The decade of the 1960s was a period of significant evolution in the foreign policy priorities of the Republic of Ireland. On 31 July 1961, Ireland applied for membership of the European Community. That application was vetoed in January 1963 by the French President, Charles de Gaulle. Nevertheless, it was an indication of the growing "Europeanisation" of Irish foreign policy, which was secured in May 1967 in a renewed and ultimately successful application by Ireland for membership of the Common Market. Because of the overlapping interests of the European Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), however, these initiatives towards integration with Western Europe posed a dilemma for the decision-makers in Dublin given that, in the Irish context, foreign policy was predicated on neutrality. Since Ireland's admission to the United Nations (UN) in 1955 and especially from the reinstatement of Frank Aiken as Minister for External Affairs in 1957, the diplomatic component of Ireland's neutrality was defined largely by its UN policy. Ireland's continued attachment to neutrality, despite its application for European Community membership, caused significant frustration to the governments of the member-states, especially France under de Gaulle, and was seen to be an obstacle to Ireland's accession. These concerns were communicated explicitly to Dublin, along with the view that Ireland needed to demonstrate a greater propensity to support Western interests on major international issues. Pressure of this kind had dissuaded other European neutrals (Austria, Finland, Malta and Sweden) from pursuing membership of the European Community until 1995 - after the Cold War had ended - but it did not deter the Irish. Despite the pressure from the European Community, Irish policy continued to be characterised by neutrality and, almost invariably, conflict with French UN policy. This included, amongst other matters, policy in relation to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the financing of peacekeeping, the Vietnam War, representation of China at the UN, and various decolonization problems in Southern Africa. This insulation of Ireland's foreign policy from the imperatives of the application for membership of the European Community was largely the product of the fragmentation of decision-making in the formulation of Irish diplomacy. This research project takes a unique perspective on the topic by focusing, in particular, on the period 1965 to 1972 and, also, breaks further new ground in utilizing documentary material only recently released by the National Archives in Dublin, the University College Dublin Archives, the Public Record Office, London, and the UN Archives in New York, along with published diplomatic records and secondary sources. Consequently, it offers an original contribution to our understanding of Irish foreign policy in this crucial period of its development and the capacity of the Irish Government to reconcile the two fundamental and apparently conflicting pillars of its foreign policy - neutrality and membership of the European Community.

No description available.

No description available.

This thesis contends from the time of September 1940 to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States and Japan offered each no workable concessions that might have deterred war. A stalemate was finally established between the two countries. The position of the Japanese nation was to expand and control "Greater East-Asia," while the position the United States held was one that claimed all nations should uphold certain basic principles of democracy, that all nations should honor the sanctity of treaties," and that they should treat neighboring countries in a friendly fashion. This thesis also contends that Yosuke Matsuoka used his position as Foreign Minister of Japan to determine policy for the entire nation. Matsuoka led Japan in such a way that a settlement of differences between the United States and his country was not attainable through diplomatic talks. Even after Matsuoka had been removed from his position, the Supreme Command was determined to prepare for war and at the same time carry on diplomatic discussions with the United States. The only possible way that war could have been avoided was if one of the two nations had been willing to break the stalemate by giving in to the demands of the other. Neither was willing to compromise.

