Foreign Affairs: Policy, Culture, and the Making of Love and War in Vietnam investigates the interplay between war and society leading to and during the Vietnam War. This project intertwines histories of foreign relations, popular culture, and gender and sexuality as lenses for understanding international power relations during the global Cold War more broadly. By examining sexual encounters between American service members and Vietnamese civilian women, this dissertation argues that relationships ranging from prostitution to dating, marriage, and rape played a significant role in the diplomacy, logistics, and international reception of the war. American disregard for South Vietnamese morality laws in favor of bolstering GI morale in the early war years contributed to the instability of the alliance and led to a rise in anti-American activities, health concerns, and military security threats. The length of the war in addition to the difficulty for service members to definitively identify enemy forces placed stress on soldiers. Publicized cases of rape and disagreements over responsibility for orphans or children born outside marriage to U.S. servicemen in the later war years further deteriorated relations. Negotiating these relationships resulted in implicit assignments of power between the United States and their allies in South Vietnam. In addition to the bi-lateral relations between the U.S. and South Vietnam, North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front propaganda citing the GI-civilian relationships sparked security concerns and further threatened the alliance. This dissertation further contends that encounters provided propaganda material for opposition forces, strained the overall war effort at home, and shaped how Americans remember the war.

This thesis is devoted to an unsuccessful mission to Sofia undertaken in the fall of 1914 by Noel Buxton, a Liberal British M.P., who aimed to win Bulgaria over to the side of the Triple Entente. Although referred to on occasion in works having to do with the conduct of British foreign policy during the First World War, the affair has never before been described in full. Through a close examination of hitherto unexploited material from Buxton's own archive, it has been possible to reconstruct the evolution of the mission, analyze its contemporary significance, and suggest its relevance to current trends towards the moralization and democratization of diplomacy.

This thesis examines Anglo-French perceptions of power within the context of the rise of the United States of America. It uses several overlapping events falling within a moment at the end of the nineteenth century (1898-1899) - the Spanish-American War, the Dreyfus Affair and the Fashoda crisis - to explore various British and French actors' perceptions of national power, decline, and international competition. It draws heavily on diplomatic material, but its methodology is primarily cultural. It examines ways in which various cultural assumptions affected perceptions of power and global events. It takes a particular interest in the relationship between ideas about gender and dimensions of national power. It focuses on contemporary preoccupations and assumptions, whether spoken or unspoken, and argues that they could prove determinative. External realities were refracted into perceptions that in turn drove prescriptions and policy. The thesis juxtaposes perspectives from multiple states, thereby contextualizing or comparing British, French and occasionally American preoccupations with those of their transatlantic contemporaries. It draws upon archival sources which previously have been under-examined or approached from different perspectives and research priorities. Its exploration of the cultural dimensions of thought about national power and success is grounded in an awareness of the analysis and actions of certain diplomats and politicians involved in the more practical business of international affairs. Conversely, diplomatic and other records are situated within their cultural milieu, to better understand the context in which views about the international order were shaped. The thesis necessarily makes excursions into the history of emotions, since its actors' political analyses at times appear entangled and aligned with their emotional responses. The thesis therefore serves as an example of an international history that integrates diplomatic with cultural and emotional elements and demonstrates their mutual illumination.

This diplomatic and military history offers a new interpretation of the origins of the three fighting fronts during the final phase of the Cold War in Angola, Central America, and Afghanistan. Vaguely remembered today as proxy wars on the periphery, in fact, these were protracted revolutionary civil wars and regional contests for the balance of power in which millions died, while at the same time they were central to global superpower confrontation. Analysis focuses on the strategy and policy of the United States. The chronology from 1975 to 1982 covers the Ford administration's covert action intervention in the Angolan Civil War, which came to grief at the hands of Cuban troops; Jimmy Carter's effort to conduct foreign policy based on principles, which ran foul of power considerations in Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Afghanistan; and Ronald Reagan's embrace of these wars early in his first term as part of the revival of U.S. strength in its competition with the Soviet Union. The principal argument is that, while generally undervalued as controversial small wars of dubious significance, these wars were in fact integral to U.S. experience of limited war during the Cold War following victory in World War II. In strategic terms, the main conclusion is that the U.S. restricted itself to conducting economy of force contingency operations in Angola, Central America, and Afghanistan as a result of its costly struggles in Korea and Vietnam. Despite declaring these peripheral wars to be central to the Cold War, avoiding the costs of involving U.S forces directly in Third World conflicts and minimizing the risks of escalation with the Soviet Union were overriding political and military imperatives.

