This paper aims to shed light on the intersex infant, a baby born with an unclear gender. The main goal of the paper is to discuss whether unnecessary gender normalizing surgeries on infants, also called intersex genital mutilation (IGM) that is not necessary to preserve the life or physical health of the infant is in the best interest of the child. Legal method will be used to frame the topic in a legal context and discourse analysis in combination with content analysis will be applied in order to understand the transformation of intersex, from being a social emergency to becoming a human rights issue. The use of the concept, the best interest of the child will serve as an analytical framework together with a theoretical framework consisting of queer theory. Together it will help to map out the human rights challenges regarding IGM as a socially constructed medical product that needs to be highlighted and prevented in order to secure the rights of the child. Hopefully, the concluding results will contribute to further awareness on the issue of unnecessary infant intersex surgery and frame it in a human rights context.

This dissertation explores the place that jus cogens occupies in contemporary international legal thought and practice. More specifically it looks at the place that the concept occupies within the discourse surrounding constitutionalism in international law. The question is asked whether it is viable to posit a specific constitutional structure for international law and whether such structure can be legitimized by the existence of certain values that are held in common by the international community. Both structural and value-based approaches posit a place for norms of jus cogens as possibly being seen as constitutional norms to some extent. Jus cogens as a now widely accepted concept in international law, continues to be the subject of much contemporary debate. The nature and function of the concept as proposed by various authors is looked at and the problematic aspects set out. Although there is a large amount of literature acknowledging the existence and importance of jus cogens, this has not been supported by international judicial practice. It seems that it is the practical difficulties surrounding the functioning of normative hierarchy that is the main reason for this. Chapter 1 introduces the approaches to the constitutionalism debate that have posited a legitimate place for norms of jus cogens. It also provides an introduction to the concept of jus cogens within contemporary international law. Chapter 2 starts out by defining certain concepts involved in the discourse surrounding constitutionalism. The strands of thought involved in the constitutionalism debate are then set out in order to provide the context for the placements of jus cogens posited by various authors. Chapter 3 looks at the evolution of the concept of jus cogens and the limited practical effect that has been given to the concept in international judicial practice. The main consideration here is the perceived inapplicability of jus cogens within cases concerning jurisdictional immunity. It therefore seems that jus cogens is, in general, limited to application against rules directly contradicting the substance of the jus cogens norm. Chapter 4 provides a critique of normative hierarchy theory, which is a main aspect dealt with in much constitutionalist thought. The chapter shows how the proposed functionality of normative hierarchy theory is unconvincing as only negative prohibitions can function as jus cogens under this construction. This further limits the instances where jus cogens can be seen as effective under constitutional thought. Chapter 5 concludes that under a strict conception of normative hierarchy, jus cogens is unlikely to receive much practical legal effect. This is due to the inapplicability of jus cogens in procedural matters and the limited number of norms that can function as jus cogens under normative hierarchy. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Public Law / unrestricted

Since the end of World War II there has been a rapid proliferation of international law and international legal institutions. Once limited to issues in maritime and trade law, today the most recognizable examples of international law govern issues such as human rights, intellectual property, crimes against humanity and armed conflict. In many ways, this proliferation has been a welcomed development. However, when coupled with international law’s decentralized structure, this rapid proliferation has also posed problems for how we (and in particular judges) identify if, when, and where international law exists. This dissertation puts forward a novel, dignity-based account for how we answer these questions. The upshot of my account is two-fold. First, it explains many features of international law that other theories leave unaccounted for or under-explained. And second, my dignity-based account provides for a mechanism through which the system can continue to be developed and improved. / 2023-02-22T00:00:00Z

