Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T18:39:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cibele de Paula Deis.pdf: 672256 bytes, checksum: 63dd609334b89d8b2e6b3f76d3f9de9a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-23 / PricewaterhouseCoopers Auditores Independentes / The purpose of this study is to analyze the performance of insurance companies operating in auto lines, during the period from 1999 to 2008. Based on the analysis of the combined and broad-based combined ratios, as well as other correlated indices (claims ratio and ratios of selling and administrative expenses), it was possible to ascertain the level of dependence on financial gains required to obtain positive results. The study was limited to insurance companies operating in auto lines, which is Brazil's most popular type of insurance and, in this context, 18 large, medium and small insurance companies were analyzed based on their financial statements. The performance of insurance companies linked to banks, as well as that of the independent companies was examined. The results of the study revealed that, during the period from 1999 to 2008, financial gains contributed from 10.19% to 17.52% to improving the operating efficiency of the insurance companies under analysis and to maintaining, for the whole period, the broad-based combined ratios below 100%. At the same time, the average combined ratios determined varied from 122.91% to 98.33%. Only in 2006 and 2007, did the sample under analysis present operating efficiency. Moreover, the insurance companies presented high operating costs, especially for claims. In a comparison between the bank-linked insurance companies and the independent insurance companies, it was noted that, on average, the selling and administrative expenses of insurance companies which use a bank branch network for distributing their products were lower than those of the independent companies comprising the sample. During the period from 2003 to 2007, the large-sized insurance companies not associated to banks revealed a gradual improvement in operating efficiency, due to the significant decrease in the claims ratio of the portfolio and a partial reduction in administrative expenses. Considering that competition is expected to become even tougher, it follows that the insurance companies will need to focus on reducing costs and improving their operating controls in order to reduce their dependence on financial results and promote the continuity of their business / O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o desempenho operacional de seguradoras que operam no ramo de Automóveis, no período de 1999 a 2008. A partir da análise dos índices combinado e combinado ampliado, bem como dos demais índices correlatos (sinistralidade e das despesas de comercialização e administrativa) foi possível verificar o nível de dependência dos ganhos financeiros para obtenção de resultados positivos. A pesquisa foi limitada às seguradoras que atuam no ramo de Automóveis, que é o seguro mais popular no país, e, nesse contexto, foram estudadas as 18 maiores seguradoras de grande, médio e pequeno porte, tomando por base as demonstrações contábeis. Verificou-se, também, o desempenho das seguradoras ligadas a Bancos e as Independentes. Os resultados da pesquisa evidenciaram que no período de 1999 a 2008, os ganhos financeiros contribuíram de 10,19% a 17,52% para melhoria da eficiência operacional das seguradoras estudadas e, fazendo com que durante todo o período os índices combinados ampliados ficassem inferiores a 100%. Por sua vez, os índices combinados médios apurados variaram de 122,91% a 98,33%. A amostra estudada apresentou eficiência operacional, somente em relação aos exercícios de 2006 e 2007. Além disso, as seguradoras apresentaram elevados custos operacionais, especialmente, com sinistros. Na comparação das seguradoras ligadas a Bancos e independentes, observou-se que, na média, as despesas de comercialização e administrativas das seguradoras que utilizam a rede de agência dos Bancos para distribuição de seus produtos foram inferiores as demais. No período de 2003 a 2007, as seguradoras de grande porte não ligadas a Bancos mostraram uma melhoria gradual na eficiência operacional, devido à redução significativa da sinistralidade da carteira e parcialmente das despesas administrativas. Considerando que a concorrência tende a continuar ser cada vez mais acirrada, conclui-se que as seguradoras necessitam focar na redução dos custos e controles operacionais, a fim de reduzir sua dependência dos resultados financeiros e a continuidade do seu negócio

