This item is not the definitive copy. Please use the following citation when referencing this material: Dillon, A. (1987) Knowledge acquisition and conceptual models: a cognitive analysis of the interface. In: D. Diaper and R.Winder (eds.) People and Computers III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 371-379. Abstract: Understanding how users process the information available to them through the computer interface can greatly enhance our abilities to design usable systems. This paper details the results of a longitudinal psychological experiment investigating the effect of interface style on user performance, knowledge acquisition and conceptual model development. Through the use of standard performance measures, interactive error scoring and protocol analysis techniques it becomes possible to identify crucial psychological factors in successful human computer use. Results indicate that a distinction between "deep" and "shallow" knowledge of system functioning can be drawn where both types of user appear to interact identically with the machine although significant differences in their respective knowledge exists. The effect of these differences on user ability to perform under stress and transfer to similar systems is noted. Implications for the design of usable systems are discussed.

Winner of the 1997 Brown Publication Award from ECT. This item is not the definitive copy. Please use the following citation when referencing this material: McKnight, C., Dillon, A., and Richardson, J. (1996) User Centered Design of Hypertext and Hypermedia for Education. In: D. Jonassen (ed) Handbook of Research on Educational Communications and Technology. New York: Macmillan, 622-633 Abstract The chapter begins by describing the fundamental concepts of hypertext and gives a brief overview of the different philosophical perspectives manifest in the key figures of the field. It then considers the role of hypertext in learning, concluding from a review of empirical evaluations that many of the claims for hypertext have failed to be substantiated. It is argued that for a variety of conceptual and methodological reasons, it is extremely difficult to evaluate hypertext experimentally in an educational context. However, rather than simply abandon either hypertext or empirical evaluation, the chapter concludes by arguing for an empirically grounded, user centred approach to the design of hypertext based on a knowledge of the users, their tasks, the information space and the context in which the three interact.

This thesis is concerned with the elucidation of the structure of three basic cognitive functions. Firstly, an organism must be able to make distinctions between different aspects of its environment if it is to respond selectively. This is classification. Secondly, it must be able to anticipate conditions in other parts of its environment. If an organism at x is to anticipate that the condition c holds at y then, at the very least, the information that c holds must be accessible from x. Hence anticipation depends on a flow of information. Thirdly, an organism must be able to recognize uniformities across different parts of the environment. This is individuation. We propose that each of these functions can be understood in terms of a primitive ability of `seeing' the world from a perspective. In contrast to the possession of a conceptual scheme, or mastery of a language of thought, a characteristic of an organism's ability to adopt perspectives is the additional ability to shift from one perspective to another. In the thesis we first propose a theory of classification. Its usefulness in categorizing different classificatory systems, like taxonomies, state systems and attribute-value structures, is demonstrated in the Appendix. We then study two approaches to characterizing the flow of information. One, due to Dretske (1981), is based on conditional probabilities. The other, due to Barwise and Perry (1983), is based on the Situation Theoretic idea of a constraint. Our theory of perspectives takes ideas from both accounts: from Situation Theory, the distinction between information supported and information carried by a situation, and from Dretske, the implicit relativity to an information channel. We give a rudimentary account of the individuation of objects as predictive regularities across situations. Properties of objects individuated in this way are characterized as shifts in perspective which preserve the predictive regularity. Finally, we consider a more concrete model of information flow (called a world system, Rosenschein (1989)) in which environmental conditions are understood in terms of possible state distributions over locations and times. We generalize his model and show how information channels offer a more sensitive account of information flow than the one induced by the global notion of possibility. Information channels are then used to construct perspectives within a world system.

This thesis puts forward a formal theory of levels and algorithms to provide a foundation for those terms as they are used in much of cognitive science and computer science. Abstraction with respect to concreteness is distinguished from abstraction with respect to detail, resulting in three levels of concreteness and a large number of algorithmic levels, which are levels of detail and the primary focus of the theory. An algorithm or ideal machine is a set of sequences of states defining a particular level of detail. Rather than one fundamental ideal machine to describe the behaviour of a complex system, there are many possible ideal machines, extending Turing's approach to reflect the multiplicity of system descriptions required to express more than weak input-output equivalence of systems. Cognitive science is concerned with stronger equivalence; e.g., do two models go through the same states at some level of description? The state-based definition of algorithms serves as a basis for such strong equivalence and facilitates formal renditions of abstraction and implementation as relations between algorithms. It is possible to prove within the new framework whether or not one given algorithm is a valid implementation of another, or whether two unequal algorithms have a common abstraction, for example. Some implications of the theory are discussed, notably a characterisation of connectionist versus classical models.

