This study deals with two aspects of international law. The first is ‘immunity of state officials’ and the second is ‘prosecution of international crimes.’ Immunity is discussed in the context of international crimes. The study focuses on Africa because African state officials have become subjects of international criminal justice before international courts and various national courts both in Europe and Africa. It presents a new contribution to international criminal justice in Africa by examining the practice on prosecution of international crimes in eleven African states: South Africa; Kenya; Senegal; Ethiopia; Burundi; Rwanda; DRC; Congo; Niger; Burkina Faso and Uganda. The study concludes that immunity of state officials has been outlawed in these states thereby rendering state officials amenable to criminal prosecution for international crimes. The thesis argues that although immunity is founded under customary international law, it does not prevail over international law jus cogens on the prosecution of international crimes because such jus cogens trumps immunity. It is argued that, committing international crimes cannot qualify as acts performed in official capacity for the purpose of upholding immunity of state officials. In principle, customary international law outlaws functional immunity in respect of international crimes. Hence, in relation to international crimes, state officials cannot benefit from immunity from prosecution or subpoenas. Further, the study criticises the African Union’s opposition to the prosecutions before the International Criminal Court (ICC). It argues that however strong it may be, such opposition is unfounded in international law and is motivated by African solidarity to weaken the role of the ICC in Africa. It concludes that the decisions taken by the African Union not to cooperate with the ICC are geared towards breaching international obligations on cooperation with the ICC. The study calls upon African states to respect their obligations under the Rome Statute and customary international law. It recommends that African states should cooperate with the ICC in the investigations and prosecution of persons responsible for international crimes in Africa. At international level, the study reveals the conflicting jurisprudence of international courts on subpoenas against state officials. It argues that, state officials are not immune from being subpoenaed to testify or adduce evidence before international courts. It contends that issuing subpoenas to state officials ensures fairness and equality of arms in the prosecution of international crimes. It recommends that international courts should treat state officials equally regarding prosecution and subpoenas. It further recommends that African states should respect their obligations arising from the Rome Statute and that, immunity should not be used to develop a culture of impunity for international crimes committed in Africa. / Thesis (LLD)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted

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A Rome, les délégations des Etats présents ont convenu que la CPI n’exercera sa compétence à l’égard des crimes relevant du Statut que s’ils ont été commis sur le territoire, à bord d’un navire ou aéronef ou encore par le ressortissant d’un Etat partie et l’ont expressément codifié dans l’article 12, § 2 du Statut. Rédigé dans les dernières heures de la Conférence, le mécanisme a laissé en suspens beaucoup de questions brûlantes. Depuis, la portée de la disposition en ce qui concerne son champ d’application et son contenu est très discutée. Toutes ces lacunes et inquiétudes ont jusqu’à ce jour entretenu le malentendu persistant observé à l’égard de la Cour pénale internationale et semblent nuire à la clarté de sa mission. La présente étude vient aider à fixer l’état du droit sur les problèmes d’ordre pénal qui surgissent encore. Il s’agira, à partir d’un examen approfondi de la jurisprudence et de la pratique, de clarifier, dans une première partie, les concepts de rattachements territorial et personnel définis dans le Statut de Rome, c'est-à-dire d’en délimiter les contours et d’en déterminer sa consistance. Dans une seconde partie, l’on mettra en lumière la manière dont les deux titres de compétence énoncés alternativement dans le Statut de Rome permettent à la CPI d’étendre sa compétence, en toute légalité, à la fois à l’égard des Etats parties et des Etats non parties / In Rome, the delegations of the participating States agreed that the International Criminal Court (ICC) would only exercise jurisdiction regarding crimes set out in the Statute provided that these crimes were committed on the territory, on board a vessel or aircraft or by a national of a State Party, as stressed in article 12, § 2 of the Statute. This mechanism, which was drafted in the very last hours of the Conference, left open many critical issues. Since then, the scope and content of this provision is the subject of heated debate. These gaps, and the concern they raised until now, have perpetuated the persisting misunderstanding about the ICC and seem to undermine the clarity of the Court’s mission. The study helps to assess the state of the law on the criminal issues that remain so far. As a first step, it aims at clarifying, on the basis of an extensive review of the case-law and practice, the concepts of territorial and personal links defined in the Rome Statute, by marking out their contours and determining their substance. Secondly, it will be demonstrated how these two grounds of jurisdiction set out in the Rome Statute allow the ICC to lawfully expand its jurisdiction, both vis-à-vis State Parties as well as non-Party States.