國內保險經營，長久以來即是人身保險及財產保險分業經營方式，但兩者的經營規模差距很大，據統計資料顯示，壽險業這五年來的傷害險保費收入，平均每年約有580億元，健康險平均年約1260億元，對於產險業整體業界總保費收入約1100億元的市場規模而言，實在是塊誘人和商機無限的新市場，能加入傷害險或健康險的經營，將是產險業者突破經營瓶頸的關鍵，不僅保險市場會產生蛻變，更會對消費大眾帶來多元的選擇與影響。 在此背景下，本研究主要探討產險業經營傷害險的績效，並舉個案實例經營此單一險種的過程，就其在商品研發、行銷、核保和理賠等各項作業流程，進行探討分析。經本研究個案分析，歸納出幾點問題，一是在經營策略面，以業績成長為首要的考量，自然會選擇通路商的行銷方式，所謂「掌握通路，就是贏家」，兩年來通路業績佔了該險種的73%，而其賠款金額佔率，亦佔了76%左右，經營績效的結果顯示出「成也通路，敗也通路」，如何強化通路商之管理是經營重點。二是由理賠資料分析統計，並與壽險業資料比較，發現有相關性趨勢，但卻有相對惡化的現象，諸如平均死亡率，男性比女性多出5倍以上，比壽險業的3倍高；平均每件死亡賠款230萬元，比壽險業的120萬元，高出近一倍，且又以男性50~59歲的年齡層最高，此點顯示出其商品是否有「保費太低而保障過高」的問題。三是其面臨人力和經驗不足的問題，加上缺乏醫療、法務、徵信調查等相關專業人員及其運作經驗，無法在核保和理賠作業時，因應實際的作業需求。 我國保險法經過兩次修正後，現在已開放產險業者得以經營傷害險，再者，有關健康險是否可進一步開放予產險業者經營，相信很快會經立法院通過修法審議。故本研究的結果，即是找出經營問題和原因，並提出改善建議，期能提供產險業者經營傷害險或未來健康險的參酌。 關鍵字：個人傷害保險、綜合率、非比率再保險 / In our insurance market, there are two types of operation, that is, life insurance and non-life insurance, but the business scale of the two types has a long way to go. According to the data, the average premium income of whole life insurance market of the personal accident and health insurance is about NT$58 billion and NT$126 billion per year respectively among these five years. Relative to the non-life insurance which premium income is about NT$110 billion, it’s really a captivating and unlimited new market that the non-life insurance can take the risk about the personal accident and health insurance. From my point of view, it will be the main key to break through the bottleneck of operation of the non-life insurance market. Not only the whole insurance market will be changed but also it can bring multi-choice and influence to consumers. Under this background, the main task of this research is discussing the non-life insurance’s result of operation the personal accident insurance. It has a real case that also includes the product of development, marketing, underwriter and claim for further discussion and analysis. According to the research of this case, it can generalize some points as below. The first is about the tactic of operation: we will choice the way of marketing way of channel if we consider the growth of premium income as primary issue. What is called” Someone will be a winner if he controls the channel”. In our company, the business of channel was occupied about 73% of the personal accident insurance and the claim also in the same situation was about 76% over the past two years. Unfortunately, the result of operation is “Control the channel will make someone success and failure”, so the key point of operation is how to enhance the management of channel. The second is about the statistics of claim: we compared with the data of life and non-life insurance and find some related trends, but there is a phenomenon of related aggravation, such as rate of average death, men are five times more than women in non-life insurance but only three times in life insurance statistics; the average indemnity of death is about NT$2.3 million in non-life insurance which is one time higher than life insurance market and especially with men that age level among in 50~59 years old. On the basis of above mentioned, it shows the problem of this product have higher indemnification but lower premium income. The third is about the problem of lack of manpower and inadequate experience, in addition, it also lack such relevant professional personnel as medical, legal and investigative, etc. So it can’t offer the demand of real operation in the underwriting and claim process. The law of insurance has already opened that the non-life insurance can operate the personal accident insurance after revision two times in our country. Moreover, we believe that will be passed through about the non-life insurance also can operate the health insurance by the legislative rapidly. After the analysis, the conclusion of this research is finding out the question and reason of operation and offering the suggestion of improvement. I hope it can provide some recommendations for the non-life insurance that will operate the personal accident insurance or oncoming of the health insurance. Key words: Personal Accident Insurance、Combined Ratio、Excess of Loss

