Les conséquences des chocs économiques négatifs sur les ménages ont été documentés extensivement, mais on en sait beaucoup moins sur la manière dont ces chocs sont transmis aux individus à travers la médiation du ménage. Le ménage contribue-il à modérer l'effet des chocs négatifs ? Dans quelle mesure le choc économique pèse-t-il dans la négociation familiale ? À partir de données sur la crise économique argentine de 2001, je montre d'abord que les femmes en couple ont une plus grande probabilité de devenir actives si leur mari a fait l'expérience d'un choc de revenu. Ensuite, je montre que le cycle économique importe dans les décisions d'investissement en capital humain. Sur le long terme, les profils de salaire et d'employabilité des hommes argentins sont affectés de manière persistante par les conditions économiques initiales au moment de l'obtention du diplôme. Enfin, je considère la dimension “man-cession” de la crise économique de 2009 en Espagne et montre que la part des ressources du ménage reçues par les femmes pour leur consommation privée augmente avec la diminution de l'écart des taux de chômage hommes-femmes, confortant l'hypothèse que les chocs négatifs modifient le pouvoir de négociation des individus au sein du ménage. / The consequences of adverse aggregate shocks on households have been repeatedly documented, but far less has been said on the way they are passed over to individuals through the mediation of the household. Does the household contribute in mitigating the effects? Or does the economic shock rather invite itself at the family negociating table? Using the Argentine 2001 economic crisis as a natural experiment, I first show that married women are more likely to enter the labor market if their husband experienced a loss in income, giving credit to the insurance mechanism. Then, I show that the business cycle matters for investments in education, and that long run labor outcomes of Argentine men are persistently affected by the initial conditions upon graduation. Finally, I consider the “Mancession” dimension of the Great Recession in Spain and demonstrate that the resource share accruing to wives for own consumption increases together with the decreasing unemployment gap, which comes in support to the bargaining hypothesis.

