Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2009. / Thesis directed by Keir A. Lieber for the Department of Political Science. "April 2009." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 260-274).

Det kan vara svårt att göra korrekta bedömningar i konflikter likt Afghanistan idag. Nato har definerat insatsen i Afghanistan som en Counter-insurgency (COIN)-operation. Osäkerhetsfaktorerna är många och där skiftningar i framgångarna varierar kraftigt över tiden. Det gör också att i många fall måste det finnas parallella processer för det säkerhetspolitiska arbetet. Komplexiteten med detta har gjort att det har utvecklats multifunktionella strategier. Grundtanken är att samordna militära och civila ansatser för att nå största möjliga effekt. Syftet med uppsatsen är att belysa svårigheterna med de säkerhetspolitiska målsättningarna i en COIN-operation. Resultatet av undersökningen visar att de politiska målsättningarna måste vara tydliga och att det måste finnas en slutmålsättning (Exit Strategy). Den politiska nivån är även ansvarigt för att det finns en gemensam förståelse för vad som ska uppnås samt att samordna resurserna för bästa möjliga effekt. Ekonomiska medel är viktiga men inte självklara för att påverka utvecklingen i konflikten. Effekten av bistånd och utvecklingsarbetet är ifrågasätt p.g.a. korruption och dålig samordning. Utan tydliga målsättningar från den politiska nivån kommer det militära maktmedlet ha svårt att bidra till lösningen av konflikten då risken finns att ansträngningarna leder i fel riktning. Slutligen kan det konstateras att media har en stor inverkan på hur konflikten uppfattas och att oegentligheter kan påverka hela strategin och därmed att målsättningarna inte uppnås. / It can be difficult to make accurate assessments in conflicts like Afghanistan today. NATO has defined the operation in Afghanistan as a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation. The uncertainties are many and where the changes of success varies considerably over time. It also means that in many cases, there must be parallel processes for the security policy work. The complexity of this means it has developed multi-functional strategies. The basic idea is to coordinate military and civilian approaches to achieve maximum impact. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the difficulties of the security policy objectives in a COIN operation. The survey data shows that the political objectives must be clear and that there must be an end goal (Exit Strategy). The political aspect is also responsible for the existence of a common understanding of what is to be achieved, and to coordinate resources to best effect. Financial resources are important but not obvious to influence developments in the conflict. The effect of aid and development work is questionable due corruption and poor coordination. Without clear objectives from the political level, the military power may have difficulty in helping resolve the conflict and then the chances are that the effort will lead in the wrong direction. Finally, it is clear that the media has a huge impact on how conflict is perceived and that irregularities can affect the whole strategy and therefore that the objectives are not achieved.

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / This thesis examines the role of paramilitary forces in the counterinsurgency operations being launched by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) against the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People's Army (NPA). The Philippine government and the AFP firmly believe that the present Civilian Armed Force Geographical Unit Active Auxiliary (CAA) is an essential component of the AFP's Operational clear-hold-support methodology. Many scholars have argued that separating the Communist guerrillas from the populace is an important element in winning the counterinsurgency campaign. Isolating the Communist insurgents is done through the creation of local militia. However, some authors contend it would be dangerous for any government to train paramilitary forces because, in the long term, the governments are unsure of the future loyalties of these paramilitary forces. They may currently be working for the government, but as they work and gain skills, these paramilitary forces could use these same skills against the government in the future. Thus, it is quite dangerous to train paramilitary forces. The Philippine paramilitaries are good examples of paramilitary forces being used effectively for counterinsurgency. Their primary task of protecting the communities and the people from the coercive and abusive acts of the Communist insurgents are achieved. They are an effective counterinsurgency force because of proper training as well as command and control. This thesis concludes that the Philippine government and the AFP are headed in the right operational direction for utilizing paramilitary forces for village defense and as the protectors of the people. The paramilitary forces in the Philippines need the proper training as well as command and control in order to make these paramilitary forces effective counterinsurgency forces. / Colonel, Philippine Army

