隨著全球治理網絡之形成，政府肩負服務公眾以及國家治理的責任，廉政是良善治理的基石，透過廉能政府的領航以及全民反貪腐的力量，方能止於至善。「新加坡讓它的四鄰及國際社會敬畏的，不止是經濟表現或軍事實力，而是有效率的廉潔政府、有紀律的多元社會、有素質的公民文化」(戴至中譯，2004)。 面對國人對廉政工作的期許，現行唯一派駐在政府機關內之政風機構扮演著關鍵角色，因而強化政風機構組織及其運作成效則更為重要。為瞭解政風組織運作現況及其可能面臨的困境或相關問題，除檢閱組織設計理論以及相關研究文獻外，並以深度訪談法作為本文之研究途徑，以利進一步歸納及分析，進而研提相關政策建議。 經過文獻探討及訪談資料分析，本研究發現影響政風機構組織運作的構面，包括：「結構」、「效能」、「策略」及「心態」，而影響組織運作成效的因素，則涵蓋「組織層級」、「雙軌體制」、「專業專責」、「政風職權」、「法制規範」、「國際廉政趨勢」及「決心與共識」七個面向。 最後，本論文希望在兼顧國情及公部門體制影響層面最低，而又必須強化或改善之前提下，針對政風機構組織及其運作提出五項政策建議，分別為「提高政風組織位階」、「降低雙軌運作之強度」、「形塑防貪肅貪專業專責」、「研訂政風人員職權行使法」、「凝聚反貪決心與共識」，作為權責機關未來研擬相關政策之參考。 / With the establishment of global government network, the government gradually takes the responsibility to service the public and to govern the country. Incorrupt politic is the foundation of sound governance, with the guidance of rectitude government and the power of public anti-corruption, the goal of pursuing absolute perfection can be finally achieved. “What make Singapore be awed by its neighbor countries and the internationals are the efficient and incorruptible government, disciplinal diverse society, and the accomplished and educated citizens.” (Dai, 2004) Facing the high compatriots’ expectation of incorrupt governance, the sole Government Employee Ethics Unit accredited in the government plays a crucial role; and the strengthening of the organization and operation effectiveness becomes more important. The purpose of this thesis is to understand the current situation of the Government Employee Ethics Organization, and to find out the possible upcoming dilemma and relevant issues. The thesis not only reviews the organization design theory and the relevant researches, but also adopts interviews as the research method for further analysis, conclusion and policy suggestions. Through the literature review, interview discussion and analysis, it is found in this research that framework, efficiency, strategy and mindset are the ”dimensions” influencing the operation of Government Employee Ethics Unit. And the seven factors that affect the outcomes of operation are organization hierarchy, double-track system, dedicated specialization, authority and responsibility, legal regulation, international trend of rectitude, and determination and consensus. In conclusion, considering both the national situation and the impact on the public sectors, this research provides five policy recommendations for the authority organizations with the aim to strengthen and improve the Government Employee Ethics Unit and its operation, which are, Promoting the organization’s hierarchy, Moderating the intensity of double-track system,Forming dedicated specialized unit for preventing and fighting corruption,Drafting power exercise act for the Government Employee Ethics Officers,Uniting determination and consensus of anti-corruption.

