This study analyzes the rule of the law of treaties permitting the provisional application of treaties or parts thereof, which usually occurs between signature and ratification (article 25 of the 1969 Vienna Convention). Chapter 1 reviews the negotiating record of article 25. Chapter 2 examines the reasons for provisional application, which include the urgency of the treaty and preparation for a new international organization. Chapter 3 considers article 25 in detail, while chapter 4 explores provisional application under customary international law, including the origins of the custom. The constitutionality of provisional application and the municipal effect of provisionally applied treaties are examined in chapter 5, along with provisional application in South African law and treaty practice. Chapter 6 considers the special role of provisional application in the field of arms control instruments. The main conclusion reached is that the principle of pacta sunt servanda applies during the provisional period. / Jurisprudence / LL.M

This study examines the implementation and enforcement of the right to environment in the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and compares it with the situation in South Africa. To date, there is no legislation in the DRC that gives effect to this right, and the gap between the guaranteed right and the reality remains significant. Guidance may be found in the South African model for implementing and enforcing environmental right(s) which is sustained by an array of legislation. While the priorities on the agenda of political leaders in the DRC lack real willingness to deal with this matter, parliament must be pressured to pass legislation that gives effect to the right to environment and to improve the current framework of environmental regulation. It is imperative to create awareness in government and at grassroots level for the protection of the environment as a human right. / Jurisprudence / LL.M.

