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This study attempts to offer an ecological interpretation of Genesis 1: 1-2:4a in view of the question as to what extent this passage bears footprints of anthropocentrism, on the one hand, and/or ecological wisdom, on the other hand. Extant ecological readings of this text tend to either recover its ecofriendliness, or they criticise the text on the basis of its dominion and subdual language in Genesis 1:26-28 which seems to go against the grain of ecological sensibilities. In resonance with revisionist readings, this study shows that the only way to mollify the dominion language of Genesis I :26-28 is to read this section as part of the whole Priestly creation account. Elements of the exilic context and many literary features of Genesis I: l-2:4a present humans as a member of a world of interdependences. Hence, accusing Genesis I: l-2:4a of lying at the root of modern indifference towards nature, is not the whole story. / Old Testament & Ancient Near Eastern Studies / M. A. (Biblical Studies)

This thesis considers the nature of primary, intermediate and district high school buildings designed by the Building Department of the Canterbury Education Board from its consolidation in 1916 until its termination in 1989. Before 1916, the influence of British models on the CEB’s predecessors had been dominant, while after that date, Board architects were more likely to attempt vernacular solutions that were relevant to the geographic situation of the Canterbury district, the secular nature of New Zealand education and changing ideas of the relative importance of the key architectural drivers of design i.e. function and form. One development, unique to Canterbury, was that for a short period, from 1924-29, a local pressure group, the Open Air Schools’ League became so powerful that it virtually dictated the CEB’s design policy until the Board architects George Penlington and John Alexander Bigg reassumed control by inflecting the open-air model into the much acclaimed veranda block. The extent to which Board architects had the freedom to express themselves within a framework of funding control exercised by the Department of Education was further circumscribed by successive building codes that, at their most directive, required national standardisation under the 1951 Dominion Basic Plan and to a slightly lesser extent under the1956 code and associated White Lines regime. Following World War 2, the use of prefabricated structures had prompted the recognition that better designed relocatable rooms could hold the key to a more flexible and effective allocation of resources in an environment increasingly subject to rapid demographic change. By the end of the period, the exploitation of new construction technologies and modern materials led to the dominance of the relocatable CEBUS buildings in Canterbury schoolyards. A concurrent development was the response of architects A. Frederick (Fred) McCook and John Sinclair Arthur to the Department’s call to design more flexible spaces, i.e. open planning, to facilitate a change in pedagogical method. Other issues raised in this study are the CEB’s solutions to the challenges of building on the West Coast, and the recurring need to ensure structural integrity in a region where there was a continuous risk of seismic activity.

Scholarship has tended to depict John Owen as a “Reformed catholic” attempting a synthesis of Reformed principles with a largely Thomist doctrine of God. In this thesis, I argue that this depiction risks losing sight of those aspects of Owen's doctrine of God that are intended to support a distinctly Protestant account of the economy of grace. By an examination of the principles of divine government, I argue that Owen employs the theme of God's “dominion” in order to establish the freedom and gratuity of God's grace, and to resist theologies that might otherwise use the doctrine of creation to structure and norm God's government of creatures. In chapter one, I argue against prevailing readings of Owen's thought that his theology of the divine will is, in fact, “voluntarist” in nature, prioritizing God's will over his intellect in the determination of the divine decree. I show that Owen regards God's absolute dominion as an entailment of his ontological priority over creatures. Chapters two and three examine the character of God's dominion over creatures in virtue of their “two-fold dependence” upon him as both Creator and Lawgiver. Chapter four takes up Owen's theology of God's remunerative justice in the context of his covenant theology. I show here that his doctrine of divine dominion underwrites his critique of merit-theology and attempts to establish the gratuity of that supernatural end to which humans are destined. Finally, in chapter five, I examine the principles of God's mercy, expressed in the work of redemption, where I demonstrate how Owen's conception of divine dominion underwrites the freedom of God in election and his account of particular redemption.

This study attempts to offer an ecological interpretation of Genesis 1: 1-2:4a in view of the question as to what extent this passage bears footprints of anthropocentrism, on the one hand, and/or ecological wisdom, on the other hand. Extant ecological readings of this text tend to either recover its ecofriendliness, or they criticise the text on the basis of its dominion and subdual language in Genesis 1:26-28 which seems to go against the grain of ecological sensibilities. In resonance with revisionist readings, this study shows that the only way to mollify the dominion language of Genesis I :26-28 is to read this section as part of the whole Priestly creation account. Elements of the exilic context and many literary features of Genesis I: l-2:4a present humans as a member of a world of interdependences. Hence, accusing Genesis I: l-2:4a of lying at the root of modern indifference towards nature, is not the whole story. / Biblical and Ancient Studies / M. A. (Biblical Studies)

Fragen: Es gibt nach h.M. der deutschen Strafrechtswissenschaft drei Vorsatzformen: Absicht, sicheres Wissen und dolus eventualis. Soll unterschiedliche Vorsatzform, ceteris paribus, auch bei der Strafzumessung unterschiedlich bewertet werden? Warum? Methode: Diese Fragen werden in einem interdisziplinären Dialog zwischen Norm und Empirie untersucht. Neben der strafrechtlichen und verfassungsrechtlichen Ausführung bezieht sich diese Arbeit großenteils auf die Erkenntnisse aus den Bereichen Kriminalpolitik, Kriminologie, Psychologie, Verhaltensökonomie und Neurowissenschaft. Zur Auswertung der Erkenntnisse wird großer Wert auch auf Forschungsmethode gelegt. Ergebnisse: Zur ersten Frage: Die Schuldangemessenheit gebietet, unterschiedliche Vorsatzformen bei der Strafzumessung unterschiedlich zu bewerten, wenn sie quantitative oder qualitative beachtliche Unterschiede aufweisen. Zur zweiten Frage: Der in Kapitel 6 erarbeitete Maßstab, Vorsatzformen nach dem Risiko für die Tatbestandsverwirklichung abzustufen, erweist sich als am aussichtsvollsten, sich auf solide Grundlagen der Norm und Empirie zu stützen. Möglichkeiten für Vorsatzabstufung nach diesem Maßstab werden erörtert. Eine klare Antwort bedarf aber einer Anpassung der Vorsatzformen an empirisches Wissen, weil die Studien aus anderen Bereichen den Nuancen von rechtlichen Begriffen nicht genug Rechnung tragen. Ferner wäre eine Vorsatzabstufung nach dem Bedarf einer Straftäterbehandlung, wie in Kapitel 4 gezeigt, erfolgversprechend, sollte die Beziehung zwischen den Vorsatzformen und dem Rückfallrisiko festgestellt werden. Ausblick: Der Verfasser plädiert für eine normativ sowie empirisch fundierte Strafrechtsdogmatik. Das heißt, Strafrechtler sollen empirische Beweise vorbringen, nötigenfalls durch eigene Studien, soweit ihre Argumente empirische Thesen enthalten. Zum Schluss verweist der Verfasser auf die Erforderlichkeit, das Potenzial und die Grenzen dieses Ansatzes und die Herausforderungen auf diesem Weg. / Question: According to the prevailing view of German legal doctrines, there are three severe types of mens rea, collectively referred to as "Vorsatz," i.e., intent, knowledge, and dolus eventualis. This work examined two questions: Should criminal acts committed with different "Vorsatz" types, all other things being equal, be punished differently? Why? Method: This work answered these questions in an interdisciplinary discourse between jurisprudence and empirical research, based chiefly on knowledge from criminal and constitutional law jurisprudence, penal policy, criminology, psychology, behavioral economics, and empirical research methods. Conclusion: To the first question: The proportionality between the penalty and criminal act demands that criminal acts committed with different "Vorsatz" types shall be differently punished if they exhibit considerable qualitative or quantitative differences. To the second question: The state of research, as discussed in Chapter 6, indicated that a gradation of "Vorsatz" types according to the risk they pose for crime completion is the most promising guideline that could enjoy both normative and empirical justifications. Possibilities of "Vorsatz" gradation are suggested. However, revisions of the definition of "Vorsatz" types are prerequisite for all these possibilities, because the studies in other disciplines did not take sufficiently into consideration the nuances of legal notions. On the other hand, a gradation of "Vorsatz" types according to the requirements for successful offender rehabilitation, as shown in Chapter 4, would also be promising if the relation between "Vorsatz" types and recidivism risk could be proven. Prospects: The author called for a criminal legal dogmatics on both normative and empirical bases. It means that criminal law scholars should provide evidence for arguments comprising empirical hypotheses. The necessity, potential, and limitations of this approach and challenge toward it are discussed. / 問題：按照德國刑法學通說，故意有三種類型：意圖、明知、間接故意。假設其他條件相同，不同的故意類型在量刑時是否應做不同評價？ 方法：本文以規範與實證之間的對話來回答上述問題。除了刑法學和憲法學的辯證之外，本文大量援引數個領域的知識，例如刑事政策、犯罪學、心理學、行為經濟學及神經科學。為了適切評析實證知識，也注重實證研究方法的理解。 結果：回答第一個問題：罪刑相當原則要求，若故意類型之間具有量或質的重要差異，便應於量刑時做相應不同的評價。回答第二個問題：第6章提出的標準，亦即按照故意類型所代表的構成要件實現風險來做故意分級，是最有潛力同時具備堅實的規範基礎及實證基礎之標準。本章提出按照此標準來做故意分級的數種可能性。然而，必須先對故意類型的定義略做修改，才能得出明確的答案，這是因為其他領域做的研究不能充分顧及法律概念的細微變化。此外，若有朝一日能釐清故意類型與再犯風險之間的關係，則按照犯罪人矯治的需求來做故意分級，如同第4章所分析，也是很可能成功的。 展望：作者提倡「兼具規範與實證基礎的刑法釋義學」，此意味著，刑法學者應該提出經驗證據來支持自己論述當中的經驗命題，若有需要時，也應自己從事實證研究來達成此事。於論文結尾，作者提示這種研究取徑的必要性、潛力和界線，也指出追求此路徑之際可能面臨的挑戰。