This thesis deals mainly with internal fraud. In the first section, a definition of fraud is mentioned. The second section briefly describes the internal and external fraud and provides their basic structure. The third section deals with the reasons for committing fraud. The fourth section is concerned with the specific forms of internal fraud which come under the basic groups of corruption, misappropriation of assets and statements manipulation and other forms of fraud which may be between the internal and external fraud. The last section provides examples of large and small accounting examples relating to the internal fraudulent activities.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-10-19T11:50:17Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcos Roberto Emilio.pdf: 2440497 bytes, checksum: 17e2d694935776656f7e8f09d51b74bd (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-10-19T11:50:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcos Roberto Emilio.pdf: 2440497 bytes, checksum: 17e2d694935776656f7e8f09d51b74bd (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-08-06 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This Master Thesis aims to study the main mechanisms for preventing and fighting corruption, emphasizing those of transparency and accountability; in addition to understand how these public policies are built, it seeks to understand the importance of State and society in running these mechanisms and to analyze the experience of the State Government of Maranhão related to the fight against corruption between 2015 and 2017. In order to understand the phenomenon of corruption, firstly it is necessary to understand the particularities of its conceptualization, classification and measurement, once it is necessary to consider the context of its occurrence, laws in force and its effects in society. Therefore, a research was also carried out on the concept of corruption through a brief analysis of the modern period using Machiavelli's thought and main trends in social sciences in the contemporary period, seeking to achieve its expression in the Brazilian reality / Esta dissertação tem como objeto de estudo os principais mecanismos de prevenção e combate à corrupção, evidenciando os de transparência e accountability; além de entender como essas políticas públicas são construídas, busca também compreender a importância do Estado e da sociedade no funcionamento desses mecanismos e analisar a experiência do governo do estado do Maranhão relacionada ao combate à corrupção no período de 2015 a 2017. Para entendermos o fenômeno da corrupção, torna-se necessário, primeiramente, compreendermos as particularidades de sua conceituação, tipificação e mensuração, uma vez que é preciso considerar o contexto de sua ocorrência, as leis vigentes e os efeitos na sociedade. Em razão disso, realizou-se também, uma pesquisa sobre o conceito de corrupção através de uma sucinta análise do período moderno recorrendo ao pensamento de Maquiavel e das principais vertentes das ciências sociais no período contemporâneo, buscando alcançar sua expressão na realidade brasileira

Democracy seems to be in crisis and scholars have started to consider the possibility that “the only game in town” might be rigged. This book theorizes the crisis of democracy from a structural point of view, arguing that liberal representative governments suffer from systemic corruption, a form of political decay that should be understood as the oligarchization of society, and proposes an anti-oligarchic institutional solution based on a radical interpretation of republican constitutional thought. If one agrees that the minimal normative expectation of liberal democracies is that governments should advance the welfare of the majority within constitutional safeguards, increasing income inequality and the relative immiseration of the majority of citizens would be in itself a deviation from good rule, a sign of corruption. As a way to understand how we could revert the current patterns of political corruption, the book provides an in-depth analysis of the institutional, procedural, and normative innovations to protect political liberty proposed by Niccolò Machiavelli, Nicolas de Condorcet, Rosa Luxemburg, and Hannah Arendt. Because their ideas to institutionalize popular power have consistently been misunderstood, instrumentalized, demonized, or neglected, part of what this project wants to accomplish is to offer a serious engagement with their proposals through a plebeian interpretative lens that renders them as part of the same intellectual tradition. In this way, the book assembles a “B side” of constitutional thought composed of the apparent misfits in a tradition that has been dominated by the impulse to suppress conflict instead of harnessing its liberty-producing properties. As a way to effectively deal with systemic corruption and oligarchic domination, the book proposes to follow this plebeian constitutionalism and instituionalize popular collective power. A proposed plebeian branch would be autonomous and aimed not at achieving self-government or direct democracy, but rather at an effort to both judge and censor elites who rule. The plebeian branch would consist of two institutions: a decentralized network of radically inclusive local assemblies, empowered to initiate and veto legislation as well as to exercise periodic constituent power, and a delegate, surveillance office able to enforce decisions and impeach public officials. The establishment of primary assemblies at the local level would not only allow ordinary people to push back against oligarchic domination through the political system but also inaugurate an institutional conception of the people as the many assembled locally: a political collective agent operating as a network of political judgment in permanent flow. The people as network would be a political subject with as many brains as assemblies, in which collective learning, reaction against domination, and social change would occur organically and independently from representative government and political parties.