The present study describes the nature, scope and application of universal jurisdiction as an important tool against impunity in international criminal law, in a straight forward manner, where inquiry into the recent developments of universal jurisdiction is undertaken. Forthwith, the formation of the principle of universal jurisdiction - especially its practical application - must be guided by international consensus, not through advocacy action of states with short term and narrow objectives. The thesis seeks to identify and observe how far the law of universal jurisdiction has actually evolved and how far we should expect it to evolve in the near future, considering its restrains and challenges. It is argued that the concept of state sovereignty, which constitutes the greatest impediment on the exercise of universal jurisdiction, has seen various changes to its fundamentals elements in the 21st Century. The aim is to look at the universality principle, not as an isolated part, but as part of a broader framework in modern international law and thus special attention is given to the relationship between universal jurisdiction and the principle of aut dedere aut judicare. These principles are interrelated, yet distinct, parallels in deterring commission of the most heinous offences of international...

Thèse en cotutelle : Université Laval, Québec, Canada et Université de Bordeaux, Talence, France / Dans l'ordre juridique international, les organes de protection des droits de la personne sont de nature différente, indépendants et non hiérarchisés. Le phénomène du dialogue juridictionnel est une pratique spontanée qui consiste pour un organe de protection à intégrer dans le processus d'interprétation d'une disposition donnée, des éléments étrangers à son système, qu'il s'agisse de décisions ou d'instruments de protection émanant d'autres organes. Dans cette étude, le dialogue est illustré avec la jurisprudence interprétée à l'aide de ces éléments extrasystémiques en matière de prohibition de la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels inhumains ou dégradants. Cette interdiction est à la croisée du droit international des droits de l'Homme, du droit international humanitaire et du droit international pénal. Ainsi, les éventuelles violations peuvent engager, de manière complémentaire, la responsabilité internationale de l'État et la responsabilité pénale individuelle. Le dialogue jurisprudentiel est envisagé comme une technique interprétative permettant d'aboutir à des interprétations communes du contenu, du sens et de la portée de cette interdiction bien que ces interprétations partagées puissent être extensives ou restrictives. En effet, le dialogue permettra de mettre parfois en lumière des positions internationales communes justifiant des interprétations extensives en faveur de la personne humaine. L'interprétation unanime des rapports complémentaires entre droit international des droits de l'homme et droit international humanitaire ou à l'égard de l'application extraterritoriale des traités de protection des droits de l'homme a un impact sur les rapports entre systèmes juridiques et entre ordres juridiques. L'extraterritorialité élargit les espaces protégés par des instruments conventionnels, en contribuant ainsi à un renforcement de la perméabilité entre les normes internationales de protection des droits de la personne et une concrétisation de leur intérdépendance matérielle. Toutefois, le dialogue sera parfois un instrument d'éclairage des positions divergentes découlant de l'absence de consensus dans l'ordre juridique international. C'est le cas lorsqu'il sera question de déterminer précisément les effets d'une norme impérative qui se heurte à la règle des immunités en droit international. L'étude interroge l'étendue et la teneur du pouvoir juridictionnel dans l'ordre juridique international ainsi que sa capacité à aboutir à une convergence normative en matière de protection des droits de la personne, qui découle d'une convergence interprétative. La notion d'interprétation globale par contextualisation normative et systémique renvoie à la confrontation d'une disposition donnée aux autres normes internationales qui lui sont analogues et aux autres systèmes juridiques qui sont semblables au système d'origine de l'interprète, dans laquelle la disposition s'inscrit. Ainsi, il s'agit de montrer que les organes internationaux de protection des droits de la personne, malgré leur diversité, font usage de méthodes d'interprétation communes contribuant à définir le sens, la portée et le contenu des normes. Grâce au dialogue juridictionnel, ils s'inscrivent dans un processus d'autorégulation, entre autoélargissement de leur pouvoir d'interprétation et autolimitation de leur marge d'appréciation, par la confrontation aux éléments extrasystémiques. Implicitement, le dialogue joue le rôle d'un outil de régulation et de coordination qui s'impose spontanément dans la pratique interprétative des organes internationaux, contribuant à l'émergence d'un objectivisme jurisprudentiel. Ce dernier tend à s'opposer au volontarisme étatique dans un but de protection de l'ordre public international et de garantie des droits de la personne. / In the international legal order, international bodies protecting human rights are both of a different nature and independent. Indeed, a hierarchical principle of organization still remains unknown and multiple legal systems protect human rights. Judicial dialogue consists in referring to decisions or international instruments that are external sources to the system in which the international body has to exercise its power of interpretation. In this study, the example of the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments will be used to illustrate this spontaneous practice. This prohibition is at the crossroads of international human rights law, of international humanitarian law and of international criminal law. Therefore, its violations can both engage the international responsibility of State and the individual criminal responsibility. Judicial dialogue is seen as an interpretive technique, allowing to reach common interpretations of the substance, the meaning and the scope of this prohibition. Nevertheless, the use of external sources does not always lead to extensive interpretations since it can also highlight disagreements in which case restrictive interpretations are inevitable. Sometimes, this spontaneous practice will show the existence of international common positions regarding certains aspects of human rights. It is the case regarding the entrenched consensus of the complementarity between international human rights law and international humanitarian law and concerning the extraterritoriality of human rights treaties. This acknowledgement expands States jurisdiction and strengthens the protection offered to the