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Thesis advisor: John Sallis / Martin Heidegger’s work centers on the task of retrieving the traditional problem of ontology, metaphysics, and first philosophy: the problem of Being. There has been a tendency in the scholarship to take Heidegger’s formulation and solution to the problem together as a whole. In contrast, I propose to differentiate between the two, and to engage Heidegger’s formulation of the problem as such, which takes shape as phenomenological ontology in the second half of the 1920s. I claim that the subject matter of phenomenological ontology, the problem of Being, is in fact the unitary articulation of four problems: the ontological difference, the basic articulation of Being, the possible modifications of Being, and the truth-character of Being. My analysis shows that these four problems are Heidegger’s problematization (following Brentano) of the four main senses of Being, traditionally associated with Aristotle and Aristotelianism: the difference between the incidental and the in itself; the articulation of being-at-work, potency, and being-at-work-staying-itself; Being in the sense of the categories; and Being in the sense of truth. Concerning its method, I claim that phenomenological ontology reformulates the problem of Being in three moments: reduction, construction, and destruction. My analysis shows that, with these three moments, Heidegger problematizes (following Husserl) the movement of ascent and descent traditionally associated with Plato and Platonism. Although Heidegger never makes it fully explicit, the problem of the phenomenologically reductive, constructive, and destructive unitary whole of the four basic problems of Being is in fact his problematization of a (the) perennial locus philosophiae—the unity of the four senses of Being in an ascent and a descent. Moreover, I claim that phenomenological ontology has a transcendental-architectonic character, in a Kantian sense. The problem of Being is formulated in three differentiated moments: the reductive fundamental ontology asks and answers the question of the sense of Dasein’s Being; the constructive transcendental science of Being asks and answers the question of the sense of Being as such; and the destructive groundwork of metaphysics asks and answers the question of the (historical) whole [καθ'ὅλου] of the Being of entities. Heidegger considers that his own architectonic is the historical outcome of the ontotheological orientation of the problem since Antiquity (Aristotle’s Metaphysics), during the Middle Ages (Suárez’s Disputationes), and throughout Modernity (Kant’s Critiques.) Because my interest lies in the problem itself, my aim is to problematize Heidegger’s ontotheological interpretation of the locus philosophiae. The first task in this direction is to clarify Heidegger’s incomplete construction of a unitary phenomenological ontology during the mid-late 1920s. The present text begins this clarification by outlining the reconstruction of fundamental ontology as projected upon the science of Being, and on the basis of the indicated locus. The reconstruction is a clarification in that it exhibits the simplest moments of the inner structure of phenomenological ontology. The dissertation is divided into two main parts. In the first part, I analyze the basic concepts of phenomenological ontology. I exhibit first the basic concepts of fundamental ontology (Chapter 1), and then the basic concepts of the science of Being (Chapter 2.) Through these first two chapters I show the correspondence between the concepts of fundamental ontology and the science of Being based on the projection of the former onto the latter. It is here that I argue that fundamental ontology and the science of Being are two stages in Heidegger’s architectonic reformulation of the problem of Being. I also argue that each of these stages reflects the whole problem from its own standpoint. In the second part, I begin the reconstruction of fundamental ontology as projected upon the science of Being. I claim that the analytic of Dasein is to be understood as the reduction of Dasein. The reduction of Dasein is articulated in two distinct moments that I call ‘ontological’ and ‘existential.’ I first characterize the reduction of Dasein as a whole (Chapter 3) and then its first moment—the ontological reduction (Chapter 4.) The text ends with an Appendix where I clarify Heidegger’s lexicon of Being. Here, I anticipate fundamental aspects of the existential reduction, and point toward the connection between Heidegger’s and Husserl’s accounts of the reduction. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2021. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Critics frequently, sometimes irresponsibly, label Spenser's poetry "emblematic" because of the appearance of either striking allegorical figures or moral assertions. This thesis establishes a standard for the application of the term "emblematic": first, by defining those elements which characterize emblems; second, by examining the emblem's cultural milieu; and third, by analyzing the "emblem patterns" that appear in The Faerie Queene. The study concludes that these "emblem patterns" transform the two essential elements of emblems to a literary treatment: the emblem engraving takes the form of a poetic description of allegorical figures or scenes; the didactic poem is condensed to an explicit moral statement. These "emblem patterns," then, can be regarded as reasonable criteria for labelling Spenser's poem "emblematic."