En 2012, en pleine crise économique, le gouvernement autonome de la Catalogne convoque des élections anticipées et demande, pour la première fois depuis le retour de l’Espagne à la démocratie suivant la mort du dictateur Francisco Franco, une forte majorité afin de pouvoir mener la région vers la sécession. Plus ou moins en même temps, le groupe armé sécessionniste basque, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, annonce la fin de sa campagne meurtrière qu’elle mène depuis des décennies et qui fait plus de 800 victimes. Si l’on accusait depuis longtemps les Basques d’être plus séparatistes que les Catalans, ces nouveaux faits suggèrent un renversement des rôles de leurs mouvements sécessionnistes. En s’appuyant sur les littératures sur les mouvements sociaux et la sécession, l’objectif de cette étude est d’expliquer ce phénomène. Nous montrerons d’abord en quoi les structures économiques et institutionnelles encadrant les régions et leurs relations avec l’État central font en sorte que la crise économique espagnole (2008-2014) offre une structure d’opportunité politique pour la réussite du sécessionnisme catalan alors que cela n’a pas été le cas au Pays basque. Ensuite, nous démontrerons que le manque de synchronisme entre les processus basque et catalan de pacification des clivages de la violence politique joue un rôle déterminant sur la capacité de coopération entre nationalistes sur la question nationale durant la crise, ce qui affecte le potentiel de mobilisation sécessionniste. Enfin, nous verrons que grâce aux structures présentées tout au long de cet ouvrage, les cadres sécessionnistes mobilisés par les revendicateurs stratégiques et les fervents champions de la sécession sont plus crédibles et pertinents en Catalogne qu’au Pays basque, ce qui explique les niveaux opposés de résonance transversale du discours sécessionniste. / In 2012, in the midst of an economic crisis, the autonomous government of Catalonia called snap elections, seeking for the first time since Spain’s return to democracy following the death of the dictator Francisco Franco, a strong majority in order to lead the region towards secession. At roughly the same time, the Basque secessionist armed group, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, announced the end of its decades-long murderous campaign, which had claimed over 800 lives. If the Basques have long been accused of being more separatist than the Catalans, these new developments suggested a role reversal for both secessionist movements. By drawing from the literature on social movements and secession, the aim of this study is to explain this phenomenon. We will firstly show that the economic and institutional structures framing for the regions and their relations with the central state made it that the Spanish economic crisis (2008-2014) offered a political opportunity structure for the success of Catalan secessionism, whereas this was not the case in the Basque Country. Secondly, we will demonstrate that the lack of synchronicity between both regions’ processes of pacifying their political violence cleavages played a decisive role in determining the capacity for nationalists to cooperation on the national questions, thereby affecting the potential for secessionist mobilization. Finally, we will see that, due to the structures presented throughout this work, the secessionist frames used by the strategic claimants and the consistent champions of secession were more relevant and credible in Catalonia than in the Basque Country, which explains the opposite levels of transversal resonance of the secessionist discourse. / En 2012, en plena crisis económica, el gobierno autónomo de Cataluña convoca elecciones anticipadas y, por primera vez desde el restablecimiento de la democracia española tras la muerte del dictador Francisco Franco, exige una mayoría amplia para llevar a la región hacia la secesión. Más o menos al mismo tiempo, el grupo armado secesionista vasco, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, anuncia el fin de su campaña mortífera de décadas, que ha cobrado más de 800 víctimas. Si los vascos han sido acusados durante mucho tiempo de ser más separatistas que los catalanes, estos nuevos acontecimientos sugieren una inversión de roles de sus movimientos secesionistas. Apoyándonos en la literatura sobre los movimientos sociales y la secesión, el objetivo de este estudio es explicar este fenómeno. En primer lugar, mostraremos que las estructuras económicas e institucionales que enmarcan las regiones y sus relaciones con el Estado central aseguraron que la crisis económica española (2008-2014) proporcionara una estructura de oportunidad política para el éxito del secesionismo catalán, mientras que no fue el caso en el País Vasco. A continuación, demostraremos que la falta de sincronía entre los procesos vasco y catalán de pacificación de los clivajes de la violencia política juega un papel decisivo en determinar la capacidad de cooperación entre nacionalistas sobre la cuestión nacional durante la crisis, lo que afecta al potencial de movilización secesionista. Por último, veremos que, gracias a las estructuras presentadas a lo largo de esta encuesta, los marcos secesionistas movilizados por los reclamantes estratégicos y los fervientes defensores de la secesión han sido más creíbles y relevantes en Cataluña que en el País Vasco, lo que explica los niveles opuestos de resonancia transversal del discurso secesionista. / Al 2012, en plena crisi econòmica, el govern autònom de Catalunya convoca eleccions anticipades, demanant per primera vegada des del retorn d’Espanya a la democràcia després de la mort del dictador Francisco Franco, una majoria àmplia per dirigir la regió cap a la secessió. Més o menys alhora, el grup armat secessionista basc, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, anuncia la fi de la seva campanya mortífera de dècades, que va fer més de 800 víctimes. Si els bascos han estat acusats des de fa temps de ser més separatistes que els catalans, aquests esdeveniments suggereixen una reversió dels papers dels seus moviments secessionistes. Recolzant-nos en les literatures sobre els moviments socials i la secessió, l’objectiu d’aquest estudi és d’explicar aquest fenomen. Primer, mostrarem que les estructures econòmiques i institucionals que emmarquen les regions i les seves relacions amb l’Estat central van assegurar que la crisi econòmica espanyola (2008-2014) proporcionés una estructura d’oportunitat política per a l’èxit del secessionisme català, mentre que això no va ser el cas al País Basc. En segon lloc, demostrarem que la manca de sincronia entre els processos basc i català de pacificació dels clivatges de la violència política juga un paper decisiu en determinar la capacitat de col·laboració entre nacionalistes sobre la qüestió nacional durant la crisi, el que afecta el potencial de mobilització secessionista. Finalment, veurem que, gràcies a les estructures presentades al llarg d’aquest estudi, els marcs secessionistes mobilitzats pels reclamants estratègics i els fervents defensors de la secessió han estat més creïbles i rellevants a Catalunya que al País Basc, el que explica els nivells oposats de ressonància transversal del discurs secessionista.

