During the second world war relations between the United States and Ireland deteriorated to the point that many Irishmen feared that an American invasion of Ireland was imminent. At the same time many people in the United States came to believe that the Irish government of Eamon de Valera was pro-Nazi, This study examines the causes for the deterioration of relations between the two countries and the actual attitudes of David Gray, the United States minister to Ireland, and other American officials toward Irish neutrality. Since there are few secondary works on the subject, the research was undertaken almost entirely among primary sources, personal and diplomatic papers, various American newspapers, and memoirs. Of particular importance were David Gray's personal papers, especially his frequent letters to President Franklin D. Roosevelt.. Copies of some letters, not available among Gray's personal papers at the University of Wyoming, were furnished by the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. The study has also made extensive use of the diplomatic papers published by the Department of $tate in the various volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States. Finally, the author corresponded with more than a dozen of those still living who were personally connected with the wartime relations between the United States and Ireland.

In modern historiography, Henri Christophe, king of northern Haiti from 1816-1820, is generally given a negative persona due to his controlling nature and his absolutist regime, but in his correspondence, he engages in diplomatic collaborations with two British abolitionists, William Wilberforce and Thomas Clarkson, in order to improve his new policies and obtain international recognition. This paper argues that the Haitian king and the abolitionists engaged in a mutual collaboration in which each party benefitted from the correspondence. Christophe used the advice of the British abolitionists in order to increase the power of Haiti into a powerful black state, and Wilberforce and Clarkson helped the king position Haiti as a self-sufficient nation to fuel their abolitionist argument of the potential of post-emancipation societies.

Os conceitos geopolíticos elaborados, ou apropriados, e ressignificados pelas grandes potências moldam as relações internacionais. A partir desta tese, esta pesquisa versa sobre as relações internacionais entre os Estados americanos, que tiveram lugar no movimento panamericano de 1933 a 1954. Durante o período, no âmbito dos eventos continentais mais importantes (Conferências Pan-Americanas e Reuniões de Consulta aos Ministros das Relações Exteriores), destacaram-se dois conceitos geopolíticos levados a termos pelos Estados Unidos e que serviram de baliza para as relações interamericanas: América do Sul e América Latina. A primeira proposição, em vigência de 1933 a 1942, compreendia o conjunto das Américas como espaço formado pelos Estados Unidos, por Estados da América Central e por Estados diferentes e desenvolvidos que formavam a América do Sul. Após este período, uma nova proposição sugeriu que as relações hemisféricas eram constituídas, por um lado, pelos Estados Unidos e, por outro, pelos demais Estados americanos que passaram a compor a América Latina, sem distinção. Neste sentido, o objetivo geral deste trabalho é analisar a atuação da diplomacia dos Estados Unidos e da diplomacia do Brasil em relação aos conceitos de América do Sul e América Latina nas relações hemisféricas. Para tanto, procuramos identificar o que denominamos como demandas latino-americanas e que receberam destaque na documentação diplomática produzida e arquivada pelo Departamento de Estado e pelo Ministério das Relações Exteriores do Brasil. Buscamos, ainda, verificar o posicionamento dos Estados Unidos e do Brasil e qualificar a cooperação entre o ambos. A pesquisa levou-nos a atuar na intersecção de dois temas clássicos da história das relações interamericanas: a política da Boa Vizinhança e a Doutrina Truman de contenção ao comunismo. Concluiu-se que durante o período da Boa Vizinhança, a América do Sul emergiu tanto de uma crise de interpretação da sociedade (e da diplomacia) americana sobre o que havia ao sul do Rio Grande, quanto de uma crise do capitalismo mundial. A delimitação geopolítica e o prestígio atribuído à diplomacia brasileira foi ao encontro do interesse da política externa brasileira, cuja abrangência sul-americana há muito constava de seu horizonte de atuação regional. Neste sentido, no início da década de 1940, o Brasil vislumbrava que seria essencial para a política hemisférica dos Estados Unidos e para as relações interamericanas. No entanto, a perspectiva de um lugar reservado nas relações hemisféricas não sustentou-se no pós-guerra, especialmente nos eventos pan-americanos sob a Doutrina Truman. A proposição norteamericana de que havia igualdade entre os Estados da América Latina, composta por um grupo homogêneo de Estados, levou as diplomacias brasileira e americana a operar desde posições opostas. Paradoxalmente, o Brasil deu os primeiros passos rumo a aproximação com os demais Estados do subcontinente. As conclusões deste trabalho são relevantes e subsidiam a compreensão das relações internacionais americanas contemporâneas, sobretudo os processos de integração regional. / Geopolitical concepts elaborated, appropriated or reinterpreted by the great powers play a key role in shaping international relations. This thesis deals with international relations among the American states from 1933 to 1954, specifically in the Pan-American movement. In the major continental events (Pan-American Conferences and Consultation Meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs) under consideration, two geopolitical concepts brought to terms by the United States served as a beacon for inter-American relations: South America and Latin America. The first proposition, in effect from 1933 to 1942, comprised the whole of the Americas as a space formed by the United States, by the Central American states and the different and developed states that formed South America. After this period, a new proposition suggested that hemispheric relations were established, on the one hand, by the United States and, secondly, by other American states that were included in Latin America without distinctions. In this sense, the aim of this study is to analyze the performance of the diplomacy of the United States and Brazil in relation to the concepts of South America and Latin America in hemispheric relations. Therefore, I try to identify what I call Latin American demands, which were highlighted in the diplomatic documentation produced and filed by the State Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil. I also seek to trace the positions of the United States and Brazil and qualify cooperation between both countries. The research led me to explore the intersection of two classic themes of the history of inter-American relations: the Good Neighbor Policy and the Truman Doctrine to contain communism. It was concluded that during the period of the Good Neighbor Policy, South America emerged both as a crisis of the American interpretation of society (and diplomacy) about what was occurring south of the Rio Grande and a crisis of world capitalism. The geopolitical boundaries and prestige attributed to Brazilian diplomacy during this period was clearly in the interest of Brazilian foreign policy, whose South American horizon had long consisted only of regional operations. In this sense, in the early 1940s, Brazilian politicians envisioned that the country would be essential for the hemispheric policy of the United States and for inter-American relations. However, the prospect of a reserved place in hemispheric relations did not hold up after the war, especially in the Pan American events during the period of the Truman Doctrine. The United States proposition that there was equality among the homogeneous group of states led Brazilian and American diplomacies to stake out opposite positions. Paradoxically, Brazil took the first steps towards rapprochement with the other states of the subcontinent. The findings of this study subsidize the understanding of contemporary inter-American relations, particularly processes of regional integration.

