This thesis was inspired by the question of how the state addresses irregular challenges for its survival and reputation. It used an example of the confrontation between illegal armed groups (IAGs) operating in the North Caucasus and the Russian state in 2007-2014. Investigation started by asking to what extent do repressive and reconciliatory counter tactics decrease the level of violence produced by illegal armed groups? The thesis was situated in-between of deterrence and backlash theories to examine (in)effectiveness of repressive and reconciliatory policies. It accounted for (in)effectiveness by investigating whether the policy decreases or increases the level of insurgency-related violence; namely, whether it causes deterrence or backlash, in the case of repression or, alternatively, whether it causes conformity or backlash in the case of reconciliation. The thesis operationalised its main variables by disaggregating the strategy into separate repressive and reconciliatory tactics. It considered, on the one hand, three types of IAGs tactics: armed assault, bombings (suicide bombing, vehicle bomb, bomb placement, bomb tossing, firing, fake bomb) and hostage taking. One the other hand, the state tactics were divided into four categories: repressive indiscriminate (regime of counterterrorist operation, clash, and shelling), repressive discriminate (special operation, shooting, arrest, seizure, and detection), reconciliatory indiscriminate (involvement of civil society through dialogue, and socio-economic development), and reconciliatory discriminate (amnesty and reintegration). The thesis expected targeted repressive operations to suppress active IAGs members, whereas socio-economic incentives to contribute to maintaining the success of violent repressive operations. To test these hypotheses, the thesis relied on large empirical data, specially collected from the open sources, including 3270 episodes of IAG-initiated violence and 6114 governmental repressive actions. Data for reconciliatory efforts was taken from official statistics. The thesis used a generalized linear negative binomial and a generalized additive negative binomial model to assess the relationship between governmental policies and the level of violence. The thesis found that discriminate violence does indeed decrease attacks. However, it causes an immediate strong backlash effect at first, and only with considerable time and magnitude of repression eventually leads to the reduction of violence. The more discriminate repression is applied the less backlash it causes. Unlike repression, reconciliatory tactics produce a decrease in attacks. Thus, the thesis found partial support for both deterrence and backlash models. It, however, showed that deterrence effect overcomes initial backlash reaction.

This diploma thesis studies the influence of Sendero Luminoso, Peruvian Maoist guerilla movement, upon the life in Peru. The introductory part deals with the second half of the 20th century Peruvian history that preceded the internal armed conflict. The main part of the thesis focuses on the activity of Sendero Luminoso and counterinsurgency forces in the last two decades of the previous century and on the influence these activities had on the Peruvian population. The final part evaluates the present time (post-2000) influence of Sendero Luminoso in Peru as well as various forms of its presence.

<p>Uppsatsen är inriktad på den militära delen i upprorsbekämpning och tar sin utgångspunkt i två stycken militärteoretikers teorier inom ämnet. Teoretikerna är John Mackinlay och David Kilcullen, som under 2009 utkom med varsin ny bok inom området, The Insurgent Archipelago samt The Accidental Guerilla. Den metod som arbetet vilar på är kvalitativ textanalys. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka i vilken utsträckning som teorin och doktrinerna stämmer överrens. Därför har först teoretikernas syn på hur en utifrån kommande intervenerande styrka påverkar lokalbefolkningen analyserats. Det som framkommit av detta är dels Mackinlays uppfattning att samtliga styrkor av denna karaktär kommer att betraktas som ockupanter av lokalbefolkningen. Dels Kilcullens uppfattning att styrkan påverkar lokalbefolkningen till att gripa vapen mot dem. Detta trots att även de har en avig inställning mot upprorsrörelsen. Som lösning på problemet för Kilcullen fram bildandet av en strategisk tjänst i likhet med Office of Strategic Services. Från dessa teorier har ett antal kriterier valts ut vilka sedan använts som analysverktyg för att undersöka doktrinernas syn på områdena. De doktriner som har analyserats är Storbritanniens Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, USA:s Joint Publication 3-24, samt NATO:s i nuläget gällande styrdokument BI-SC Cointerinsurgency Joint Operational Guidelines. Av analysen har framkommit att en viss överrensstämmelse mellan teori och konceptuell verklighet förekommer. Dock att teorin snarare rör sig inom en eventuell framtid emedan doktrinerna är fast inom nulägets ramar.</p> / <p>The essay focuses on the military part of counter-insurgency and is based on two theories by the military theorists John Mackinlay and David Kilcullen. Who both in 2009 published a new book on the subject, The Insurgent Archipelago and The Accidental Guerrilla. The method used in the essay is qualitative text-analysis. The purpose of this essay is to examine whether resemblance between theory and doctrine exists. Therefore first of the theorists view in how an exogenous intervening force affects the local population has been analyzed. What emerged from this is partly Mackinlay's view that all forces of this nature will be seen as occupiers by the local people. Partly Kilcullen's view that the force affects the local population to resort to arms against them. This despite the fact that they’re original attitude towards the insurgent movement, which is the reason for the intervening forces presence, is of negative. As a solution to the problem Kilcullen brings forward the constitution of a strategic service, like the Office of Strategic Services. From these theories, a number of criteria have been selected which are then used as analytical tools to examine the doctrines. The doctrines which have been analyzed is the UK's Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, U.S. Joint Publication 3-24 and the currently governing NATO document BI-SC Counterinsurgency Joint Operational Guidelines. The analysis has shown that some resemblance between theory and conceptual reality exist. However that theory, rather involved in a possible future while the doctrines are restrained by the framework of the present day.</p>

