Humans are a social species. Automatic affective responses generated by neural systems wired into our brains create a moral intuition or “gut-feeling” of wrong and right that guides our moral judgments. Humans are also an intelligent, problem solving and planning species with neural structures that enable cognitive control and the ability to reason about the costs and benefits of decisions, and moral judgments, not the least. Previous research suggests that moral intuition and moral reasoning operates on different neural networks - a dual process of moral cognition, that sometimes gives rise to an inner conflict in moral judgments. Early lesion studies found correlations between damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and changes in moral behaviour. This has been further established through brain imaging studies and the suggestion is that VMPFC mediates affective signals from the amygdala in moral decision making and is highly involved in generating the gut-feeling of right and wrong. However, some moral issues are complex and demand higher level processing than intuition, and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) seems to be responsible for the rational, cost-benefit reasoning during moral judgments. Further, recent research suggests that during moral judgments, the brain employ neural systems that generates the representation of value, perspective and cognitive control as well as the representation of the mental and emotional states of others. The present thesis aims to investigate prominent and up to date research on the neural correlates of necessary components in moral cognition, and to examine the function of moral intuition versus reason in relation to current complex moral issues. Moral intuition is supposedly an adaption to favour “us” before “them”, not to be concerned with large scale cooperation, which may explain why we treat many moral issues with ignorance. Understanding how the moral brain works involve understanding what sort of tasks the neural mechanisms in moral cognition evolved to handle, which may explain why some modern issues are so difficult to solve.

Heavy episodic drinking is linked with poorer academic performance, injury, and risk behaviors among college students. Understanding the cognitive and motivational factors that influence self-control of alcohol use is critical to identifying students' risk factors and developing interventions. Dual process models characterize alcohol use patterns as a function of automatic appetitive responses to alcohol-related stimuli and executive control functions. These processes may be influenced by contextual cues such as mood. The present research sought to better understand the cognitive-motivational mechanisms through which an established contextual cue for drinking - positive mood - influences alcohol use. Two studies examined the influence of positive mood induction on undergraduate drinkers' approach biases for alcohol cues and executive functioning using established and modified Stimulus Response Compatibility Tasks (SRC). Undergraduates who used alcohol at least once in the past month were recruited from the introductory psychology subject pool and randomized to positive or neutral mood induction conditions to determine whether positive mood: (1) increased approach bias or (2) impaired efforts to control alcohol cue responses. Prior to mood induction, participants completed individual difference measures related to alcohol use to evaluate potential moderators. Experiment 1 (N=93) examined post-induction alcohol approach bias and approach response inhibition using a stop-signal task within SRCs. Those in the positive mood condition did not exhibit greater approach bias or less inhibition, and mood effects were not moderated by individual differences as hypothesized. Experiment 2 (N=141) examined the influence of mood on approach bias and the ability to reverse established SRC responses to alcohol cues, with a pre-induction SRC to control for baseline approach biases. Again, positive mood did not significantly influence alcohol approach bias or executive control. Discussion: Results did not support positive mood influences on cognitive-motivational processes associated with drinking. The absence of mood effects may be a function of the type of positive mood induced or sensitivity of the SRC to detect alcohol-specific approach bias in this population. Future studies should explore these processes using alternate measures of alcohol-specific approach bias, response inhibition, and mood states that may be more specific to drinking.

Approximately 60% of college seniors lost at least one family member or friend since beginning college (Cox, Dean, & Kowalski, 2015). Research reveals that bereaved students are more likely than their nonbereaved peers to struggle with academic problems and attrition (Cousins, Servaty-Seib & Lockman, 2017), highlighting the importance of identifying protective factors for this group of individuals. Researchers have identified restoration-oriented coping as a helpful coping mechanism in other samples (Caserta & Lund, 2007; Caserta, Lund, Utza, & de Vries, 2009). Despite qualitative evidence suggesting bereaved undergraduates often employ restoration-oriented coping, no research has formally assessed the effects of restoration-oriented coping in a bereaved undergraduate sample. This study assessed the effects of restoration-oriented coping on students’ (N=420; 68.8% female; 46.7% white) psychological well-being in a longitudinal design. Data were part of a larger study (“Spit 4 Science”) assessing the development of substance use and emotional health outcomes in college students. Students were assessed annually; those who reported a loss, had pre-, and post-loss data were included in analysis. Hierarchical multiple linear regressions were conducted and showed restoration-oriented coping was predictive of better psychological well-being and that this relationship was strengthened by social support quality. Extraversion was also predictive of better psychological well-being, while openness and neuroticism were related to poorer psychological well-being. Moreover, neuroticism mediated the relationship between distress at indication of loss and post-loss follow-up. Further research of restoration-oriented coping efforts among bereaved undergraduates is warranted. Additional resources and support may help to keep students engaged following a loss.

