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Policymakers in China and other developing countries grapple with a metropolitan dilemma. Building on the existing advantages of leading cities makes it easier to achieve fast, visible progress in economic development. But further concentrating resources in top urban centers can marginalize other areas, worsen urban congestion, and increase inequality. The degree to which governments favor key metropolitan centers relative to other cities and outlying areas in the distribution of policy support and resources is thus a consequential issue in development politics. Yet, scholars lack a systematic understanding of "metropolitan bias," and existing theories have difficulty explaining wide variation in development approaches over time and across regions in countries like China. This project analyzes variation in development strategies across China's provinces during the 1990s and 2000s to shed light on the nature and sources of metropolitan bias. Existing research generally views favoritism toward large cities as an unintended consequence of rapid industrialization and rent-seeking dynamics. In contrast, I highlight more strategic efforts by higher-level governments to shape the growth of cities and regions, and probe the politics surrounding spatial development policies. First, I argue that metropolitan bias tends to be greater in provinces that have experienced lagging economic performance, where policymakers build up top cities as a means of enhancing regional competitiveness. Second, I argue that metropolitan-oriented development has been driven in large part by provincial governments, and that there is greater metropolitan bias where the provincial level is strong relative to other government tiers. To develop and test these claims, I employ a mixed-method research design and draw on Chinese- and English-language written sources, interview material, and statistical data. Through comparative case studies of Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi provinces and analysis of China's policy institutions, I explore how different explanatory factors influence the formulation and implementation of development strategies. Meanwhile, I use statistical analysis to test how well key claims generalize to a larger sample of units. Beyond contributing in a timely way to our knowledge of the politics behind China's urban boom, the study advances our theoretical understanding of the politics of state-led development and multilevel governance more broadly. / Government

本文以國家行動為研究目標，意欲探究的是中共政治行動對農民抗議產生的影響以及遭遇農民抗議時中共政治行動的回應。其中，主要探討的是中共中央與地方行動上的差異性。兩者行動上的差異在本文中一方面認定為導致農民抗議產生的外部環境因素（即政治機會），一方面據以探究面對農民抗議時中共中央與地方在回應時所採取的政治行動分別為何。 本文以政治機會結構理論及國家與社會互動理論作為研究理論，並在「中央—地方—農民」三分的分析框架下，提出中央與地方的差異作為研究面向。整理農民抗議的定義、特點、方式、類型及成因時，並討論與之相關的農民權益。在探究行動上的差異對農民抗議的影響以及面對農民抗議時中央與地方的各自行動時，本文從稅費問題及土地徵用來看行動差異對農民抗議的影響，而中央政府的回應行動包括國家重建、事件定調、策略防範以及守住底線。基層政權的回應行動則分別就「官方論調」、「力量對比」、「對上訪時幹部行動的參酌」、「秩序共識下的行動劇碼」，以及「角色扮演」等予以解讀。 / State action is regarded as the research target, intending for the influence on peasant protest by PRC’s action and the response to peasant protest by PRC. Focusing on these two topics, action discrepancy in central-local relations is what I’d like to discuss in this research. For one thing, action discrepancy is seen as the outer environmental factor that brings about the begin of peasant protest. For another, based on action discrepancy,while responding to peasant protest, what the central do and what the local do can be explored. Based on the political opportunity structure theory and the state-society interaction theory, and analyzed on the framework of “central-local–peasant” tripartition, this research presents the discrepancy in central-local relations as main dimension. While definitions, characters, measures, types, and reasons concerning peasant protest are organized, peasant rights and interests are also discussed. The influence on peasant protest by action discrepancy and the actions separately by the central and the local when encountering peasant protest are then explored. This research examines the influence through tax-fee problem and land expropriation, and then concludes that the central actions include state-rebuilding, affair-identifying, strategy-guarding, and deadline-defending, and moreover, interprets the local regime’s actions in such ways like “official-like statement”, “power contrast”, “reference to local cadres’action toward peasant appealings to higher levels(shangfang)”, “act performance on the consensus of order”, and “role play”.

中國經濟的快速成長導致電力需求的急劇增教。雖然現在主要仍是以煤炭的方式提供全國的電力，但中國政府也一直在尋找能有效降低環境污染的替代能源。因此“水力發電”在中國能源政策扮演的角色越來越重要－－這時，擁有巨大水資源的雲南省就變成了中國西南的關鍵提電者之一。過去二十年之內，已有企業與政府針對該省重點的水力設施進行大量投資。然而，發展水電雖然有助於生產大量的電，也帶來眾多環境和社會層面的影響。中國政府承認這些反面的影響，因此開始了設計一系列水電發展政策來預防可能的嚴重後果。 本論文分析中國中央政府和雲南地方政府共同制定的水電移民政策，以及新政策對當地執行過程所帶來的影響。基於多元的田野調查，本論文顯示地方政府如何落實中央政府制定的政策。雖然這幾年中國的水庫移民政策有大量的改進，但因為建設大水電站涉及層面廣，時間長，安置過程久，所以中央政府政策的彈性調整，造成當地政府執行過程對不同時間的移民外置帶來不對等的安置，因此印發水庫移民的方抗。 / Policy-making of dam-induced resettlement is a dynamic process that shows how group interests have been distributed and adjusted during different stages of water resource development in China. Since 1949, China’s political direction, economic system and its national strength have been in constant flux, reflecting in the policy towards land appropriation and resettlement induced by water conservancy and hydropower projects. The present study focuses on the changes that have taken place in the area of dam-induced resettlement policy after 2006 when the first regulations on resettlement caused by water resource and hydropower projects were amended. It shows how this policy change is perceived by villagers relocated in the course of dam construction, and addresses the question of why policy improvements have not led to desired results. The paper first addresses policy change in the area of dam-induced resettlement over the past six decades. In subsequent sections, I draw on findings gathered during my doctoral fieldwork to demonstrate how the recent improvement of resettlement regulations for water resource and hydropower projects at the central level are translated into implementation strategies at the local level in Yunnan. I show that while delegating the implementation of resettlement processes to the lowest level of the administrative hierarchy allows for innovative policy experimentation and flexible adaptation, the long timespan needed for the construction of large dam projects gives rise to uneven policy implementation and resistance on the side of resettled communities.