A tese estuda a evolução histórica do atitude multilateral do Brasil. Parte da noção que o multilateralismo é um aspecto significativo da política externa brasileira, desde as primeiras conferências internacionais dos países americanos, que começam ainda no fim do século XIX. Em tempos recentes, na Liga das Nações, mas sobretudo nas Nações Unidas, a importância das instituições multilaterais só fez crescer. O estudo parte, no ângulo teórico, da perspectiva de que o multilateralismo tem uma lógica própria e que, ao aceitá-la, o comportamento diplomático dos Estados deve naturalmente estar em sintonia com o que aquela lógica impõe. A concepção de John Ruggie apóia a parte teórica da tese e sustenta o seu objetivo central, que é o de procura definir o que seriam constantes do comportamento multilateral do Brasil. Procura-se mostrar que suas origens estariam nas reações que a diplomacia brasileira teve ao Pan Americanismo, se fixaram com nossa participação na II Conferência da Haia, quando, com Ruy Barbosa, defendemos que as instituições multilaterais deveriam estar fundadas na igualdade entre os Estados e com a aspiração a uma participação influente nos processos decisórios internacionais, expresso recentemente com a aspiração a um lugar permanente no Conselho de Segurança das Nações. / The thesis studies the evolution of Brazil´s multilateral attitude. It accepts the notion that multilateralism has been a meaningful aspect of Brazilian foreign policy since the first conferences of American States, a series of international gatherings that began at the end of nineteenth century. From them on, after the creation of the League of Nations and, specially, the United Nations, the importance of multilateral institutions for Brazil has grown consistently. From the theoretical perspective, the thesis accepts the idea that multilateralism is defined by a singular logic and States, when working in multilateral institutions, are bound by that logic. John Ruggie´s conception of nultilateralism supoorts that idea and frames the main goal of the thesis, that is, a investigation of the constant patterns of Brazil´s multilateral behavior. The origins of those patterns could be identified in the diplomatic reactions to the challenges of the Pan American conferences. But, the patterns became more evident during our participation in the II Peace Conference (Hague, 1907) when our delegation, headed by Ruy Barbosa, advocated the understanding that necessary foundation of the multilateral institutions is the equality among States. Another constant is the Brazilian wish to have a more influential participation in the decision making process of the international institutions, as today shown in our aspiration to occupy a permanent seat at the Security Council of the United Nations.