Le présent travail propose de caractériser le projet philosophique de Husserl et de Heidegger comme une phénoménologie de la possibilité. Il s’agit, ce faisant, de démontrer qu’il existe un concept phénoménologique de possibilité, qui ne se confond ni avec le concept métaphysique ni avec le concept modal, et de reconstruire ce concept à l’aide de Husserl et de Heidegger. Il apparaît ainsi que la phénoménologie, non seulement renverse le primat traditionnel de l’effectif sur le possible, mais accomplit le dépassement de leur opposition statique pour mettre au jour leur co-appartenance dynamique. Si donc, pour la phénoménologie, « plus haut que l’effectivité se tient la possibilité », c’est pour autant qu’elle découvre l’entrelacement de l’effectif et du possible dans le réel. / While describing Husserl’s and Heidegger’s philosophical project as a phenomenology of possibility, we intend to prove the existence of a phenomenological concept of possibility that cannot be reduced to a metaphysical or a mere modal concept. For phenomenology not only inverts the traditional primacy of effectivity on possibility, but also, and most importantly, overcomes the static opposition of the two by bringing to light the fact that they dynamically belong together. Therefore, phenomenology has the right to assert that « higher than effectivity stands possibility » insofar it discovers their constant and irreducible intertwining within reality.

No presente trabalho propomos aproximar criticamente as filosofias de Edmund Husserl e Martin Heidegger, no que concerne às concepções de intencionalidade, intuição categorial e a questão do ser. Com isso, o objetivo é apontar que a questão do ser articulada em Ser e Tempo é consequência de um processo investigativo do jovem Heidegger no qual a fenomenologia husserliana desempenha papel fundamental. Para isso, versamos mostrar conceitualmente como algumas das noções propostas por Husserl em particular a de intuição categorial são empregadas nas problematizações do jovem Heidegger. Desse modo, almejamos mostrar que a questão do ser formulada por Heidegger deve muito à noção de intencionalidade de origem husserliana. / In the present study we propose to approximate critically the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, regarding the conception of intentionality, categorial intuition and the question of being. Therewith, the aim is to point that the question of being articulated in Being and Time is a consequence of an investigative process of the young Heidegger, in which the husserlian\'s phenomenology performs a main role. Thereunto, we plan to show conceptually how some of the notions proposed by Husserl in particular the categorial intuition are employed in the thesis of the young Heidegger. Thereby, we intend to show that the question of being formulated by Heidegger owes much to the husserlian\'s notion of intentionality.

Zugl.: Canberra, Univ., Diss.

Si certains héritiers de la phénoménologie ont cherché à libérer l'apparaître des normes qui lui étaient imposées, il en allait autrement chez Husserl. Les normes étaient d'abord appliquées aux visées de sens elles-mêmes, lesquelles étaient dites « correctes» ou « incorrectes». Autre façon de dire que la phénoménologie ne pouvait faire l'économie des normes : point de description sans prescription, et sans prescription à la description. Dire que le projet phénoménologique est essentiellement descriptif, c’est cependant admettre que les normes s'y tiennent en retrait. Le premier défi d'une phénoménologie des normes est donc de les mettre au jour. De plus, en son versant critique, la phénoménologie des normes doit justifier notre droit de les poser et de les appliquer normativement. À ce titre, elle sera une phénoménologie du caractère normatif des normes . Suivant les traces de Husserl, nous considèrerons d'abord les enjeux normatifs liés à la logique, puis les autres normes reconnues par lui. Ces normes étant assimilées à l'obtention d'une évidence ou d'un certain type d'évidence, elles avaient toutes un usage théorique. Nous ferons cependant l'hypothèse que certaines normes peuvent avoir un usage pratique. Cette hypothèse se heurtera à un obstacle de taille chez Husserl, qui proposait de justifier les devoirs pratiques grâce aux valeurs et non par les normes. Déconstruisant chacun des présupposés normatifs ayant conduit Husserl à recourir aux valeurs en éthique, nous paverons la voie à une éthique phénoménologique, normative et suspensive. / If some of phenomenology's heirs sought to free that which appears from the norms imposed upon it, it was not Husserl's main concern. He applied norms foremost to sense itself, which was then said to be «correct» or «incorrect». This was another way of saying that phenomenology could not avoid norms: no description without prescription, and without prescription to description. To say that the phenomenological project is essentially descriptive is to admit that norms keep out of the limelight in phenomenology. The first challenge of a phenomenology of norms is therefore to shine a spot upon them. Moreover, in its critical orientation, a phenomenology of norms must justify our right to posit and apply them normatively. As such, it is a phenomenology of the normative character of norms. Following Husserl's reflection, I will first consider the normative stakes linked to logic and then the other norms he recognized. As norms were assimilated to evidence or to some type of evidence, they all had a theoretical use. I will assume, however, that some norms may have a practical function. This hypothesis will encounter a major obstacle, as Husserl proposed to justify practical ougths by means of values instead of norms. By deconstructing each of the normative presuppositions that led Husserl to rely on values in ethics, I will pave the way for a phenomenological, normative and suspensive ethic.