Teleological reasoning reflects the general tendency to view objects, behaviors and events in terms of their “purpose.” Although healthy educated adults tend to refrain from committing errors in teleological reasoning about objects, our knowledge regarding how adults reason about events is limited. It has been suggested that teleological reasoning biases our interpretations of emotionally significant and unexpected life events of which a physical or social cause is absent or unsatisfactory. The current investigation seeks to better understand the types of events that evoke a teleological perspective and the conditions and individual difference factors that facilitate it. The results revealed that participants high in religiosity and low in ACT science reasoning are more likely to commit teleological errors (i.e., imbuing purpose upon events with non-intentional causal forces). Additionally, participants of low religiosity were more likely to commit teleological errors when placed under cognitive load. It appears that two routes to teleological reasoning exist: one that represents an explicit belief system such as religion, and one that reflects implicit intuitions about how the world works. These findings shed light on how, when confronted with certain life events, both our belief systems and situational pressures lead us to rely on intuitive assumptions rather than engage in careful consideration of more scientifically sound alternatives.

Ce mémoire est consacré aux théories à processus duaux, abondamment discutées dans la littérature récente en sciences cognitives. L'auteur y propose une version fortement amendée de l'approche défendue par Samuels (2009), remplaçant la distinction entre 'Systèmes' par une distinction entre 'Types de processus', qui permet de critiquer à la fois les approches (uniquement) modularistes et les approches décrivant une différence profonde entre deux systèmes ayant chacun leurs spécificités (fonctionnelles, phénoménologiques, neurologiques). Cependant, dans la version des théories à processus duaux défendue ici, la distinction entre 'Types de processus' n'est considérée a priori que comme une distinction heuristique permettant aux chercheuses et chercheurs de mieux comprendre l'esprit et d'en expliquer certaines propriétés. L'idée centrale défendue dans ce mémoire est que les processus cognitifs devraient y être distingués selon leur position dans un espace conceptuel multidimensionnel permettant de considérer l'ensemble des caractéristiques et des spécificités attribuées à un processus, cela étant préférable à les forcer dans l'un ou l'autre des 'Systèmes' ou des 'Types' identifiés dans les approches les plus influentes (cf. Evans, 2008). Une fois ce programme de recherche entamé, il sera alors possible de réviser la définition des concepts et des catégories utilisés pour refonder certaines notions présentes dans la littérature ('module', 'Système 1/2', etc.). L'argument se déroule en trois temps: 1) Le premier chapitre vise à clarifier la notion de 'module' très utilisée en sciences cognitives. Contre les approches visant à affaiblir cette notion afin que tous les processus de l'esprit soient considérés comme étant des modules, l'auteur - suivant notamment Faucher et Poirier (2009) et Samuels (2006) - jette le doute sur l'emploi qui est fait de cette notion par plusieurs auteurs très influents, notamment en psychologie évolutionniste (par exemple, Barrett, Carruthers, Cosmides, Tooby). 2) L'objectif du second chapitre est de présenter, examiner et critiquer plusieurs théories à processus duaux et de suggérer qu'aucune théorie actuellement discutée n'est adéquate pour décrire l'architecture de l'esprit. Les approches, particulièrement influentes ou représentatives, défendues par Stanovich (1999; 2004; 2009), par Evans (2008; 2009), par Lieberman (2007; 2009) et par Carruthers (2006; 2009) y sont abordées. 3) Dans le troisième chapitre, l'auteur critique le cadre développé par Samuels (2009), puis développe son approche des théories à processus duaux en montrant certains de ses avantages. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : philosophie des sciences, sciences cognitives, psychologie, neurosciences, théorie à processus duaux, modularité, module, heuristique, biais, pensée critique, naturalisme.

Cognitive and emotional processes both seem to contribute in the production of moral judgments, but how they interact is still under investigation. Greene’s dual-process model suggests that these processes constitute dissociable systems in the brain, which are hypothesized to give rise to two qualitatively different ways of moral thinking characterized by two normative moral theories, consequentialism and deontology. Greene indicates that this research undermine deontology as a normative theory. The empirical investigation of moral judgments implies that the dual-process model only seems to accurately predict and explain moral judgments in moral dilemmas involving physical harmful intentions. Regardless of the models empirical support, the empirical findings in the study of moral judgments could have normative and metaethical implications.

