原住民族長期生活於山村地區，有著特殊民族文化維繫個人或團體間長期的互動，惟日本時期沿襲迄今的保留地制度，無論是空間區位的選擇或增劃編地點的決定，原住民族毫無參與的餘地，導致無法妥善勘選區位適當的土地作為原住民保留地使用，進而使文化傳承、經濟生活所依賴的母土逐漸流失；近年來受國外原住民保留地經營管理成功案例的激勵及民族意識的興起下，原住民發起三次還我土地運動，而政府部門在增劃編的回應中，也認真的思索保留地興革的建議，遂在學者專家及原住民族菁英的討論過程，凝聚回復傳統產權共有舊制的共識。 　　憲法增修條文第十條第十二項對原住民族基本權的規範，含有「制度保障」之意涵，因此原住民族土地管理法規，是有提昇為法律位階之必要性，爰由內政部研定「原住民族土地開發管理條例」草案，刻正依法定程序送請立法院審議中。按該條例草案異於前之管理辦法者，在於增加了「原住民族保留區」的制度設計，新制在原住民族社會已有共識，惟尚缺乏個案研究的實證分析，因此難以辨別制度可能引發的後遺症，爰有本研究就桃源鄉進行個案分析驗證。 　　本研究以國外學者Elinor Ostrom在制度經濟學對共用資源共管機制的制度設計原則，來檢驗分析個案在保留區新制實施過程中，可能衍生的問題，以實地問卷訪談的方式進行調查；嗣經得知劃設原住民族保留區可以解決桃源鄉現存的保留地問題，而劃設地點以該鄉梅山村及寶山村最適宜，惟應建立一套劃設指標據以實施且應有相關配套措施，最後根據當地原住民的意見反應，證明集體決策理論觀點，適合運用在劃設原住民族保留區的決策過程。 　　此外，在後續研究的部分，本研究亦建議：桃源鄉小規模群體自主治理的資源利用方式，可否全面運用到保留區新制，有待與其他個案比較分析及探討，而欲達此政策目的，必須選定實驗區域，進行試驗及檢討，方得確保制度設計成為法律後，能夠彌補現行保留地措施肇致政府失靈與市場失靈的缺失。 / Taiwan indigenous people have lived in mountainous area for centuries. The interactions between their individuals and groups are regulated by specific cultures. However, the Reserved Land Institution began with Japan Colonist Era does not allow indigenous people to chose the place they live in by themselves. It made improper zoning. urthermore, it led to the land, which had supported their cultural and economic life lapsed gradually. In past twenty years, encouraged by the international indigenous movements and domestic ideology wakening, Taiwan indigenous people had held the Return My Land Demonstrations for three times. Government began to deliberate the reform of Indigenous Reserved Land Institution, and acquired conclusions after long-term discussion between government, scholars and indigenous elites. One of the conclusions is to revert to the traditional land tenure co-owning institution. 　　According to the Added Article of the Constitution (article 10, item 12) , this country has obligation to protect the basic rights of indigenous people with formal institutions. It means the Indigenous Reserved Land Developing and Managing Regulation needs to be promoted to a formal law. At this moment, The Legislative Yuan is deliberating the Indigenous Reserved Land Developing and Managing Law drafted by the Exclusive Yuan. A new designing named Reserved Area was made in it. This new designing was agreed by most of indigenous people. However, there is no empirical analysis to it and its side effect so far. Therefore, this research examined the Reserved Area Institution by case study in Taoyuan Township of Kaohsiung County. 　　The theoretical basis of this research is the institution designing principles of common pool resources self-governance, which addressed by Elinor Ostrom. Meanwhile, the investigation was processed by questionnaires. After the analysis, this research pointed that Indigenous Reserved Area Institution can solve the problems of Reserved land in Taoyuan Township now. The most proper locations of Indigenous Reserved Area are May-Shan and Pao-Shan villages. In farther step, it needs relative supporting measures and concrete area setting index. Beside, base on the responses of local residences, the research proved that Collective Action Theory is proper to be applied in the decision making process of setting the Indigenous Reserved Area. 　　In the end, the research suggested: the way people in Taoyuan Township governing their resource is not definitely proper to other indigenous groups. The precondition of implementing the new designing is to make more case tudies, compares and analysis. It is necessary to have small-scale experiments in advance. In the way, it can just correct the market failure and government failure caused by on going regulation when the new designing becomes a formal new law.