Internal strife has plagued the South American country of Colombia for well over forty years. In an effort to combat the different subversive elements within its borders, the Government of Colombia developed an interagency counterinsurgency strategy that takes a whole-of-government approach. This approach takes many governmental functions and institutions and places them under one counterinsurgency "umbrella". The cornerstone of this interagency model is strong civil-military cooperation. What this research project seeks to accomplish is to first apply the Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations to Colombia's unique civil-military relationship. Secondly, this research project seeks to understand how the Colombian interagency counterinsurgency model has balanced the country's security and socio-political development and sustainability. Specifically, this research project attempts to answer the question of how this interagency model of counterinsurgency influences socio-political and security sustainability since the implementation of Plan Colombia. The methodology for this research project will include a combination of primary source reviews, comparative case study examination and simple trend analysis of significant security and socio-political variables. This methodological approach will best describe the unique political, military and social dynamics taking place within Colombia. This analysis of Colombia's interagency counterinsurgency strategy is relevant not only to Colombia but to many other countries facing similar challenges in Latin America and around the world. The applicability of this model to other insurgency scenarios will also be briefly examined. / by Harvey A. Schoonover. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2010. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2010. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 5, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 11, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Begreppet counterinsurgency har fått stor uppmärksamhet efter 2001 och USA:s militäraengagemang i Afghanistan och Irak. USA har bedrivit ett gediget utvecklingsarbete sedan dess och en ny doktrin för just counterinsurgency presenterades 2006. Redan 1964 utkom fransmannen David Galula med en bok i ämnet. Det har alltså funnits teorier om counterinsurgency sedan dess. Sovjetunionens engagemang i Afghanistan under 1980-talet slutade med att den afghanska kommunistregimen kollapsade. Viljan att vinna konflikten borde ha funnits där och precis som USA har dragit erfarenheter, borde något ha gjorts för att försöka vinna konflikten även på 1980-talet. Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka om de parter som försökte besegra den afghanska motståndsrörelsen gjorde det på ett sätt som kom att likna Galulas teorier om counterinsurgency. Konflikten har analyserats utifrån Galulas teori om upprorsbekämpning med både politiska och militära medel. Analysen har visat att Sovjetunionen och den afghanska kommunistregimen inte utvecklade sitt sättatt hantera konflikten i en riktning som motsvarade Galulas teorier. Den primära politiska orsaken var att regimen förlitade sig på förtryck för att försöka avskräcka motståndssympatier. Detta tillvägagångssätt ledde istället till ökat stöd för motståndsrörelsen. Militärt saknades medlen att befästa närvaro i nya områden där regimen kunde ha börjat utöva inflytande. I förlängningen innebardet att regimen saknade förmåga att bredda sin inflytandesfär. / The term counterinsurgency has received a lot of attention since 2001 and the U.S commitment in Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S has conducted thorough developmental work since then and a new doctrine on counterinsurgency was presented in 2006. As early as 1964, the Frenchman David Galula issued a book on the subject, and there have existed theories on counterinsurgency ever since. The Soviet Union’s commitment in Afghanistan during the 1980s ended with the collapse of the Afghan communist regime. The will to win the conflict should have been present there, and in the same way that the U.S have capitalized on their experiences something ought to have been done to try to win the conflict during the 1980s. The purpose of this study is to examine whether the parties involved in the fight against the Afghan resistance acted in a way that resembles Galula’s theories on counterinsurgency. The conflict has been analyzed with Galulas theories on how to defeat an insurgency by both political and military means. The analysis has shown that the Soviet Union and the Afghan communist regime did not develop their way of handling the conflict in a way which is consistent with Galula’s theories. The primary political cause was that the regime put its trust in oppression in their attempts to discourage resistance sympathies. This approach resulted in an increase in support for the Afghan resistance rather than the support of the regime. Militarily, the lack of means to secure the regime’s political presence in new areas meant that the regime was unable to broaden its sphere of influence.

The specific task of this thesis is to illustrate the complexity of a cooperation between civilian and military entities by examining Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and their role as an actor among others in the field in a war-torn Afghanistan. By using counterinsurgency strategy as an analytical framework it has been possible to examine the civilian and military contexts closer. Underlying structures concerning the norms and interpretation of reality of the PRTs has been partly revealed. Studies of the PRTs as one significant bearers of "the comprehensive approach", which includes a holistic approach regarding the use of civilian and military capabilities, new conclusions can be drawn on whether a general civil-military approach can be a part of the solution for current and future conflicts. Based on the counterinsurgency strategy, the author has identified three themes as bearing and thus appears through the thesis as a foundation. These are Coordination, Development and Security. The empirical material is filtered through these themes as they are central to counterinsurgency and there by affect the PRT-concept. This study leads to five conclusions regarding the integration of the civilian and military contexts. In summary the conclusions states that it seems to be no starting points for creating a robust culture for cooperation. The absence of common objectives regarding operation, competition between different narratives as well as parallel processes of development and security risks causing a counterproductive outcome. A single resonance must be allowed to emerge from a convergence of civil and military powers as to what should be the civilmilitary mission. With mutual trust and dialogue improved conditions can be shaped to build common ground and goals for what needs to be done in countries with similar problems like Afghanistan.

The United States, the number one consumer of drugs in the world, since 1969, has made it their goal to decrease the supply of drugs to a global zero. However, the vast supply of US drugs consumed do not originate in the US. To understand the impact of US anti-drug policy, mainly interdiction, eradication, and the targeting of DTO’s abroad, I conducted three case studies of three states with which the US has participated with in the drug war: Colombia, Honduras, and Mexico. What I found is that in each situation, each state approaches their own domestic drug war (with US support) as a COIN. However, given the unique nature of DTOs, this COIN strategy has failed, weakening the state institutions of the countries.

The central question of this thesis examines how Malaya/Malaysia and Singapore learned and adapted successful terrorist disengagement programs and policies; through their unique and non-military rehabilitation programs. The methodology is a comparative case study analysis of Malaysia and Singapore. In order to understand how the countries of Malaya/Malaysia and Singapore adapted a colonial-era counter-insurgency program to disengage Communist Terrorists into a program that now rehabilitates radicalized Islamist Terrorists, an analysis of the periods of the Malayan Emergency and the post-Cold War era of Malaya/Malaysia and Singapore is necessary. The argument presented in this thesis contends the colonial framework and policies of the Malayan Emergency had a positive impact on Malaysia and Singapore; which both countries have further developed and learned as a foundation for their successful terrorist disengagement programs and policies to counter radical Islamist groups and individuals. The hypothesis is that successful counter-insurgency operations must include disengagement programs, rather than purely military solutions or strategies to ensure countries success in counter-insurgency operations and strategies. The Malaysian counter-insurgency disengagement program and the Singapore counter-insurgency disengagement program can provide lessons for modern day counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism programs and policies.