In September, 1911, Italy declared war on Turkey and proceeded to the conquest of the vilayet of Tripoli, a North African province of the Ottoman Empire. This thesis will attempt to determine the effect of this war upon British policy during the critical period just prior to the First Great War.

This senior thesis studies the character and influence of a young American naval officer and diplomat. George Clayton Foulk, the 1st Naval Attaché to the United States Legation and the 2nd U.S. Minister to Korea, brought his intellectual ability and passion to this East Asian country. He hoped for Korea to become an independent, modernized state. Due to the strong Chinese opposition and lack of assistance from the U.S. government, Foulk failed to realize his dream and left Korea in disgrace. However, his service instilled a positive image of America in the minds of many Koreans. By closely examining his letters and journals, this thesis brings an image of a cosmopolitan who expressed genuine understanding of and sympathy for Korea. More importantly, this thesis introduces his vision that America must become an exceptional country which spreads its values across the world through peaceful means. Even today, the clash between Foulk’s idealism and the realpolitik of Washington policymakers raises a question on the future of American diplomacy.

Early in her Prime Ministership, Margaret Thatcher fought an unlikely diversionary war far from home for the ownership of the Falkland Islands. The Islands lie off of Argentina’s coast about 8,000 miles from London, but have been subject to Britain’s rule since 1836. In April 1982, hoping to distract from domestic political and economic turmoil, Argentina’s military dictatorship ordered a surprise invasion of the Islands. Thatcher, Britain’s first female Prime Minister, responded in full force. By early May, a British fleet reached the Islands. By June, despite American efforts to stop a war between its allies, Britain launched an assault on the Islands and took them back by force. Thatcher’s victory propelled her to immense popularity in late-1982 and 1983, and the Argentine dictatorship’s defeat gave life to a people’s revolt that quickly ended the regime and decades of military leadership. This thesis examines Thatcher’s leadership in April 1982, before Britain launched its retaliatory invasion of the Islands. It seeks to answer how Thatcher managed to make the war possible and popular in three key arenas: with her own cabinet and government, with the United States and the United Nations, and ultimately with the British public. This study operates on the idea that the war served as an intentional diversion for Thatcher, who had struggled domestically as Prime Minister up until the Falklands Crisis. Utilizing newly released archival documents from the Thatcher government, this study shows the Prime Minister never had any interest in avoiding war, undermining any potential for peace as it emerged.

