Vado atsakomybė yra tarptautinėje paprotinėje teisėje nusistovėjęs principas. Vadai, pagal šią doktriną, atsako ne už savo pačių įvykdytus nusikaltimus, o už pavaldinių, kuriems nesugebėjo užkirsti kelio ar bausti. Ši atsakomybė kyla dėl neveikimo. Mokslininkų bendruomenėje iki šių dienų nėra aišku, ar vadai atsako už pavaldinių nusikaltimus, ar už savo paties pareigos nevykdymą. Vadai atsako už atskirą nusikaltimą, kuriam neužkirto kelio ar už kurį nebaudė, kuomet tarptautinė teisė jį buvo įpareigojus tą daryti. Vado atsakomybė yra sui generis atsakomybės už neveikimą forma. Pagal ad hoc tribunolų jurisprudenciją, vado atsakomybė susideda iš trijų elementų: vado-pavaldinių santykių, vado mens rea ir būtinų ir tinkamų priemonių užkirsti kelią nusikaltimui ar bausti nesiėmimo. Visi šie elementai turi būti įrodyti ir bet kokios abejonės kilimas turi būti sprendžiamas kaltinamojo naudai. Vado-pavaldinių santykiai galimi tik esant efektyviai vado kontrolei. Efektyvumas reiškia, kad vadas gali ne tik vienaip ar kitaip daryti įtaką pavaldinių veiksmams, tačiau ir priversti paklusti, materialiai sugebėti užkirsti kelią nusikaltimams ar bausti. Romos statute karo vadų ir asmenų, efektyviai vykdančių karo vado funkcijas, mens rea skiriasi nuo civilių vadų. Romos statuto travaux préparatoires pasufleruoja, kad civiliai vadai, skirtingai nei karo, neturi tokių pačių galimybių vykdyti savo pareigas. Dėl šios priežasties jų žinojimo standartas yra švelnesnis nei karo vadų. Romos statutas... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Superior responsibility, otherwise known as command responsibility, is a well established doctrine in both treaty and customary international law. Superiors are held criminally responsible for breaches of international humanitaran law committed by their subordinates. Responsibility arises only after superior fails to take any preventive or punitive action when he was under a duty to do so. There is no common opinion of what that doctrine should stand for, is it a mode of liability for subordinates crimes or a separate offence of superior. It is a crime of omission which has no or little support in national legislation systems. Superior responsibility is a sui generis form of responsibility for omission. Superior responsibility, according to ad hoc tribunals jurisprudence, is constructed of three elements which are superior-subordinate relationship, superior’s mens rea and ability to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent subordinate’s crime and punish. All these elements must be proofed beyond reasonable doubt. Superior-subordinate relationship can only be established if there existed effective command and control between those two. Effectiveness is a material ability to influence subordinates actions in a way of either stopping them from committing a crime or being able to punish. Superiors mens rea in Rome Statute for military commander and a person, effectively acting as such is more strict than for other superiors, described in art. 28(b). Travaux... [to full text]

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The master's thesis represents an analysis of the sources of law, case law and literature concerning the doctrine of command responsibility. Analysis itself is preceded by the description of historical development of command responsibility. Aim of the analysis is to identify requirements of command responsibility set out by the ad hoc tribunals and requirements of command responsibility according to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, to compare those requirements and to find out most significant differences between the two approaches. Analysis provides that according to the Rome Statute there are two more requirements than according to the ad hoc tribunals' case law. Firstly there is the requirement of causal relationship and secondly there are two categories of superiors introduced - the military or military-like commanders and other superiors. Newly, there are slightly stricter requirements of responsibility for the former category than for the latter. Benefits of this thesis include the identification of requirements of command responsibility in Czech language.

This thesis analyses States’ duty to investigate grave breaches of humanitarian law and how it applies to deep reinforcement learning autonomous weapons. It identifies basic technologic intricacies related to deep reinforcement learning and discusses what issues may arise if such software is used in weapons systems. The thesis applies a legal doctrinal method to study how the technology could frustrate the grave breaches regime and hamper States’ ability to investigate suspected incidents. Furthermore, investigative standards under humanitarian law and human rights law are examined in the context of autonomous weapons systems.  The main argument is that deep reinforcement learning algorithms create a black box that is virtually impossible to investigate and consequently causes accountability issues.