This study is an attempt to combine the disciplines of Asian history and United States diplomatic history in analyzing the 1871 Korean-American Incident. The Incident revolves around the Low-Rodgers expedition to Korea, and the subsequent breakdown of peaceful negotiations into a military clash of arms. To describe the Incident as merely another example of American "imperialism,'' or as a result of narrow-minded Korean isolationism, is to oversimplify its causes and miss the larger implications that can be learned from it. A basic premise of this paper is that the 1871 Incident is an example of East-West cultural conflict. As such, the forces that helped to determine the attitudes and behavior of both the Americans and Koreans were of a broad nature reflecting their respective cultural differences. At times, these differences were so basic and general that the specialist in history can easily overlook them. To better understand this conflict of cultures, Chapters II and III discuss elements of Korean and American diplomacy before the 1860’s, and how their unique experiences led to widely different attitudes toward foreign relations. Chapter II concentrates on traditional Chinese-Korean relations, and their effect upon Korea's approach to diplomacy; Chapter III emphasizes the nature of America's first contacts with East Asia and the important influence of the activities of the United States in the Mediterranean region. Chapters IV and V deal with domestic politics in Korea and the United States, and how these internal conditions affected each nation's attitude toward the other. Chapter VI is a detailed description of the immediate events that culminated in the 1871 Incident. Chapters I and VII are the introduction and conclusion. In researching this paper, government documents, memoirs, diaries, personal accounts, contemporary newspapers, books, and articles were all used. When writing the chapters that deal primarily with Korea, Korean sources have been used as much as possible. The Korean and American officials, though communicating in the same language (Chinese characters), were negotiating from completely different cultural norms. Both sides felt that their positions and actions were morally justified. In studying the official documents concerning the Incident, the reader is indeed impressed by the sincerity and honesty of all parties involved. In this sense, it is difficult to label one group "guilty" and the other group "innocent." It must be remembered, however, that the Americans were carrying out naval activities in Korean waters, and not the Koreans in American waters. The student of history is reminded that American-East Asian relations, unlike most American-European relations, must constantly confront and overcome wide cultural differences. To ignore these differences, or to impose one's own cultural views on another society, is to invite misunderstanding, raise suspicions, and increase the possibility of conflict.

Throughout the period of the American Revolution, Great Britain pursued a policy of reconciliation and reunion toward its North American colonies. While this was but one of the several policy alternatives open to British leadership, it was always an element of British strategy toward the colonies from 1775 to 1783. This thesis follows the evolution of reconciliation and reunion in the final days of crisis in 1774-1775. It seeks to define its development during the war itself, and especially during the abortive American Peace Commission of 1778. By tracing this policy from its emergence through to the peacemaking in 1782-1783, it shows its growth and analyzes its strengths and weaknesses as a coherent whole rather than considering it in relation to particular events. This provides an understanding of why reconciliation and reunion had become the dominant and controlling policy toward America at the time of the Anglo-American negotiations leading to the Treaty of Paris.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

“One should doff one’s cap to the statue of Jupiter, in case he returned to power.” – Lord Byron Our task in this study is to determine whether the words of Lord Byron are true in the realm of International Power Politics. This is a study of the application of the principle of non-recognition – the refusal of acknowledgement – to Russo-American relations during the period from 1917 to 1933. The year was 1917, and the Gladiator of Capitalism stood over the prostrate form of Russian Bolshevism and appealed for the decision of “life” or “death” to be meted out by the world powers. England signaled, “Thumbs down”; “Death,” cried France; “Yes,” said Japan, “let him die.” But in the center of the Powers stood the United States deciding the action – vetoing the anti-Bolshevik crusade. “He is wounded and dying of his own accord,” observed Uncle Sam. “Let us wash our hands of this matter and let him live – if indeed he can! Let us reiterate our confidence in the great Russian people who will eventually throw off this conspiracy. In the meanwhile, let us ‘wait and see’ and refuse during the interim to recognize this ‘communist’ experiment.” And so began the sixteen-year non-recognition period in United States-Russian relations. This thesis concerns this period and the relations of these two countries. The writer first became interested in this subject while reading on the 1954-1955 Intercollegiate Debate Topic, “The Recognition of Communist China.” On the suggestion of Dr. James H. Poteet, head of the History Department, Western Kentucky State College, the subject of this investigation was formulated. This paper at best can be only a cursory study of the history of this period; however, the writer will endeavor to develop to its fullest, the effects of the official attitude of non-recognition as practiced by the United States. It is hoped that this study will result in a clear elucidation on the issue of the non-recognition of Soviet Russia as seen from the vantage point of 1955.