土地制度規範著對於土地的使用所引起的人與人之間相互認可的行為關係，對於制度起源的討論，往往認為制度具有降低成本、創造集體利益的功能，但由於制度主體的因素，制度則可能是國家對某一群體的剝削，例如日治時期將原住民土地收歸國有；由於制度安排的失當，很可能使得後續的發展陷入惡性的路徑依賴之中，例如民國五十五年的保留地私有化政策後原住民地權的快速流失。 　　一項近年的政府調查顯示，原住民保留地被非法使用、私下轉讓的情況日益嚴重，但同一時期的另一項研究卻又指出：原住民社會普遍傾向認為原住民保留地不得移轉給非原住民的限制不宜開放。從政治經濟的角度來說，保留地若朝向全面的私有化、開放原漢買賣，固然可以回應市場立即的需求，但交易過程中信息不完全、原住民經濟的弱勢等等外部效果卻不可能依靠市場機制加以解決，同時，可預見的原住民土地大量流失將和社會普遍認同的價值相違背；另一方面，保留地若朝向以國有化進行政府的干預，固然可以抑制自由買賣造成的原住民地權流失，但卻又和資源利用極佳化的市場邏輯相去甚遠而必須付出高額的成本，亦難以有效執行；從制度研究的眼光來看，現行的保留地制度正處於兩難下的制度失衡狀態。 　　在五年的反覆討論之後，內政部法規會於九十年一月十七號通過了「原住民族保留地開發管理條例草案」，該條例草案最大的特色是在所有權移轉限制下，增加了「原住民族保留區」的制度設計，在「原住民族保留區」中的土地所有權，得登記為原住民部落團體「共有」，土地的經營管理也將由部落團體來共同進行，這樣的政策所呈現是政府對於社會壓力和原住民土地困境的回應。然而，作為共有制實行的基礎，無論是在學理上或實證上，對於共有資源自主治理的探討都有尚待進一步充實的空間。 　　經過先期的調查和訪談，本研究選定新竹縣尖石鄉中三個公共資源自主治理的案例，並從制度經濟與集體選擇理論的架構，分析案例中人們如何建立自主性的組織，如何經由集體的選擇制定符合當地條件的公共資源治理規則，如何履行彼此的承諾並相互監督，以及如何避免陷入集體不理性的過度利用的悲劇，且對於案例中影響原住民部落採取資源共有和自主治理策略的因素加以探討。最後，評析內在制度的變遷及泰雅族傳統制度在現代的演化，以及公共資源自主管理在降低執行和監督成本、降低其外部效果、降低制度供給的成本等方面的制度優勢，並指出資源形式與共有範圍的關係、學習過程的重要、共有組織的作用是為共有制度有效運作的關鍵。 　　此外，在後續研究部份，本研究亦建議：理論上對於非以直接提取資源單位方式產生的利益分配問題、排他性技術的成本的雙重影響的探討；實證上對於集團移住後的原住民部落中共有組織的分析；政策上對共有組織「分級分類」原則的研議，皆值得作為後續進一步研究的課題。 / Institution about land rules the relationship, which is caused by land using and identified between people. According to the discussion of the beginning of institution, it can descend the cost of trade and make collective interesting. However, institutions can also be the means for a nation to exploit its people because of the subject of institution. The Nationalization of land, which is owned by aboriginal people in the time Japan governed Taiwan for instance. And, because of the improper arrangement of institution, the development may go in to a vicious path-dependence circle; the privatization policy in 1966 made the fast lapse of aboriginal land for example. 　　A recent investigation made by government shows that more and more aboriginal reserved-land was illegally sold and transferred in the black market. However, in the same time, another research appointed that most people in aboriginal society disagree the revocation of the limit that non-aboriginal cannot get the property of aboriginal reserved-land. In the view of political economics, if the property of aboriginal reserved-land was turn to entirely privatized, it can reply the immediate need market, but the external diseconomy such as incomplete information and the lower position of the aboriginal people can not be resolved by the market, and the following results that most of the aboriginal land property lapse will belie the general value identified by our society. On the other hand, if the property of aboriginal keeps on nationalized it can bate the lapse of the land property, but government has to pay high cost to belie the market logic hat resource should be optima used, and it will be difficult to administer. In the view of institutional study, the institution of aboriginal reserved-land is in a situation of inequilibrium. 　　After a long discussion lasted from more than five years, the Act Committee of Administer Department announced a proposed act for the development and administers of aboriginal reserved-land. The most particular part of this proposed act is the design of "aboriginal-reserved zone" and common land property. The total area of the aboriginal reserved zones was supposed to be 1.4 million acres, and the land property in the zones may belong to the whole settlement society. Such a policy is a positive reply to the social strait and the predicament of aboriginal society. However, being the base to exercise the common property institution, either the theoretical or the practical discussion of the "common pool resources self-governing" still needs to be completed. 　　