This study has several key purposes. First, it tests the potential applicability of the modern discourses of neuro- and cognitive science to the study of medieval texts and languages: more specifically, it does this by using two core methodological tools, namely the embodied view of the mind and a theory of metaphor developed collaboratively by the linguist, George Lakoff, and the philosopher, Mark Johnson, to explore the range of significances which may be drawn from the ways in which human life and existence are represented in a sample of twelfth-century Latin texts. Second, it challenges the view, held by some modern scholars, that by the medieval period Latin was an intrinsically inadequate language for the purposes of self-expression. And finally, it problematises the existing discourses in medieval studies on the individual, self, and subjectivity, first, by developing a new mode of analysing the mental lives of medieval people, and second, by challenging the view that advanced forms of self-awareness were “discovered” during the twelfth century. By following this course, this study offers a number of fresh insights into twelfth-century texts and the phenomena of the individual, self, and subjectivity. Most importantly, it shows that the ways in which human life and existence are represented in medieval texts are best understood in terms of complex interactions between the biological mind and body and their effects in the world (especially their “socio-cultural” effects). From this conclusion, it is argued that the basis of the individual, self, or subject must be found, not just in socio-cultural development, but also the biological realities of human existence. Furthermore, this study contributes to existing literature on the twelfth century by exploring the range of influences, ancient and contemporary, which affected how medieval people thought about themselves and other people, while affirming their basis in the interaction between the mind, body, and culture.

Orientador: Jonas Gonçalves Coelho / Banca: Maria Eunice Quilici Gonzalez / Banca: Débora Cristina Morato Pinto / Resumo: Compreendendo a organização da vida por um viés evolucionista, ou seja, naturalista, tivemos por oportuno enfatizar a questão que envolve a necessidade que as modelagens das Ciências Cognitivas têm como desafio para criar um sistema artificial que se torne capaz de se constituir e evoluir como capacidades de movimento à maneira dos seres vivos, isto é, de criar um sistema capaz de criar a si como ser autônomo ao criar para si suas necessidades ambientais de interação com o meio, orientadoras de seu movimento no espaço. Não obstante ser razoável que um sistema artificial efetue movimentos que reflitam a natureza viva de movimento, o que procuramos focar é a capacidade de esse sistema superar os mecanismos de organização, objetivados em estruturas robóticas, de modo a constituir, por si mesmos, outros mecanismos adaptativos capazes de efetuar movimentos determinados pelas necessidades de se organizar no espaço autonomamente. Lançamos luz sobre esta questão, tendo presente algumas considerações que a Teoria dos Sistemas estima como fundamentais para pensar a vida em sua dimensão organizativa, na qual a complexidade se constitui como natureza de sua organização e a diferencia dos eventos que ocorrem segundo a lei de causa e efeito linear. A causalidade, nesse contexto teórico, é concebida como circular, em que os eventos se transformam e se determinam em sua ordenação e variação no tempo. A vida, em sua atividade organizativa, sendo de natureza complexa, insere-se como ordem própria de seus movimentos. Como efeito de processos interativos, a vida evolui, em suas capacidades de organização no espaço, ao assimilar do meio os eventos que se constituem, interativamente, como ambiente de ação. / Abstract: Understanding the organization of life through an evolutionist view, that is, naturalistic, we found opportune to emphasize the issue that involves the necessity that Cognitive Sciences have on modeling as a challenge for creating an artificial system capable of constituting itself and of evolving, movement capacities like human beings'. What we mean by movement capacities is to create a system capable of creating itself as an autonomous being by just creating its environment necessities of interaction with the milieu, guiders of its movement in space. Notwithstanding, to be reasonable that an artificial system performs movements that reflect the living nature of movement, what we search to focus here is the capacity of this system to face organization mechanisms, intended in robotic structures, so as to constitute, by itself, other adaptative mechanisms capable of performing movements determinate by autonomous organization necessities in space. We bring to light this issue, having some considerations that System Theory estimates as fundamental for thinking life in its organizative dimension, in which complexity is constituted as the nature of its organization and differentiates itself from the events that occur according to the law of linear cause and effect. Causality, in this theoretical context, is conceived as circular, in which events are transformed and determinate in their time ordination and variation. Life, in its organizative activity, being a complex nature, is introduced as own order of its movements. As an effect of interactive processes, life evolves, in its capacities of interaction in space, and in assimilating by the milieu the events that are constituted, interactingly, as action environment. / Mestre

