This dissertation examines the latter stages of the Second Indochina War through the lens of geography, spatial contestation, and the environment. The natural and the manmade world were not only central but a decisive factor in the struggle to control the population and territory of South Vietnam. The war was shaped and in many ways determined by spatial / environmental factors. Like other revolutionary civil conflicts, the key to winning political power in South Vietnam was to control both the physical world (territory, population, resources) and the ideational world (the political organization of occupied territory). The means to do so was insurgency and pacification - two approaches that pursued the same goals (population and territory control) and used the same methods (a blend of military force, political violence, and socioeconomic policy) despite their countervailing purposes. The war in South Vietnam, like all armed conflicts, possessed a unique spatiality due to its irregular nature. Although it has often been called a "war without fronts," the reality is that the conflict in South Vietnam was a war with innumerable fronts, as insurgents and counterinsurgents feverishly wrestled to win political power and control of the civilian environment throughout forty-four provinces, 250 districts, and more than 11,000 hamlets. The conflict in South Vietnam was not one geographical war, but many; it was a highly complex politico-military struggle that fragmented space and atomized the battlefield along a million divergent points of conflict. This paper explores the unique spatiality of the Second Indochina War and examines the ways that both sides of the conflict conceptualized and utilized geography and the environment to serve strategic, tactical, and political purposes. / History

Many scholars have written about the counterinsurgency phase of the Philippine- American War (1899-1902). Military historians often downplayed the impact of human rights abuses, while emphasizing the success of the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency instead. In contrast, social historians frequently focused on human rights abuses at the expense of understanding the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency efforts. Unlike the majority of earlier works, this thesis unifies military, social, and legal history to primarily answer these questions: what significant factors led U.S. soldiers to commit human rights abuses during the war, and at what cost did the U.S. pacify the Filipino rebellion? The war was successfully waged at the tactical, operational, and strategic level, but wavered at the grand strategic level.1 This study argues that racism, ambiguous rules and regulations, and a breakdown of discipline contributed to U.S. soldiers committing human rights abuses against Filipinos during the counterinsurgency. Primary sources from the perspectives of American policy makers, military leaders, and common soldiers—in addition to documents on U.S. Army regulations and its past traditions—reveal a comprehensive story of what happened during this conflict. The U.S. Army’s abuse were not a historical anomaly, but a growing trend extending from nineteenth century conflicts against other races. The counterinsurgency revealed that beneath the stated principles of 1 For the purposes of this thesis, grand strategy is “the direction and use made of any and all of the assets of a security community, including its military instruments, for the purposes of policy as decided by politics.” This differs from the strategic level of war, which is the direction and exclusive use of military forces for the purposes of policy as decided by politics. Finally, the operational level is the level of war where the tasks, decided by strategy, are coordinated and individual units are commanded. These units, in turn, engaging in tactics to achieve operational objectives. Colin S. Gray, The Future of Strategy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 29, 47. iii America’s benevolent mission, violent racial underpinnings existed in U.S. desires for global and domestic hegemony. The U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency resulted in a flawed victory, won at the cost of combatants, innocent civilians, and American idealism. / History

This master's thesis deals with the development and implementation of counterinsurgency warfare by the military and government of the United States during the Vietnam War. The main point of this work revolves around the fact that the United States did not develop a successful and comprehensive counterinsurgency doctrine during this period. However, certain counterinsurgency units and programs were developed that did achieve success in deterring the guerrilla war waged by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army. The Phoenix Program and especially the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Program, which was developed and operated by the U.S. Army Special Forces, proved that counterinsurgency warfare could be waged successfully against an elusive foe. As the Vietnam War escalated, the United States relied upon the technology, the mobility, and the firepower of America's conventional military to try and destroy an unconventional enemy. This reliance upon conventional military strategies and tactics eventually led to the withdrawal of American troops and the defeat of the Republic of Vietnam by the communist forces of North Vietnam. I believe that the United States and the Republic of Vietnam could have prevented a communist victory through the proper development of counterinsurgency warfare doctrine. This doctrine would include a combination of counterinsurgency tactics and strategies I social reform, economic assistance, military training, and political stability. The United States learned many valuable lessons in Vietnam, including the importance of maintaining specialized units that could be used to fight a limited war against a dedicated enemy with a political agenda. Warfare has never been an exact science, and a nation must be prepared to deal with any contingency. / Master of Arts