Text in Afrikaans / In this thesis, the place and role of incorporeal things in the new South African law of things are examined. In the Roman law and Germanic customary law not only physical but also incorporeal objects, including rights, were regarded as things. In the early South African law of property (the period until 1950) a wide interpretation was given to the concept "thing". Consequently, things were said to denote either corporeal or incorporeal objects, as was the position in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. The recognition of incorporeal things suffered a setback during the fifties with the reception of the theories of the Pandectists in the South African law of things. The reception of the Pandectists theories can in all probability be attributed to writers such as WA Joubert and CG Van der Merwe. These writers gives preference to a narrow thing concept which only includes corporeal things and can be related to a certain interpretation of the doctrine of private law (subjective) rights which they adhere to. Incorporeal things are merely considered as exceptions. However, this narrow interpretation of things, are not generally accepted as correct. Several academics and the South African legal practice acknowledge a wider and more pragmatic concept of things which includes incorporeal things. Even before South Africa's new constitutional dispensation, pressure were exercised to extend the private law concept of things, despite the resistance of Joubert and Van der Merwe against the acknowledgement of incorporeal things. Creative legislation were introduced in 1971 which extended the concept of things by creating new land use rights. Within the context of the protection of land rights, a functional division of ownership is required in order to overcome the conflict between individual rights and public interests. The fragmentation of land rights provide the greatest possible number of people with the widest possible chance of access to land, and where necessary ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide suitable security of tenure. Needs and problems regarding land reform were also addressed through legislation by recognizing different rights in land. By doing so, further pressure was placed on the narrow thing concept. Against this background, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 started a new era for the South African private law. It is within this context that the relationship between private and public law comes to the fore. The Constitution offers the possibility of a wide interpretation of the public law concept of things. Our courts has already confirmed that the constitutional meaning of property is wider than the private law concept of property and that constitutional property is not limited to corporeal things. The application of the new constitutional dispensation on specific areas such as new property, labour related rights and intellectual property must be considered in light of the fact that the thing concept differs in the private law and public law. These constitutional developments can only sometimes be seen as an extension of the narrow thing concept. The implication is that incorporeal objects and rights can therefore be accommodated either within the existing private law paradigm, or within the wider constitutional paradigm. It is also argued that in certain circumstances ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide the required security and protection. An analysis of the literature indicates that this is the preferable approach, rather than the dogmatic view that incorporeal things, in the form of other rights, are not considered as things. The new public law thing concept will have no influence on the further development of the private law in certain cases, but in combination with the existing theoretical and practical pressures to adopt a wider thing concept, the narrow private law approach could be given the final death-blow. / In hierdie verhandeling word die plek en rol van onstoflike sake binne die nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg ondersoek. In die Romeinse reg en Germaanse gemenereg is nie net stoflike nie maar ook onstoflike objekte, insluitende regte, as sake beskou. In die vroee Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsreg (die tydperk tot 1950) is daar 'n wye interpretasie aan die begrip "saak" geheg. Daar is gevolglik verklaar dat sowel stoflike as onstoflike objekte sake is, soortgelyk aan die posisie in die Romeinse en Romeinse-Hollandse reg. Die erkenning van onstoflike sake het 'n terugslag beleef gedurende die vyftiger jare met die resepsie van die Pandektiste se teoriee in die Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg. Die resepsie van die Pandektisme kan waarskynlik toegeskryf word aan skrywers soos WA Joubert en CG Van der Merwe. Hierdie skrywers verkies 'n enger omskrywing van die saakbegrip wat slegs stoflike sake insluit, in navolging van 'n bepaalde interpretasie van die leerstuk van subjektiewe regte. Onstoflike sake word bloot as uitsonderings verklaar. Hierdie eng interpretasie wat aan die saakbegrip geheg word, word egter nie algemeen as korrek aanvaar nie. Verskeie akademici en die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraktyk erken 'n wyer en meer pragmatiese saakbegrip wat onstoflike sake insluit. Desondanks Joubert en Van der Merwe se weerstand teen die erkenning van onstoflike sake, is daar reeds voor Suid-Afrika se nuwe konstitusionele bedeling druk uitgeoefen om die privaatregtelike saakbegrip uit te brei. Kreatiewe wetgewing het in 1971 die lig gesien wat die privaatregtelik saakbegrip uitgebrei het deur die skepping van nuwe grondgebruiksregte. In die konteks van die beskerming van grondregte word 'n funksionele verdeling van eiendomsreg vereis ten einde die konflik tussen individuele regte en die openbare belang te oorkom. Die fragmentasie van grondregte bied aan die grootste moontlike aantal mense die wydste moontlike geleentheid om toegang tot grand te verkry. Behoeftes en probleme ten aansien van grondhervorming is oak by wyse van wetgewing aangespreek deur die erkenning van verskillende regte in grand. Sodoende is verdere druk op die eng saakbegrip geplaas. Teen hierdie agtergrond het die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 108 van 1996 'n nuwe era in die Suid-Afrikaanse privaatregtelike sakereg ingelui. Binne hierdie konteks staan die verhouding tussen die privaat- en publiekregtelike saakbegrip op die voorgrond. Die Grondwet skep die moontlikheid om 'n wyer interpretasie aan die publiekregtelike saakbegrip te heg. Ons howe het reeds bevestig dat die konstitusionele betekenis van eiendom wyer is as die privaatregtelike eiendomskonsep en dat eiendom as 'n konstitusionele reg nie beperk word tot stoflike sake nie. Die nuwe konstitusionele bedeling se toepassing op spesifieke velde soos new property, arbeidsverwante regte en intellektuele goedereregte moet beoordeel word met inagneming van die feit dat die saakbegrip in die privaat- en publiekreg van mekaar verskil. Hierdie konstitusionele ontwikkelings kan soms as uitbreidings van die eng saakbegrip gesien word en soms nie. Die implikasie hiervan is dat onstoflike sake en regte of binne die bestaande privaatregparadigma of binne 'n wyer konstitusionele paradigma verklaar kan word. Daarword ook geargumenteer dat ad hoc wetgewing in sekere gevalle uitgevaardig moet word ten einde die nodige sekerheid en beskerming te verleen. 'n Analise van die literatuur dui daarop dat hierdie 'n lofwaardige benadering is, wat verkies moet word bo die dogmatiese siening dat onstoflike sake, in die gedaante van ander regte, nie as sake beskou kan word nie. In sommige gevalle sal die nuwe publiekregtelike saakbegrip geen invloed op die verdere ontwikkeling van die privaatreg uitoefen nie, maar in kombinasie met die reeds bestaande teoretiese en praktiese druk om 'n wyer saakbegrip te aanvaar kan dit die eng privaatregtelike benadering 'n finale nekslag toedien. / Private Law / LL.D.

Law / LL.M.

Text in Afrikaans / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LLM

Law / LL.M.

