Philosophers who show interest in authenticity tend to narrowly focus on its capacity to help people evade conformity and affirm individuality, a simplistic reduction that neglects authenticity’s moral potential and gives credence to the many critics who dismiss it as a euphemism for excessive individualism. Yet when conceived ethically, authenticity can also allow for worthy human flourishing without falling prey to conformity’s opposite extreme—egoism. This thesis proposes a relational conception of authenticity that can help prevent the often destructive excess of egoism while also offsetting the undesirable deficiency of heteronomy, concertedly moving agents towards socially responsible living. It demonstrates how authenticity necessarily has ethical dimensions when rooted in existentialist and dialogical frameworks. It also defines egoism as a form of self-deception rooted in flawed logic that cannot be considered “authentic” by relational standards. Relational authenticity recognizes the interpersonal relationships and social engagements that imbue meaning into agents’ lives, fostering a balance between personal ambitions and social obligations, and enabling more consistently moral lifestyles.

Uppsatsens syfte har varit att undersöka om det i ett urval av storsäljande självhjälpslitteratur med fokus på självutveckling förmedlas narcissistiska budskap. Studien grundar sig i tidigare forskning som behandlat narcissism utifrån både ett psykologiskt-, och ett samhällsperspektiv. Därutöver har forskning om självhjälpslitteratur utgjort en del av referensramen för studien. Kvalitativ innehållsanalys har applicerats på materialet. Det empiriska urvalet har bestått av tre svenska självhjälpsböcker som figurerat på topplistor för större återförsäljare av litteratur på internet. Materialet har analyserats ur ett samhällsperspektiv med hjälp av Eric Fromms teorier om frihet, individuationsprocessen, själviskhet och ideal samt delar av Erving Goffmans dramaturgiska perspektiv. Resultatet visade att självhjälpslitteraturen som studerats förmedlar budskap som var och ett för sig kan uppfattas som sunda och rimliga. Läsaren uppmanades sätta sig själv främst, vara målmedveten, lära sig att hantera relationen till sig själv och andra samt hantera sina svagheter. Texterna förmedlade att självrespekt och empati var förutsättningar för lycka. Sammanfattningsvis har vissa budskap återfunnits som i samspel med varandra kan ses som narcissistiska. Studiens slutsats var att litteraturen förmedlade narcissistiska budskap, där gränsen mellan det sunda och osunda i hur läsaren uppmanades sätta sig själv i fokus, använda relationer, sätta egna mål samt sträva efter lycka och framgång, inte var självklar. / The purpose of this study was to investigate if a selection of best-selling self-help literature focusing on self-development contained narcissistic messages. The study is based on previous studies which analyzed narcissism from a psychological as well as a sociologic perspective. Research concerning self-help literature has also been used in the study. Content analysis has been applied to the material. The empiric selection consisted of three popular Swedish self-help books. The material has been analyzed from a sociologic perspective by using Eric Fromm’s theories on freedom, the individuation process, selfishness and ideals as well as Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical perspective. The result showed that the chosen self-help literature contained messages that on their own could be interpreted as rational and sound. The reader was encouraged to focus on itself, be goal-oriented and learn how to manage the own self and its weaknesses. The texts conveyed that self-respect and empathy were necessary conditions for achieving happiness. In summary, some messages that in interplay encouraged narcissism were found. In the end it was concluded that the literature conveyed narcissistic messages, where the line between healthy and unhealthy in how the readers were encouraged to put themselves first, use relations, set their own goals as well as pursuing happiness and success, wasn’t obvious.

