by introducing a new case (Dundee jute industry) and developing a better understanding of strategic response within the jute and textile industry in general. Second, this thesis contributes to the theoretical development of capabilities approach in two specific areas: a) it helps to address the issue of determinism inherent in the capabilities approach through the notion of path-dependency. This was done by also examining the strategic options that were available to firms while developing their capabilities and underlining the reasons for not pursuing them. b) the analysis sheds new light on the nature of branching of capabilities in an industry over a long period. Third, this research makes significant contribution to the existing literature on the business history of the Dundee jute industry, which is sparse. The contributions can be categorised into four key aspects which have not been examined in the current literature: a) period (inter-war and post-war), b) issue (systematic examination of the Dundee jute industry’s decline, strategic response and role of collective strategies), c) method (detailed study of individual firm’s strategies), and d) cross comparison of industry’s experience with related sectors (for example, the cotton industry). Focusing on these issues has helped to throw new light on the challenges, especially technological, facing the industry in developing its strategic response.

Univ., Diss.--Bonn, 1999.

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Cette thèse étudie la place des Galeries Lafayette dans l’échange marchand entre l’offre et la demande, au cœur du système de la mode. Elle réévalue le rôle de la distribution en général et du grand magasin en particulier comme intermédiaire créateur de valeur dans la relation entre le producteur et le consommateur. Au tournant du XXe siècle, sur le marché de la nouveauté et le segment émergent de la confection, l’enseigne répond aux attentes des consommateurs qui cherchent à se distinguer et se différencier en suivant de près les phénomènes de mode. Alors que les maisons de couture exercent un monopole sur les tendances, et limitent leur diffusion en France à un cercle de clientes privilégiées, les Galeries Lafayette ont fait « entrer la mode dans le grand magasin ». Elles fabriquent et vendent sous leur propre marque des modèles inspirés de ceux des couturiers. Cette appropriation efficace de la création construit la légitimité de l’entreprise en tant qu'intermédiaire ainsi que le pouvoir prescripteur de la marque sur le marché de la mode. Elle fait aussi des Galeries Lafayette un acteur de l’économie de la contrefaçon, au centre des enjeux de l’industrie du vêtement dans l’entre-deux-guerres. La thèse montre cependant qu’il existe plusieurs régimes de management de la création aux Galeries Lafayette. A travers l’analyse des investissements de l’entreprise dans les industries créatives et en particulier les cas des Parfums Chanel, des maisons Madeleine Vionnet et Jean Patou, elle se saisit pour la première fois de la question du financement de la couture et décloisonne l’étude des principaux acteurs du système de la mode. La période couverte, de la fin du XIXe aux années 1960, rend compte des transformations de l’industrie du vêtement, mais aussi de la plasticité de la stratégie et des structures de l’organisation. Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, l’intégration verticale de la fabrication laisse progressivement la place à de nouvelles modalités de construction de l’offre. Dans un contexte marqué par la modernisation de la filière habillement, la « révolution » du prêt-à-porter, et l’émergence de nouvelles capitales de la mode, la centrale d’achats élargit ses approvisionnements aux marques et à l’international. La mise en place pionnière d’un bureau de style au début des années 1950 est centrale dans cette transformation pour faire le lien entre les créateurs, les industriels et les clients avec lesquelles les Galeries Lafayette sont en contact direct.Une partie des développements est consacrée aux associations professionnelles internationale qui sont le véhicule privilégié des transferts transatlantiques mais aussi de la construction d’un réseau européen favorisant la circulation des idées et des marchandises. Ces échanges montrent que la diffusion des méthodes nouvelles d’organisation, importées et adaptées des États-Unis, ne s’est pas limitée à l’industrie. Les efforts des Galeries Lafayette pour rationaliser l’organisation sont une nouvelle démonstration de la nécessité de réévaluer le rôle de la distribution et des intermédiaires du système de la mode longtemps négligés au profit de la figure du créateur. / This thesis researches the role of Galeries Lafayette at the heart of the French fashion system. It re-evaluates the role of retail and department stores as value-creating intermediaries in the relationship between producer and consumer. Additionally, the research highlights the innovative capacity of a family business and shows that the introduction of new organizational methods in retail trade along the 20th century, imported and adapted from the United States, was as much present as in manufacturing enterprises. In the first part, the thesis looks at the foundation of the company, its competitors and its customers. To differentiate themselves, Galeries Lafayette manufactured and sold models inspired by those of the couturiers under the store private label. At the turn of the twentieth century, while fashion houses claimed a monopoly on trend setting, Galeries Lafayette introduced fashion in department store. This effective appropriation of fashion design built the legitimacy of the company as an intermediary, and posited the prescribing power of the brand in the fashion market. It also made Galeries Lafayette a player in the economy of counterfeiting, a major issue for the apparel industry in the inter-war period. The thesis shows, however, that various management regimes for design exist at Galeries Lafayette. In a second part, we analyze the investments of the company in the creative industries and in particular the cases of Chanel Perfumes as well as Madeleine Vionnet and Jean Patou fashion houses. In doing so, for the first time, the thesis analyzes the financing of fashion houses thus unbundling the study of the main actors in the fashion system. In a third part, the thesis studies competitive and market change from World War II onwards: the modernization of the clothing industry, the ready-to-wear revolution, and the emergence of new capitals of fashion besides Paris. The dismantling of the vertical integration in manufacturing, the opening of central purchasing to new suppliers, the pioneering establishment of in-house fashion forecasting office in the early 1950s induced a new organization and changes in the link between creators, designers, industrialists and customers for Galeries Lafayette.