The presented thesis deals with current immigration crisis in Greece, which has not been examined in the Czech Republic so far. The macro-level analysis elaborates process of immigration to Greece with emphasis on the period 1990-2012. Causation of the immigration is clarified through historical-demographical, sociopolitical and legislative point of view. Greece was hit by immigration wave due to the process of globalization framework and the crisis is not inflicted exclusively by the Hellenic state. This is demonstrated by the elaboration of the European legislative system and the EU policy towards immigration. Contrary to this, the Hellenic failure regarding management of immigration policy is made of insufficient complexity and flexibility of national legislation and its slow development especially in 1990s. The other specific issue is rise of racism among Hellenes. Roots of xenophobia are examined by the conception of Hellenic nationality and historical-demographical method natural history, through which statistical data are put in the chronological order. Decision- making process and administration is exposed in part dealing with Hellenic immigration law. Analyzing immigration policy of all main political subjects on the background of radical right-wing electoral success in parliament...

This essay describes the radicalization of the Greek society and the rise of the political extremism in Greece in the period of 2000-2012. In this time important changes could have been observed in the Greek political scene and in the society which were linked to the polarization of the electorate and the growth of populism, nationalism, euroscepticism, xenophobia and racism. As a result of modernizing efforts of Constantinos Simitis cabinet (1996-2004), which were related to the Greek ambition to become fully-fledged member of the EU and the Eurozone, under the influence of globalization, immigration crisis and finally the recent slump of the Greek economy, a new social conflict emerged in Greece. This essay analyzes these problems from the perspective of the cleavages theory by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan and tries to find social and political roots of such conflict. The radicalization of the Greek society between 2000 and 2012 does not represent a new phenomenon, but is is a continuation of long-term ideological clashes present in the Greek social reality since the World WarI. After identifying the main cleavages in interwar and postwar period the essay identifies the main conflict of Greece after the fall of junta in 1974. Afterwards it confronts the new political issues of the period 2000-2012...

This thesis examined husband immobility and the international migration of married women from Zimbabwe. Data was collected from husbands and wives in married couple households where the wife had migrated alone. Face-to-face semi structured interviews were conducted with migrant women’s husbands in Zimbabwe while migrant women were interviewed in countries of destination telephonically. Empirical results showed that migrant women and their husbands were middle aged. Preferred countries of destination were in the region and the United Kingdom. Having a wife’s own social contacts in the preferred destination encouraged migration by reducing financial and emotional costs. Husbands' immobility facilitated wifely migration. Many wives exercised agency in migration decision making with more wives than husbands having initiated the discussion on migration. There were also cases of joint and wife sole decision making. With a few exceptions decision making was consensual. The women migrated as a survival strategy. In several households remittances were the primary source of income. Husbands were the main recipients of remittances. Some wives gave instructions on how the remittances should be used. Overall, remittances were used for paying fees, buying assets and for household upkeep. Some of the women had not visited their families since their migration. The physical separation of spouses had caused emotional distress in some marital relationships. The majority of respondents cited loss of consortium as a major problem. / Sociology / D. Phil.

This thesis examined husband immobility and the international migration of married women from Zimbabwe. Data was collected from husbands and wives in married couple households where the wife had migrated alone. Face-to-face semi structured interviews were conducted with migrant women’s husbands in Zimbabwe while migrant women were interviewed in countries of destination telephonically. Empirical results showed that migrant women and their husbands were middle aged. Preferred countries of destination were in the region and the United Kingdom. Having a wife’s own social contacts in the preferred destination encouraged migration by reducing financial and emotional costs. Husbands' immobility facilitated wifely migration. Many wives exercised agency in migration decision making with more wives than husbands having initiated the discussion on migration. There were also cases of joint and wife sole decision making. With a few exceptions decision making was consensual. The women migrated as a survival strategy. In several households remittances were the primary source of income. Husbands were the main recipients of remittances. Some wives gave instructions on how the remittances should be used. Overall, remittances were used for paying fees, buying assets and for household upkeep. Some of the women had not visited their families since their migration. The physical separation of spouses had caused emotional distress in some marital relationships. The majority of respondents cited loss of consortium as a major problem. / Sociology / D. Phil.