Les États ont l’obligation juridique de protéger les personnes et leurs propriétés. Cette obligation juridique a pour fondements, les conventions internationales. Mais, les États ou autres personnes de droit public, se comportent comme des personnes de droit privé, ils contractent des contrats internationaux, des contrats d’État, the state contracts, commerciaux, d’investissements, de marchés publics, d’import-export, etc., et ignorent les attributs d'un État de droit à caractère universel. Lesdits États ne parviennent pas à respecter leurs engagements internationaux à savoir, la reconnaissance et la protection des droits fondamentaux ou le respect des principes judiciaires universels. La recherche du profit personnel ou la prise illégale d’intérêt des personnes de droit public, ne subordonne pas la protection des droits de l’Homme, de sorte que; les personnes faibles sont lésées, les personnes lésées sont des Civils non armés, des enfants, du fait d'acte internationalement illicite, les véritables coupables ne sont jamais inculpés. L’ingérence a son sens, mais le règlement pacifique semble mieux caractériser les principes judiciaires et de droit internationalement universel, lorsque la partie faible à caractère universel devient victime d'actes internationalement illicites ou des systèmes coloniaux ou néocoloniaux irréguliers de sorte que le mimétisme des institutions juridiques françaises par les États francophones d'Afrique, et le mimétisme des institutions juridiques américains par les États anglophones d'Afrique, perd son sens universellement réel. En effet, l’État de Droit est devenu une simple phrase, de sorte que le droit universel a un challenge. / The States have legal obligations to protect the persons and their properties. That legal obligation is based on the international Conventions. But The States or the officials behave like the private persons, they contract The State Contracts, etc.., and, Those States breach the attributes or the feature, or the characteristics, of the rule of law of Universal Nature. they fail to perform the universal law or the universal principles. To seek personal profit do not surbordinate the protection of the Human Rights. Thus, the weak people have their universal law violate, those who are not strong, children and unarmed civilians are the victims of the internationally wrongful act or the internationally wrongful act of the state, and the real authors are never accused. The interference has its meaning in the rule of law, but the peaceful settlement of conflicts seems to be better characterize the judicial principles and international law, when weak people with an universal character becomes victim of internationally wrongful acts or victims of the irregular colonial or neocolonial systems, so the mimicry of French legal institutions by the French-speaking States of Africa, or the mimicry of American legal institutions by the English-speaking States of Africa, is the mimicry that loses its universally real meaning. Indeed, the rule of law has become a simple sentence, so that the universal right has a challenge.

La fin de la guerre froide, marquée par l'accord retrouvé des cinq grandes puissances membres permanents au Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, au lieu de connaître un déclin dans les interventions militaires extérieures de celles-ci, a vu au contraire leur nombre se multiplier, ce qui portait atteinte à la règle générale, considérée comme une norme impérative (de jus cogens), celle de l'interdiction du recours à la force dans les relations internationales. Malgré les tentatives de justification des différentes interventions de grande envergure, menées au nom de la sécurité collective (interventions autorisées par le Conseil de sécurité) ou unilatéralement, celles-ci se sont écartées des prescriptions du droit international et de la Charte des Nations unies. En conséquence, elles s'avèrent à des degrés divers des actions entachées d'illégalité En effet, elles ont été fondées sur des interprétations extensives des dispositions de la Charte ou en violation de celles-ci, voire en violation des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité lui-même, ainsi qu'on peut le percevoir à travers les grandes interventions menées en Irak par les coalisés en 1991, celles de l'OTAN au Kosovo en 1999, des États-Unis en Afghanistan, à travers l'occupation américano-britannique de l'Irak en2003, l'intervention de la Russie en Géorgie (2008), de l'OTAN en Libye (2011) et celle de la France au Mali (2013). Cela n'a pas manqué de relancer le débat, récurrent dans les instances internationales concernées, sur la nécessité de réformer le Conseil de sécurité (élargissement de sa composition et règlementation du veto) ainsi que d'instituer un véritable contrôle de légalité sur ses actes. / The end of the cold war, marked by the agreement between the five major permanent member states of the United Nations Security Council, instead of a decline in their external military interventions, has, on the contrary, increased in number, which detracted from the general rule, considered as an imperative norm Qus cogens), that of the prohibition of the use of force in international relations. Despite the attempts to justify the various large-scale interventions carried out in the name of collective security (interventions authorized by the Security Council) or unilaterally, they have departed from the requirements of international law and the United Nations Charter. As a result, they appear to be in varying degrees to illegal actions. Indeed, they have been based on extensive interpretations of the Charter or on the breach of it or even in violation of the resolutions of the Council Security itself, as can be seen from the major interventions carried out in IRAK by the allies in 1991, those of NATO in KOSOVO in 1999, the US in AFGHANISTAN, through the US and British occupation of IRAQ in 2003, the intervention of Russia in GEORGIA (2008), NATO in LIBYA (2011) and that of FRANCE in MALI (2013). This did not fail to revive the debate, recurrent in the international bodies concerned, on the need to reform the Security Council (enlargement of its composition and regulation of the veto) as well as to establish a real contrai of legality on its acts.