Loss is an inevitable part of the human experience. How each individual reacts to loss may be affected by various factors (e.g. an individual’s attachment style). The current studies focused on how individuals respond to and cope with the loss of one type of attachment figure, specifically the loss of a romantic partner. The relationship between romantic loss and attachment theory is discussed and an integrated model of romantic relationship loss and attachment is proposed. This model accounts for various differences in how individuals respond to the loss of romantic relationships in young adulthood. Study 1 focused on the development of a revised form of the Inventory of Daily Widowed Life (IDWL; Caserta and Lund, 2007), which was labelled the Daily Activities After Relationship Loss (DAARL), to assess loss-orientation, restoration-orientation, and the oscillation between these processes following romantic relationship loss. This measure allowed for the assessment of coping in keeping with the constructs of the Dual Process Model of Bereavement (DPM; Stroebe & Schut, 1999), but allowed for these processes to be assessed in the context of romantic relationship loss as opposed to coping following the death of a loved one. Study 1 was comprised of two parts with differing samples: Part 1 included seven (four female) graduate students and undergraduate alumni in the social sciences as participants whereas Part 2 included ninety-seven (sixty-nine female) undergraduate psychology students. Participants were presented with proposed items for the new measure, as well as definitions of loss-oriented and restoration-oriented coping, and then were asked to categorize these items as loss-oriented coping, restoration-oriented coping, both, or other. Items yielding the highest levels of inter-rater agreement were used for the DAARL in Study 2. Study 2 focussed on the attachment relationship between former romantic partners, and how individuals coped with the loss of an attachment figure following the termination of a romantic relationship. One hundred and fifty-nine (one hundred and eleven female) individuals who had been broken up with or deemed their most recent romantic loss as being a mutual break-up were asked to complete a questionnaire packet containing measures of attachment style, coping behaviours following the loss, depression, anxiety, and socially desirable responding. A model of differences in coping with romantic relationship loss based on an individual’s attachment style was proposed and tested based on Stroebe, Schut, and Stroebe’s (2005) DPM and findings by Waskowic (2010; See Figure 4). Based on the findings from the current studies there are differences between the four types of attachment (i.e., secure, dismissing, preoccupied, and fearful) in how each copes with the loss of a romantic attachment figure. In light of the current findings, a revised model of romantic grief, which integrates the Dual Process Model of Bereavement within an attachment theoretical framework is offered (See Figure 5). This new model accounts for observed differences in the way individuals cope with the loss of a romantic relationship and suggests that researchers focus on the attachment relationship to explain variability in an individual’s response following romantic loss. The results of Study 2 provide support for the new integrated model and encourage others to consider using attachment theory, when examining how individuals with different attachment styles (i.e., secure, dismissing, preoccupied, and fearful) will respond to a romantic loss. Study 1 and 2 in conjunction also provide early stage support for the validity of the DAARL. Study 1 provided initial content validity by having independent raters assess items as being consistent with restoration-oriented or loss-oriented coping. Study 2 provided empirical support of the items selected as being consistent with their intended constructs by analyzing internal consistency and item-total correlations. The findings of Study 2 suggested that the dimensions proposed represented related, but distinct constructs. The current studies aimed to advance our understanding of the relationship between attachment theory and romantic relationship loss by expanding upon relevant theories and empirical findings for bereavement following a death to other forms of loss. Further, the findings are reported in regards to specific attachment styles, rather than the secure versus insecure distinction that has been commonly utilized when conducting research on attachment style differences. Implications and future directions for research are discussed.