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Patterns of domestic political contestation in international affairs often see the centre aligned against both the left and the right of the ideological spectrum. This is observable in a range of issues, from democracy promotion, intervention, international law, European integration, free trade, globalization and the creation of international regimes. Why centre-periphery ideological competition occurs is an interesting puzzle, given the challenge it offers to the idea that partisanship is an inherently left-right phenomenon. Yet the role of the political centre in foreign policy has not been subjected to systematic analysis. This thesis studies the nature and effects of the foreign policy position of the political centre. It argues that the centre is distinguished from left and right by its embrace of distinct elements of liberal ideology. The liberal view of international politics differs in thee important respects from its socialist and conservative competitors: It is particular, rather than pluralist, when it comes to questions of sovereignty and international legitimacy; it views interdependence, rather than independence, as a natural and desirable condition of the international; and it views deterrence, rather than diplomacy, as the best means of achieving security. To test the validity of this thesis I discuss the role of ideology in explaining variation in relations between four Euratlantic states (Britain, France, West Germany and Canada) and the United States during the Cold War. This is a hard case given the intensity of global threat at the time. The thesis tests the claim that the strength of Euratlantic-American relations is a function of the relative influence of the political centre at the time. To do this it outlines a mixed-methods research design that combines in-depth case studies with a quantitative analysis of Euratlantic-US relations. The results from both elements confirm the validity of the theoretical proposition.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T19:15:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 5564.pdf: 1459572 bytes, checksum: 12d89dd6d0f48e26ced73933484b5c04 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-03-15 / This paper analyzes the capacity of Regional Cooperation by the Japanese state and the advantages obtained through strategic management of state institutions. For this research, take focus on internal historical factors and key political actors who led Japan's to become a Soft Power agent. The ultimate goal of this research is a timely contribution on the Japanese experience in the field of cooperation that may be of relevance for Brazilian diplomacy and expanding national Soft Power. / Este trabalho analisa a capacidade de produção de Cooperação Regional por parte do Estado japonês e a vantagens obtidas através de estratégias de gestão de instituições estatais. Para realização desta pesquisa, detêm-se acerca de fatores históricos internos e os principais atores políticos que levaram o Japão há constituir-se como agende de Poder Brando. A finalidade última desta pesquisa, atem-se sobre as contribuições da experiência japonesa no campo de cooperação que podem ser de relevância para a diplomacia brasileira e a ampliação do Poder Brando nacional.

A tese estuda a evolução histórica do atitude multilateral do Brasil. Parte da noção que o multilateralismo é um aspecto significativo da política externa brasileira, desde as primeiras conferências internacionais dos países americanos, que começam ainda no fim do século XIX. Em tempos recentes, na Liga das Nações, mas sobretudo nas Nações Unidas, a importância das instituições multilaterais só fez crescer. O estudo parte, no ângulo teórico, da perspectiva de que o multilateralismo tem uma lógica própria e que, ao aceitá-la, o comportamento diplomático dos Estados deve naturalmente estar em sintonia com o que aquela lógica impõe. A concepção de John Ruggie apóia a parte teórica da tese e sustenta o seu objetivo central, que é o de procura definir o que seriam constantes do comportamento multilateral do Brasil. Procura-se mostrar que suas origens estariam nas reações que a diplomacia brasileira teve ao Pan Americanismo, se fixaram com nossa participação na II Conferência da Haia, quando, com Ruy Barbosa, defendemos que as instituições multilaterais deveriam estar fundadas na igualdade entre os Estados e com a aspiração a uma participação influente nos processos decisórios internacionais, expresso recentemente com a aspiração a um lugar permanente no Conselho de Segurança das Nações. / The thesis studies the evolution of Brazil´s multilateral attitude. It accepts the notion that multilateralism has been a meaningful aspect of Brazilian foreign policy since the first conferences of American States, a series of international gatherings that began at the end of nineteenth century. From them on, after the creation of the League of Nations and, specially, the United Nations, the importance of multilateral institutions for Brazil has grown consistently. From the theoretical perspective, the thesis accepts the idea that multilateralism is defined by a singular logic and States, when working in multilateral institutions, are bound by that logic. John Ruggie´s conception of nultilateralism supoorts that idea and frames the main goal of the thesis, that is, a investigation of the constant patterns of Brazil´s multilateral behavior. The origins of those patterns could be identified in the diplomatic reactions to the challenges of the Pan American conferences. But, the patterns became more evident during our participation in the II Peace Conference (Hague, 1907) when our delegation, headed by Ruy Barbosa, advocated the understanding that necessary foundation of the multilateral institutions is the equality among States. Another constant is the Brazilian wish to have a more influential participation in the decision making process of the international institutions, as today shown in our aspiration to occupy a permanent seat at the Security Council of the United Nations.