貪腐是先進國家檢視政府行政效率的重要指標，貪腐會影響國家整體形象，甚至左右外國直接投資與金融市場的評比。中國之國家預防腐敗局的機構定位突顯中國內部對貪腐問題與政治結構調整問題。因此，本研究針對中國大陸貪腐問題、貪腐機制之演變過程、國家預防腐敗局現階段工作成效與不足之處、國家預防腐敗局未來工作方向展望與挑戰等問題，以文獻分析方法進行探討與分析。 經過本研究的分析與討論，本研究歸納以下論點： 一、中國大陸貪腐問題可以用尋租理論解釋，當改革開放後，地方官員可以藉由經濟特區許可證或稅務等工作內容，進行利益勾結與建立政商貪腐集團。 二、貪腐機制可分為權權交易模式與權錢交易模式，其貪腐集團的交接與政權交接息息相關。改革開放前的貪腐模式為權權交易模式，改革開放後為權錢交易模式。 三、中共貪腐機制以政治運作角度分析其過程，可以視為政權交接期間的合作式賽局崩解與重新建立，其崩解原因在於內部利益分配不平均導致矛盾加深，藉著政權交接期間之權力洗牌模式，產生新的貪腐集團與經濟利益分配模式。 四、過去中共對於貪腐問題的處理模式屬於政權協商方式，例如屬於江澤明體系的陳良宇貪腐案歷經「陳良宇涉嫌貪污」至「陳良宇同志違紀問題」的兩種處理模式，透露出中共對於貪腐問題的防治處理屬於政權協商的模式。因此，國家預防腐敗局的設立過程背後潛伏著個政治派系的妥協。 五、就組織架構而言，國家預防腐敗局目前位於監察部之下，部門本身並無獨立監察權，僅被視為調研與幕僚單位，此與香港或新加坡之獨立性反貪腐機構的特性有所差異。 六、在中共維持黨政雙軌制下，中紀委與監察部將是反貪腐制度的主軸，所以短期而言，對內部角色定位，國家預防腐敗局的功能將定位於中紀委領導的執行單位，負責實際的反貪腐之協調運作；對外部角色定位，國家預防腐敗局將定位於接收國際組織的意見，國家預防腐敗局的角色將是整合國際反貪腐的科技運作。 七、就國家預防腐敗局之未來發展模式，國家預防腐敗局需要建立獨立監察權，且其成員任命方式必須擺脫派系協商的影子，但在中共目前政治角力過程下，國家預防腐敗局之未來發展將視內部政治利益與輿論壓力的角力結果而定。 / The extent of corruption is an important index to review the administrative efficiency of the governments among advanced countries. The corruption issue affects the image of a country, the foreign direct investment and the rating of financial market. The role of National Bureau of Corruption Prevention of China (thereafter as “NBCP”) stresses the problems of corruption in internal systems of China and political restructuring. Therefore, this study adopts the literature analysis method to explore and analyze the corruption problems in China, the development of corruption prevention scheme, the performance and deficiencies of NBCP, and the future prospects and challenges of NBCP. After the analysis and discussions in this study, the conclusions are as follows. First, the problems of corruption in China could be interpreted by the rent-seeking theory. After China’s reform, the local government officials could take advantage of the permission of economically-designated zone or taxation, etc. to collude with private enterprises based on interests, and form the corruption groups. Second, according to the past literatures, the patterns of corruption in China could be categorized as the exchange of privilege for privilege and the exchange of privilege for money, and the transition of both corruption groups and regimes is closely bound up. From the perspective of rent-seeking theory, the exchange of privilege for privilege is the pattern of corruption before China’s reform, with the exchange of privilege for money standing for the ones after China’s reform. Third, from the perspective of operation of political system in China, the transition of regimes could be interpreted as the process of collapse and rebuilding in the dynamics of cooperative games. The reasons of collapse could result from the disequilibrium in the allocation of internal interests and then conflicts from the disequilibrium. Therefore, by the reshuffle of political interests during the transition of regimes, the new corruption groups and new scheme for the allocation of economic interests appear. Fourth, China used to deal with corruption through regime consultation. For instance, the corruption case of Chen, Lian-yu in the administration of Jiang, Ze-ming ,which was shifted from original tone of “Chen, Lian-yu suspected in corruption” to “Chen, Lian-yu’s violating disciplines”, shows that the strategy for corruption in China could be categorized by the features of regime consultation. Hence, the setup of NBCP implies the compromises among different political groups. Fifth, in terms of organizational structure, NBCP is under the Ministry of Supervision, without independent supervision, and only works as the research and staff unit of independent supervision, which differs from the independence of the anti-corruption institute of Hong Kong and Singapore. Sixth, under the present dual-track system of China, the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Committee of the CPC and Ministry of Supervision play the main roles in the system of anti-corruption. In the short term, as to the internal role, NBCP is regarded as the execution unit of Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. As to the external role, NBCP is responsible for receiving the opinions from international organizations and integrating the technology of international anti-corruption. Seventh, the future model of NBCP should build up the independent supervision and appoint the members without the influence of the political groups. However, in the struggle of different political groups in Chinese Communist party, the future development of NBCP will depend on the outcome of the struggle between internal political interests and public stress.