Cette thèse a pour objectif d’étudier les relations interalliées entre l’Italie et l’Entente avec rigueur et dans toutes ses dimensions : militaire, diplomatique, économique et sociale de 1914 à 1919. Nous avons établi des rapports de forces et des lignes stratégiques structurants les anciens et nouveaux équilibres stratégiques de la guerre à la paix de Versailles. L’Italie de l’indépendance stratégique en 1914-1916 à la subordination envers lesAlliés en 1917, pour finir par être vassalisée en 1918-1919 par l’Entente et les Etats-Unis. La Victoire Mutilée de1919 devient un résultat logique provenant du nouvel ordre mondial crée par la Première Guerre Mondiale.Ce résultat est obtenu par une nouvelle analyse stratégique globale fondée sur les déterminants de la puissance :l’économie, la cohésion nationale, l’effort de guerre et les victoires ou défaites qui en découlent, la diplomatie, les forces morales des nations. Cette analyse balaie tout le spectre du conflit armé : de la déclaration de guerre à la paix. Elle est fondée sur 3 piliers théoriques : la pensée stratégique de Sun Tzu, l’héritage de Clausewitz, et lathéorie des jeux. Les lignes stratégiques obtenues définissent des rapports de force internationaux et de nouveauxéquilibres. Cette thèse débouche au niveau de la recherche historique sur une nouvelle vision des relations interalliées durant la Grande Guerre. Elle revient au fondement de l’histoire : la politique et la guerre en sont le coeur. Il s’agit de rendre à l’histoire politico-militaire ses lettres de noblesse. Cependant 3 pistes de recherches restent à explorer : les rivalités culturelles entre nations, les différences entre modèles sociaux, et une analyse des mentalités. Le Fascisme est la conséquence ultime en Italie de la guerre en raison de la Victoire Mutilée et l’affaiblissement général du pays. En effet, la guerre a déstabilisé le pays en créant une crise politique, socio économique grave. La naissance de l’esprit Arditi, l’absence de réformes sociales en 1919 et l’expérience de la guerre sont-ils responsables de la Marche sur Rome par les fascistes ? / This thesis aims to study interallied relationships between Italy and the Entente with rigor and in all dimensions: military, diplomatic, economic and social from 1914 to 1919. We can establish force reports and strategic lines in order to structuring old and new balances from war to Versailles’ peace. The world war one beganby an independent Italy in 1914-1916. Then in 1917, Italy became an subordinate state toward Allies. Finaly, in1918-1919 Italy was a vassal state of Allies and Associates. The injured victory of 1919 became a logic result inreason of new global order created by the World War one.This result is obtained by a new strategic global analysis,founded on power determinants: economy, national cohesion, war effort, diplomacy and moral forces of nations.This analysis scans all the spectre of war: from breaking out to peace. It’s founded on three theoric schemes: thestategic think of Sun Tzu, the war meaning of Clauzewitz and the game theory. The obtained strategic lines giveinternational force reports and new balances.This thesis emerges on historic level on a new vision of interalliedrelationships during the World War one. It was back at historic foundation: policy and war are the history heart. It concerns to restore at politic and military history her nobility letters. Moreover it stays three research sectors todevelop: cultural rivalries between nations, differences between social models, and a psychologic analysis.Fascism is the last consequence in Italy from war and the injured victory. Italy was lower than before the WorldWar one. The World War one has destabilized Italy by creating a politic and economic crisis. The beginning of Arditi spirit, missing of social reforms in 1919 and the experience of war are they in charge of the March onRome by Fascists ?

