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在刑事審判程序中，法院常因釐清事實的能力有限，以致對被告的被訴事實無法完全明確證明，若依傳統見解(in dubio pro reo､the Pre-sumption of Innocence)為保護人權，往往須為被告無罪之判決。然而當案情雖無法完全釐清，但法院卻可以確定被告在兩種可能犯罪事實「版本」中，若不是犯了這個罪，就是犯了另一個，總之沒有無辜的可能性存在，此時，若分別就二以上的事實可能性檢討，則被告行為合致於此罪構成要件將因事實尚存有構成他罪的可能性而落空；反之，在檢討他罪時，同樣因為仍存有構成此罪的嫌疑而不能完全證明，分別適用傳統見解的結果，只會使一個明知其行為抵觸現行有效處罰法規的被告，獲得無罪判決的寬典。此種結論，是否仍屬法治國原則下，罪刑法定構成要件明確性要求所要保護的目的。為了在法律安定性與個案正義間尋求一個平衡點，德國早在十九世紀末即有「選擇認定」原則的提出，認為在訴訟程序中，若法院極盡一切事實上以及程序上所允許的證明方式，仍無法將案情事實完全釐清，只知道被告所為的事實經過，僅存有兩個「非此即彼」的可能性，而分別可能合致兩個刑罰構成要件，若構成其中一個，即排斥另一個，但總是構成一個，絕對沒有無辜的可能。此時，若該列入考慮的二以上犯罪構成要件彼此間具有一定的關連（通說認為是「法倫理或心理上可比較性」）時，法院可以基於多選擇的事實基礎，而以較輕的罪刑與被告以有罪判決。例如，某被告因持有他人被竊的贓物而被捕，法院在極盡調查､審理之能事後，只知道該名被告若非犯了竊盜行為，就是明知為贓物而故買之，總是犯了一個。依德國聯邦最高法院的見解，由於竊盜罪（德國刑法第二四二條）及贓物罪（德國刑法第二五九條）間具有相同的道德非難，故可允許基於「竊盜罪或贓物罪」的多選擇事實基礎下，為被告有罪之判決。

Submitted by Caroline Xavier (caroline.xavier@pucrs.br) on 2017-05-11T14:26:12Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DIS_PAULO_THIAGO_FERNANDES_DIAS_PARCIAL.pdf: 793965 bytes, checksum: 6b187c3e0f0633990694e880f89aa7a2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-11T14:26:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DIS_PAULO_THIAGO_FERNANDES_DIAS_PARCIAL.pdf: 793965 bytes, checksum: 6b187c3e0f0633990694e880f89aa7a2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-12-01 / This dissertation, linked to the Contemporary Legal and Criminal Systems line of research of the Graduate Program in Criminal Sciences stricto sensu of the Faculty of Law, is an expansive interdisciplinary, historical and in-depth study, concerning the unconstitutionality and unconventionality of how the adage in dubio pro societate incides into the judicial order, as a form of solving legal doubts as to the sufficiency of evidence as to criminal authorship and proof of materiality. Based on hermeneutical discussions, we seek to examine the decision-making act, notably in judicial analysis of the evidence produced by the parties. In this sense, the study found that such judicial protagonism, rather than providing fundamental rights protection, functions in fact, as a reminder of the inquisitorial culture to which the of Criminal Process Code of 1941 and much of the legal institutions that followed are linked. The adoption of the referred to adage as a decision-making standard for the solution of legal questions, violates the rule in dubio pro reo, or the presumption of innocence and human dignity, to the extent that it submits a person to trial, despite no certainty as to the minimum requirements for the delivery of the verdict. Finally, under the new Constitutional order established in 1988, and opening rules provided by paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 of Article 5, of the Federal Constitution, it is necessary to exercise conventional jurisdictional control of normative or judicial acts especially in the course of criminal proceedings. All of this occurs, within the continuing process of human rights internationalization of which Brazil is part of. Through a brief review, the study shows that despite all of the internal and external regulatory efforts to secure human rights, the Brazilian Judiciary, through its Superior Courts, has both systematically and massively been removing the presumption of innocence, in order to consecrate an incompatible adage to the founding values of the Republic. / A presente disserta??o, vinculada ? linha de pesquisa Sistema Jur?dico-Penais Contempor?neos do Programa de P?s-gradua??o stricto sensu em Ci?ncias Criminais da Faculdade de Direito, representa uma pesquisa expansiva e aprofundada, interdisciplinar, hist?rica sobre a (in)constitucionalidade e a (in)convencionalidade da incid?ncia do ad?gio do in dubio pro societate na decis?o de pron?ncia, como forma de solu??o da d?vida judicial quanto aos ind?cios suficientes de autoria e prova da materialidade delitivas. Com base em discuss?es de ordem hermen?utica, buscou-se analisar o ato decis?rio, notadamente no que pertine ? an?lise judicial das provas produzidas pelas partes. Nesse sentido, a investiga??o apurou que o protagonismo judicial, ao inv?s de proporcionar a prote??o dos direitos fundamentais, funciona, em verdade, como resqu?cio de uma cultura inquisit?ria da qual o C?digo de Processo Penal de 1941 e boa parte das Institui??es jur?dicas seguem vinculados. Al?m mais, a ado??o do ad?gio referido como standard probat?rio, para solu??o da d?vida judicial, viola, ao mesmo tempo, a regra do in dubio pro reo, enquanto decorr?ncia da presun??o de inoc?ncia, e a dignidade humana, na medida em que submete uma pessoa a julgamento, a despeito da n?o seguran?a quanto aos requisitos m?nimos para o proferimento da pron?ncia. Por fim, nos termos da nova ordem constitucional instaurada em 1988, e da abertura normativa proporcionada pelos ?2? e ?3?, do artigo 5?, da Constitui??o da Rep?blica, faz-se necess?rio o exerc?cio do controle jurisdicional de convencionalidade dos atos normativos e judici?rios, principalmente no bojo do processo penal. Trata-se, de um processo de internacionaliza??o dos direitos humanos do qual o Brasil se faz integrante. Em breve levantamento, a pesquisa demonstrou que, a despeito de todo o esfor?o normativo interno e externo para a valoriza??o dos direitos humanos, o Judici?rio brasileiro, por meio de seus Tribunais Superiores, vem, sistem?tica e maci?amente, afastando a presun??o de inoc?ncia para consagrar um brocardo incompat?vel com os valores fundantes da Rep?blica.