During the 1990s Yugoslavia and Rwanda were swept by wars accompanied by serious violations of international humanitarian law. Grave and severe crimes wiped away lives and destroyed properties. The United Nations Security Council determined that the violations committed constituted threats to international peace and security, declaring itself empowered to take action. It established international ad hoc criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda with the mandate of prosecuting individuals responsible for those crimes as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Investigating the tribunals’ effectiveness enables one to assess whether they achieved the anticipated outcomes based on the tribunals’ mission, goals, and objectives without creating other problems. The research relies on naturalism and positivism to put the tribunals in a moral and ethical perspective. By examining how the tribunals were established, their objectives, the investigation and prosecution processes, the reliance on guilty plea and judicial notice and the imputation of criminal responsibility by applying joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility doctrines; the study argues that prosecution has not been an effective tool as contemplated by the Security Council. An analytical and comparative review of various domestic and international legal resources helped to provide an insightful approach for an effective prosecution of international crimes. Credible, legitimate and legal judicial institutions in which professional judges and prosecutors discharge their function independently, impartially and are accountable may achieve justice for the victims of international crimes. Ad hoc tribunals failed to thoroughly investigate and assume the dual role of prosecution. They conveniently used legal procedural tools that fit petty domestic crimes; unfortunately demeaning the magnitude of international crimes of concern. Criminal responsibility was mostly imputed without properly scrutinising the legality, extent, actual participation and guilty mind of the alleged perpetrators. Effectiveness should be a value assessment. Imposed and overburdened ad hoc tribunals are inappropriate and should be abandoned. / Public, Constitutional, & International / LLD

During the 1990s Yugoslavia and Rwanda were swept by wars accompanied by serious violations of international humanitarian law. Grave and severe crimes wiped away lives and destroyed properties. The United Nations Security Council determined that the violations committed constituted threats to international peace and security, declaring itself empowered to take action. It established international ad hoc criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda with the mandate of prosecuting individuals responsible for those crimes as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Investigating the tribunals’ effectiveness enables one to assess whether they achieved the anticipated outcomes based on the tribunals’ mission, goals, and objectives without creating other problems. The research relies on naturalism and positivism to put the tribunals in a moral and ethical perspective. By examining how the tribunals were established, their objectives, the investigation and prosecution processes, the reliance on guilty plea and judicial notice and the imputation of criminal responsibility by applying joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility doctrines; the study argues that prosecution has not been an effective tool as contemplated by the Security Council. An analytical and comparative review of various domestic and international legal resources helped to provide an insightful approach for an effective prosecution of international crimes. Credible, legitimate and legal judicial institutions in which professional judges and prosecutors discharge their function independently, impartially and are accountable may achieve justice for the victims of international crimes. Ad hoc tribunals failed to thoroughly investigate and assume the dual role of prosecution. They conveniently used legal procedural tools that fit petty domestic crimes; unfortunately demeaning the magnitude of international crimes of concern. Criminal responsibility was mostly imputed without properly scrutinising the legality, extent, actual participation and guilty mind of the alleged perpetrators. Effectiveness should be a value assessment. Imposed and overburdened ad hoc tribunals are inappropriate and should be abandoned. / Public, Constitutional, and International / LL. D.

This study examines the phenomenon of abusive violence (AV) in the context of the American Post-9/11 Counter-terrorism and Counter-insurgency campaigns. Previous research into atrocities by states and their agents has largely come from examinations of totalitarian regimes with well-developed torture and assassination institutions. The mechanisms influencing willingness to do harm have been examined in experimental studies of obedience to authority and the influences of deindividuation, dehumanization, context and system. This study used Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) to examine the lived experience of AV reported by fourteen American military and intelligence veterans. Participants were AV observers, objectors, or abusers. Subjects described why AV appeared sensible at the time, how methods of violence were selected, and what sense they made of their experiences after the fact. Accounts revealed the roles that frustration, fear, anger and mission pressure played to prompt acts of AV that ranged from the petty to heinous. Much of the AV was tied to a shift in mission view from macro strategic aims of CT and COIN to individual and small group survival. Routine hazing punishment soldiers received involving forced exercise and stress positions made similar acts inflicted on detainees unrecognizable as abusive. Overt and implied permissiveness from military superiors enabled AV extending to torture, and extra-judicial killings. Attempting to overcome feelings of vulnerability, powerlessness and rage, subjects enacted communal punishment through indiscriminate beatings and shooting. Participants committed AV to amuse themselves and humiliate their enemies; some killed detainees to force confessions from others, conceal misdeeds, and avoid routine paperwork. Participants realized that AV practices were unnecessary, counter-productive, and self-damaging. Several reduced or halted their AV as a result. The lived experience of AV left most respondents feeling guilt, shame, and inadequacy, whether they committed abuse or failed to stop it.