Recognition memory for complex pictures was investigated using 3 variables: meaningf ulness of the target (anomalous or conventional), type of transformation in the distractor (substitution or rearrangement), and extent of transformation (whether the target and distractor were consistent or inconsistent in meaningf ulness) . Three- and four- year olds were familiarized with 16 different thematic scenes with which a child this age would likely have had experience. Half of the target pictures shown to a child were conventional, and half were anomalous, containing either an object or arrangement of objects that did not fit the theme. During the recognition test, targets were paired with distractors that were either conventional or anomalous (yielding the consistent-inconsistent conditions) and contained either a substitution of one object or a rearrangement of objects. Overall, recognition memory was similar for conventional and anomalous targets indicating that both types of pictures were assimilated into schemata equally well. When target and distractor were inconsistent in meaningfulness, recognition memory was facilitated. Thus, information about whether the target contained an anomaly or not was remembered.

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Children at ages 4 and 7 were presented three stories, one in each of three causality versions, in order to determine whether inference ability and recall are influenced by the strength of the causal chain in the story. For each story, children were asked two inference questions about logical causality, two questions constrained by story information, and two unconstrained inference questions. Three question-timing conditions were used to address issues concerning when inferences are drawn in story comprehension and how they are influenced by the total amount of information provided. Questions were asked either on-line, or at the end of the story, or not at all. Following completion of each story, children were asked to retell it, and were then asked premise information questions.

In language, information is omitted for brevity. Comprehension requires inferences to be made, but do we make such inferences during encoding or later? Kintsch (1988) claimed that transitive inferences are made during reading and proposed transitive inferences are extracted from a constructed mental image. Two experiments were performed to test his ideas. Participants read sentences permitting a transitive or reciprocal inference, then immediately answered an inference based question. Data included reaction time and accuracy. By comparing verification against inferential sentences, it is possible to determine if the inference is made during encoding or later. A further manipulation was to compare concrete sentences that could be easily converted to an image with abstract sentences that are hard to image. Results showed reciprocal sentences are slower to verify than transitive, suggesting additional processing is needed. In contrast, no difference was observed between concrete and abstract relations, calling into question Kintsch’s inference/image view.

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Thesis (Ed.D.)--Boston University.

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