Philosophers who show interest in authenticity tend to narrowly focus on its capacity to help people evade conformity and affirm individuality, a simplistic reduction that neglects authenticity’s moral potential and gives credence to the many critics who dismiss it as a euphemism for excessive individualism. Yet when conceived ethically, authenticity can also allow for worthy human flourishing without falling prey to conformity’s opposite extreme—egoism. This thesis proposes a relational conception of authenticity that can help prevent the often destructive excess of egoism while also offsetting the undesirable deficiency of heteronomy, concertedly moving agents towards socially responsible living. It demonstrates how authenticity necessarily has ethical dimensions when rooted in existentialist and dialogical frameworks. It also defines egoism as a form of self-deception rooted in flawed logic that cannot be considered “authentic” by relational standards. Relational authenticity recognizes the interpersonal relationships and social engagements that imbue meaning into agents’ lives, fostering a balance between personal ambitions and social obligations, and enabling more consistently moral lifestyles.

Although the Epicurean ethical system is fundamentally egoistic and hedonistic, it attributes a surprisingly significant role to friendship. Even so, I argue that traditional discussions of Epicurean friendship fail to adequately account for the value (or pleasure) of individual friends. In this thesis I present an amended notion of Epicurean friendship that better accounts for all of the pleasure friends afford. However, the success of my project requires rejecting an Epicurean ethical principle. Because of this, I explore textual evidence both in favor and against the amended notion I propose and the problematic ethical principle. After arguing against the problematic ethical principle and dispelling additional objections to my project, I conclude that Epicureans should endorse the amended notion of friendship I have developed.

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Philosophers who show interest in authenticity tend to narrowly focus on its capacity to help people evade conformity and affirm individuality, a simplistic reduction that neglects authenticity’s moral potential and gives credence to the many critics who dismiss it as a euphemism for excessive individualism. Yet when conceived ethically, authenticity can also allow for worthy human flourishing without falling prey to conformity’s opposite extreme—egoism. This thesis proposes a relational conception of authenticity that can help prevent the often destructive excess of egoism while also offsetting the undesirable deficiency of heteronomy, concertedly moving agents towards socially responsible living. It demonstrates how authenticity necessarily has ethical dimensions when rooted in existentialist and dialogical frameworks. It also defines egoism as a form of self-deception rooted in flawed logic that cannot be considered “authentic” by relational standards. Relational authenticity recognizes the interpersonal relationships and social engagements that imbue meaning into agents’ lives, fostering a balance between personal ambitions and social obligations, and enabling more consistently moral lifestyles.

<p>This project advocates an urgent role for neurobiological evidence and models in the study of altruism. I argue for two claims: that neurobiological evidence should be used to constrain candidate scientific accounts of altruistic behavior, and that neurobiological techniques can be used to elucidate component mechanisms of altruistic behavior. </p><p>Chapter 1 reviews the historical progression of theories of altruism, and the empirical observations that motivated their development. A distinction is drawn between evolutionary altruism -- any self-sacrificial, fitness-reducing behavior, and psychological altruism -- self-sacrificial behaviors that are caused by psychological states like desire and motivation. Three theories of psychological altruism are described, and it is argued that the crucial difference between these theories is their conceptions of the role of affect in motivation, and how the processes of affect and motivation contribute to psychological altruism.</p><p>Chapter 2 describes dominant theories of motivation and the neurobiological and psychological mechanisms that support motivated behavior. Although the evidence is not conclusive, I argue that our best scientific models and neurobiological evidence support affective models of psychological altruism, and that other models are at best incomplete and possibly implausible in light of neurobiological considerations.</p><p>Chapter 3 introduces mind reading approaches to altruism, which argue that the capacity for altruistic motivations depends upon the capacity to represent the psychological states or circumstances of others. I conclude that altruism requires at a minimum the ability to attribute affective experiences to others. Further, I argue that the representations produced by mind reading processes provide a means for distinguishing between self-regarding and altruistic motivations. In contrast with the dominant philosophical theory of psychological altruism, the mind reading model I propose is compatible with the affective theory of motivation depicted in Chapter 2. My own empirical work is described as an example of how neurobiological techniques can reveal the differential role of neural systems in producing self-regarding and altruistic behavior.</p><p>Chapter 4 departs from the mechanistic approach to altruism discussed in the previous chapters, and presents an overview of how the fields of philosophy, psychology, psychobiology and genetics, have investigated altruism as a stable characteristic or personality trait. Recent technological advances make this a promising approach for investigating the psychological and neurobiological systems supporting altruistic behavior.</p> / Dissertation