A previous investigation and visiting, an Atayal county with three CPR self-governing cases was chosen in this approach. With a framework of institutional economics and collective act theory, this approach analyzed how people organized a self-governing organization, how a public choice was made to design the rules which are proper to local CPR situation, how people fulfill their obligation and supervise each other, how people avoid the tragic result o collective irrationality such as over using, furthermore, discuss the factor effect the CPR self-governing strategy .In the end, this approach discuss the change of internal institution and the evolution of Atayal tribes’ traditional institution in modern time, and the advantage of self-governing institution. Then, pointed out the relation between types of resources and areas of common property, the processes of learning, and the effects of organization are the key points to exercise the common property institution. 　　In addition, this approach suggested: in the theoretical aspect, the dispute caused by distribution of the interest that was not made by direct appropriation, the dual influence from the cost of exclusion technology. And, in the practical aspect, the principles to classify the self-governing organizations, can be the new problematic for further approach.

The Peruvian anchoveta fishery was for nearly 60 years characterized by the unsustainable dynamics of open access resource pools. This thesis investigates whether the 2009 Peruvian Legislative Decree 1084 on Individual Vessel Quotas (IVQ's) is an effective response to the industrial overcapacity and race-to-fish problems that threatened the environment before its implementation. It employs Common-Pool Resource theory to assess the impact of the new IVQ scheme on collective dynamics, and Ribot and Peluso's access theory (2009) to elucidate evolving power relations in the fishery. In this framework, DL1084 is evaluated as a regulatory instrument, as a lens on fisheries governance in Peru, and as a source of insight into how environmental impact serves in developing regulations of natural resource exploitation. A triangulated mixed-method design is employed: (1) a two-stream literature review of fisheries management and of the fishery's political ecology; (2) a quantitative analysis of daily state-published landings reports; and (3) seven in-depth intensive interviews with key actors in the fishery, conducted in Peru over two field-trips of approximately 2 months in total. Results indicate that although IVQ's supported existing trends towards large-scale economic efficiency and altered extreme competitive strategies previously associated with open access, fishing companies have built larger ships, favour bigger catches and still concentrate fishing effort around a given annual peak. Meanwhile, capacity has again increased in the unregulated artisanal fishery sector. DL1084 appears to reflect a broader process of growing private sector involvement in managing the fishery, made official by its institutionalization of market self-regulation. Ultimately, it evidences deep structure and capacity limitations in the state's ability to govern marine resources. The law was nevertheless seen as a landmark for the environmental legal process in Peru and an opportunity for reform. This thesis suggests that studying such legislations can provide insight into state identity and the evolving relationship between a nation and its geography. / Durante casi 60 años, la pesquería peruana de anchoveta estaba caracterizada por las dinámicas insostenibles de la explotación de recursos de propiedad común en situación de acceso abierto. Esta tesis investiga si el Decreto Legislativo Peruano 1084 (DL1084) sobre Límites Máximos de Captura por Embarcación (LMCE) es una respuesta efectiva a los problemas de sobrecapacidad industrial y de carrera por el recurso que amenazaban el ambiente antes de su aplicación en 2009. Se basa en la teoría de los Recursos de Propiedad Común (Common-Pool Resource theory) para evaluar el impacto del nuevo modelo de gestión por LMCE sobre las dinámicas colectivas, y en la teoría del Acceso de Ribot y Peluso (2009) para trazar la evolución de las relaciones de poder en la pesquería. En este marco, el DL1084 es evaluado como herramienta regulatoria, como lente sobre la gobernanza pesquera en el Perú y como reflejo del proceso por el cual el impacto ambiental sirve como base para el desarrollo de regulaciones sobre el acceso a recursos naturales. Sigue un