Dans l’ordre juridique international, les organes de protection des droits de la personne sont de nature différente, indépendants et non hiérarchisés. Le phénomène du dialogue juridictionnel est une pratique spontanée qui consiste pour un organe de protection à intégrer dans le processus d’interprétation d’une disposition donnée, des éléments étrangers à son système, qu’il s’agisse de décisions ou d’instruments de protection émanant d’autres organes. Le dialogue est illustré avec la jurisprudence interprétée à l’aide de ces éléments extrasystémiques en matière de prohibition de la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants. Il est envisagé comme une technique interprétative permettant d’aboutir à des interprétations communes du contenu, du sens et de la portée de cette interdiction, bien que ces interprétations partagées puissent être extensives ou restrictives. L’étude interroge l’étendue et la teneur du pouvoir juridictionnel dans l’ordre juridique international ainsi que sa capacité à aboutir à une convergence normative en matière de protection des droits de la personne, qui découlerait d’une convergence interprétative. Implicitement, le dialogue joue le rôle d’un outil de régulation et de coordination qui s’impose spontanément dans la pratique interprétative des organes internationaux, contribuant à l’émergence d’un objectivisme jurisprudentiel. Ce dernier tend à s’opposer au volontarisme étatique dans un but de protection de l’ordre public international et de garantie des droits de la personne. / In the international legal order, international bodies protecting human rights are both of a different nature and independent. Judicial dialogue consists in referring to decisions or international instruments that are external sources to the system in which the international body has to exercise its power of interpretation. The example of the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments will be used to illustrate this spontaneous practice. Judicial dialogue is seen as an interpretive technique, allowing to reach common interpretations of the substance, the meaning and the scope of this prohibition, by reaching a normative convergence through the use of external sources that shows an interpretive convergence in the first place. Nevertheless, the use of external sources does not always lead to extensive interpretations since it can also highlight disagreements in which case restrictive interpretations are inevitable. Finally, it appears that the international jurisprudential dialogue can both contribute to coordinate and harmonize the application and interpretation of international human rights law in order to protect the international public order.

La présente étude porte sur l’analyse de l’aspect normatif de l’interdiction de traite en droit international ainsi que sur la mise en oeuvre du principe de cette interdiction. Les recherches effectuées montrent que l’aspect normatif de la notion conditionne une protection renforcée, et que sa mise en oeuvre nécessite une approche axée sur les droits de l’homme. La notion juridique de « traite des personnes » fait son entrée littérale dans le droit international des droits de l’homme par l’adoption du Protocole additionnel à la Convention des Nations Unies contre la criminalité transnationale organisée visant à prévenir, réprimer et punir la traite des personnes, et en particulier des femmes et des enfants (2000). La première définition conventionnelle de traite, qui a un caractère composite, englobant aussi plusieurs autres notions, pose, en même temps, les premières difficultés dans l’appréhension juridique de la notion. Une protection renforcée et une mise en oeuvre axée sur les droits de l’homme, faisant également l’objet de cette étude, permettent, en fait, de voir que le droit positif donne, pour l’essentiel, une définition de la traite aggravée, tandis que la notion de « traite » tout court continue à évoluer à la lumière des exigences des droits de l’homme. La multiplication des instruments internationaux et celle des mécanismes de contrôle dans la lutte contre la traite s’avèrent, pour le moment, incapables de lutter efficacement contre l’augmentation constante du nombre des victimes de traite, ce qui ne cesse de susciter des interrogations. En réalité, une lutte efficace contre la traite ne peut passer que par la reconnaissance des spécificités du crime de traite dans son ensemble ainsi que par une mise en œuvre effective des droits des victimes de traite conformément aux exigences des droits de l’homme, les approches actuelles privilégiant plutôt la punition des bourreaux à la protection de leurs victimes. / This study focuses on the analysis of the normative aspect of the prohibition of trafficking in international law and on the implementation of the principle of the prohibition. Research shows that the normative notion of conditional strengthened protection and its implementation require an approach based on human rights. The legal concept of "trafficking in persons"entered in the international human rights law literature with the adoption of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000). The first conventional definition of trafficking, which has a composite characterencompassing several other concepts, poses simultaneously the first difficulties in addressing the legal concept. Reinforced protection and an implementation based on human rights, which have also been evaluated in this study, allow one to see that the positive law, in principal, gives a definition of aggravated trafficking while the term "trafficking" in short continues to evolve in light of the requirements of human rights. The proliferation of international instruments and control mechanisms in the fight against trafficking, for the moment, prove to be unable to effectively fight against the ever increasing number of victims of trafficking, which continues to raise questions. An effective fight against trafficking can only be achievedthrough the recognition of the specific crime of trafficking as a whole as well as an effective implementation of human trafficking victims’ rights in accordance with the requirements of human rights, while the current approaches favor instead the punishment of perpetrators to protect their victims.