CIMIC er, som et interface mellem den militære styrke og de civile omgivelser, siden ”Balkanmissionerne”blevet en væsentlig del af konceptet for at skabe en effektiv militær indsats i PeaceOperations. CIMIC konceptet, som blev anvendt relativt succesfuldt under ”Balkan-missionerne,vurderes at være det samme, som i dag anvendes i Irak. Men virker dette koncept samtidigt med,at koalitionen er blevet en del af de stridende parter? Virker det samtidigt med, at volden er rettetmod koalitionen? Og virker det i et operationsmiljø som er langt fra at være ”safe and secure” –og hvor kontrollen med de stridende parter må siges at være begrænset?På baggrund af disse spørgsmål har hensigten med denne ”uppsats” været at analysere udvalgtetilfælde af dansk CIMIC, i relation til COIN-operationer for at kunne pege på, hvorvidt danskCIMIC kan siges at have haft den ønskede effekt og dermed understøttet opnåelsen af deoperative målsætninger. Denne opgave skal således ses som et bidrag til en vurdering afCIMIC´s evne som ”Force Multiplier” i COIN-operationer. Opgaven er besvaret gennem atundersøge følgende spørgsmål: Hvad skal der opnås med CIMIC under COIN-operationer?Hvordan kan effekten af CIMIC måles under COIN-operationer? Hvilken effekt kan det siges atdanske CIMIC-enheders indsats har haft under COIN-operationerne i Irak? Er de opnåedeeffekter i overensstemmelse med målsætningerne?Følgende fem analysefaktorer er udledt og har dannet grundlag for, hvorvidt det kan siges omdansk CIMIC har virket i COIN-operationer: (1) Forbedring af hverdagen for befolkningen, (2)samarbejde og koordination med civile organisationer (forbindelsesvirksomhed), gennemførelseaf (3) informationsindhentning, informationsspredning og vurderinger (Situational Awareness),(4) uddannelse i lokale forhold for egne styrker og (5) Force Protection.Resultatet af undersøgelsen er, at CIMIC inden for alle analysefaktorer samlet set har vist, atCIMIC som minimum har haft en moderat effekt. Det er derfor konkluderet, at CIMIC-konceptethar virket i COIN-operationer og at CIMIC dermed har kunnet fungere som en ”ForceMultiplier”. / Since the missions in the Balkans during the 1990´s CIMIC has become a vital part of theconcept of creating effective Peace Operations, by acting as an interface between the militaryforces and the civilian environment. The CIMIC concept being used with relative success duringthe “Balkans-missions” is, in principle, the same concept being used in Iraq today. But does thisconcept work also if the coalition becomes part of the warring parties? Does it work when theviolence is also directed at the coalition? And does it work in an operational environment whichis far from being safe and secure, and with a limited or with no control of the warring factions?Using the above questions as the background, the aim of this paper has been to analyse specificcases of Danish CIMIC related to COIN-operations. This has been done in order to identify towhich extent Danish CIMIC has achieved the desired effects and thereby supported theoperational objectives. This paper can be seen as a contribution to the evaluation of CIMIC as aForce Multiplier in COIN-operations. The paper has been aimed at answering the followingquestions: What is CIMIC to achieve within COIN-operations? How can the effects of CIMICwithin COIN-operations be measured? What are the effects of Danish CIMIC within the COINoperationsin Iraq? Have the desired effects been achieved and thus supported the operationalobjectives?In order to identify to which extent Danish CIMIC has been effective within the COINoperationsin Iraq, the analysis of the paper focuses on the following five distinctive factors: (1)Improvement of the living standards for the local population (2) Co-operation and Co-ordinationwith civilian organizations (Liaison activity), (3) Information gathering, information sharing, andassessments (Situational Awareness), (4) Education of own troops concerning the localenvironment as well as cultural awareness, and finally (5) Force Protection.The analysis of the above mentioned factors shows that CIMIC has had a positive effect withregard to the COIN-operations. The measured effects range from no effect to high effect, with anaverage effect that can be best described as moderate. It is therefore the conclusion of the paperthat the CIMIC concept has worked within the COIN-operations in Iraq, and that it has thusacted as a Force Multiplier. / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps. Hylla: Upps. ChP 06-08