本研究探討費率自由化政策與台灣產物保險市場經營效益，利用實證資料評估產物保險公司之整體經營績效及核保利潤。本研究自保險年鑑、台灣經濟新報資料庫及保險市場重要指標，選取1998年至2006年間財務及業務資訊來進行實證分析。 依Klein (1999)分類，台灣產物保險市場屬於類似獨占性競爭市場，產物保險公司高度競爭。依實證結果顯示，實施費率自由化政策，公司自留費用率持續緩慢增加，自留綜合成本率亦呈現上升趨勢。多數產物保險公司之實際核保利潤仍大於依Fairley (1979)計算之均衡核保利潤。 實證結果摘要如下： (1) 類似獨占性競爭市場：赫芬多指數皆小於0.1，市場呈現競爭狀態。1996年後，火險及車險之簽單保費成長率似乎每四、五年會呈現負成長。另外，1998-2003年費用率與公司規模呈現顯著負相關(p=0.01)。2004-2006年，此負相關並不顯著(p=0.1)，顯示大公司漸不具有成本優勢，即產險市場之進入障礙有減少之趨勢。 (2) 成本費用支出增加：除2001年外，1998至2006年之產物保險公司自留綜合成本率介於91.09% 和 93.49%。2006年之自留綜合成本率為93.49%。2006年之產物保險公司費用率上升至40.51% 且損失率下降至52.97%。 (3) 核保利潤呈現正值：依Fairley(1979)計算之2006年預期均衡核保利潤。20家產物保險公司，17家實際核保利潤大於預期均衡核保利潤。 / This paper provides an empirical study of rate deregulation plan and profit performance in Taiwan property-liability insurance market. The data used in this study are from Insurance Year Book, Taiwan Economic Journal Data Bank, and Important Indexes of Insurance Industry (Taiwan) during the period from 1998 to 2006. Based on the classification by Klein (1999), the market structure of Taiwan property-liability insurance industry is similar to monopolistic competitive market and the property-liability insurers are engaged in intense competition. The results of this study show that the expense ratios of insurers rise slightly from year to year and the combined ratios also follow a trend of increase. The actual underwriting profits of most property-liability insurers are larger than the expected numbers estimated by using the methodology in Fairley (1979). The empirical results are as follows: (1) The market structure is similar to monopolistic competitive market for that the Herfindahl indexes are all below 0.1. The growth ratios of written premium on fire insurance and automobile insurance seem to become negative every four or five years after 1996. Besides, the negative correlation between expense ratio and the scale of economics in insurance market from 1998 to 2003 was significant at the p = 0.01 level. However, this correlation from 2004 to 2006 was not significant at the p = 0.1 level. It seems that larger insurers do not have significant cost advantages over smaller insurers in the recent years, namely the entry barriers decline. (2) The expenses and costs keep increasing. Except 2001, the combined ratios ranged from 91.09% in 1998 to 93.49% in 2006. The expense ratio increased to 40.51% while the net loss ratio decreased to 52.97% in 2006. (3) The underwriting profits of most insurers are positive. The expected underwriting profits by using the methodology in Fairley (1979) is less than the actual ones in 2006. Among the 20 property-liability insurers, the actual underwriting profits of 17 insurers were larger than their expected underwriting profits.

The aim of this thesis is to enhance our understanding of Swedish marine insurers' choices of business strategies under the potentially difficult business circumstances of the interwar period 1918-1939. Little previous research exists on marine insurance during the interwar period. This is remarkable in the Swedish context since the Swedish economy has traditionally depended on its exports. The focus on Sweden is justified since the Swedish insurance market saw regulatory stability during the interwar period. It was also characterised by the coexistence of stock and mutual insurers, allowing this thesis to contribute with insights on potentially problematic insurance cartelisaton. This thesis employs a mixed methods design, including qualitative methods and regression analysis. To interpret results, this thesis employs insurance risk theory, cartel theory, theories on reinsurance and risk diversification, and agency theory. By employing this combination of theories, it is possible to explain choices and outcomes of adopted strategies both with reference to particularities of marine insurance and with reference to particularities of the two different organisational forms. The results show that the insurers conceived several new characteristics of their business environment as challenges and implemented both cartel strategies and company-specific strategies of risk diversification. Among the challenges were rapid inflation, rapidly decreasing prices and business volumes in shipping and trade, the introduction of motor ships, and the existence of naval mines on many trade routes. Also, exchange-rate fluctuations were considered to cause losses on established marine insurance contracts and rendered business results uncertain. Swedish insurers adopted cartel strategies from 1918 through The Swedish Association of Marine Underwriters (Sjöassuradörernas Förening) since they had anticipated a post-war crisis. Market division agreements were adopted for the most attractive market segments, but eventually price agreements became the primary cartel strategy, supported by prohibitions of competition. The work on price agreements sometimes increased the market efficiency since it reduced uncertainty, for instance in insurance of cargo with motor ships. Few price agreements were however adopted for the insurance of shipping since that market segment was dominated by mutual insurers, highlighting the difficulties of cartelisation in insurance markets inhabited by both stock and mutual insurers. The cartel further adopted reinsurance agreements to create barriers to entry in the Swedish marine