Thesis (M.Phil.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2006. / "Submitted to Department of Applied Social Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy" Includes bibliographical references (leaves 113-133)

This study explores the literature on factors favorable to democratization. It is argued that there has been a domestic dominance, with international factors a forgotten dimension. It is also argued that the limited body of work dealing with international factors has been empirical in nature. This study sheds lights on one international factor in democracy promotion. The theoretical contribution of this study is the presented analytical framework for democracy promotion. The analytical framework consists of actors, interests, methods, channels, relations and impact. It is argued that, within a specific time-context (setting): (1) There are actors (2) that may promote the democracy norm and reinforcing interests. ( 3) They may use different methods of pursuing their interests and (4) that may be channeled towards domestic actors. (5) This may create certain relations and (6) have different impact on domestic actors. The empirical aim of this study is to illustrate the analytical framework. The empirical contribution is to provide an improved understanding of democracy promotion and democratization in postcommunist Europe. This is done by analyzing the role of the EU as democracy promoter in Slovakia, Belarus and FRY from 1995 to 2003. The analysis illustrates different interests, methods, channels, relations and impact between the EU as democracy promoter and the targeted states in Slovakia, Belarus and FRY.

Architecture is an act of agency, and a technology that can be learned by anyone for their own purpose. It evolved as a system of organization and a protective shell for our fragile bodies, a vast, complex technology that enables human survival. Yet despite its universal nature, we have artificially limited our control over it, and who has access to it; we limit its potentials, its adaptive capacities, its diversity, and our continued survival. Walled-up in universities, behind certifications and dissertations, we have removed architecture from the public’s mind so that few understand it and use it. The city, in its surging complexity, is ever more opaque; the systems, infrastructure, and regulations that govern its formation are hidden from view, behind doors, walls, and fences. Hack seeks to make the city legible and architecture accessible, by leveraging a growing tide of hacker culture, and its subcultures – makers and DIY drone enthusiasts – and their respective technologies. Since the birth of the computer, Hackers have sought to democratize information technology held by military, government, and corporate interests. In doing so they’ve provided a number of methods, that enable free sharing and collaboration between individuals, distributing problem-solving practices, open-source systems, hands-on education, and free access to tools, all applicable to the challenges and opportunities facing architecture and city building today. Hack bootstraps itself to these ideals with hands-on experiments and reflections on those experiments, reframing architecture as a basic skill, a technology to be used by anyone, democratizing architecture through online communities, and the Hacker culture, in order to define a new active role for the architect. Internalizing the Hacker Ethic, and appropriate existing technologies to build new tools – devices to survey space, architecture and the city. – Hack traces the construction of a kite, a model car, a quadrocopter, and a remote-control airplane, each capable of gathering intimate information about the local environment. Hack concludes by reexamining the role of the aerial view in making cities and exercising power, speculating on the potential to level the fields of perception through online co-operation and these small-scale cartographic technologies.

In many African countries, including Ethiopia, decades of ruthless dictatorships and civil war, were followed by an almost universal demand for democracy combined with a seemingly willing leadership. However, two decades since this significant upsurge to adopt democratic governance, many are left wondering about the depth of commitment to this effort and the sincerity of political leaders. In fact, many dictators and autocrats have adopted the language of democracy and some of its formal elements. Academics, donor countries, and international organizations are struggling to identify an appropriate model of governance. The theory of semi-authoritarianism strives to address this issue of ambiguity by placing the responsibility for democratization, or the lack thereof, with the political leadership. The argument here is that many countries seemingly in transition are not. Rather, they are semi-authoritarian by design as the political elite has a vested interest in preventing democratic consolidation. The theory of semi-authoritarianism attempts to explain the continuation of false democracies. However, the theory is too broad and superficial, it raises just as many questions as it attempts to address. The attempt to classify and explain emerging political trends in countries such as Ethiopia without an appreciation of deeper forces beyond elite manipulation can jeopardize a realistic appraisal of the fate of democracy.

Turkey and Pakistan share a long history of military tutelage, influence, and intervention in politics. This thesis analyzes the evolution of the political role of the military in the two countries, in order to understand the causes of the Turkish military’s diminished political influence since 2002, contrasted with the Pakistani military’s continuing grip over the country’s political system. Three factors can explain this divergence in civilian control of the military between the two countries. In Turkey, there has been a constant process of elite turnover and replacement, culminating in the gradual emergence and consolidation of counter-elite power in the 1990s and 2000s. In Pakistan, the traditional civil-military “Establishment” has remained remarkably unchanged in its constitution and structure. The role of elites in determining the course of civil-military relations has been conditioned by two other factors, (1) external influences and (2) varying patterns of civilian institutional legitimacy.