diseño triangulado de métodos combinados: (1) una revisión de literatura en dos ramas de la gestión de pesquería como campo general y de la ecología política de la pesquería de anchoveta; (2) un análisis cuantitativo de los informes diarios de desembarques publicados por el estado (IMARPE); y (3) siete entrevistas intensivas de fondo con actores claves en la pesquería, realizadas en Perú durante dos visitas de aproximadamente dos meses en total. Los resultados indican que a pesar de que los LMCE soportaron una tendencia existente hacia una eficiencia económica de mayor escala y alteraron las estrategias competitivas extremas asociadas con el acceso abierto, las empresas pesqueras han construido embarcaciones más grandes, favorecen capturas de mayor tamaño y todavía concentran su esfuerzo pesquero alrededor de un pico anual de abundancia. En paralelo, ha aumentado la capacidad de captura en el sector artesanal, el cual no cuenta con límites de captura. El DL1084 aparece como parte de un proceso más general de creciente involucramiento del sector privado en el manejo de la pesquería, haciéndolo oficial por su misma institucionalización de la autorregulación del mercado. Por último, pone en evidencia profundas limitaciones de estructura y de capacidad en el estado en cuanto a cómo gobierna los recursos marinos. La ley ha sin embargo sido vista como un precedente importante para el proceso legislativo ambiental en el Perú así como una oportunidad para impulsar otras reformas. Esta tesis sugiere que el estudio de tales legislaciones puede ofrecer una mirada sobre los procesos de formación de la identidad de un estado y sobre la evolución de la relación entre una nación y su geografía.

Why do communal conflicts turn violent in some regions but not in others? Communal conflicts pose a severe threat to human security and kill thousands of people each year, but our understanding of this phenomenon is still limited. In particular, we lack knowledge about why some of these conflicts become violent while others are resolved peacefully. This study addresses this knowledge gap and has a novel approach by addressing subnational variations that are unexplained by previous research. The theoretical framework combines insights from three different perspectives focusing on the role of the state, elite interactions, and conditions for cooperation over common resources. Empirically, the research question is investigated by combining within- and between-region analyses of three Sudanese regions: Darfur, Eastern Sudan, and Greater Upper Nile. Despite sharing several similar characteristics, communal conflicts have killed thousands in Darfur and Greater Upper Nile but only a few dozen in Eastern Sudan. The empirical analysis builds on extensive material collected during fieldwork. This study generates several conclusions about the importance of government conduct and how state behavior contributes to the prevalence of violent communal conflicts. It finds that when governments act in a biased manner – favoring certain communities over others – interactions between central and local elites as well as among local elites are disrupted. Unconstructive elite interactions, in turn, have negative effects on three mechanisms that are crucial for communal cooperation. First, when the regime is biased, communal affiliation, rather than the severity and context of a violation, determines the sanctions that are imposed on the perpetrators. Second, government bias leads to unclear boundaries, which contribute to violent communal conflicts by creating disarray and by shifting power balances between the communities. Third, regime partiality distances rules from local conditions and restricts the influence of local actors who have an understanding of local circumstances. The study also reveals why a regime acts with partiality in some areas but not in others. The answer to this question is found in the complex interplay between the threats and opportunities that a region presents to the regime. Taken together, the findings have important implications for the prevention and management of communal conflict.