In today's fast-paced, hyper-mediated society, the ability to balance accuracy and efficiency is essential. Media literacy educational programs have arisen to meet this need and proliferated in recent years. Although the practice of media literacy is thriving, its underlying mechanisms are poorly understood and evidence of effectiveness is mixed (e.g., Bergsma & Carney, 2008). A social psychological perspective has the potential to illuminate previously overlooked variables and inform research and practice in this growing field. In particular, whereas media literacy efforts typically emphasize thorough processing of media messages, dual-process theories of persuasion (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) suggest this is not always realistic. When motivation or ability is compromised, individuals default to a low-effort processing mode, relying on peripheral cues or heuristics rather than carefully evaluating message arguments. In this mode, media messages can persuade unconsciously. Using a dual-process approach, the present research investigated how specific barriers to motivation (perceptions of personal invulnerability) and processing ability (emotion-based advertising, environmental distractions) influence the processes of media literacy. Participants (N = 882) were randomly assigned to 16 conditions in a 2 [vulnerability: demonstrated, control] x 2 [distractions: present, absent] x 2(2) [ad type: informational, emotional; two replicates of each type] between-subjects nested design. The vulnerability manipulation increased distrust in the target ads and reduced their persuasiveness, not through the hypothesized mechanism of heightened perceptions of vulnerability, but mediated by increased counterarguing. Relative to informational ads, emotional ads were judged more persuasive, attractive, similar to personal experience, and elicited greater identification. However, they were also rated less trustworthy than informational ads, suggesting emotional advertising largely bypasses logical decision-making processes. Distraction reduced counterarguing only among those who found the ad relatively unpersuasive. The results of this research highlight the central role of trust in media literacy processes. Although individuals recognize and distrust emotional forms of advertising, they are nonetheless persuaded by such appeals. Given the sophistication of contemporary advertising techniques and the ubiquity of distractions, the present research suggests new approaches to media literacy are needed, specifically tailored to decision-making under these more realistic media-use conditions.

The dual process theory proposes that evaluative conditioning is a form of learning distinct from Pavlovian conditioning and that it displays different functional characteristics such as not being subject to modulation. However, when assessed online as opposed to post-experimentally, modulation of evaluative conditioning by context change has been found in a contingency reversal procedure. Reversal of evaluative learning was found to be faster when trained in a different context rather than in the original training context. The present study addressed the question whether context change or instructions would affect the rate of reversal of evaluative learning and whether reversal learning would accelerate across repetitions. A picture-picture paradigm was used to expose participants to CS-US pairs and contingency was reversed three times during the experiment. Participants were required to provide online causal judgements and valence ratings after each set of 10 training trials. Context change, but not instructions, displayed a trend in affecting reversal of evaluative learning with participants displaying faster learning on trials immediately subsequent to contingency reversal. Instructions affected the reversal of contingency judgements. There was no evidence of acceleration across repetitions for either measure or manipulation.

Abstract This research investigated the extent to which taking notes influenced the quality of mock jurors’ decisions. High quality decisions were defined in this research as those which did not reflect the influence of the offender stereotype. The impact of note taking on the quality of jurors’ decisions is central to the judicial community’s concerns about note taking as a jury aid and their willingness to offer it in trial contexts. Previous research has argued that note takers make better quality decisions than non-note takers because note takers recall more trial content and make judgements that better reflect the evidence presented. However, according to dual process models of persuasion, high quality decisions should show evidence of both effortful processing of information and no influence of peripheral cues, such as stereotypes. To date, the existing literature has neglected to consider the extent to which note takers, as compared to non-note takers, are influenced by peripheral cues. The current research sought to address this by investigating the extent to which note taking and non-note taking mock jurors were influenced by stereotypes when making decisions in a mock criminal trial. In particular, note taking and non-note taking mock jurors were presented with a criminal trial in which either a male or female defendant had been charged with a stereotypically masculine crime (e.g., aggravated robbery or murder). The extent to which mock jurors were more likely to convict the male defendant and acquit the female defendant was used as a marker of the extent that stereotypes about offenders influenced participants in these studies. Across studies, note takers’ perceptions of guilt, evaluation of the defendant, and, in some instances, recall of trial content, reflected stereotype-based processing while the corresponding measures for non-note takers did not. This research then went on to investigate why note takers were more vulnerable to the influence of stereotypes than non-note takers. It was proposed that one reason might be the requirement that note takers simultaneously record and evaluate trial content. Previous research has shown that persons engaged in dual tasks rely on stereotypes to increase information processing efficiency and are therefore able to re-direct cognitive resources to the additional task. Consistent with previous studies, the current research found that both note takers and mock jurors engaged in an additional task during the trial were more vulnerable to the influence of stereotypes than non-note takers. Furthermore, whilst investigating interventions designed to reduce the influence of stereotypes on note takers’ decisions, results revealed that such interventions were less successful in improving decision quality than interventions that removed the requirement to engage in dual tasks. In particular, the influence of stereotypes was reduced when note takers were encouraged to elaborate on the content of their notes during designated review periods. Whilst methodological features of this research program--namely a reliance on student samples and the relative brevity of mock trials used--may have led to an underestimation of the reliance on stereotypes for note takers, the research has implications for the instructions given to jurors about note taking in judicial contexts. Specifically, the central conclusion of the thesis is that it would seem prudent to amend instructions to direct note takers to engage in the effortful review of their notes prior to coming together to reach a verdict.