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T14:23:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Adelino de Castro Oliveira Simoes Gala.pdf: 265343 bytes, checksum: 526395f0997b919e252c59260d83f588 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-04-17 / This dissertation aims at researching the concepts of habit that emerged in philosophy, and then introduce it in the Cognitive Science program through a nondualistic approach. After discussions on methodologies and the researcher´s motivations, the first chapter starts with a survey of the most important philosophers from medieval philosophy that dealt with the theme: Aristotle, Thomas de Aquinas and mainly Duns Scotus. After exploring and identifying the concepts of intentionality and habit, it advances to the twentieth century philosophy into Husserl´s studies, who is recognized as the founder of phenomenology. Afterwards, in order to seek for an alternative to the dualism that underlies Husserl´s research of mind, chapter two engages in the understanding of Merleau-Ponty´s works and mainly his phenomenology of perception. The next step is to link M-Ponty´s philosophy and the Cognitive Science program. This is done in chapter three which contextualizes Varela´s research and how it constrains both fields. Finally, the conclusion suggests a definition of the concept of habit as a cognitive operator, and shows possible future paths for the present work / Esta dissertação tem como objetivo de pesquisa examinar os conceitos filosóficos do hábito, introduzi-lo no campo das Ciências Cognitivas dentro de uma abordagem não-dualista e defini-lo como operador cognitivo. Após introdução metodológica e apresentação das reflexões e motivações do trabalho, começa no primeiro capítulo com um levantamento dos principais autores que abordaram o tema na filosofia medieval, observando Aristóteles, Tomás de Aquino e enfatizando Duns Scotus. Destacados os entendimentos e conceitos chaves do hábito e da intencionalidade, avança para a filosofia do século XX através dos estudos de Husserl, autor compreendido como sendo o pai da fenomenologia. Em seguida, com o intuito de buscar uma alternativa ao dualismo característico dos estudos da mente de Husserl, o capítulo dois aplica-se na compreensão fenomenológica de Merleau-Ponty, da noção do corpo como mente e do hábito incorporado. Como ponte entre a filosofia e as Ciências Cognitivas, o capítulo três apresenta o trabalho de Varela contextualizado na filosofia de M-Ponty e na história e paradigmas das Ciências Cognitivas. Por final, sugere na conclusão uma definição para o hábito como operador cognitivo e possíveis caminhos de desenvolvimento futuro da pesquisa

Cette recherche, composée de 7 expériences a pour but d'observer mais aussi de manipuler implicitement les mécanismes attentionnels de sujets sains et de patients cérébro-lésés droits souffrant ou non de négligence spatiale gauche. Ce travail de recherche apporte un nouvel éclairage sur la compréhension théorique de la négligence spatiale unilatérale. En effet, la compilation de tous les résultats nous mène à interpréter la négligence en ces termes: l'expression d'une négligence spatiale pourrait être la résultante d'un chaos perceptif, se définissant par un manque d'invariant, qui impliquerait un trouble de l'orientation exogène de l'attention, majoré au niveau de l'hémiespace gauche, ceci dans un contexte de trouble bilatéral de l'orientation endogène de l'attention, émaillé de troubles frontaux. Cette assomption est corroborée par la mise en évidence, pour la première fois, d'une variabilité perceptive spécifique aux patients négligents. Ainsi, cette nouvelle hypothèse ouvre désormais la voie à un champ de réflexion pour l'étude et la rééducation de la négligence spatiale.