5 v. (xliv, 1314 p.) A print copy of this title is available through the UO Libraries under the call numbers: KNIGHT HV6545.D84M3 / Few have perceived that Durkheim entertained two distinct schemas of anomie and egoisme in his classic Suicide. I shall demonstrate that Durkheim shifted on his analytical axes from the notion that the absence of moral discipline generates modern suicides, to the more significant insight that anomie and egoisme are generated by the presence of extreme modern cultural sanctions. Absence/presence, too little/ too much--these are the key analytical axes around which Durkheim's two schemas of suicide revolved. Resting on his image of human nature (homo duplex) as inherently egoistic and insatiable, the first schema concerns the absence of legitimate moral constraint over the pre-social ego in the modern transitional crisis. The second schema, which shifted the original burden of insatiability from the organic half of human nature to modern culture, concerns the presence of cultural sanctions which absolutize individualism and d.rives for "progress and perfection." Only selected parts of the first schema have been perceived and pursued so far by sociologists. In the second schema, all four suicidal types are seen as the "exaggerated or deflected forms of virtues." Both anomie and egoisme proceed from common sources; they differ in their prime mode of expression .. Anomie is active; egoisme passive. When extreme individualism and drives for "progress and perfection" are turned against the external world, we see anomie--the "infinity of desires'--and the collapse of the will in frustration, as seen in suicides in the economic arena. This ethos,is supported by what I shall call the "Anglo Utilitarian Cultural Tradition." Further, when these twin sanctions for absolute individualism and legitimate insatiability are turned inward against the self, we witness egoisme--the "infinity of dreams'--and the collapse of the will and imagination in frustration and exhaustion seen in suicides of artists, poets, and intellectuals. This ethos of angst and the "journey into the interior," in which suicide becomes a vocation, is sanctioned by what I shall call the "Romantic-Idealistic Cultural Tradition." Finally, these ironic and destructive outcomes of some of our highest aspirations are then linked with Weber's work in the sociology of religion and culture. As an "infinity of desires" sanctioned by a dominant modern cultural tradition, anomie is interpreted as the secularized outcome of Protestant "inner-light," "inner-worldly asceticism." As an "infinity of dreams" sanctioned by another dominant contemporary cultural tradition, egoisme is interpreted as the secularized outcome of Protestant "inner-light," "inner-worldly mysticism." These twin expressions of our highest callings and heroic ideals are chronic forms of the "moral anarchy" and "diseases of the infinite" plaguing the modern world. Durkheim's moral philosophy of "human finitude" and health as the "golden mean,'" lead us to recognize, then, that when our virtues are pushed to extremes, they also become, ironically, our special vices. / Adviser: G. Benton Johnson

Philosophers who show interest in authenticity tend to narrowly focus on its capacity to help people evade conformity and affirm individuality, a simplistic reduction that neglects authenticity’s moral potential and gives credence to the many critics who dismiss it as a euphemism for excessive individualism. Yet when conceived ethically, authenticity can also allow for worthy human flourishing without falling prey to conformity’s opposite extreme—egoism. This thesis proposes a relational conception of authenticity that can help prevent the often destructive excess of egoism while also offsetting the undesirable deficiency of heteronomy, concertedly moving agents towards socially responsible living. It demonstrates how authenticity necessarily has ethical dimensions when rooted in existentialist and dialogical frameworks. It also defines egoism as a form of self-deception rooted in flawed logic that cannot be considered “authentic” by relational standards. Relational authenticity recognizes the interpersonal relationships and social engagements that imbue meaning into agents’ lives, fostering a balance between personal ambitions and social obligations, and enabling more consistently moral lifestyles.

No description available.