Originally presented as the author's dissertation (doctoral)--Freiburg/Schweiz, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 224-258).

So-called obligations erga omnes, owed to the international community as a whole, including all States, now form part of positive international law. These obligations protect some of the most basic values of present-day international relations. Examples include the obligations not to commit genocide or torture, to uphold the most basic human rights, to respect the self-determination of peoples, and so on. However, there is little agreement as to what these obligations imply, how they have come about, and how to identify them. In the literature, at least, there is widespread agreement that obligations erga omnes are different in essence and in nature from obligations owed by one State to another State, so-called obligations inter partes. In turn, this —alleged— radical conceptual break severs obligations erga omnes from a wealth of norms that exist in present-day, general international law, but whose origins lie farther back in time. This thesis attempts to reconcile obligations erga omnes with obligations arising in classic, general international law. It explores what it means to be owed an obligation and how it came to pass that most obligations were owed inter partes. The particular way in which sovereignty came to be conceived and the furtherance of sovereignty, at the expense of other values, forms the pattern that gave rise to obligations inter partes. But even at that time, exceptions to this pattern existed which brought about obligations analogous to those owed erga omnes today. Relevant state practice will be analysed. If obligations erga omnes could have been created in classic international law, it is unjustified to maintain that obligations erga omnes represent so radical a break with the past. Obligations erga omnes are aggregates of bilateral, primary obligations. From this perspective, it is possible to identify these obligations, their consequences, and to discern their origins.

Paprotys - vienas reikšmingiausių ir seniausių teisės šaltinių. Kartu, nepaisant egzistuojančių priešingų nuomonių, tai vienas reikšmingiausių tarptautinės teisės šaltinių. Tarptautinį paprotį sudaro du elementai: 1. objektyvus - valstybių praktika, kuri turi atitikti bendrumo, vieningumo, nuoseklumo, trukmės reikalavimus; 2. subjektyvus - atitinkamos praktikos pripažinimas teisiškai privaloma. Abu minėti elementai yra reikšmingi ir būtini paprotinės normos susiformavimui. Kartu tarptautinis paprotys yra glaudžiai susijęs su "pastovaus prieštarautojo", "greito" papročio bei jus cogens normų doktrinomis. Pažymėtina, jog, nepaisant egzistuojančių kodifikavimo tendencijų, tarptautinis paprotys išlieka reikšmingu tarptautinės teisės šaltiniu. / Custom is one of the oldest and widely recognized legal sources. In addition, despite existing different approaches, custom is considered to be one of the most significant legal sources of international law. International custom consists of two elements: 1. objective - state practice, which must also fulfill the requirements of consistency, repetition, duration and generality; 2. subjective - the recognition of certain practice as legally binding. Both above mentioned elements are of significant importance in the formation of customary rule. International custom is also closely related to the doctrines of "persistent objector", "instant" custom and jus cogens norms. Finally, it must be noticed that, despite the existing codification tendencies, international custom still remains a very important source of international law.