This submission for PhD by Publication includes two studies I conducted during 8 years of dedicated field research examining the US role in mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict. These studies developed from my collection of in-depth oral testimonies and were buttressed by my recovery and examination of troves of original documents that had been previously denied any public, much less academic, scrutiny. The scope of this qualitative research and my political and historical analysis of it resulted in two published books that chronicle the unsuccessful American efforts to negotiate Arab-Israeli peace agreements during the presidencies of William Clinton, George W. Bush, and the first term of Barack Obama. In order of publication, they are The Truth About Camp David (New York: Nation Books, 2004) and The Palestine Papers: The End of the Road? (London: Hesperus Press, 2011). The original academic contribution of both works was the presentation of new empirical evidence to advance understanding of how heavily biased American mediation severely damaged this diplomatic undertaking. Despite being a solidly pro-Israel country, the United States had previously been able to achieve some notable mediation successes when it made efforts to adopt an “even-handed” approach. Yet in the period covered by both my books, I demonstrated how top American mediators—comprised of mostly pro-Israel partisans—dismissed any pretext of impartiality, and in most instances even escalated their mediation bias. This behavior has exacerbated the Arab-Israeli conflict and made the stated aim of a comprehensive peace a very distant prospect. The Truth About Camp David was intended as a first rough draft of history. The title references the famous summit convened by President Clinton in July 2000 that failed to forge peace between Israelis and Palestinians and the overarching US-led “peace process” around it which contributed to the outbreak of the Second Intifada. The book also details the effort to conclude an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement at Geneva just months before, which also failed. My research advanced the thesis that both the Geneva and Camp David summits were historic miscarriages of diplomacy by my presentation of granular insider accounts revealing the intensity of American mediation bias. I also exposed the general disorganization of its negotiating team, a dysfunction that was largely unknown to the public prior to my book’s release. My primary purpose in writing The Truth About Camp David was thus to enable its reinterpretation by making public new evidence about this watershed moment and the period surrounding it. Relying primarily on oral history, I interviewed US, Arab, Israeli and European officials who were first-hand participants to collect their personal narratives. I sought to identify discrepancies in their accounts, and attempted to reconcile them through further interviews, document interrogation, and my own analysis. A key challenge of The Truth About Camp David was thus to weave a thread through the various testimonies and present, as best as I could, a coherent historical narrative. Following that, my aim was to have it reviewed and discussed among credible scholars and the foreign policy community. The testimonies within The Truth About Camp David directly challenged the official narrative and prevailing media orthodoxy at the time of Palestinian blame and Syrian intransigence. As a result, it helped reframe both political debate and academic scholarship concerning this crucial period of American diplomatic intervention. In 2006, The Truth About Camp David was translated into Arabic, giving its contents even greater reach. My 2011 book “The Palestine Papers: The End of the Road?” continued my earlier line of inquiry and was largely based on documents given to me the year prior, referred to as “The Palestine Papers,” the largest leak of confidential negotiating records in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Published in full by Al Jazeera Media Network, and in limited partnership with the UK’s Guardian newspaper, the content of the files generated headlines around the world from January 24-27, 2011. My additional research for The Palestine Papers was released in May 2011 as an anthology of select papers with my accompanying qualitative analysis and interpretation rather than a stylistic mediation critique. My aim in writing “The Palestine Papers: The End of the Road?” publication was to reach beyond Al Jazeera and Guardian audiences and equip interested scholars, practitioners, and skeptics with essential highlights from the papers as well as an analytical framework to put them into context. My research for The Palestine Papers sought to help reconcile the intervening gap of negotiating history from Truth About Camp David, following the trajectory of how Israelis and Palestinians alike had grown even more conditioned to expect if not rely upon biased American mediation that excessively tilts toward Israel. The Palestine Papers also catalogues for the first time the dynamics that enabled US negotiators to escalate its role from being the self-appointed judge of Palestinian negotiating behavior during the talks (in the Camp David 2000 era) to the unilateral “juror” of its final-status positions (evidenced by the presidencies of George W Bush and Barack Obama). A supplemental essay included in this submission analyzes an earlier diplomatic era to advance my thesis of how far US mediation bias has traveled since America assumed the principal negotiator role of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the early 1970’s. Indeed, based on the overarching narrative that evolve from both those publications and this essay, it is entirely predictable to see how America’s mediation posture has matured into the era of extreme pro-Israel bias that now characterizes the approach of the Trump Administration. I will interpret this collective diplomatic history using a range of multidisciplinary academic theories addressing biased mediation in international conflict resolution. Then, by drawing on the scholarship from my previous books, I will assess and critique the theoretical benefits of employing biased mediators in conflict resolution—as some prominent scholars have advocated for. By taking a fresh look at earlier Arab-Israeli negotiations led by Henry Kissinger under President’s Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, I am able to make even greater contrast to that very limited era when biased American mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict appeared to yield limited success. The process of applying the scholarship of others against the knowledge created from my own published works enable me to demonstrate in this essay that the present day American negotiating bias toward Israel largely exceeds what the normative scholarship on mediation bias envisaged.

In the decades following the Peace of Westphalia the foundations of what many consider modern diplomacy were formed. These foundations have been a popular topic for many historians, and extensive work has been made on Diplomatic Theory, and the ideals of what a diplomat should be within the field of new diplomatic history. However, the practices, performativity and persona of the diplomats still needs a deeper level of study, which is the main purpose behind this thesis. This thesis investigates the diplomatic practices in the early 18th century through the correspondence of a controversial Swedish diplomat by the name of Carl Gyllenborg. The controversy surrounding him was because of his involvement with a Jacobite plot to restore the house of Stuart on the British throne, which ultimately failed, called The Swedish Plot. By analysing his correspondence with another ambassador, Erik Sparre, the institutional, material and communicational practices of an early modern diplomat emerge.  What this thesis shows is the way Gyllenborg navigated both the expectations and obstacles inflicted upon diplomatic practices. Some of the obstacles he faced was neglect from his sovereign, which included a lack of a letter of credence, being considered an enemy at his assigned court, and lacking finances to fund his life as an ambassador. He managed to navigate these although lacking the necessities stated by Diplomatic Theory. Gyllenborg’s story brings too light the complexity of early modern diplomatic life which has been lacking in previous research.

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This article publishes a new text by Giannozzo Manetti and places it into the political, diplomatic, and biographical context from which it emerged. Manetti’s “Panegyric to King Alfonso” was written for the occasion of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick III’s visit to Naples in the spring of 1452. This article and the accompanying first edition of Manetti’s treatise add new insights into the events of mid-Quattrocento Italy that led to Manetti’s voluntary exile from Florence, in addition to a new chapter in the narrative of patrician resistance to the consolidation of political power in Florence under Cosimo de’ Medici and his allies.

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