insurance market. It however experienced prominent difficulties to implement the cartel strategies. One prominent difficulty of implementation was cheating. Also international competition created difficulties. The cartel companies therefore engaged in international cartelisation through The International Union of Marine Insurance (Internationaler Tranport-Versicherungs-Verband) from the late 1920s. This international cartel sought to reduce international competition by agreements not to compete in foreign markets. It also sought to manage the exchange-rate fluctuations of the early 1920s and the early 1930s by agreements among marine insurers, but it failed to obtain sufficient support. In spite of cartelisation, the returns on marine insurance were pushed down by the recognized challenges during the early 1920s, inflicting losses. The business however recovered and remained profitable throughout the 1930s, showing that the great depression was not as great as the deflation crisis in marine insurance. Exchange-rate fluctuations affected the international competitive strength of both stock and mutual insurers and additionally influenced the stock insurers' returns on established marine insurance contracts. The insurers were however compensated for the poor marine business results of the early 1920s by greater reliance than previously on reinsurers and by diversification among insurance lines, which rendered profits less negative than the returns on marine insurance. The business ceded to reinsurers on average inflicted losses during each of the first seven years of the 1920s. These losses were indirectly caused by World War I since that war had caused the establishment of new reinsurers in different countries, not the least in Scandinavia, and in turn caused over capacity during the 1920s. New contractual formulations evolved internationally to the benefit of ceding insurers, indicating information asymmetries. Exits became frequent among reinsurers. In effect, into the 1930s, ceding insurers internationally found it difficult to obtain obligatory reinsurance treaties. During the early 1920s, the Swedish stock marine insurers also increasingly diversified their insurance businesses among insurance lines. This process had been catalysed by World War I, was accelerated during the 1920s, and continued into the 1930s. / Syftet med denna avhandling är att förståeliggöra svenska marinförsäkringsbolags val av affärsstrategier under mellankrigstiden 1918-1939, en period som kännetecknades av potentiellt svåra affärsförhållanden. Försäkringsverksamhet är känslig för ekonomiska kriser, men har uppmärksammats mindre än bankverksamhet när det gäller mellankrigstiden. Inte minst marinförsäkring är känslig för ekonomiska kriser eftersom de försäkrade verksamheterna, sjöfart och handel, endast förekommer i den mån som transporterade varor efterfrågas. Tidigare forskning har endast i liten omfattning fokuserat på marinförsäkring, vilket ur ett svenskt perspektiv kan tyckas anmärkningsvärt med tanke på att den svenska ekonomin har i hög grad varit beroende av sjöburen handel. En studie av svensk marinförsäkring är motiverad ur ett internationellt perspektiv eftersom den svenska försäkringslagstiftningen förblev i stort sett oförändrad under perioden, vilket gör det rimligt att tolka marinförsäkringsbolags val av affärsstrategier som svar på ekonomiska omständigheter. Under mellankrigstiden var katellstrategier ett vanligt svar på svåra affärsförhållanden i olika verksamheter, men kartellisering var potentiellt problematisk i marinförsäkring eftersom den verksamheten är internationell och eftersom marinförsäkring är en heterogen produkt. Dessutom befolkades den svenska försäkringsmarknaden av både aktiebolag och ömsesidiga bolag, vilket är ett ytterligare potentiellt hinder för kartellisering. Studier av kartellisering under potentiallt svåra förutsättningar kan bidra med insikter om under vilka förutsättningar karteller uppstår, vilket ytterligare motiverar studien. Denna avhandling analyserar även två företagsspecifika riskdiversifieringsstrategier, som potentiellt kan kompensera för låg avkastning på mottagen försäkring, nämligen återförsäkring och diversifiering mellan försäkringsgrenar. Återförsäkring har av tidigare forskning framhållits som ett underutforskat område. Avhandlingen tillämpar både kvalitativa och kvantitativa undersökningsmetoder. För att uttolka de empiriska resultaten tillämpas riskteori för försäkring, kartellteori, återförsäkringsteori, riskdiversifieringsteori, samt incitamentsteori på företagsnivå (agency theory). Denna kombination av teorier gör det möjligt att förklara strategival med utgångspunkt både i marinförsäkringens