No presente trabalho propomos aproximar criticamente as filosofias de Edmund Husserl e Martin Heidegger, no que concerne às concepções de intencionalidade, intuição categorial e a questão do ser. Com isso, o objetivo é apontar que a questão do ser articulada em Ser e Tempo é consequência de um processo investigativo do jovem Heidegger no qual a fenomenologia husserliana desempenha papel fundamental. Para isso, versamos mostrar conceitualmente como algumas das noções propostas por Husserl em particular a de intuição categorial são empregadas nas problematizações do jovem Heidegger. Desse modo, almejamos mostrar que a questão do ser formulada por Heidegger deve muito à noção de intencionalidade de origem husserliana. / In the present study we propose to approximate critically the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, regarding the conception of intentionality, categorial intuition and the question of being. Therewith, the aim is to point that the question of being articulated in Being and Time is a consequence of an investigative process of the young Heidegger, in which the husserlian\'s phenomenology performs a main role. Thereunto, we plan to show conceptually how some of the notions proposed by Husserl in particular the categorial intuition are employed in the thesis of the young Heidegger. Thereby, we intend to show that the question of being formulated by Heidegger owes much to the husserlian\'s notion of intentionality.

Submitted by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2017-09-27T13:57:14Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Augusto Seixas Brandão Rêgo - 2017.pdf: 1709044 bytes, checksum: 4b49cd4ee3863319f68cb444e937e8e4 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2017-09-27T13:57:33Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Augusto Seixas Brandão Rêgo - 2017.pdf: 1709044 bytes, checksum: 4b49cd4ee3863319f68cb444e937e8e4 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-09-27T13:57:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Augusto Seixas Brandão Rêgo - 2017.pdf: 1709044 bytes, checksum: 4b49cd4ee3863319f68cb444e937e8e4 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-08-29 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / Le présent travail a pour intention d'analyser les concept de conscience et d'ego tels que développés par le philosophe Jean-Paul Sartre dans ses oeuvres de jeunesse, plus spécifiquement dans l'opuscule la transcendance de l'ego. Une brève présentation historique de l'atmosphère intellectuelle de l'époque de Sartre montre l'importance de la réception de l'oeuvre de Husserl en France mais aussi les obstacles que celle-ci implique relativement à la question du contact immédiat avec le concret. Ce contact, rendu possible par l'idée d'intetionalité développée par Husserl, sera graduellement surmonté au nom d'un transcendantalisme auquel il se référe en tant que phénoménologue. Afin de revenir au concret, Sartre abandonnera l'idéalisme transcendantal au profit d'une relation avec le monde non intellectualiste, qui permettra la réflexion à partir d'une conscience pré-réflexive. Ce type de conscience pourra être perçue dans divers concepts de Sartre développés à la même époque, comme, entre autres, la magie, la mauvaise foi, la temporalité. Notre hypothése d'interprétation avance l'idée selon laquelle la dynamique entre la conscience et l'égo oriente l'argumentation de Sartre dans cette période où l'ego, passant du réfléchi à l'irréflechi, perd son "intimité" et où la conscience reprend sa loi absolue selon notre auteur: l'immédiat. / Na presente dissertação pretendemos analisar o conceito de consciência e de ego no pensamento desenvolvido pelo filósofo Jean-Paul Sartre em seus trabalhos de juventude, nomeadamente no opúsculo A Transcendência do ego. Uma breve exposição histórica do ambiente intelectual francês à época de Sartre esclarece a importância do advento da obra de Husserl na França, bem como os obstáculos que ela impõe no que concerne a um contato imediato com o concreto. Tal contato, possibilitado pela ideia de intencionalidade desenvolvida por Husserl, gradativamente será obliterado em nome de um transcendentalismo ao qual como fenomenólogo ele se adéqua. Para retomar o concreto, Sartre lançará mão do idealismo transcendental, vai elaborar uma filosofia da relação não intelectualista com o mundo para fundamentar a reflexão a partir de uma consciência pré-reflexiva. Esse tipo de consciência se fará perceber em diversos conceitos de Sartre também desenvolvidos neste período, como a mágica, a má-fé, a temporalidade, dentre outros. A dinâmica entre a consciência e o ego orienta a argumentação de Sartre, eis nossa hipótese interpretativa, neste período em que o ego, resvalando do plano refletido para o irrefletido, perde sua “intimidade” e a consciência retoma o que para nosso autor configura sua lei absoluta: o imediato.