Sverige har en lång tradition i att utbilda soldater och förband för försvar av det egna landet. Dettahar varit i fokus för de svenska förbanden under kalla kriget. Idag ställs svenska förband inför nyauppgifter och i andra miljöer än de traditionella, men framförallt möter de svenska förbanden enmotståndare som har andra drivkrafter, medel och metoder än vad motståndaren hade under detkalla kriget.Uppsatsen syfte är att diskutera huruvida den svenska soldat- och förbandsutbildningen äranpassad för denna motståndare. D.v.s. erhåller de svenska förbanden en relevant utbildning?Denna studie genomförs som en fallstudie av FS 15. Studien leds fram av ett antal studiefrågorsom utgör grunden för de variabler som utgör analysverktyget och som sedan nyttjas för attanalysera utbildningen av soldater och förband.Studien visar att de svenska förbanden erhåller en ändamålsenlig utbildning avseende hur upprorbekämpas med direkta och indirekta metoder. Analysen visar också på en utvecklingspotentialavseende lessons learned processen och i utbildningen avseende fenomenet uppror. / Sweden has a long tradition in training soldiers and units for the defense of their ownterritory. This has been the main effort of the Swedish units during the cold war. TheSwedish units of today have to deal with tasks and environments other than thetraditional ones. Moreover, the Swedish units face a belligerent force that has differentmotives, ways and means than the enemy during the cold war.The aim of the thesis is to discuss whether the Swedish soldier and unit training aresuited for this new enemy. Do the Swedish units receive a relevant and proper training?The thesis is accomplished in the form of a case study. The thesis is implementedthrough questions which are the base for the analytical tool. This tool will be used foranalyzing the training of soldiers and units.The thesis shows that the Swedish units receive a relevant training concerningcounterinsurgency with a direct and indirect approach. The analysis also shows apotential for development concerning lessons learned and training in the phenomenainsurgency. / Avdelning: ALB – Slutet Mag. 3 C-upps. Hylla: Upps. ChP 07-09

Begreppen upprorsbekämpning eller counterinsurgency (COIN) ochstabiliseringsoperationer utgör ett debatterat ämne i den dagsaktuella militärteorin. Bådabegreppen förefaller användas för en och samma typ av operation. Erfarenheter från Irakoch Afghanistan har inneburit att USA utvecklat en specifik doktrin för counterinsurgency(FM 3-24) respektive stability operations (FM 3-07). Detta indikerar att det föreligger enskillnad i de två begreppen.Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka och definiera skillnader i begreppen COIN(upprorsbekämpning) och stabiliseringsoperationer. Medlet för att nå syftet utgörs av enjämförande studie av amerikanska doktriner. Doktrinerna har analyserats med utgångspunkt iett hermeneutiskt förhållningssätt. Kriterierna synen på motståndaren, mål och syfte, medelsamt metoder har nyttjats som analysverktyg för att hantera empirin.Analysen har visat att stabiliseringsoperationer utgår från ett strategiskt perspektiv emedanupprorsbekämpning utgår från ett taktiskt perspektiv. De olika typerna av operationer är inteömsesidigt uteslutande och delar förhållningssätt till principiella metoder. Detaljer avseendeskillnader framgår av genomförd analys av empirin samt redovisade slutsatser. / The concept of counterinsurgency and stability operations are two forms of operations, whichare often referred to in military discussions today. Both of these concepts appear to be usedfor the same type of operation or conflict. The implications of the war in Iraq and Afghanistanhave led USA to develop a specific doctrine for Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24) as well as forStability operations (FM 3-07). This indicates that there is a difference in the two concepts.The main purpose of this research is to examine and define the differences between theconcepts of counterinsurgency and stability operations. This has been accomplished byexamining and comparing American doctrines. The doctrines have been analyzed from ahermeneutist point of view. The criteria’s conception of an opponent, end-state and purpose,means and methods together with the tactical and strategic levels of war have been used as ananalytic tool.The study shows that stability operations mainly address a conflict from a strategic point ofview, while counterinsurgency address it from the tactical level. The two types of operationsare not mutually exclusive and address the main part of the same concepts of method. Detailsconcerning differences are presented in the conclusions deducted from the analysis. / Avdelning: ALB – Slutet Mag. 3 C-upps. Hylla: Upps. ChP 07-09

Among the most important choices made by groups fighting a civil war -- governments and rebels alike -- is how to allocate available military and pecuniary resources across the contested areas of a conflict-ridden territory. Combatants use military force to coerce and money to persuade and co-opt. A vast body of literature in political science and security studies examines how and where combatants in civil wars apply violence. Scholars, however, have devoted less attention to combatants' use of material inducements to attain their objectives. This dissertation proposes a logic that guides combatants' use of material benefits alongside military force in pursuit of valuable support from communities in the midst of civil war. Focused on the interaction between the military and the local population, the theory envisions a bargaining process between a commander and a community whose support he seeks. The outcome of the bargaining process is a fiscal strategy defined by the extent to which material benefits are distributed diffusely or targeted narrowly. That outcome follows from key characteristics of the community in question that include its sociopolitical solidarity (or fragmentation) and its economic resilience (or vulnerability). I evaluate the theory of fiscal strategies through a series of case studies from the Philippine-American War of 1899-1902. As a further test of external validity, I consider the theory's applicability to key events from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. / Government

Thesis (M.M.A.S.)--US Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. / Cover title. AD-A463 835. Includes bibliographical references (p. 58-60). Electronic version available on the Public STINET.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 11, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008. / Thesis Advisor(s): Lee, Doowan. "December 2008." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 28, 2009. Includes bibliographical references (p. 131-133). Also available in print.