Afrikaans text. / Public, Constitutional, & International / LLM

I Europa finns det flertal exempel på länder där den politiska makten utnyttjat sin maktposition, vilket har resulterat i ett lidande för befolkningen. Många länder och dess medborgare har varit utsatta för diktaturstyre, maktmissbruk och kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter. En konstitution kan fungera som ett medel för att garantera medborgarna vissa fri- och rättigheter samt att begränsa den styrande makten från att kränka de värderingar som är tänkta att prägla samhället. Den mest grundläggande författningen i ett rättssystem utgörs av en eller flera grundläggande författningar, dessa grundlagar anger riktlinjer för vilka värderingar och normer som ska styra samhället. Grundlagen, konstitutionen eller statsförfattningen ska tillförsäkra en normgivande funktion i ett rättssystem genom att reglera bland annat bestämmelser om sin överordnade ställning. Den överordnade ställningen innebär att den genom sina stadganden ska vägleda den lagstiftande makten till att anta lagar som är förenliga med grundlagen. Konstitutionen kan också tillförsäkra alla medborgare deras rättigheter att delta i det politiska rummet, genom att föreskriva grundläggande värderingar som tillförsäkrar att minoriteters rättigheter garanteras. Ett viktigt element i konstitutionalismen är just att begränsa att en politiskt vald makt inte ska kunna ändra på grundläggande författningar som enbart syftar till att gynna majoritetsåsikter i landet. Däremot finns det inga krav på vilka värderingar som konstitutionen ska föreskriva, ett lands författning kan vara god eller ond och tillförsäkra medborgarna skilda rättigheter och binda landets lagstiftande makt på olika sätt. Bosnien och Hercegovina (BiH) är ett land som grundar sig på en konstitution som landet själv inte har författat. Konstitutionen är unik eftersom den är skapad av omvärlden i samband med Dayton Peace Agreement med syftet att bygga upp en stat som ska tillförsäkra fred och rättvisa. Sverige däremot är ett land som har en lång tradition av fred och ett stabilt välfungerande samhälle, ett land där den politiska makten verkar med folkets förtroende. Konstitutionen har historiskt sett inte haft en stark ställning i Sverige och behovet av att begränsa den politiska makten har inte alltid varit en prioritering. För att försäkra konstitutionens genomslag i ett land och att den efterlevs av den lagstiftande makten krävs det någon form av kontroller som kan tillförsäkra konstitutionens effekt. Kontrollerna kan göras i form av preventiv normkontroll som utövas innan parlamentet antagit en lag och ett system av efterhandskontroll av redan antagna lagar. Båda formerna av kontroll utövas i BiH och i Sverige. I BiH utövas den preventiva normkontrollen av The Constitutional Legal Commitee (Ustavnopravna Komisija), vilka granskar alla lagförslag och andra juridiska akter under lagstiftningsprocessen i parlamentet. I Sverige finns ett liknande organ, Lagrådet som på begäran av regeringen eller aktuellt riksdagsutskott uttalar sig om ett lagförslags grundlagsförenlighet innan lagen ska antas av riksdagen.  Utöver den preventiva kontrollen finns det även en möjlighet att genomföra efterhandskontroll av lagarnas grundlagsförenlighet i länderna. I BiH har författningsdomstolen ensam kompetens i att utöva den konkreta normkontrollen och har möjlighet att kräva en ändring av en lag eller att kräva upphävning av en rättsakt som bedömts vara oförenlig med den nationella konstitutionen. I Sverige utövas den konkreta normkontrollen av alla de allmänna domstolarna men också av förvaltningsmyndigheterna. Om något av dessa organ skulle förklara att en lag inte är förenlig med grundlagen kan de enbart åsidosätta den grundlagsstridiga lagen i det aktuella ärendet.9 BiH och Sverige är länder med tämligen olika konstitutioner och de har valt skilda metoder för att garantera konstitutionens genomslag. Uppsatsen kommer att belysa ländernas likheter och skillnader vid den konkreta normkontrollen samt undersöka vad för effekter dessa skilda modeller av konkret normkontroll ger för att försäkra konstitutionens värderingar och dess genomslag.

A different type of polity requires a different type of constitution; more importantly, it also requires a different way of thinking, a new constitutionalism able to address the relevant descriptive and normative questions facing this new political entity. This thesis tries to contribute to the development of EU constitutionalism by focusing on the interplay between the different normative concerns behind the EU’s market freedoms identified in traditional legal discourse – as results mainly from court decisions and academic discussions –, and the institutional environment which mediates the freedoms’ application. It is hypothesised that such interplay can be better understood by reference to the findings of some disciplines ‘external’ to internal legal discourses such as economics, philosophy, or political science. Normatively, it is hoped that debates concerning the market freedoms that take into account ‘external elements’ will be more attractive to the legal community than those that do not include such considerations. Descriptively, it is submitted that the incorporation of insights arising from these ‘external’ disciplines into the traditional modes of discourse and analysis on the EU market freedoms – in effect, the internalisation of these ‘external’ elements – can provide better descriptive fits of the law and its development than theories that do not take them into account. An incidental result of this approach is that by the end of this thesis a theory of the market freedoms will have been sketched: by combining ‘internal’ and ‘external’ elements, an analytical framework can be developed that is able to make descriptive sense, formally and substantively, of free movement law at both its most general – where formal common structures seem to be undeniable, and a minimum common substantive content can be found –, and at its most detailed levels – where substantive variations and greater normative specification seem to exist.