Les interneurones GABAergiques sont des composants cruciaux du réseau neocortical et la caractérisation fonctionnelle du neocortex a été fortement ralentie par l'absence de consensus concernant leur classification. Les interneurones se différencient du point de vue électrophysiologique et morphologique ainsi que par l'expression de marqueurs moléculaires. Une controverse demeure cependant, pour déterminer si la combinaison de ces caractéristiques définit des classes séparées ou au contraire, un continuum phénotypique où chaque cellule est unique. Pendant ma thèse, je me suis proposé d'étudier la diversité des interneurons neocorticaux en prenant en compte l'ensemble de ces critères. Des enregistrements de patch-clamp couplés à la technique de PCR sur cellule unique ont été réalisés sur un échantillon de plus de 300 interneurones et l'arborisation de près de 200 d'entre eux a été reconstruites en 3 dimensions. Les phénotypes électrophysiologiques, morphologiques et moléculaires de notre échantillon ont été quantifiés au travers d'un ensemble de 56 paramètres quantitatifs. Cet échantillon a d'abord été utilisé pour caractériser les interneurones dans la couche VI du neocortex, une région où ils n'avaient été que partiellement décrits. En utilisant une approche non supervisée, 4 classes d'interneurones ont pu être identifiées sur la base de propriétés électrophysiologiques, morphologiques et moléculaires. Additionnellement, en utilisant des immunomarquages sur des souris GAD67::GFP Knock-In, les distributions d'interneurones exprimant des marqueurs caractéristiques ont été cartographiées à travers la couche VI, mettant en évidence que des populations distinctes s'accumulent dans des sous-couches particulières. Ces analyses ont été soumises pour publication. Nous avons ensuite entrepris de caractériser la diversité des interneurones à travers l'ensemble des couches du neocortex. En utilisant des méthodes non supervisées reposant sur les propriétés électrophysiologiques et moléculaires des interneurones, nous avons montré que les classes que nous avions caractérisées dans la couche VI pouvaient être identifiées sur l'ensemble de notre échantillon. Toutefois, en analysant la séparation de ces classes avec des méthodes analytiques, nous avons trouvé que, si certaines formaient des archétypes distincts, une fraction substantielle de notre échantillon présentait des phénotypes intermédiaires à des classes particulières. Ce travail suggère donc que les interneurones du neocortex se séparent bien en plusieurs populations, mais que ces groupes ne constituent pas des classes distinctes mais plutôt des archétypes phénotypiques. Ces résultats supportent une nouvelle façon de regarder la diversité des interneurones GABAErgiques et seront rapportés dans un second article.

La langue étant un bien commun partagé par tous les membres d'une communauté linguistique, chaque sujet parlant a une certaine idée de la langue, se fait son idée de sa propre pratique, à l'aune d'une variété standard, normée, dite " de référence ". Ces idées se manifestent le plus souvent au travers du discours tenu par la langue (métalinguistique) sur la langue (épilinguistique) puisque ce dernier véhicule un certain nombre de jugements de valeur que le linguiste, en tant que spécialiste et scientifique habité par un souci d'objectivité et de neutralité, est amené à, sinon les rejeter, au moins les qualifier d'idées reçues, de préjugés, voire d'idéologies. Quelle place occupe aujourd'hui l'attitude normative dans le discours épilinguistique ? Les représentations métalinguistiques du discours ordinaire sont-elles uniquement le fruit d'un jugement porté sur la langue de l'autre ? Si d'un point de vue strictement communicationnel, la nécessité du concept de norme linguistique ne semble plus être à démontrer, sa pertinence pourra néanmoins être questionnée en se plaçant d'un point de vue sociolinguistique, perspective à partir de laquelle l'on est à même de constater que ce concept véhicule également l'idée d'exclusion. Cette recherche abordera donc les notions de variété et de variation, intrinsèquement liées à celle de norme. De plus, il semble que l'attitude normative traduise également une idéalisation de l'objet-langue chez le locuteur lambda. Il sera donc également question des représentations sociolinguistiques -et attitudes qui en découlent- qui concernent la langue et ses usages au sein de la communauté linguistique.