This dissertation investigates the effect of state capacity on the probability for democratic transition and the survival of democracies. I seek to answer these quesitons through the use of both quantitative and qualitative analysis. In my statistical models, I make use of Cox Proportional Hazard Models. These are supplemented by two case studies involving South Korea and the Philippines. My expectation, which is supported by the results presented in this study, is that higher levels of state capacity will make authoritarian regimes more stable and thus make democratic transitions less likely, but if democratic transitions take place, higher levels of state capacity will make new democratic regimes more likely to survive.

Election boycotts are a common occurrence in unconsolidated democracies, particularly in the developing world, with prominent examples from recent years occurring in Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia. Despite the frequent occurrence of boycotts, there are few studies available in the scholarly literature concerning the effectiveness of electoral boycotts, particularly as a strategy of opposition parties seeking to bring about the end of electoral authoritarian governments. This paper is based in the democratization literature, with a particular focus on the behavior and vulnerabilities of hybrid or electoral authoritarian regimes. Using an original dataset with global coverage including hybrid regimes from 1981 to 2006, this paper uses event-history analysis to determine the efficacy of boycotts in national elections among other risk factors thought to undermine electoral authoritarian regimes as well as the possibilities for subsequent democratization occurring following both contested and boycotted electoral processes.

In many African countries, including Ethiopia, decades of ruthless dictatorships and civil war, were followed by an almost universal demand for democracy combined with a seemingly willing leadership. However, two decades since this significant upsurge to adopt democratic governance, many are left wondering about the depth of commitment to this effort and the sincerity of political leaders. In fact, many dictators and autocrats have adopted the language of democracy and some of its formal elements. Academics, donor countries, and international organizations are struggling to identify an appropriate model of governance. The theory of semi-authoritarianism strives to address this issue of ambiguity by placing the responsibility for democratization, or the lack thereof, with the political leadership. The argument here is that many countries seemingly in transition are not. Rather, they are semi-authoritarian by design as the political elite has a vested interest in preventing democratic consolidation. The theory of semi-authoritarianism attempts to explain the continuation of false democracies. However, the theory is too broad and superficial, it raises just as many questions as it attempts to address. The attempt to classify and explain emerging political trends in countries such as Ethiopia without an appreciation of deeper forces beyond elite manipulation can jeopardize a realistic appraisal of the fate of democracy.

The aim ofthis study was to examine how economic growth affects the level of democracy inauthoritarian states. Some of these states have experienced high economicgrowth. However, one can discuss how it affects the country’s democratization-process.For that reason this study was needed to contribute to a clarification of howeconomic growth can affect authoritarian rule and democratization. This wasdone through an examination of the development in China. Hence, this study aimsto contribute to the research field of democracy and to suggest how to manageand support democracy in authoritarian growth-states that deny their denizensdemocratic rights. The study was conducted through a comparison of the expecteddevelopment that the modernization theory stipulates with the actualdevelopment of the Chinese society. The study has examined the impact of twofactors of modernization, namely education and media.  The analysis of the empirical material showsthat the expected development, suggested by the modernization theory, in largeparts corresponds to the development in China. However, based on thedevelopment in China, it seems that economic growth suggest two implications inauthoritarian states; firstly it means a legitimization of the currentpolitical leadership and secondly it means the growth of a middle class throughimproved socioeconomic conditions. This suggest that economic growth bothsupport and undermines the level of democracy. In the case of China this suggests that a popularization of society has begun. However, the democratizationin China is still inconclusive and there are no signs of change in thepolitical leadership. The dualities of the conclusions underline the importanceof further research on the subject of economic growth and its implications fordemocracy and authoritarian states.

<p>Less democratic countries conduct elections under the majoritarian electoral formula more often than under proportional representation by a wide margin. Yet, robust democratic systems utilize both majoritarian and PR electoral formulas with great success. This dissertation approaches this empirical puzzle and tries to unveil what role, if any, electoral formulas play in politics.</p><p> To do so, it focuses on the electoral process exclusively and utilizes Judith Kelley's recently completed comprehensive dataset on election quality to perform some large-sample statistical analyses of the relationship between the electoral formula, ethno-cultural polarization and election quality. Then, it presents three in-depth case studies of Nigeria, Ghana and Indonesia to unveil in more detail institutional origins and the mechanisms of electoral manipulation, as refracted through the electoral formula. </p><p>The conclusions reached are that PR is much better suited for conducting free and fair elections in ethno-culturally polarized countries. Yet, majoritarian and mixed formulas perform just as well when polarization is low. This finding is directly related to an ongoing debate by institutional designers and academics alike and provides systematic quantitative and detailed qualitative support. The study also suggests that PR might not only mediate inter-ethnic differences when disagreement is high, but also reduces the level of polarization if applied over several electoral cycles.</p> / Dissertation