Despite historians describing the 1970s as a time of détente, both National Security Advisors that dominated America’s foreign policy pursued harsh stances against the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski sabotaged peace talks in order help the United States keep its edge against the other world superpower. Most historians point to the similarities between these two men, but what is most often left out of the narrative is that both men witnessed persecution at the hands of totalitarian governments: Kissinger by the Nazis and Brzezinski by both the Nazis and the Soviets. This influence is strong in their first works written at Harvard University, where they met Dr. Carl J. Friedrich and Hannah Arendt, both German émigrés. This paper will explore how European intellectuals, as well as their own European heritage, predisposed both Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski in their hawkish stances against the Soviet Union.

In 1928 Hipo´lito lrigoyen was the most popular President that the Argentine people had elected. Two years later his popularity had evaporated and a few hundred military cadets ousted the government. The reasons go beyond this two-year period. Argentina, contrary to popular belief, did not have a democratic tradition. The nation had been ruled by the dominant economic interests up to 1916. In 1916, Hipo´lito Irigoyen was elected to his first term. The people expected him to provide them with a decent and honorable life. But in choosing the legal path of elections instead of revolution Irigoyen pre-empted any revolutionary social changes. In 1928, Irigoyen, at 76, surprised his opponents and won a second term. He was loved by the people as he had embodied their spirit. But lrigoyen considered his victory as a mandate from the people, not an election. As the ends justified the means, the government operated on the margin of legality. lrigoyen had abandoned the principles that he had fought to maintain for over thirty years. This could have been tolerated if lrigoyen had enacted some pervasive social measures to maintain his support. Instead he permitted the usurped power to remain idle. The governmental processes slowed to a snail's pace. Appointments were not made, contracts were not signed, payments were not made while the President was intent upon increasing his power for power alone. The governmental inactivity and usurpations caused a wave of political unrest which culminated in the military golpe de estado of September 6, 1930.

Arikara people had been adapting their tribal structures to European influences since Europeans first arrived on the northern Plains in the early seventeenth century. Their sedentary lifestyle, focused on agriculture and hunting, increasingly included trade with French, British, and American trappers by the seventeenth century. The goods procured from European traders, such as firearms and other metallurgical works, began to upset the balance of geopolitical power on the Plains, setting the stage for the violence and political realignments at the center of this thesis. As my research reveals, by the time of the Lewis and Clark expedition, tensions between the frontiersmen and the Indigenous people across the northern Plains reached new heights. As Arikara oral histories, United States diplomatic records, ethnological sources – such as travel writings – and correspondence from frontier settlers and soldiers reveal, the Arikara tribe struggled to innovate and reshape their societies in the face of colonial expansionism and hostilities with other Indigenous polities.

This thesis analyzes how Eisenhower defined war and its utility in his New Look defense policy and the ramifications for America’s interactions with the world through its foreign policy. It argues that Eisenhower redefined the relationship between war and society as he executed his grand strategy, further removing society from the decision for war. To avoid what he believed to be the inevitable global destruction of a general war turned nuclear, Eisenhower broadened the scope of ‘war” to balance domestic opinion for containing communism while also avoiding the devastating consequences of war in American society. By authorizing coups in Iran and Guatemala, Eisenhower blurred the line between coercive diplomacy and violent political warfare. President Eisenhower’s reliance on covert action to achieve political outcomes prevented general or nuclear war but it strengthened an emerging model for society’s relationship with war. Political warfare and covert action increased the gap between society and the commitment of American power during the Cold War. In his effort to prevent war, Eisenhower expanded presidential power and set a precedent that continues today.

<p>Adopting a socio-cultural approach to the study of cold war historiography, this master’s degree essay is a comparative study of the two main disciplinary fields of cold war scholarship, diplomatic history and international relations theory (IR). The study applies the theory of scientific development formulated by Thomas Kuhn and the concept of paradigm on the field of cold war research.</p><p>Diplomatic history and IR shows many similarities in their development, and in the importance different schools has had in scholarly debate. These different schools are analysed as paradigms, a concept that has been more willingly adopted within IR than in diplomatic history. The transition from what historian John Lewis Gaddis has termed Old Cold War History to New Cold War History is discussed in terms of paradigms and paradigm shift. What this shift has meant for historical cold war research is also addressed. With the starting point in conclusions by historian Anders Stephanson, the study also suggests that the predominating view of the cold war during the cold war can be analysed as a paradigm, effecting interpretations and theories about the conflict. As IR scholar Ted Hopf has suggested, the normal science during the cold war prevented IR research from correctly predicting the end of the cold war.</p><p>From a Kuhnian perspective, an interpretation of the difficulties in communication and scholarly interchange between diplomatic history and IR is offered. The study emphasizes the importance of political and social factors in the development of the different paradigms within the field, and concludes that the goal to become a paradigmatic science might not be attainable, or even desirable, for disciplines such as diplomatic history and IR.</p>