The legal concept of formal burden of proof of public prosecutor has been discussed for more than 17 years of legislative work on the new Criminal Procedure Code and an increased attention was also paid to it before by the legal science, at the same time with the enforcement of adversary elements of court proceedings. The legal concept in question was established and developed as part of the Anglo-Saxon type of criminal proceedings where trial is based on a dispute between the parties. This involves the exclusive procedural responsibility of public prosecutor to clarify the facts relevant to the indictment filed. Although it is possible to give a brief description of the legal concept in question in a single sentence, its enactment would affect the overall nature of the proceedings before the court and would also be reflected in other stages of the criminal proceedings. The aim of the dissertation was to analyse the prerequisites and consequences of the enactment of the formal burden of proof of public prosecutor in the Czech criminal proceedings. Given the origin of the legal concept, the crucial question was whether its adoption would necessarily constitute a total departure from the legal principles which the existing Criminal Procedure Code is based on or whether it is possible and appropriate...

Submitted by PPG Ci?ncias Criminais (ppgccrim@pucrs.br) on 2018-04-18T20:50:41Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Disserta??o Carolina Final Homologa??o.pdf: 1868291 bytes, checksum: 884b20071fc17fcaf6ce2bc73dfc3320 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Caroline Xavier (caroline.xavier@pucrs.br) on 2018-05-07T13:46:56Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Disserta??o Carolina Final Homologa??o.pdf: 1868291 bytes, checksum: 884b20071fc17fcaf6ce2bc73dfc3320 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-07T13:50:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Disserta??o Carolina Final Homologa??o.pdf: 1868291 bytes, checksum: 884b20071fc17fcaf6ce2bc73dfc3320 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-08 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior - CAPES / The present work is grounded on Penal System and Violence area, in the line of research on Contemporary Criminal Justice Systems of the Postgraduate Program in Criminal Sciences of PUCRS, and aims at analyzing the probative issue concerning the judge?s decision to pursue, when it allows sufficient evidence to justify, in overcoming the dubio pro reo, by the dubio pro societate. It is assumed a constitutional view of Brazilian criminal procedure of the principles studied, by the filter of the presumption of innocence guarantee in criminal proceedings. The problem under discussion is the principle of presumption of innocence and its scope of observance within Brazilian criminal proceedings, as well as the adage of the in dubio pro societate, in order to allow a deeper evidentiary dilemma contained in the judge?s decision to pursue, that is, whether sufficient evidence has the force to overcome the presumption of innocence in face of a pro-societal judgment, or not, in a criminal justice system, which is claimed to be democratic. We also worked on the specific differences between indication and evidence, as well as on differences between investigative acts and evidence acts, with the purpose of fostering a separation between these precepts and demarcating their moments of action within criminal prosecution. Finally, we presented and analyzed documentary research data, identifying vices in speeches of judge?s decision to pursue, which affirm a certain argument from authority contained in such documents, and which may end up influencing the jurors? beliefs. We concluded that there is no democratic criminal procedure without the actual observance of the principle of presumption of innocence, which must be imposed at decisive moments, surpassing any other technical principles colliding with it. / No presente trabalho, inserto na ?rea de concentra??o Sistema Penal e Viol?ncia e na linha de pesquisa Sistemas Jur?dico-Penais Contempor?neos, do Programa de P?s Gradua??o em Ci?ncias Criminais da PUCRS, buscou-se analisar, atrav?s de um olhar constitucional do processo penal brasileiro, perpassando-se os institutos estudados, pelo filtro da garantia do estado de inoc?ncia dos acusados em procedimento processual penal, a quest?o probat?ria afeita ? decis?o de pron?ncia, quando esta permite uma fundamenta??o com a afirma??o de ind?cios suficientes de autoria, em supera??o da d?vida pro reo, pela d?vida pro societate. O problema posto em discuss?o se prop?s a trabalhar o princ?pio da presun??o de inoc?ncia e seu alcance de observ?ncia dentro do processo penal p?trio, bem como o ad?gio do in dubio pro societate, a fim de permitir um aprofundamento do dilema probat?rio contido na decis?o de pron?ncia, qual seja, se ind?cios suficientes de autoria possuem for?a para superar a presun??o de inoc?ncia em face de um julgamento pr?-sociedade, ou n?o, ante um processo penal que se denomina democr?tico. Trabalhadas, ainda, as diferen?as pontuais entre ind?cios e provas, e atos de investiga??o e atos de prova, com a finalidade de propiciar um afastamento entre tais institutos e demarcar seus momentos de atua??o dentro da persecu??o penal. Ao final, apresentados e analisados dados de pesquisa documental realizada, a qual identificou v?cios em discursos exarados na decis?o de pron?ncia, os quais acabam por afirmar um certo argumento de autoridade contido em tais documentos, e que podem acabar por influenciar os jurados quando da forma??o de sua convic??o. A conclus?o ? qual se chegou foi a de que n?o h? um processo penal democr?tico sem a real observ?ncia do principio da presun??o de inoc?ncia, a qual deve se impor em momentos decis?rios, superados institutos t?cnicos que colidem com a mesma.