"Audience costs" models of international relations suggest a purely informational role for domestic politics in conflict settings. Here, domestic politics serve as a rich signal of belligerents' true intentions, allowing them to more quickly resolve disagreements, decreasing the likelihood and duration of war. But if belligerents can have different beliefs about publicly available information, then domestic politics might confuse rather than clarify conflict situations, increasing the likelihood and duration of war. I present empirical evidence of conventional "audience costs" models' shortcomings in explaining the dynamics of the US counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and the response of Iraqi insurgents to those efforts. I then develop a formal model to show how differences in beliefs between insurgents and counterinsurgents about domestic political audiences in Iraq may have contributed to the prolonged nature of the conflict. I argue that the underlying cause of the conflict's duration is disagreement between belligerents about whether and how Iraqi civilians contribute to a successful counterinsurgency, leading belligerents to disagree not only before fighting about who is likely to win, but during fighting about who is actually winning. / text

This paper evaluates the differences between U.S. multilateralism within ad hoc coalitions and U.S. multilateralism within permanent institutions – specifically NATO, the only standing defense alliance with which the U.S. is involved – within the context of the war in Afghanistan's COIN operations. Specifically, this work contrasts the strategies of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the portion of the war that was undertaken by U.S. forces and a coalition of allies, and the operations of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which were defined by U.S. cooperation with NATO. Along with contrasting the overarching strategies of OEF and ISAF, this thesis evaluates the tactical differences between the two operations as they presented themselves within two pairs of tactical maneuvers: OEF Operation Red Wings vs. ISAF Operation Siege of Sangin and OEF Operation Eastern Resolve II vs. ISAF Operation Panther’s Claw.

Doctor of Philosophy (Economics) / This dissertation asks how foreign assistance to one or both sides in a civil war affects the dynamics of the conflict. This overarching question is subsequently divided into two further questions: 1) how does foreign intervention affect the capabilities of the recipient, and 2) how does this affect the nature of the warfare. The puzzle for the first is that the impact of foreign intervention on combat effectiveness frequently varies significantly between recipients. This variation is explained by recipients’ different abilities to convert the inputs of foreign intervention into the outputs of fighting capability. The nature of the warfare in civil war will change in line with the balance of military capabilities between the belligerents. The balance of capabilities will be responsible for the form of warfare at a particular place and time whether it be conventional, irregular or guerrilla/counter-guerrilla. The argument is then illustrated with two extensive case studies, of civil wars in Angola and Afghanistan, where temporal and spatial variation in the type of warfare is shown to correlate with the type, degree, and direction of foreign intervention.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2007. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 287-293).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2008. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 411-435).

Thesis (M.S.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Cover title. "June 2002." AD-A406 050. Includes bibliographical references (p. 81-85). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.S.)--Missouri State University, 2009. / "May 2009." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 156-164). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, August, 2008. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010. / Thesis Advisor(s): Simons, Anna ; Second Reader: Khan, Feroz H. "June 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on July 15, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Pashtun Nationalism, Pashtunwali, Durand Line, Afghan Jihad, Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, FATA, South Asian Conflicts, Indian Cold-Start Strategy, Kashmir Dispute, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, U.S. AFPAK Strategy, U.S. Troop Surge, Reconciliation with Taliban, Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S.-Pakistan Relations, Nuclear Weapons of Pakistan, Counterinsurgency Strategy of Pakistan, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Operation Rah-e-Raast, Operation Rah-e-Nejat, Drone Attacks, Central Asian Republics (CARs), Oil and Gas, The New Great Game, Interests of Iran, India, China and Russia in Afghanistan, Gwadar Port. Includes bibliographical references (p. 105-115). Also available in print.

abstract: Counterinsurgency (COIN) is a long process that even great powers struggle with. Nevertheless, South Korea as a middle power was successful with COINs in Vietnam and Iraq. What were the drivers for the Republic of Korea (ROK) military's success? This dissertation maintains that the unusual nature of missions coupled with political/socio-cultural advantages are sufficient conditions for success of the middle power COIN. COIN missions are seen as unusual to middle powers. A rare mission stimulates military forces to fight harder because they recognize this mission as an opportunity to increase their national prestige. COIN mission success is also more probable for middle powers because their forces make the best of their country's political/socio-cultural advantages. The ROK military's COINs are optimal cases to test these hypotheses. The ROK military's COIN in Vietnam was an extremely rare mission, which increased its enthusiasm. This enthusiasm was converted into appropriate capabilities. By identifying battleground dynamics, the ROK forces initially chose an enemy-oriented approach based upon the method of company-led tactical base, and then later introduced a population-led method. South Korea's political/socio-cultural advantages also contributed to its military success in Vietnam. The Confucius culture that South Koreans and Vietnamese shared allowed the ROK forces to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese population. The mission in Iraq was also a rare and important one for national prestige. Accordingly, South Korean forces were equipped with pride and were enthusiastic about missions in Arbil. They changed their organization from a rigid one to a more flexible one by strengthening civil-military units. The ROK military possessed the ability to choose a population-centric approach. South Korea's political and cultural climate also served as an advantage to accomplish COIN in Iraq. The culture of Jung allowed ROK soldiers to sincerely help the local Iraqis. This project contributes to developing a theory of the middle power COIN. The findings also generate security policy implications of how to deal with contingent situations led by the collapse of the North Korean regime and how to redefine the ROK military strategy for the future. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Political Science 2011