A tese estuda a evolução histórica do atitude multilateral do Brasil. Parte da noção que o multilateralismo é um aspecto significativo da política externa brasileira, desde as primeiras conferências internacionais dos países americanos, que começam ainda no fim do século XIX. Em tempos recentes, na Liga das Nações, mas sobretudo nas Nações Unidas, a importância das instituições multilaterais só fez crescer. O estudo parte, no ângulo teórico, da perspectiva de que o multilateralismo tem uma lógica própria e que, ao aceitá-la, o comportamento diplomático dos Estados deve naturalmente estar em sintonia com o que aquela lógica impõe. A concepção de John Ruggie apóia a parte teórica da tese e sustenta o seu objetivo central, que é o de procura definir o que seriam constantes do comportamento multilateral do Brasil. Procura-se mostrar que suas origens estariam nas reações que a diplomacia brasileira teve ao Pan Americanismo, se fixaram com nossa participação na II Conferência da Haia, quando, com Ruy Barbosa, defendemos que as instituições multilaterais deveriam estar fundadas na igualdade entre os Estados e com a aspiração a uma participação influente nos processos decisórios internacionais, expresso recentemente com a aspiração a um lugar permanente no Conselho de Segurança das Nações. / The thesis studies the evolution of Brazil´s multilateral attitude. It accepts the notion that multilateralism has been a meaningful aspect of Brazilian foreign policy since the first conferences of American States, a series of international gatherings that began at the end of nineteenth century. From them on, after the creation of the League of Nations and, specially, the United Nations, the importance of multilateral institutions for Brazil has grown consistently. From the theoretical perspective, the thesis accepts the idea that multilateralism is defined by a singular logic and States, when working in multilateral institutions, are bound by that logic. John Ruggie´s conception of nultilateralism supoorts that idea and frames the main goal of the thesis, that is, a investigation of the constant patterns of Brazil´s multilateral behavior. The origins of those patterns could be identified in the diplomatic reactions to the challenges of the Pan American conferences. But, the patterns became more evident during our participation in the II Peace Conference (Hague, 1907) when our delegation, headed by Ruy Barbosa, advocated the understanding that necessary foundation of the multilateral institutions is the equality among States. Another constant is the Brazilian wish to have a more influential participation in the decision making process of the international institutions, as today shown in our aspiration to occupy a permanent seat at the Security Council of the United Nations.

The humanist Biondo wrote three different narratives of the Fourth Crusade aimed at establishing the legitimacy of western claims to lands in the east. Biondo had played an integral part in the ephemeral reunification of the Greek and Latin Churches at the Council of Florence in July 1439. Biondo blamed the Greeks for the failure and thus did not mourn the loss of their empire to the Ottoman Turks in 1453. However, Biondo did urge several states in the Italian Peninsula to set out en mass to fight the Turks. He viewed the fall of Constantinople as an opportunity for the Latin West to reestablish its rightful empire in the east. He explicated this opinion in at least two different treatises dedicated to rulers shortly after the fall of the ancient city. To Alfonso of Aragon, Biondo argued that the King could establish a peaceful and prosperous extension of his maritime holdings to include a fallen empire with no legal ruler. To the Venetians, he presented the Fourth Crusade as a glorious victory that established their legal claim to rule the now-lost remnants of the Byzantine Empire. Biondo shaped his source material of the Fourth Crusade into an historical narrative that made this primary argument and urged powerful rulers in the Italian peninsula to take back what was rightfully theirs.

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A Double Review of "Paolina's Innocence: Child Abuse in Casanova's Venice" by Larry Wolff and "Venice: A New History" by Thomas F. Madden

The main objective of American foreign policy in the Middle East, during the post-War period of 1946-1958, was to safeguard the area against Soviet intrusions. This thesis attempts to examine the causes for the failure of the United States to achieve this objective. It concludes that this failure is the result of an alienation of the major national forces in the Middle East. The United States alienated the Arab world by openly and unreservedly supporting Zionist aims in Palestine. She alienated newly independent states by establishing close cooperation with Britain and France, their former colonial masters. She alienated revolutionary nationalists by supporting reactionary and traditional rulers against them and by opposing their ideals of neutrality and revolutionary change. In doing so, the United States opened the way for the Soviet Union to challenge her position and threaten her interests in the area. By emphasizing the military aspects of containment, she demonstrated a lack of understanding of the nature of the Soviet threat. The revolutionary nationalists sought to obtain military, economic, and technical aid without conditions or political strings. By insisting on imposing her conditions of alliance against communism and securing concessions and guarantees, including the safety and security of Israel, the United States made it impossible for the nationalist forces to cooperate with her. They, therefore, were forced to deal with the Soviet Union, whose aid was offered with no conditions or strings attached. The American response to isolate and weaken those states which accepted Soviet aid, through such means as the Eisenhower Doctrine, brought on a most serious deterioration in relations never before encountered by the United States and the most spectacular successes ever realized by the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

On November 26, 1945, the Ambassador to China, Patrick J. Hurley, announced his resignation to the American press. In doing so, he leveled charges against the State Department and a number of its Foreign Service officers—charges which questioned the integrity of many, in their relation with what Hurley termed the “Imperialist” and communist nations in China. Those charges were the beginning of two and one-half decades of ideological crusading in America by many who developed the theory that those men charged by Hurley had been responsible for America’s “loss of China” Hurley was sent to China in 1944 as President Roosevelt’s personal representatives to Chiang Kai-shek. His directive was to promote efficient and harmonious relations between Chiang Kai-shek and General Stilwell, Commander of American Forces, China Theatre. Hurley was, further, to facilitate Stilwell’s exercise of command over the Chinese armies, which, it was hoped, would soon be placed under him. Failing in this mission, Hurley was ultimately appointed to the rank of Ambassador after the resignation of Clarence T. Gauss. Hurley had by this time, taken on the responsibility of promoting negotiations between the Kuomintang Government of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communist Party, headquartered in Yenan. Rather than simply offering his “good offices” in the negotiations, Hurley became personally involved, interjecting his personal, ideological beliefs into the proposals of each side. Through his involvement, Hurley became personally committed to unification on his terms and eventually gave the Kuomintang Party and Chiang Kai-shek the impression that the United States was permanently committed to support of the Central Government. Hurley soon came into conflict with a number of Foreign Service officers and the Department of State, below the level of the Secretary of State, over opposing interpretations of American policy in China. Hurley became intransigent in his overwhelming support of the National Government, while members of the State department believed that the United States should remain flexible in its approach to the problems in China to avoid supporting the losing side in what was seen as an inevitable civil war. Hurley came to see criticism of Chiang Kai-shek’s government and suggestions for alterations in policy, as personal criticism directed to him. In the face of this perceived threat to himself, he had a number of Foreign Service officers re-called or transferred, only to discover that they had been reassigned to positions which he thought were superior to his. In the face of these events and rising criticism, in addition to eventual failure to bring the two Chinese factions together and impending civil war. Hurley submitted his resignation to the Secretary of State, after first announcing his reasons to the press. Experiencing one of the few failures of his life , the man who had risen from the coal mines of Oklahoma to become a millionaire twice over, Secretary of Defense und0er President Hoover, and Ambassador to China under Roosevelt, turned the blame for his failure to those with whom he had come into conflict, the Department of State being the principal culprit. This study of Hurley’s experience in China is based upon several secondary accounts of the period, recently published Department of State papers (Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers), Hurley’s several testimonials before Congressional Committees, and interviews with Mr. John Stewart Service, upon whom attention was focused in numerous loyalty investigations subsequent to Hurley’s resignation.

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