Os conceitos geopolíticos elaborados, ou apropriados, e ressignificados pelas grandes potências moldam as relações internacionais. A partir desta tese, esta pesquisa versa sobre as relações internacionais entre os Estados americanos, que tiveram lugar no movimento panamericano de 1933 a 1954. Durante o período, no âmbito dos eventos continentais mais importantes (Conferências Pan-Americanas e Reuniões de Consulta aos Ministros das Relações Exteriores), destacaram-se dois conceitos geopolíticos levados a termos pelos Estados Unidos e que serviram de baliza para as relações interamericanas: América do Sul e América Latina. A primeira proposição, em vigência de 1933 a 1942, compreendia o conjunto das Américas como espaço formado pelos Estados Unidos, por Estados da América Central e por Estados diferentes e desenvolvidos que formavam a América do Sul. Após este período, uma nova proposição sugeriu que as relações hemisféricas eram constituídas, por um lado, pelos Estados Unidos e, por outro, pelos demais Estados americanos que passaram a compor a América Latina, sem distinção. Neste sentido, o objetivo geral deste trabalho é analisar a atuação da diplomacia dos Estados Unidos e da diplomacia do Brasil em relação aos conceitos de América do Sul e América Latina nas relações hemisféricas. Para tanto, procuramos identificar o que denominamos como demandas latino-americanas e que receberam destaque na documentação diplomática produzida e arquivada pelo Departamento de Estado e pelo Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil. Buscamos, ainda, verificar o posicionamento dos Estados Unidos e do Brasil e qualificar a cooperação entre o ambos. A pesquisa levou-nos a atuar na intersecção de dois temas clássicos da história das relações interamericanas: a política da Boa Vizinhança e a Doutrina Truman de contenção ao comunismo. Concluiu-se que durante o período da Boa Vizinhança, a América do Sul emergiu tanto de uma crise de interpretação da sociedade (e da diplomacia) americana sobre o que havia ao sul do Rio Grande, quanto de uma crise do capitalismo mundial. A delimitação geopolítica e o prestígio atribuído à diplomacia brasileira foi ao encontro do interesse da política externa brasileira, cuja abrangência sul-americana há muito constava de seu horizonte de atuação regional. Neste sentido, no início da década de 1940, o Brasil vislumbrava que seria essencial para a política hemisférica dos Estados Unidos e para as relações interamericanas. No entanto, a perspectiva de um lugar reservado nas relações hemisféricas não sustentou-se no pós-guerra, especialmente nos eventos pan-americanos sob a Doutrina Truman. A proposição norteamericana de que havia igualdade entre os Estados da América Latina, composta por um grupo homogêneo de Estados, levou as diplomacias brasileira e americana a operar desde posições opostas. Paradoxalmente, o Brasil deu os primeiros passos rumo a aproximação com os demais Estados do subcontinente. As conclusões deste trabalho são relevantes e subsidiam a compreensão das relações internacionais americanas contemporâneas, sobretudo os processos de integração regional. / Geopolitical concepts elaborated, appropriated or reinterpreted by the great powers play a key role in shaping international relations. This thesis deals with international relations among the American states from 1933 to 1954, specifically in the Pan-American movement. In the major continental events (Pan-American Conferences and Consultation Meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs) under consideration, two geopolitical concepts brought to terms by the United States served as a beacon for inter-American relations: South America and Latin America. The first proposition, in effect from 1933 to 1942, comprised the whole of the Americas as a space formed by the United States, by the Central American states and the different and developed states that formed South America. After this period, a new proposition suggested that hemispheric relations were established, on the one hand, by the United States and, secondly, by other American states that were included in Latin America without distinctions. In this sense, the aim of this study is to analyze the performance of the diplomacy of the United States and Brazil in relation to the concepts of South America and Latin America in hemispheric relations. Therefore, I try to identify what I call Latin American demands, which were highlighted in the diplomatic documentation produced and filed by the State Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil. I also seek to trace the positions of the United States and Brazil and qualify cooperation between both countries. The research led me to explore the intersection of two classic themes of the history of inter-American relations: the Good Neighbor Policy and the Truman Doctrine to contain communism. It was concluded that during the period of the Good Neighbor Policy, South America emerged both as a crisis of the American interpretation of society (and diplomacy) about what was occurring south of the Rio Grande and a crisis of world capitalism. The geopolitical boundaries and prestige attributed to Brazilian diplomacy during this period was clearly in the interest of Brazilian foreign policy, whose South American horizon had long consisted only of regional operations. In this sense, in the early 1940s, Brazilian politicians envisioned that the country would be essential for the hemispheric policy of the United States and for inter-American relations. However, the prospect of a reserved place in hemispheric relations did not hold up after the war, especially in the Pan American events during the period of the Truman Doctrine. The United States proposition that there was equality among the homogeneous group of states led Brazilian and American diplomacies to stake out opposite positions. Paradoxically, Brazil took the first steps towards rapprochement with the other states of the subcontinent. The findings of this study subsidize the understanding of contemporary inter-American relations, particularly processes of regional integration.