This study analyzes United States foreign policy toward Communist China in the transitional period since 1966, based on the American China experts' writings in journals dealing with international affairs and their views expressed in Congressional hearings. The contents explain the changing of American policy toward China from "containment without isolation" toward a rapprochement with Peking and progress toward normalization. The achievement of normalization has been a basic policy goal of the United States and has received bipartisan support, but the formula to accomplish normalization still remains obscure, due mainly to the settlement of the "Taiwan question." The essay includes four parts: (1). The introduction provides a general review of United States policy toward Peking since the establishment of the People's Republic of China; (2). Chapter I analyzes and explains the reasons for the Nixon Administration seeking a new approach to Peking; (3). Chapter II reports on American and Chinese signals of their willingness to pursue rapprochement and improve their relations; (4). Chapter III describes the American normalization process with China since the 1972 Shanghai Communique and the obstacles to the development of normalization; (5). Chapter IV concludes with speculation on future United States policy toward China.

To achieve independence, the Dominican Republic had to first endure three centuries of heavy-handed Spanish rule and period of Haitian domination that lasted for twenty-two years. Fear of Haitian reconquest, however, convinced the leading Dominican politicians that the new nation could not long endure without foreign protection. Encouraged by Dominican offers of a naval base, the United States toyed with the idea of expansion in the Caribbean as early as 1850, but civil war cut short these notions and allowed Spain to reassert control over her former colony. Although Spanish occupation ended in failure the United States became more determined that the island Republic should never again be dominated by a European power. Such a determination on the part of the United States to prevent European incursion led to an abortive annexationist attempt by the Grant administration in 1869 and to the establishment of a customs receivership in 1905, when unpaid foreign debts aroused the ire of European creditors. It was hoped that the establishment of a customs receivership would usher in a period of peace and prosperity for the Dominicans but by 1912 it became evident that such hopes were not to be realized. President Wilson adhered to the argument that foreign intervention in the Caribbean was not to be tolerated but broadened United States involvement in the domestic policies of the Dominican Republic by insisting on the establishment of a constitutional democracy, which he felt would establish domestic tranquility. When it became apparent that the internal conditions of the island Republic were not improving, Wilson reluctantly ordered in the United States Marines in the hopes that they would be able to educate the Dominicans to the ways of democracy. By broadening the scope of United States involvement in the domestic affairs of the Dominican Republic, Wilson had produce an occupation that denied the Dominicans the inherent right of a nation to govern itself, a liberty which had been maintained against overwhelming odds during the preceding seventy-two years.

It is necessary and desirable for Armenia to retain close relations with Russia in both the short and long term. However, recent concessions to Russia for good relations in the short term may have potentially harmful repercussions for Armenia in the future. These concessions have in part resulted in the Russian dominance in the economic sector, over-dependence on Russia for Armenia’s energy needs, and the perpetuation of Armenian submissiveness to Russian interests. Armenia should, therefore, maintain good relations with Russia while simultaneously securing long-term paths that focus on actual strategic partnership and not dependence. In short, Armenia should return to a foreign policy of complementarism, which was first enacted under the Republic of Armenia’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrossian. Complementarism stresses the importance of pursuing Armenia’s best interest through the adoption of balanced policies and through minimal involvement or identification within regional blocs. The leveraging of Armenia’s long-term interests for close relations with Russia is possibly best exemplified in the state of Armenia’s economy. Like many former Soviet republics, the collapse of entangled Soviet trading patterns and the legacy of its centrally-planned economy still have negative implications for Armenian industry and trade.

This thesis is concerned with the diplomatic reaction of the Axis Countries, Italy, Japan, Spain and Hungary, to the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939. The immediate origins of the Pact were studied in order to put into context the individual responses of the various countries, known as the Axis Powers. Each of these countries was confronted with a dramatic change in the European situation and each had to adjust its relations with Germany in accordance with its own interests and expectations for the question of war or peace in Europe. / With the exception of Hungary, all were opposed to the Pact because it seemed to run contrary to their national interests and promised to upset the Balance of Power on the European, and indeed, the Asian continent. The thesis thus illustrates the special character of Hitler's diplomacy, in the last year of peace before the Second World War, which did not consider the interests of his partners when concluding his arrangements with the Soviet Union.

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