The author offers a comprehensive analysis of the thought of Machiavelli situated against the backdrop of political and biographical developments in the early 16th century.

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This dissertation examines the relationship between intelligence analysis and policy formation during the Vietnam War from 1962 to 1968. Rooted in a multidisciplinary approach that draws from history and international relations theory, it argues that Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, along with most of their top advisors, used intelligence analysis to confirm their preconceived notions about the U.S. war effort in Vietnam. Both presidents and the majority of their advisors all agreed that while victory in Vietnam would be difficult, allowing the Republic of (South) Vietnam (RVN) to fall to Communism was unthinkable. They filtered out intelligence analyses that suggested the U.S. could not win or that its geopolitical position could withstand the RVN’s loss. JFK and LBJ’s national security decision-making system enabled this dysfunctional use of intelligence. Both presidents relied on an ad hoc system of policy formation in which major policy decisions took place in informal meetings staffed only by their most trusted advisors. Doing so allowed either president or their advisors latitude to expel intelligence officers from critical meetings for any reason. Analysts who became bearers of bad news on the war effort or developed negative personal relationships with any influential member of the administration risked banishment to the policy wilderness. On the other hand, analysts who reinforced their customers’ preconceptions received more access to policy circles. Top Kennedy and Johnson administration officials abused intelligence in several different ways. Ignoring or disregarding analyses that cast doubt on the war effort’s prospects was most common. In such cases, officials favored more optimistic reporting or used their own reasoning. In doing the latter, most policymakers and military officials based decisions on personal insecurity, rigid anti-Communism, previous personal experiences during World War II, and interpretations of history that justified American involvement in Vietnam. They also “cherry-picked” or pulled language from analyses that justified their positions while ignoring language elsewhere in the same reports that did not. And when the war became more controversial within the Johnson administration in 1967, some pro-war officials began openly politicizing intelligence, or pressuring analysts to advance a particular conclusion regardless of evidence. Finally, gaps in intelligence collection and analytic tradecraft worsened the intelligence community’s standing during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Throughout the war, American intelligence collectors were unable to break the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam’s high-level communication codes or recruit any defectors or spies within the Hanoi government. Analysts thus used less reliable evidence, which weakened the reliability of their conclusions. Many analysts did not even cite sources at all. Analysts also used vague language that made their findings appear untrustworthy. All of these factors made Vietnam-era intelligence analyses easier for their readers to ignore. The result was flawed policy and strategy in Vietnam. / History

The United States, during both the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan administrations, pursued humanitarian relief in the Horn of Africa and East Africa with an eye towards Cold War politics. During the Carter administration the focus was on Ethiopia and the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam, while during the Reagan administration the United States’ efforts were mainly targeted towards Sudan and the regime of Gaffar Nimeiry. In both instances, the United States was concerned with the politics of the Cold War, trying to create a more positive image of the U.S. abroad by relieving world hunger, while also propping up governments that supported U.S. interests during the Cold War against the Soviet Union.

This dissertation argues that through a secret backchannel, US National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin formed a relationship which provided the empathy needed to bridge many of the ideological differences between their two countries. It examines transcripts of their telephone conversations from 1969-1977 when the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in detente, or a relaxation of tensions, during the Cold War. The dissertation concludes that the Kissinger-Dobrynin backchannel serves as a case study of the effectiveness of back channels in international diplomacy.

Ce mémoire étudie les origines de l’engagement des combattants de nationalité française en faveur de la sécession du Katanga (1960-63), au moment de l’indépendance du Congo belge. Recrutés pour s’opposer à l’Armée nationale congolaise et aux Casques bleus de l’ONU qui cherchent à faire réintégrer la province par la force, ces hommes aguerris par quinze années de guerre contre-insurrectionnelle vont s’avérer être les éléments clefs du dispositif militaire katangais. Centrée sur les « conditions objectives » de l’action plutôt que sur ses « fondements psychologiques », notre étude vise à mettre en lumière les « forces profondes » au gré desquelles l’intervention des « affreux » a pris forme. Elle s’intéresse en particulier à la trajectoire de trois figures remarquables du point de vue de l'historiographie de l'engagement armé international : Roger Trinquier, Roger Faulques et Bob Denard. Inspirée de la sociologie du champ intellectuel et militant dont elle contribue à montrer la pertinence pour l’étude du fait militaire transnational, notre recherche soutient que le sens de l'engagement ne peut être saisi qu'en replaçant la trajectoire de ces hommes au sein des différents niveaux de contexte dans lesquels elle s’est réalisée. Notre mémoire montre que le recours aux « affreux » coïncide avec le recul des vieilles puissances coloniales sur la scène internationale et avec l'affirmation des nouveaux acteurs que sont les États-Unis, l'URSS et l'ONU. L'engagement de ces hommes, dépourvus de statut officiel, apparaît pour la France comme un moyen détourné de maintenir en Afrique des intérêts et une influence contraire à la dynamique des indépendances. / This thesis studies the case of three French combatants engaged in favor of the secession of Katanga (1960-1963), in the wake of Belgian Congo’s independence. These men were recruited to fight against the Congolese army and UN peacekeepers as those latter sought to reintegrate by force the province into a united Congo. Hardened by a decade of counter-insurgency warfare, the few dozens of French “affreux” proved to be key figures in the Katangese military apparatus. The thesis is informed by recent work in the sociology of intellectual and activist fields, and confirms the relevance of these methodologies in the study of transnational military service. Focusing on the objective conditions that structure practice rather than on the psychological dimensions of action, this research highlights the “deep forces” according to which the intervention of the “affreux” was shaped. The trajectories of these men are examined across the varying levels of context within which they took place: the history of decolonization and of the Cold War; the rapports between old European nations and emerging world powers regarding Africa; the principles, rules and rationale characterizing the foreign policy of France under the Fifth Republic. Our thesis reveals that the use of the “affreux” coincides with the decline of old colonial powers and with the affirmation of new players such as the United States, the Soviet Union and the UN on the international stage. The engagement of these men, without any official status, appears to France as a roundabout way to keep in place some of its interests and influence in Africa.

Le but de cette thèse est de trouver les éléments, internes ou externes, qui influencent les relations politico-diplomatiques entre la France et la Chine depuis 1964. Comme premier grand pays occidental qui reconnaît la Chine en 1964, les rapports privilégiés avec Beijng (Pékin) sont devenus l’un des trois grands axes de la politique asiatique de la France. Et du côté chinois, les dirigeants chinois sont aussi attentifs à cette relation bilatérale. Puisque le contexte international ne cesse pas d'évoluer durant les quatre dernières décennies, les relations sino-françaises se développent aussi. Face à cette période, plusieurs questions concernées sont posées : Pourquoi les deux gouvernements décident d’établir les relations officielles en 1964 ? Quels sont les changements de cette relation bilatérale durant la dernière quarantaine d’années ? Quelles sont les raisons de ces changements ? Comment le contexte international et les politiques extérieures des deux pays ont influencé cette relation ? Etc.Les sources que l'on étudie sont des documents officiels publiés (du côté chinois ainsi que du côté français), des notes d’interviews avec les personnes du milieu diplomatique chinois, des mémoires des diplomates et des ouvrages académiques. J’ai choisi la période de 1964 à 2007 comme le fond général de cette recherche et j’ai divisé le texte en cinq parties principales dans l’ordre chronologique.Dans la conclusion est effectuée une synthèse afin d’illustrer comment les relations sino-françaises se développent depuis 1964, sous les influences internes et externes: l’alternance du gouvernement, réformes politiques et économiques, géopolitique régionale et le contexte international. / The purpose of this thesis is to investigate which factors, internal and external, influence the evolution of Sino-French relations since 1964. France being the first occidental country that recognized the new China in 1964, the Sino-French relationship is considered a priority of French government’s Asian policies. And it’s the same situation for the Chinese government. As the international situation is always changing, this relationship is not the same as forty odd years ago. The main purpose of this research is to understand such questions as: How did these two governments decide to establish this relationship in 1964? What are the changes of this bilateral relationship during the last four decades? Which factors are the reasons of those changes? How the international society influences this relationship, and in contrast? Etc.The data used for this study have been collected through published official documents, interviews, and academic works. I chose the period from 1964 to 2007 in order to limit the field of my work. And I divide the thesis into five parts in chronological sequence.The conclusion will be drawn that the development of the relationship between China and France depends not only on the national interests of the two countries but also on the historical context of the international society. Internal factors like government alternation, political reform, external factors like the cold war, the regional interests of the United-States and the European integration, all of them influence the Sino-French relations, both positively and negatively.

La thèse examine les relations franco-suisses au début du XVIIIe siècle en s’interrogeant sur les pratiques et les canaux de négociation d’un côté, et celles du statut des acteurs de l’autre. Elle s’inscrit dans le cadre d’une histoire diplomatique renouvelée s’appuyant sur les acquis de l’histoire culturelle et sociale. Une première partie traite des relations entre les souverains : les autorités suisses et le roi de France. Face à l’asymétrie entre le roi et les cantons, leurs relations peuvent non seulement être décrites selon un modèle de relation entre souverains (inégaux), mais aussi selon un modèle patron-client. Une deuxième partie analyse les relations personnelles de l’ambassadeur français en Suisse. Il y est démontré comment les pratiques de communication entre l’ambassadeur et ses interlocuteurs suisses étaient façonnées par la culture politique différente des cantons qui n’acceptaient pas tous dans la même mesure les relations personnelles entre magistrats et diplomates étrangers. La troisième partie examine les canaux de communication et de négociation entre la Cour de France et les autorités suisses. Grâce à la présence de nombreux diplomates accrédités en Suisse et en s’appuyant sur leurs sujets séjournant aux cours étrangères en tant qu’officiers ou diplomates au service d’un prince étranger, les cantons pouvaient pratiquer une « diplomatie sans diplomates » qui ne coûtait presque rien. En dernier lieu, l’analyse des négociations du renouvellement d’alliance entre le roi de France et le canton de Berne soulève le problème des négociations avec une république aux temps modernes. / The thesis examines the Franco-Swiss relations in the early 18th century and probes into both the practices and channels of negotiation as well as the status of the actors. As a contribution to the flourishing ‘new diplomatic history’, it draws on the methods and innovations of cultural and social history. The first part discusses the relations between two unequal sovereigns: the Swiss authorities and the French king. Given the asymmetry between the king and the cantons, their relations can not only be described as relations between (unequal) sovereigns but also as patron-client ties. The second part examines the personal relations of the French ambassador in Switzerland and shows how the different political cultures of the cantons shaped the communicative practices between the ambassador and his Swiss interlocutors. In the third part, the channels of communication and negotiation between the French court and the Swiss authorities are analysed. Thanks to the presence of numerous foreign diplomats accredited in Switzerland and relying on the services of Swiss subjects staying at foreign courts as officers and diplomats serving a foreign prince, the Swiss republics were able to practice “diplomacy without diplomats”, thus economizing on the expenses associated with maintaining a formal diplomatic body. In the final part, the analysis of the negotiations for the renewal of the alliance between the French king and the Republic of Berne provides a case study of what it meant to negotiate with a polyarchy in the early modern period.

This dissertation explores how literary translators mediated cultural diplomacy between the U.S. and China during the Cold War period. Focusing on best-selling bilingual authors Lin Yutang, Eileen Chang, Hua-ling Nieh Engle, and Jade Snow Wong, I show how these “cold warriors” negotiated political boundaries, concepts, and agendas while they wrote and translated literary texts. Their works, usually divided into Asian vs. Asian American literature, are here productively read together as pawns in the same ideological struggle, even as they exceed the traditional bounds of Cold War periodization, polarized nation-states, and disciplinary canons. Together, they evince new forms of transnational cultural production that shaped policies of containment, propaganda, resistance, de-colonialism, and racialization. This project thus theorizes translation as its own process of ideology-formation, rather than overlooking it as a mere medium for communication. In the end, examining linguistic exchange in the Cold War redefines what we conceive of as Asian-American, by reconfiguring the outright ideological struggle between Democracy and Communism as an equivocal conflict in the space opened up by translation.