“Shattered Communities: Soldiers, Rabbis, and the Ostjuden during Occupation: 1915-1918" addresses the interethnic experience in Poland during the German occupation of 1915-1918. This dissertation demonstrates that the German design for 'modernization' of the East began with the First World War, which envisioned the Jews as a critically vital component, rather than an obstacle to their success. The German military made its connection to the peoples in the East via its own army rabbis and Jewish administrators. This work examines the role of the German Army rabbis, in 1915, in establishing a Jewish press and Jewish schools, along with Jewish relief agencies funded by German Jewish businessmen, in assisting the local Ostjuden communities. By the time the guns stopped firing in 1918, however, the German government had reneged on their promises of recognition and help, and the circumstances of many Ostjuden were as precarious as they had been before the war. Even worse, the experience of war in the East encouraged the rise of racist nationalism in Germany and Eastern Europe. The roots of Nazi policies toward Jews were planted firmly in Poland and Lithuania between 1915 and 1918. But for defeat in the war, it is highly unlikely that the Nazis would ever have risen to power, and in the absence of the German experience of war in the East, the later commitment to a Jewish genocide might never have been imagined. By examining the transnational relationship between the Germans and the Polish Jewish communities during the Great War, I contribute to a better understanding of the complexities leading to the crucial fracture that took place under the pressure of total war in 1917.

This thesis aims to discuss the argument of exhaustion of economic globalization as an American foreign policy principle. This study argues that economic globalization is intended to restore declining American hegemony started in 1970s, but it has eventually given way to the argument of &ldquo / return of the geopolitics&rdquo / . The return of the geopolitics is an imperial, expansionist drive as a new foreign policy imperative for United States. The new developments in the international arena in the post-cold war era and especially after the September 11, 2001 brought the end of the globalization as an American project. Globalization is replaced with geopolitics in the transition period from hegemony to empire in United States foreign policy. Because there are new threats for United States in the twenty-first century such as the rise of new global actors in world politics or international competition for oil resources in the strategic regions of the world. In this framework, this study focuses on the rise of new, alternative &ldquo / great powers&rdquo / (European Union, China etc...).

Adopting a socio-cultural approach to the study of cold war historiography, this master’s degree essay is a comparative study of the two main disciplinary fields of cold war scholarship, diplomatic history and international relations theory (IR). The study applies the theory of scientific development formulated by Thomas Kuhn and the concept of paradigm on the field of cold war research. Diplomatic history and IR shows many similarities in their development, and in the importance different schools has had in scholarly debate. These different schools are analysed as paradigms, a concept that has been more willingly adopted within IR than in diplomatic history. The transition from what historian John Lewis Gaddis has termed Old Cold War History to New Cold War History is discussed in terms of paradigms and paradigm shift. What this shift has meant for historical cold war research is also addressed. With the starting point in conclusions by historian Anders Stephanson, the study also suggests that the predominating view of the cold war during the cold war can be analysed as a paradigm, effecting interpretations and theories about the conflict. As IR scholar Ted Hopf has suggested, the normal science during the cold war prevented IR research from correctly predicting the end of the cold war. From a Kuhnian perspective, an interpretation of the difficulties in communication and scholarly interchange between diplomatic history and IR is offered. The study emphasizes the importance of political and social factors in the development of the different paradigms within the field, and concludes that the goal to become a paradigmatic science might not be attainable, or even desirable, for disciplines such as diplomatic history and IR.

The Congo Crisis of the early 1960s served as a satellite conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Scholars have argued about U.S. motivations and interests involved in the Congo Crisis. The major division between scholars is between those who contend the United States acted for national security reasons and those scholars who argue the United States desired to establish a neocolonial regime to protect economic interests pertaining to vast Congolese mineral wealth. The argument of this thesis is that the United States policy in the Congo between 1960 and 1965 focused on installing a friendly regime in the Congo in order to protect its national security interests. This argument lends to the introduction of a new term to classify U.S. actions: pseudocolonialism. The previous term, neocolonialism, denotes a negative connotation based on economic greed and does not satisfactorily explain the motivations of the United States. By examining the value to the United States of Congolese uranium and cobalt as well as Congolese geographic location, the singular explanation of economic greed is weakened.

After Hitler invaded France in 1940, the leadership of the German Social Democratic party, the SPD, decided to accept an official invitation from the British Labour party and come to England. In 1941 London became the recognised seat of the Executive, where there was also a rank and file membership. At first the SPD leaders were given considerable moral and financial support and they believed they would be able to aid the Allied war effort and influence British thinking on Germany. They also applied themselves to the construction of new policies to ensure the survival of the party and to enable it to direct German affairs if and when Hitler had been defeated. By 1942, however, the SPD's work was not meeting with success. The Labour party began to adopt a hostile attitude towards it and, in marked contrast to its earlier practice, the Foreign Office no longer collaborated with German political exiles. The final challenge to the SPD came in 1943 from the German Communists who wished to create a unified Socialist party after Hitler. Faced with political extinction in London, the SPD nevertheless managed to survive. Although it was seriously weakened by 1945, it was strong enough to offer the young Federal Republic loyal support. The failure to cooperate successfully with British authorities during its exile, however, created many difficulties for post-war European Social Democracy. A number of problems are explored in this thesis. They include the wisdom of both Foreign Office and Labour party policy towards the SPD and the people of Germany during the Second World War. Serious confusion was caused by first maintaining and then abandoning the distinction between Nazis and Germans. The nature of exile as a specific form of political activity is also examined especially in the light of the determination of the exiled leaders to return to Germany and achieve power there. Finally, some wider conclusions are drawn about the SPD, its survival in the War and its historical continuity.