individuals, while increasing interactions between international legal systems protecting human rights and therefore showing a state of substantive interdependence. The lack of consensus in the international legal order will be the ultimate limit to constructive judicial dialogue. Indeed, the latter will emphasize divergent positions in matters of interpretation. One of the most significant examples is the trouble to determine precisely the effect of peremptory norms such as the prohibition of torture when it encounters immunities in international law. This study also questions the content of the international judiciary and its capacity to reach a normative convergence through the use of external sources that shows an interpretive convergence in the first place. The notion of global interpretation through normative and systemic interactions means confronting international legal norms which are similar, even though they were adopted separate and independent systems, in order to reach a better interpretation. This study attempts to show that even though international bodies rotecting human rights are quite different and formally independent, they tend to self-regulation by using external sources. Indeed, the spontaneous practice of judicial dialogue will allow both a process of self-limitation by referring to other sources in order to interpret a given legal provision, since it means including optional limits to the margin of appreciation. At the same time, the use of external sources will also lead to a self-expansion of the possibilities in matters of interpretation by taking into account solutions that were found by other legal interpreters in comparable legal disputes. Therefore, it appears that the international jurisprudential dialogue can both contribute to coordinate and harmonize the application and interpretation of international human rights law.

Magister Legum - LLM / Even though sexual violence has always been a part and parcel of conflicts and atrocities throughout the ages, it never found any interpretation by subsequent tribunals who were responsible for prosecuting offenders.The case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu was the first of its kind to give jurisprudential recognition and interpretation to sexual violence as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide respectively. This case was important for the following reasons:1. It acknowledged that sexual violence can amount to an act of genocide; 2. It acknowledged that sexual violence can amount to a crime against humanity; and 3. It was the first case to define rape within an international context.Following the case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu many tribunals gave recognition to the extent of which sexual violence takes place during atrocities by correctly convicting accused for either participating in sexual violence or aiding and abetting to sexual violence. Amidst the various interpretations on what constitutes sexual violence and how it is defined, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone all either conceptualised sexual violence as genocide, war crimes or/ and crimes against humanity.At the same time, the development of sexual violence as either a crime against humanity or a war crime did not end with the courts. The case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu sparked a fire in the international community, which led to it paying more attention to the place of sexual violence in treaty law. Taking into account that rape is listed as a crime against humanity in both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda statutes, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court statutes both list more than one form of sexual violence as a crime against humanity. It is interesting to note that the latter two treaty developments took place only after the International Criminal Tribunal conceptualised sexual violence as a crime against humanity.Thus apart from merely listing rape as a crime against humanity, the Statute establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone, states in article 2(g) that sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence constitutes a crime against humanity. The Statute establishing the International Criminal Court states in article 7(1)(g) that rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity constitutes a crime against humanity. The interpretation of these acts is further guided by the ‘Elements of Crimes’ which are annexed to the International Criminal Court statute.Once again it is interesting to note that the ‘Elements of Crimes’ for these acts are similar to how the International Criminal Tribunals (both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals) conceptualised various acts of sexual violence.On the other hand, the definition of genocide remained the same as it was defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. This definition does not expressly mention any form of sexual violence as a form of genocide.However, once again, the trial chamber in the case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu set the benchmark for sexual violence to constitute a form of genocide by way of interpretation. The definition of genocide did not subsequently change in the Statute establishing the International Criminal Court.Based on these premises, this thesis attempts to investigate the similarities and differences in sexual violence as a form of both genocide and a crime against humanity,by addressing the following question:What are the essential and practical differences between sexual violence as crimes against humanity and genocide and what is the legal effect of the differences, should there be any? Chapter 1 highlights the historical overview and developments of sexual violence as genocide and crimes against humanity, while chapter 2 investigates how sexual violence can amount to a form of genocide. Chapter 3 assesses the advances made in sexual violence as a crime against humanity, while chapter 4 importantly draws a comparative analysis between sexual violence as genocide and a crime against humanity. Chapter 4 draws this comparison by weighing up four differences and four similarities in sexual violence as genocide and a crime against humanity.Chapter 5 highlights the conclusion and provides an answer for the research question that is posed above. Here it is concluded that even though there exist multiple differences in sexual violence as crimes against humanity and genocide, there are also multiple similarities which could possibly amount to a better chance for conviction of an accused under a crime against humanity than genocide. Chapter 5 also provide possible recommendations for the consequences that might flow should sexual violence as a crime against humanity be fairly similar to sexual violence as genocide.

Climate change litigation is expanding at fast speed throughout various jurisdictions around the world. Citizens are taking states’ lack of climate mitigation measures to courts, demanding that more has to be done on the climate crisis. More often now, litigants use human rights based argumentation which relies on international human rights law: human rights treaties, conventions, and precedent from human rights courts. According to litigants, states are therefore seen as both creating and prolonging this threat against the lives of their citizens, violating some of their most basic human rights, such as the right to life. Coupling these human rights obligations with climate treaties such as the Paris Agreement has proven effective when attempting to establish a causal connection between state emissions and climate change’s threat to citizen’s lives. This is sometimes characterized as a global ‘rights turn’ or a ‘greening’ of human rights. While a climate litigation case was denied to be brought up in Swedish courts in 2016, the Swedish government is now in 2021 finding itself tested again. Several children and youths in Sweden are currently suing the Swedish state, claiming that Sweden does not live up to its international human rights obligations. The claim is based on a human rights framing and is more similar to other ongoing or successful climate litigation cases at present time. While also facing a lawsuit as defendants in a case under the European Court of Human Rights, Sweden is now finding itself in the midst of this new phenomenon. Since, however, the issue of climate litigation in Swedish courts is quite new, the results of a new case in Sweden based on different grounds and on the precedent established in other successful cases in other similar jurisdictions, could be different.  The overall purpose of this thesis is to shed light on the intentional human rights obligations that the Swedish state is bound by internationally which can be used in a climate litigation case based on human rights argumentation. The issue at hand is therefore to ascertain what, how and why those obligations concerning the climate and human rights makes it possible or challenging to pursue a case against the Swedish government, and what these obligations entail. If the case is tried in Swedish courts, it will establish the current obligations concerning climate change and its threat to human lives under international human rights law, as well as Sweden’s mitigation duties.

<p>Vilket rättssystem har enligt folkrätten företräde vid konflikt mellan folkrätten från FN, Europakonventionen och gemen-skapsrätten, beträffande giltigheten av säkerhetsrådets resolutioner för bekämpande av den internationella terrorismen, i förhållande till mänskliga rättigheter?</p><p>Säkerhetsrådets resolutioner har ändrat karaktär när det gäller att bekämpa världens terrorism. Genom så kallade intelligenta sanktioner är säkerhetsrådets mål nu att frysa egendom för enskilda individer och företag, utan att de drabbade har någon rätt till rättvis rättegång, efter att dessa svartlistats som knutna till terroristorganisationer. Svartlistningen sker på mer eller mindre godtyckliga grunder som inte finner stöd inom folkrättens regler om jus cogens och säkerhetsrådet har förklarat att i kampen mot terrorismen är det nu tillåtet att med alla medel slå tillbaka hot mot fred och säkerhet.</p><p>Mänskliga rättigheter utvecklades inom FN och dess stadga tillkom före Europakonventionen och torde i princip ha företräde framför konventionen och Europadomstolens praxis, vid tillämpning av principen lex posterior derogat priori.</p><p>Dock har det tillskapats ett rättssystem av nytt slag (sui generis) inom gemenskaps-rätten, med ett starkare skydd för mänskliga rättigheter; i synnerhet egendomsrätten och rätten till rättvis domstolsprövning. Vid tillämpning av principen lex specialis legi generali derogat, torde dessa regler ha företräde framför de generella reglerna från FN.</p><p>EG-domstolens förstainstansrätt har i fallet Somaliasvenskarna (T-306/01) förklarat sig själv och unionen som bunden av FN:s stadga och säkerhetsrådets resolutioner och därmed åsidosatt egendomsskyddet och rätten till rättvis rättegång för unionsmedborgare.