The politicization of military forces is not a development of the 21st century. Throughout history, armies have taken on roles traditionally relegated to non-military entities and accepted the notion that the actions of even the most junior members of their force may have substantial political implications. The development of the politicization of the U.S. military in Iraq since 2003 has been particularly ubiquitous. Although the politicization of military forces is not a recent development, little effort has been made to locate the manner in which the politicization has been reflected by the doctrines included in the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24). I hypothesize that the doctrines included in FM 3-24 not only codified many systemic strategic and tactical changes for the U.S. military, but also supported the politicization of the military in the 21st century. I conclude that while not at the level I initially suspected, the doctrines included in the FM 3-24 reflected the politicization of the U.S. military in Iraq following its release in early 2007. / Master of Arts

This thesis examines the communist insurgencies in Malaya (1948-1960) and Vietnam(1961-1963). A British Colonial Service Officer, Robert Thompson, helped develop the successful counterinsurgency doctrine during the Malayan Emergency. Later he carried this knowledge to Vietnam to help in the anti-Viet Cong struggle. U.S. leaders welcomed lessons of the Malayan Emergency and their application in parts to the Vietnamese situation in the form of the Strategic Hamlet Program. Thompson’s transfer of knowledge from Malaya to Vietnam shows a historical analogy taken out of context by U.S. leadership. I begin my study by looking at British evolution of counterinsurgency doctrine and practices, specifically the New Villages in Malaya, and Robert Thompson’s role in the process. The second chapter examines Thompson’s transferal of Malayan knowledge to Vietnam and the U.S. acceptance of and support for his efforts. I also compare these insurgencies in chapter two to show the differences between them and prove my thesis. Finally, the third chapter shows some reasons why the Strategic Hamlet Program failed and whether Thompson’s program was doomed to fail or not. By examining the Strategic Hamlet Program, an understanding of how the U.S. evolved policy in the Vietnam War becomes possible. / Master of Arts

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / After defeating the Iraqi military, Coalition Forces spread out across Iraq to stabilize and transition control of the country back to Iraqis. This historical analysis of Mosul, Ramadi, and Samarra studies military operations intended to stabilize these three cities from April 2003 to September 2005. Prior to and after the reestablishment of Iraqi sovereignty, Coalition Forces worked with Iraqi citizens at the local level to reestablish control of the population. In order to achieve this, the counterinsurgent force must understand that when consensus for non-violent political opposition does not exist within the governed populace, coercive measures must be taken to enforce local security. This analysis evaluates the effects of military operations over time and through frequent unit transitions with varying numbers of U.S. and Iraqi security forces. The conclusions gleaned from this analysis are summarized as unit approaches that either achieved control or failed to achieve control at the local level. This study suggests that a distributed lightto- medium equipped ground force operating within urban centers and in continuous close proximity to the population is best able to establish local control and partner with local police and military forces. This force should be enabled with language and cultural skills. Necessary combat multipliers include human intelligence collectors and social network analysts. / Major, United States Army

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / Alternate Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism calls for addressing the war as a global insurgency. Addressing the war on terrorism as a Global Insurgency provides an alternative strategic framework for prosecuting the campaign. This study is intended to determine the utility of analyzing the war on terrorism using an insurgency/counterinsurgency conceptual framework. Additionally, the recommendations can be applied to the strategic campaign, even if it is politically unfeasible to address the war as an insurgency. The study is broken down into five chapters: an introduction, explanation of Dr. McCormick’s Counterinsurgency model used for analysis, application of the model to a historical case, application to the war on terrorism, and conclusions. The first half of the study is intended to provide a thorough understanding of Dr. McCormick’s model. This is done by, first providing an overview of the model and, second, applying the model to a historical case: the insurgency in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion in 1982. The second half of the study addresses the current U.S. lead war on terrorism. The counterinsurgency model is applied to the war on terrorism based on the al Qaeda Network and the United States’ vision and mission for the conflict. Ten on terrorism are drawn from the analysis. The final chapter addresses the utility provided by the insurgency/counterinsurgency framework as applied to the war on terrorism. / Major, United States Army

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 11, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Dec 29, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Dec 29, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.