During the third year of the Great War 1914-1918 Russia experienced the upheaval of revolution, precipitating the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II and installation of the Provisional Government in March, and culminating in the Bolshevik takeover of November, 1917. Due to the political, military, and economic chaos which accompanied the revolution Russia was unable to continue the struggle on the eastern front. Russia was not fighting the war against the Central Powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary alone, however, and her threat to capitulate was of the gravest concern to her Allies, Great Britain and France. In fact the disintegration of Russia's war effort was the pivotal issue around which Anglo-Russian relations revolved in 1917. Britain's war policy was dominated by the belief that the eastern front had to be maintained to achieve victory. It appeared that any interruption to the eastern front would allow Germany to reinforce her lines on the western front, then to win and control the economic destiny of Europe. Britain could not allow this to happen. This study focuses on the reportage from British diplomats and representatives in and outside of Russia to their superiors at the Foreign Office in London from December 1916 to December 1917. A vast wealth of documentation is available in the Foreign Office Correspondence. Analysis of these notes reveals certain trends which were dictated by the kaleidoscopic turn of events in Russia and the national ethos of these representatives. A minute analysis demonstrates a great diversity of opinion regarding the situation in Russia, ranging from optimism to pessimism and objectivity to prejudice in all phases of the year 1917. To a limited degree this diversity can be correlated with the geographical location and diplomatic status of the individual representatives. Above all it is clear that when historians quote from these sources, they choose the quotations which support the conclusions they have already reached because they know the outcome of the developments that they are describing. The individuals on the spot at the time were far less prescient and insightful. They were much more affected by their own historical prejudices and rumours, as well as the vagaries and short-term shifts of their immediate environment. Many of them believed in the great-man theory of history; a number attributed all developments and difficulties to some aspect of the Russian national character; some explained certain events during the year by conspiracies, especially of the Jews, with whom they tended to equate the Bolsheviks. Only a few were consistently solid and realistic in their appraisal of events, attributing them to factors favoured by our most respected historians. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate