The works of Henry James are renowned for their dense sub-text and the manner in which he leaves his reader to elucidate much of his meaning. In the field of adaptation theory, therefore, James presents somewhat of a problem for the film adaptor: how does one convey on screen James' delicate implications, which are formative to the text without actually existing on the printed page? This project not only works to answer that question, but it also addresses a more serious question: what does adaptation have to offer to the student of literature? In the case of Henry James, the film adaptations of his novels expose the trope of voyeurism which functions as one of the central operative mechanisms in the novels, allowing both authorial omniscience into the minds and lives of the characters, as well as the creation of a voyeuristic character through whose perceptions the reader's knowledge is filtered. In examining recent film adaptations of The Portrait of a Lady. The Wings of the Dove, and Washington Square, it becomes apparent that the key to adapting James is careful attention to this trope of voyeurism, which ultimately becomes more important to a successful adaptation (an adaptation which most closely reproduces James' observations and biases rather than those of the director) than exact fidelity to the plot itself. With these considerations in mind, I have indicated that Jane Campion's 1996 adaptation of The Portrait of a Lady most successfully achieves James' purposes, highlighting both the on-screen voyeurism of Ralph Touchett, then using techniques (lighting, camera angles, editing, sound) to similarly construct the viewer as voyeur. Agniezka Holland's Washington Square, however, ignores James' careful positioning of Catherine Sloper as an object of visual amusement to her father and creates an insipid film that plays the drama as a mercantile transaction gone awry. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Iain Softley's The Wings of the Dove bloats the construct of viewer as voyeur into ineffectuality through his use of full nudity to capture the eye of the audience, ensuring that the film's images, rather than its story, are all that is remembered.

This thesis explores the roles of widowhood and sympathy in Henry James's short and long fiction. By the time James established himself as a writer of fiction, the culture of sentiment and its formation of sympathetic identification had become central to American and British writers. Critically, however, sympathy in James's fiction has been overlooked because he chose to write about rich expatriates and European nobility. James's pervasive use of widowed characters in his fiction suggests the he too participated in the same aesthetic agenda as William Dean Howells and George Eliot to evoke sympathy in their readers as a means of promoting class unity. In this thesis I show how James's use of widowed characters places him in the same sympathetic tradition as Howells and Eliot not by eliciting sympathy for themselves, but, rather, by awakening a sympathetic response from his readers for his protagonists seeking love. In chapter one I explore why James may have used so many widowed characters in his fiction. I cite the death of his cousin Minny Temple as a defining moment in his literary career and argue that he may have experienced an "emotional widowhood" after her early death. I also discuss the role of widows in his short fiction, which I suggest, is different from the role of widows in his novels. This chapter is biographical, yet provides important background for understanding why, more than any other author, James's fiction is replete with widowed characters. Chapter two explains the culture of sentiment of which James has been excluded. It explores the theories of David Hume and Adam Smith and their influence on the aesthetic principles defining Howells and Eliot's work. In this chapter I contend that James is indeed part of this sentimental tradition despite his renunciation of sentiment in his fiction because he tried to promote sympathy among his readers through his widowed characters. In chapter three I do close readings of The Portrait of a Lady (1881) and The Wings of the Dove (1902) and argue that these two texts best represent James's attempt at sympathetic writing.

In the American capitalist society, the media is often an agent used to perpetuate ideals and to inform consumers of products that they can purchase by using multiple advertising techniques. In an attempt to counter the thin body ideal for women, some companies have begun advertising their products by using plus size models, such as the Dove Campaign for Real Beauty. The purpose of this research is to examine college women's perceptions of the Dove Campaign for Real Beauty, an advertising campaign whose goal is to reverse the stereotypical body ideal for women and broaden the definition of beauty. Some sociologists have criticized Dove for sending conflicting messages. This study is the first that focuses on women's perceptions about this potential conflict. Through the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods, this study examined if, how, and when women changed their initial perceptions toward the Dove Campaign for Real Beauty based on two separate scenarios brought to their attention. This is important because the findings suggest how consumers can change their perceptions regarding a company, in this case one that is a part of a multi-million dollar parent company, based on how a company advertises its products.

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La théorie des jeux évolutionnaires est un outil qui permet d’étudier l’évolution des stratégies dans une population composée d’un grand nombre d’agents qui interagissent d’une façon continue et aléatoire. Dans cette théorie, il y a deux concepts essentiels qui sont la stratégie évolutivement stable (ESS), et la dynamique de réplication. Une stratégie évolutivement stable est une stratégie, qui, si adoptée par toute la population,ne peut pas être envahie par une autre stratégie ”mutante” utilisée par une petite fraction de la population. Ce concept statique est un raffinement de l’équilibre de Nash, et il ne peut pas renseigner, par exemple, sur la durée du temps nécessaire pour que l’ESS élimine la stratégie mutante. La dynamique de réplication, originalement proposée par Hawk-Dove, est un modèle dynamique qui permet de prédire l’évolution de la fraction de chaque stratégie dans la population en fonction du temps, en réponse aux gains des stratégies et l’état de la population.Dans cette thèse, nous proposons dans une première partie une extension de la dynamique de réplication classique en y introduisant des délais hétérogènes et aléatoires.En effet, la plupart des phénomènes qui se produisent prennent un temps incertain avant d’avoir des résultats. Nous étudions l’effet de la distribution des délais sur la stabilité de l’ESS dans la dynamique de réplication et nous considérons les distributions uniforme, exponentielle, et Gamma (ou Erlang). Dans les cas des distributions uniforme et Gamma, nous trouvons la valeur critique de la moyenne à laquelle la stabilité de l’équilibre est perdue et des oscillations permanentes apparaissent. Dans le cas de la distribution exponentielle, nous montrons que la stabilité de l’équilibre ne peut être perdue,et ce pour toute valeur de la moyenne de la distribution. Par ailleurs, nous montrons que la distribution exponentielle peut affecter la stabilité de l’ESS quand une seule stratégie subit un délai aléatoire issu de cette distribution. Nous étudions également le cas où les délais sont discrets et nous trouvons une condition suffisante et indépendante des valeurs des délais pour la stabilité de l’équilibre. Dans tous les cas, nous montrons que les délais aléatoires sont moins risqués que les délais constants pour la stabilité de l’équilibre, vu que la valeur moyenne critique des délais aléatoires est toujours supérieure de celle des délais constants. En outre, nous considérons comme paramètre de bifurcation la moyenne de la distribution des délais et nous étudions les propriétés de la solution périodique qui apparait à la bifurcation de Hopf, et ce en utilisant une méthode de perturbation non linéaire. En effet, à la bifurcation de Hopf, une oscillation périodique stable apparait dont l’amplitude est fonction de la moyenne de la distribution. Nous déterminons analytiquement l’amplitude de l’oscillation au voisinage de la bifurcation de Hopf en fonction du paramètre de bifurcation et de la matrice des jeux dans les cas des distributions de Dirac, uniforme, Gamma et discrète, et nous appuyons nos résultats avec des simulations numériques. Dans une deuxième partie, nous considérons une population hétérogène composée de plusieurs communautés qui interagissent d’une manière non-uniforme. Pour chaque communauté, nous définissons les matrices des jeux et les probabilités d’interaction avec les autres communautés. Dans ce contexte, nous définissons trois ESS avec différents niveaux de stabilité contre les mutations: un ESS fort, un ESS faible et un ESS intermédiaire. Nous définissons un ESS fort comme suit: si toute la population adopte l’ESS, alors l’ESS ne peut pas être envahi par une petite fraction de mutants composée d’agents de toutes les communautés. / In this dissertation, we study evolutionary game theory which is a mathematical tool used to model and predict the evolution of strategies in a population composed of a largenumber of players. In this theory, there are two basic concepts which are the evolutionarilystable strategy (ESS) and the replicator dynamics. The ESS is originally definedas follows [1]: if all the population adopts the ESS, then no alternative strategy used bya sufficiently small fraction of the population can invade the population.The ESS is astatic concept and a refinement of a Nash equilibrium. It does not allow us, for example,to estimate the time required for the ESS to overcome the mutant strategy, neither to predictthe asymptotic distribution of strategies in the population. The replicator dynamics,originally introduced in [2], is a model of evolution of strategies according to which the growth rate of a given strategy is proportional to how well this strategy performs relative to the average pay off in the population.In the first part of this work, we propose an extended version of the replicator dynamics which takes into account heterogeneous random delays. Indeed, in many situations,the presence of uncertain delays is ubiquitous. We first consider continuous delays and we study the effect of the distribution of delays on the asymptotic stability of the mixed equilibrium in the replicator dynamics. In the case of uniform and Gamma delay distributions,we find the critical mean delay at which a Hopf bifurcation is created and the stability of the mixed equilibrium is lost. When the distribution of delays is exponential, we prove that the stability of the equilibrium cannot be affected by the delays. However, when only one strategy is delayed according to the exponential distribution,the asymptotic stability of the ESS can be lost. In all the cases, we show that the critical mean delay value is higher than that of constant delays, and thus random delays are less threatening than constant delays. In addition, we consider discrete delays and one o four results is that, when the instantaneous term is dominant, that is when the probabilityof zero delay is sufficiently high, the stability of the ESS cannot be lost.Furthermore, by taking as a bifurcation parameter the mean delay distribution, we examine the properties of the bifurcating periodic solution created near the Hopf bifurcationusing a nonlinear perturbation method. Indeed, near the Hopf bifurcation, a stable periodic oscillation appears whose amplitude depends on the value of the bifurcation parameter. We give a closed-form expression of the amplitude of the periodic solution and we validate our results with numerical simulations.In the second part, we consider an heterogeneous population composed of several communities which interact in a nonuniform manner. Each community has its own set of strategies, payoffs, and interaction probabilities. Indeed, individuals of a population have many inherent differences that favor the appearance of groups or clusters. In this scenario, we define three ESS with different levels of stability against mutations: strong,weak, and intermediate ESS, and we examine their connection to each other. A strongESS is a strategy that, when adopted by all the population, cannot be invaded by a sufficientlysmall fraction of mutants composed of agents from all the communities. Incontrast, a weak ESS is a strategy wherein each community resists invasion by a sufficientlysmall fraction of mutants in that community (local mutants). In the intermediateESS, the population adopting the ESS cannot be invaded by a small fraction of mutantswhen we consider the total fitness of the population rather than the fitness of eachcommunity separately.

在基督新教的《聖經》中經常以不同的象徵描述聖靈，鴿子無疑是聖靈最具代表性的象徵。本篇論文嘗試解答兩個問題：為什麼四卷《福音書》的作者均以鴿子象徵聖靈？以鴿子象徵聖靈有什麼特殊的涵義？這是在第一章中所作的介紹。 　　第二章探討象徵的詮釋理論，本文採用塔特（W. Randolph Tate）的詮釋方法為理論依據，以文本後面、文本裡面和面對文本的三個層面詮釋這個象徵。第三章尋找鴿子的蹤跡，遠從美所不達米亞古代蘇美女神伊南娜談起，陸續探尋巴比倫女神伊斯塔、敘利亞和迦南女神阿斯塔特。接著探討克里特島的米諾斯文明發現的鴿子女神和古希臘的性愛女神阿芙羅狄特，這些女神與鴿子密切連結。鴿子也作為預兆鳥，還有為宙斯說出神諭的女祭司被稱為鴿子。 第四章探究《聖經》中的鴿子，研究鴿子在《舊約聖經》和《新約聖經》中的多種形象，另外研究名為「鴿子」的先知約拿。第五章探討聖靈在《聖經》中近似鴿子的特質、《舊約聖經》和《新約聖經》聖靈觀念的區別，以及兩約之間聖靈觀念的演變。 第六章以《聖經》中其他聖靈的象徵物，探討鴿子獨特作為「感情象徵」的特質。並從前面數章的研究，歸納整合鴿子象徵聖靈突顯的宗教形象。第七章依據塔特的詮釋方法，歸納所有的探討作出結論，鴿子象徵聖靈乃是《福音書》的作者獨一無二最佳的選擇，鴿子是傳信者，象徵和表達神的智慧，傳達聖靈帶給這世界的愛。 / The Holy Spirit is frequently referred to in symbols in the Protestant Bible. Among those, a dove is undoubtedly the most representative of the symbols of the Holy Spirit. This thesis tries to answer two questions: Why the authors of the four Gospels used a dove as the symbol for the Holy Spirit? As a symbol for the Holy Spirit, what is the dove's specific significance? This is introduced in Chapter one. According to the theory of hermeneutics of W. Randolph Tate, Chapter two of this thesis interprets this symbol from three dimensions: The World Behind the Text, The World Within the Text and The World in Front of the Text. Chapter three looks for its footstep in the ancient world, beginning from Mesopotamia - the Sumer Goddess Inanna, also called Ishtar in Babylonia. She became the Syrian and Canaanite Goddess Astarte. In Crete there was Dove-Goddess, and ancient Greek people worshipped Aphrodite. These Goddesses and doves are intimately associated. The dove was also the bird of choice for omens. Amazingly, even the priestesses who announced Zeus' oracles were called "doves". Chapter four studies doves' images in the Bible, including Prophet Jonah (His name means "dove"). Chapter five discusses the concept of the Holy Spirit in the Bible and in the time between two Testaments. Chapter six compares the other symbols of the Holy Spirit in the Bible with dove. The dove was a unique "emblem of affection". From all the discovery and studies in the previous chapters the thesis attempts to portrait a conclusive religious image of doves in the ancient world. Chapter seven concludes the thesis in line with the interpretative theory of three approaches done in the previous chapters. To conclude, in search for symbols for the Holy Spirit, doves are the best choice of the authors of the four Gospels. Doves are messengers, symbolizing and delivering the wisdom of God to the world, at the same time conveying the love from the Holy Spirit.

在亨利‧詹姆士（Henry James）的小說《鴿之翼》（The Wings of the Dove, 1902）中，金錢在人際關係中的流動以及其所產生的交換方式往往為批評家們所忽略。許多批評家將小說中的角色視為兩種極端：以凱特為代表的倫敦人是剝削者；美國女孩米莉則是天真無邪的犧牲者。而注意到小說中交換議題的批評家，也多半以市場交易的模式來看待小說中的交換行為。有別於以往的研究，本論文嘗試以「禮物」的理論，為小說中的交換提供一種新的觀點。 / 法國人類學家牟斯（Marcel Mauss）的理論顯示，禮物贈與牽涉到社會關係的建立與經濟層面的交流。然而牟斯的理論亦顯示出禮物的矛盾：禮物並非單向的贈與，而是送／收禮物的主體之間的互惠交換行為。同樣的，《鴿之翼》中的金錢交換也是以此種送／收禮物的方式來達成。小說中的禮物交換與角色對金錢的追求呼應，形成一個禮物交換的體系。本論文首先討論小說中的交換者進行交換的方式，突顯其用以掩飾禮物矛盾的包裝策略。其次，本論文討論禮物交換的時間結構如何對送禮者與收禮者產生不同的影響，使米莉的回禮得以藉由時間的運用，產生諧擬（parody）的效果，進而展示了凱特所代表的倫敦人所遵從的交換原則有何限制。 / 在《鴿之翼》中，禮物不斷游移於慷慨與私利的兩端，而此種介於經濟與非經濟之間的交換方式，正是禮物有別於商品，並能夠暗渡實質利益的原因。 / In The Wings of the Dove (1902), Henry James presents a flow of money in interpersonal relations from which a distinctive mode of exchange is derived. However, the issue of exchange does not arouse much discussion among the critics on James. Some critics tend to read the two heroines as representatives of moral oppositions—Kate and other Londoners as exploiters, the young American Milly as a victim. Although there are other critics who notice the exchanges in this novel, most of them choose to approach the issue with the mode of exchange in the market. Differing from these critical perspectives, in which the characters’ exchanges are taken as transforming or reflecting transactions of commodities, this thesis analyzes The Wings of the Dove in terms of gift giving and gift returning. / As the work of the French anthropologist Marcel Mauss shows, gift giving is not only a way to construct social relations but also a part of an economic circulation. But a paradox of the gift can also be observed from Mauss’s theory of the gift—the paradox that gift giving appears as a liberal offer but initiates an exchange of gifts by obligating the gift receiver to return. / What this thesis aims to explore with the theories of the gift is whether it is effective for the characters in The Wings of the Dove to exchange money for social resources, and vice versa. The exchanges in this novel, working alongside the Londoners’ quest for money, constitute a system of gift exchange that brings about Kate’s scheme to reap money from Milly. To look into the problems created from this mode of exchange, the thesis will further be committed to the discussions on the characters’ strategies which help them conceal the paradox of the gift, as well as their actions and limitations in the temporal structure of the gift exchange. Ultimately, this thesis attempts to show the capriciousness of the gift revealed in the exchanges in The Wings of the Dove. In constant fluctuations, the gift never ceases to oscillate between the dichotomies of the economic and the noneconomic, which not only shows its elasticity but also offers a space for discussions of its logic from various critical angles.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / The music-painting analogy had a pervasive influence on American early modernist art criticism, theory, and painting. Music became an aesthetic model and a theme in painting, and, for some artists and critics, music, particularly jazz and "noise music," expressed the energy of modern America. This dissertation addresses these aspects of the music-painting analogy, using Arthur G. Dove, John Marin, and Joseph Stella as case studies. / 2999-01-01

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 410-441). Also available on the Internet.

Η παρούσα διπλωματική εργασία πραγματεύεται την θεωρία παιγνίων και το πώς αυτή εφαρμόζεται στην οικονομική επιστήμη. Συγκεκριμένα, στόχος μας είναι να απαντήσουμε στο ερώτημα: «Πως αποφασίζονται οι τελικές στρατηγικές που θα επικρατήσουν σε ένα παίγνιο με την πάροδο του χρόνου;». Η εργασία είναι χωρισμένη σε δύο μέρη. Αρχικά αναφερόμαστε στην κλασσική θεωρία παιγνίων και αναλύουμε τα βασικά της στοιχεία και στη συνέχεια περνάμε στην ανάλυση της εξελικτικής θεωρίας παιγνίων. Στο 1ο μέρος της παρούσας εργασίας, λοιπόν, αναφέρουμε τα όσα είναι σχετικά με την κλασσικά θεωρία παιγνίων. Συγκεκριμένα, στο πρώτο κεφάλαιο γίνεται μία σύντομη ιστορική αναδρομή της θεωρίας αυτής και στο δεύτερο κεφάλαιο την ορίζουμε ως την επίσημη μελέτη που εξετάζει την ορθολογικότητα σε ένα επιχειρηματικό περιβάλλον και παρουσιάζουμε τα βασικά στοιχεία ενός παιγνίου. Αναφέρουμε τα δύο επίπεδα περιγραφής των παιγνίων, δηλαδή τα παίγνια συνεργασίας και μη-συνεργασίας, καθώς και τους δύο τρόπους αναπαράστασής τους που είναι η στρατηγική ή αλλιώς κανονική μορφή (μήτρες) και η εκτεταμένη ή αλλιώς αναλυτική μορφή (δέντρα παιγνίων). Στο τρίτο κεφάλαιο ορίζονται οι κυρίαρχες στρατηγικές και η αντίστοιχη ισορροπία κυρίαρχης στρατηγικής και στο τέταρτο κεφάλαιο ορίζεται η Ισορροπία Nash, η οποία αποτελεί τη στάνταρ έννοια της ισορροπίας στα οικονομικά. Στα δύο αυτά κεφάλαια (3 και 4) υπάρχουν παραδείγματα εφαρμογής που στοχεύουν στην καλύτερη κατανόηση, και αναλύεται και το Δίλημμα του Φυλακισμένου που αποτελεί το πιο κλασσικό παράδειγμα στη θεωρία παιγνίων. Στην περίπτωση, τώρα, όπου δεν υπάρχει Ισορροπία Nash (κάτι το οποίο συμβαίνει σε παίγνια στρατηγικής μορφής) το παίγνιο λύνεται με τη βοήθεια των μικτών στρατηγικών οι οποίες αναλύονται στο πέμπτο κεφάλαιο. Συνεχίζουμε με το έκτο κεφάλαιο, όπου παρουσιάζονται τα εκτεταμένα παίγνια πλήρους πληροφόρησης και αναλύεται η μέθοδος της προς τα πίσω επαγωγής (αναδίπλωση). Στο έβδομο κεφάλαιο παρουσιάζονται τα παίγνια ελλιπούς πληροφόρησης και στο όγδοο κεφάλαιο αναφέρονται τα παίγνια μηδενικού αθροίσματος (π.χ. σκάκι) και το πώς μπορούν να χρησιμοποιηθούν μαζί με τους τυχαιοποιημένους αλγόριθμους για την ανάλυση προβλημάτων στον απευθείας σύνδεσης υπολογισμό. Το 1ο μέρος κλείνει με ένα παράδειγμα εφαρμογής της θεωρίας παιγνίων, τις δημοπρασίες. Τι γίνεται όμως όταν ένα παίγνιο επαναλαμβάνεται και παίζεται περισσότερες από μία φορές; Το ερώτημα αυτό έρχεται να μας το απαντήσει η εξελικτική θεωρία παιγνίων στο 2ο μέρος της παρούσας διπλωματικής εργασίας. Στα δύο πρώτα κεφάλαια, του μέρους αυτού, ορίζονται τα εξελικτικά παίγνια, γίνεται αναφορά για το που μπορούν να βρουν εφαρμογή καθώς και στους λόγους που δεν είναι ακόμη γνωστές οι οικονομικές εφαρμογές τους. Το τρίτο και το πέμπτο κεφάλαιο αποτελούν τα πιο σημαντικά κεφάλαιο του 2ου μέρους. Στο τρίτο κεφάλαιο παρουσιάζεται αναλυτικά το μοντέλο των εξελικτικών παιγνίων και τα στοιχεία που το αποτελούν (αναμενόμενες ανταμοιβές, πληθυσμός, καταστάσεις). Περιγράφεται το στάδιο παιγνίου το οποίο ορίζεται από μία συνάρτηση καταλληλότητας και δίνεται έμφαση στις δύο γραμμικές προδιαγραφές που έχουν οι συναρτήσεις αυτές. Στη συνέχεια, αναλύεται πλήρως το πιο αντιπροσωπευτικό παράδειγμα της εξελικτικής θεωρίας παιγνίων, το παίγνιο Hawk-Dove, που αποτελεί ένα γενικό μοντέλο καταστάσεων με επιθετικές και αμυντικές αγορές. Το παίγνιο αυτό έχει δύο ειδών παίκτες, αυτοί που επιλέγουν να είναι επιθετικοί (Hawk) και αυτοί που επιλέγουν να είναι αμυντικοί (Dove), και ερευνάται το ποιο είδος παικτών θα επικρατήσει τελικά. Μέσα από την διαφορική εξίσωση που αναλύεται στο πέμπτο κεφάλαιο, στις δυναμικές, φαίνεται πως το αποτέλεσμα εξαρτάται από τρεις παραμέτρους: από τον αρχικό πληθυσμό, από την πιθανότητα να παιχτεί η καθεμία στρατηγική και από τον πίνακα με τις ανταμοιβές των παικτών. Έτσι απαντάται το αρχικό μας ερώτημα και προκύπτει η στρατηγική που τελικά θα επικρατήσει, που ονομάζεται εξελικτική στρατηγική (evolutionary stable strategy-ESS). Στο τέταρτο κεφάλαιο ορίζεται η Ισορροπία Nash (I.N.), η Εξελικτική Σταθερή Στρατηγική (ESS) και η Εξελικτική Ισορροπία (E.E.) και στο έκτο κεφάλαιο αναφέρουμε την τοπική κατάταξη συστημάτων με χαμηλές διαστάσεις και συγκεκριμένα τα γραμμικά παίγνια μίας-διάστασης, τα συστήματα δύο μεταβλητών και άλλα συστήματα δύο-διαστάσεων και μη-γραμμικά. Κλείνοντας το 2ο μέρος και γενικά την παρούσα εργασία, παρουσιάζουμε τρία παραδείγματα στα οποία φαίνεται η εφαρμοσιμότητα των όσων αναφέραμε. Συγκεκριμένα αναλύονται τρία γνωστά παίγνια τα οποία χρησιμοποιήθηκαν από την πολιτική και παραλληλίστηκαν με καταστάσεις που είχαν να αντιμετωπίσουν εκείνη τη στιγμή. / This thesis deals with the evolutionary game theory and how it applies to economics. First of all, it is necessary to refer the original game theory and to analyze the key elements and then move to the analysis of evolutionary game theory. In the first part of this study, therefore, we indicate what is on game theory. Specifically, in the first chapter is a brief history of game theory and the second chapter defined game theory as a formal study examining the rationality in a business environment and presents the basics elements of a game. Also, at this chapter i reffer to the description of games, namely, games of cooperation and non-cooperation, and the two ways of representing their strategy, the normal form (matrix) and the extensive form (game tree). The third chapter sets out the dominant strategy and the corresponding dominant strategy equilibrium and in the fourth chapter we define the Nash Equilimbrium, which is the standard notion of equilibrium in economics. In these two chapters (third and fourth) there are examples of the application for better understanding, and we analyze the prisoner's dilemma, which is the most classic example of game theory. If there is no Nash Equilimbrium (this could happen at narmal strategy games) the game is solved by mixed strategies, which are analyzed in the fifth chapter. Continuing, at the sixth chapter we can see the extensive games with perfect information and we analyze the method of backward induction. In the seventh chapter, we can see the extensive games with imperfect information and the eighth chapter refers to the zero-sum games and how they can be used together with randomized algorithms for the analysis of problems on-line calculation. Finally, the first part closes with an example application of game theory, the auctions. The question is “What happens when a game is played more than once?” The answer comes from the second part of this thesis in which we analyse the evolutionary game theory. In the first two chapters of this part we define evolutionary games, we refere where evolutionary games might be applicable and why economic application aren’t common already. The third and fourth chapter are the most important chapters of the second part. At the third chapter we present the model of the evolutionary game and its elements (expected payoffs, population, states). We describe the stage game which is defined by a fitness function and we emphasize at its two linear specifications. Then we make a full analysis one of the most representative example of evolutionary game theory, the Hawk-Dove game. This game has two types of players, aggressive (Hawk) and defensive (Dove), which reflects the situation where there is a competitive and an uncompetitive business, and the point is to find which of the two types will eventually prevail. Based on a differential equation, we conclude that the result depends on three parameters: the initial population, the probability with which each strategy is played and the payoff matrix. All this leads in a strategy which is known as evolutionary stable (ESS). In chapter five, we define the Nash Equilibrium, the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) and Evolutionary Equilibrium (EE) and in chapter six we analyze the local classification of low dimensions systems. To make clear the applicability of all those we mention at this thesis, we are closing with three examples. More specific we analyze three well-known games which were used by the political and paralleled with situations they had to face with.