The informal sector has emerged as an important sector in Africa where many countries are striving to attain Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) number 8 on decent work and economic growth. The presence of a growing number of individuals and firms in the informal sector in Africa and the need to attain SDG 8 through formalisation have reignited the debate on informality and its possible causes and effects on the growth trajectory of African economies. Empirical questions on the determinants of informality are still not adequately answered. One question which continues to generate a lot of debate and contrasting results is the relationship between the informal sector and corruption. Both informality and corruption have emerged as ‘twin challenges’ in Africa, with a far reaching impact on economic development. The relationship between the informal sector and corruption has been an inconclusive and a polemical issue in both academic and developmental discourse. From a theoretical perspective, the two can be substitutes or complements, but the exact nature of the relationship is not clear. The main objective of this study is to empirically investigate the relationship between the informal sector, corruption and economic development in Africa, over the period 2005 to 2015. The objective of the study was answered through two ways: theoretical and empirical methodology. In the theoretical methodology, a classical approach was applied. The classical theory suggests that in the presence of a market for corruption, corruption control can reduce the size of the informal sector through reducing the supply of corruption, thereby raising the price of corruption. The negative relationship between corruption control and the size of the informal sector is supported by the described empirical data for Africa. The results from descriptive statistics, in particular the scatter plots, demonstrate that control of corruption, government effectiveness and economic development as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI) are negatively associated with the size of the informal sector. The negative association between the control of corruption and the size of the informal sector entails that corruption increases the size of the informal sector. With regards to the empirical solution, the total population of 54 African countries was considered for the study. However, a panel of 46 countries was analyzed as the other eight countries, although considered together with the rest, were scientifically isolated from the panel due to data challenges. Robustness checks were carried out to check if estimates are not sensitive to sample size or region. Further, for purposes of this study, the sample was also divided into Southern and Eastern Africa, and Northern and Western Africa. Panel data was applied in order to account for both time and country-specific heterogeneity. The use of panel data allows one to study variability through comparability of the level of informality in countries such as Zimbabwe where the economy has remained largely informalised. Four panel estimators, namely, the Pooled Effects, Fixed Effects or Within Effects, Random Effects or GLS, and Dynamic Panel Model (Arrelano-Bond), were applied. Model specification tests identified the Fixed Effect Model as the most appropriate model. Hence, the discussed results are largely from the Fixed Effects Model. On measurement of informality, the study relied on the shadow economy estimates constructed by Medina and Schneider (2018) for 158 countries from 1991 to 2015. On corruption, the study used the Control of Corruption Index (COCO) published by the World Bank, in the Governance Index Report. Unlike previous studies which used GDP per capita only as a proxy for economic development, this study went a step further and used Human Development Index (𝐻𝐷𝐼) as a proxy for economic development. Profit tax as a percentage of GDP was also tested as a potential determinant of informality. The endogeneity of the corruption variable was corrected using an instrumental variable. The findings show that an improvement in the control of corruption or government effectiveness reduces the level of informality in Africa while, an increasing informal sector is a breeding ground for corruption. The two variables are complements or jointly determined. Countries with large underground economies possess high levels of corruption, and countries with high levels of corruption are associated with large underground economies. The complementarity of corruption and the size of underground economy implies that policies that target one of the two will also help in tackling the other. In addition, the results show that economic development reduces the magnitude of informality, while a larger informal sector today implies a bigger informal sector in the future. One of the findings of this study is that previous studies which applied GDP per capita as a measure of economic development largely underestimated the impact of economic development on the size of the informal sector. The findings of the study show that the negative association between the control of corruption and the size of the informal sector holds for both the Northern and Southern regions of Africa. The impact is however bigger in the Northern Region, as a marginal improvement in corruption control has a bigger impact in reducing the size of the informal sector compared to the Southern Region. The results from the study also show that the level of informality in a country has a memory. A bigger informal sector today is likely to propel the level of the informal sector in the future. The findings show that a growth of the informal sector by one percentage point today will increase the informal sector by about 0.185 percentage points in the following year. The results from time dummies also indicate that the size of the informal sector in Africa started to grow significantly during the financial crisis period in 2009. The main implication of these findings is that African countries can target one of the two in order to reduce both the size of the underground economy and corruption. The other implication is that a policy that targets curing one of the problems will have positive external effects in curing the other unintended problem. Furthermore, the findings imply that African countries with large underground economies may continue to experience growing informal economies due to lack of regulatory capacity and weak enforcement. Solving the two problems is a double hurdle for African countries. / Economics / D. Com. (Economics)