karaktäristika och i de båda olika organisationsformers karaktäristika. Resultaten visar att försäkringsbolagen noterade ett antal nya affärsförhållanden som utmaningar och att dessa bolag implementerade både kartellstrategier och företagsspecifika riskdiversifieringsstrategier. Bland de noterade utmaningarna märks snabb inflation, snabbt fallande priser och affärsvolymer i sjöfart och handel, införandet av motorfartyg, samt sjöminor på många fartygsrutter. Försäkringsbolagen behärskade endast lite erfarenhet av risker associerade med motorfartyg och sjöminor, vilket gjorde riskbedömningar osäkra. Även växelkursfluktuationer uppfattades som utmaningar eftersom de orsakade förluster på etablerade marinförsäkringskontrakt och skapade problem att förutsäga affärsresultaten. Från 1918 antog svenska marinförsäkringsbolag kartellstrategier genom branschorganisationen Sjöassuradörernas Förening, detta eftersom de förväntade sig en efterkrigskris. Marknadsuppdelningsavtal infördes i attraktiva marknadssegment, men med tiden blev prisöverenskommelser den främsta kartellstrategin, understödd av avtal som förbjöd konkurrens. Arbetet med prisöverenskommelser ökade marknadseffektiviteten i vissa marknadssegment, detta genom att reducera osäkerheten i riskbedömningarna. Ett tydligt exempel på ett sådant marknadssegment är försäkring av varor transporterade med motorfartyg. Kartellen etablerade däremot få prisöverenskommelser för försäkring av sjöfart eftersom detta marknadssegment dominerades av ömsesidiga försäkringsbolag. Denna kontrast mellan varuförsäkring och sjöfartsförsäkring belyser svårigheterna med att kartellisera en försäkringsmarknad som befolkas både av aktiebolag och av ömsesidiga bolag. Kartellen antog också återförsäkringsavtal i syfte att skapa etableringshinder på den svenska försäkringsmarknaden. Den upplevde emellertid svårigheter att implementera överenskommelserna, såsom brott mot prisöverenskommelserna och mot konkurrensförbuden. Ytterligare svårigheter skapades av internationell konkurrens. Från slutet av 1920-talet deltog därför kartellbolagen i den internationella marinförsäkringskartellen Internationaler Tranport-Versicherungs-Verband (senare benämnd The International Union of Marine Insurance). Medlemsbolagen i denna internationella kartell skapade överenskommelser med innebörden att utländska försäkringstagare inte skulle erbjudas försäkring. Dessa överenskommelser syftade till att reducera den internationella konkurrensen. Denna kartell försökte också reducera effekterna för marinförsäkringsbolag av växelkursfluktuationer genom överenskommelser om hur växelkurser skulle beräknas i marinförsäkringsfrågor. Sådana försök gjordes både under de första åren av 1920-talet och under de första åren av 1930-talet. Det avsedda resultatet kunde emellertid inte nås, detta eftersom uppslutningen förblev otillräcklig. Trots kartelliseringen reducerades avkastningen på marinförsäkring till förlustnivåer under det tidiga 1920-talet. Avkastningen förbättrades sedan stegvis och förblev positiv under 1930-talet. I marinförsäkring var alltså den stora depression inte lika stor som deflationskrisen. Växelkursfluktuationer påverkade både aktiebolags och ömsesidiga bolags internationella konkurrenskraft. Dessutom påverkade växelkurserna aktiebolagens avkastning på etablerade marinförsäkringskontrakt. Försäkringsbolagen kompenserades för 1920-talets förlustresultat i marinförsäkring genom ökad cedering av risk till återförsäkringsbolag och genom diversifiering av de mottagna riskerna mellan olika försäkringsgrenar. Under 1920-talet var bolagens vinster därför mindre negativa än resultaten i marinförsäkring. Den affär som cederades till återförsäkringsbolag var i genomsnitt förlustbringande under vart och ett av 1920-talets första sju år. Dessa förluster orsakades indirekt av första världskriget, eftersom det kriget stimulerade etablering av nya återförsäkringsbolag, detta i olika länder och inte minst i Skandinavien. I förlängningen skapade första världskriget därmed överkapacitet på återförsäkringsmarknaden. Nya kontraktsformuleringar introducerades internationellt till de cederande bolagens fördel. Detta förhållande indikerar informationsasymmetrier i relationen mellan cederande och mottagande försäkringsbolag. Många återförsäkringsbolag lämnade marknaden. Resultatet blev att cederande bolag under början av 1930-talet i olika länder fick svårigheter att sluta obligatoriska återförsäkringsavtal. Under början av 1920-talet diversifierade aktiebolagen också sin verksamhet mellan olika försäkringsgrenar. Denna process katalyserades av första världskriget, accelererade under början av 1920-talet och fortsatte in på 1930-talet.