</p><p>I fallet går rätten emot tidigare praxis från EG-domstolen, genom att förklara unionen som bunden av FN-stadgan och genom att tilldela EU-rådet en kompetens som inte står att utläsa i fördragen.</p><p>En oroväckande fråga är vilka rättigheter som kommer att inskränkas framledes. För framtiden bör unionen sätta en tydlig gräns för när de mänskliga rättigheter som man under så lång tid byggt upp skall kunna inskränkas.</p><p>Medlemsstaterna bör anta en gemensam ståndpunkt där man deklarerar att gemenskapens grundläggande rättigheter och friheter inte kan inskränkas på godtyckliga grunder.</p>

Vilket rättssystem har enligt folkrätten företräde vid konflikt mellan folkrätten från FN, Europakonventionen och gemen-skapsrätten, beträffande giltigheten av säkerhetsrådets resolutioner för bekämpande av den internationella terrorismen, i förhållande till mänskliga rättigheter? Säkerhetsrådets resolutioner har ändrat karaktär när det gäller att bekämpa världens terrorism. Genom så kallade intelligenta sanktioner är säkerhetsrådets mål nu att frysa egendom för enskilda individer och företag, utan att de drabbade har någon rätt till rättvis rättegång, efter att dessa svartlistats som knutna till terroristorganisationer. Svartlistningen sker på mer eller mindre godtyckliga grunder som inte finner stöd inom folkrättens regler om jus cogens och säkerhetsrådet har förklarat att i kampen mot terrorismen är det nu tillåtet att med alla medel slå tillbaka hot mot fred och säkerhet. Mänskliga rättigheter utvecklades inom FN och dess stadga tillkom före Europakonventionen och torde i princip ha företräde framför konventionen och Europadomstolens praxis, vid tillämpning av principen lex posterior derogat priori. Dock har det tillskapats ett rättssystem av nytt slag (sui generis) inom gemenskaps-rätten, med ett starkare skydd för mänskliga rättigheter; i synnerhet egendomsrätten och rätten till rättvis domstolsprövning. Vid tillämpning av principen lex specialis legi generali derogat, torde dessa regler ha företräde framför de generella reglerna från FN. EG-domstolens förstainstansrätt har i fallet Somaliasvenskarna (T-306/01) förklarat sig själv och unionen som bunden av FN:s stadga och säkerhetsrådets resolutioner och därmed åsidosatt egendomsskyddet och rätten till rättvis rättegång för unionsmedborgare. I fallet går rätten emot tidigare praxis från EG-domstolen, genom att förklara unionen som bunden av FN-stadgan och genom att tilldela EU-rådet en kompetens som inte står att utläsa i fördragen. En oroväckande fråga är vilka rättigheter som kommer att inskränkas framledes. För framtiden bör unionen sätta en tydlig gräns för när de mänskliga rättigheter som man under så lång tid byggt upp skall kunna inskränkas. Medlemsstaterna bör anta en gemensam ståndpunkt där man deklarerar att gemenskapens grundläggande rättigheter och friheter inte kan inskränkas på godtyckliga grunder.

Transnational corporations are playing an important role in the global economy of today. Many of these corporations have great economic resources and have the possibility of contributing to the development of societies in developing states. At the same time, in their search for profit, the activities of TNCs have proven fatal to some of the individuals employed by them, or otherwise in contact with their activities. Within the international legal framework, corporations are not traditionally treated as subjects and if a TNC allocates its production to a state with lax human rights protection, no binding international standards exist to regulate the conduct of the corporation.  In my thesis I will assess the position of TNCs under the present core human rights instruments and soft law initiatives. I will also analyze a draft treaty text produced by the Intergovernmental Working Group on Business and Human Rights, released in July 2018, to reach a conclusion on whether such an instrument would affect the international legal status of TNCs and provide a more robust protection of international human rights.