Thesis (LLD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The question that this dissertation addresses is which immaterial property interests may be recognised and protected under the constitutional property clause and if so, under which circumstances. The question originated in the First Certification case 1 where the court held that the constitutional property clause is wide enough to include property interests that require protection according to international norms. The traditional immaterial property interests or intellectual property rights (patents, copyright, designs and trademarks) are protected as property in private law on a sui generis basis. Since it is generally accepted that the property concept in constitutional law includes at least property rights protected in private law, it is relatively unproblematic to include intellectual property rights under the constitutional property clause. In Laugh It Off v SAB International,2 the Constitutional Court explicitly balanced the right to a trademark with the right to freedom of expression, which is accepted as authority that at least trademarks may be recognised and protected as constitutional property. The other intellectual property rights may most likely be recognised and protected by analogy. Foreign law as well as international law also indicates that intellectual property should be recognised and protected as constitutional property. However, there are other, unconventional immaterial property interests that are not protected as property in private law. Some are protected in private law, but not as property; others originate in public law; and yet others are not protected yet at all. In terms of the Constitution, South African courts may consider foreign law, but must consider international law. This dissertation determines when these interests may be protected as constitutional property by reference to foreign cases from German, American, Australian and Irish law; regional international law, namely European Union cases; and international law. The conclusion is that unconventional immaterial property interests may generally be protected if they are vested and acquired in terms of normal law, have patrimonial value and serve the general purpose of constitutional property protection. Property theories are also useful to determine when immaterial property interests deserve constitutional protection, although other theories may be more useful for some of the unconventional interests. The German scaling approach and the balancing of competing interests is a useful approach for South African courts to help determine the appropriate level of protection for specific immaterial property interests without excluding some at the outset. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die vraag waarmee hierdie verhandeling handel is of belange in immateriële goedere erken en beskerm kan word in terme van die grondwetlike eiendomsklousule en indien wel, onder watter omstandighede. Die vraag het sy ontstaan in die First Certification saak,3 waar die Grondwetlike Hof beslis het dat die eiendomsklousule se omvang wyd genoeg is om belange in eiendom in te sluit wat volgens internasionale norme beskerming verg. Sekere regte in immateriële goedere word op ’n sui generis basis in die privaatreg beskerm, naamlik die regte in tradisionele immaterieelgoederereg kategorieë of intellektuele eiendom (patente, kopiereg, ontwerpe en handelsmerke). Dit is 'n algemene beginsel van grondwetlike eiendomsreg dat die konsep van eiendom minstens belange insluit wat as eiendom in die privaatreg beskerm word. In Laugh It Off v SAB International4 het die Grondwetlike Hof 'n handelsmerkreg opgeweeg teen die reg op vryheid van uitdrukking en hierdeur implisiet erken dat minstens handelsmerke en dalk ook ander intellektuele eindemsregte deur die eiendomsklousule erken en beskerm kan word. Buitelandse reg sowel as internasionale reg dui aan dat intellektuele eiendom grondwetlike beskerming behoort te ontvang. Buiten hierdie belange is daar ook immaterieelgoederereg belange wat nie onder eiendomsreg beskerm word in die privaatreg nie. Sommige van hierdie belange word wel in die privaatreg beskerm, maar dan onder ander areas van die reg as eiendom; ander het hul oorsprong in die publiekreg; en die res word tans glad nie beskerm nie. Die Grondwet bepaal dat howe buitelandse reg in ag kan neem en dat hulle internasionale reg moet oorweeg. Die verhandeling se vraag word beantwoord met verwysing na sake uit die Duitse, Amerikaanse, Australiese en Ierse grondwetlike reg; streeks-internasionale reg van die Europese Unie; en internasionale reg. Die onkonvensionele immaterieelgoederereg belange kan oor die algemeen beskerm word as eiendom indien daar 'n gevestigde reg is, die reg in terme van gewone reg verkry is en die belang die algemene oogmerke van die grondwetlike klousule bevorder. Die teorieë oor die beskerming van eiendom is van nut om te bepaal watter belange beskerm kan word, alhoewel sekere onkonvensionele belange beter geregverdig kan word deur ander tipes teorieë. Die Duitse metode om belange op te weeg kan van besonderse nut wees vir Suid Afrikaanse howe om te bepaal watter vlak van beskerming spesifieke belange in immaterieelgoedere behoort te geniet.