Résumé Association Agreement with Ukraine This thesis is devoted to the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Being an innovative and comprehensive instrument of the EU external action this Association Agreement represents a relevant topic, which draws not only professional audience's attention. The thesis comprises of an introduction, three chapters and conclusion. The introduction of the thesis outlines its purpose and content, defines the main points of research the thesis is focused on, indicates the reasons of its relevance and explains the structure of the thesis. The first chapter of the thesis describes legal framework of the relevant changes in the area of the EU external action after the Treaty of Lisbon and examines possible legal basis of the Association Agreement with Ukraine in the scope of these changes. In this part there is a short description of the basic principles of the EU external action, the EU legal personality, new EU bodies for external action after the Treaty of Lisbon, EU power in external action. Later this thesis is devoted to Article 8 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) as a new possible legal basis in the EU external action, its relation to other legal bases and possible prospects of its application. After that Article 217 of the TEU is analyzed as a "classic" broad basis for...

The European Union (EU) deployed its first police mission in 2003. Since then, the EU has deployed thirty-four missions around the world. Considering the great financial burden to the EU budget and the budget of contributing Member States (MS), as well as the fact that the realm of defence is one of the most overdue areas of the European integration project, this thesis asks the general but multifaceted question of where EU missions come from. To address this question the thesis explores the historic origins of EU missions, conceptualises them in view of the conceptual and theoretical developments in the literature and policy practice, and develops a model for the analysis of the decision-making process behind the deployment of EU missions. The model is tested on three case studies, namely the three EU missions deployed in the Horn of Africa European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Atalanta, European Union Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia and European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Nestor. The findings of the analysis reveal a gradual evolution of EU crisis management after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the European External Action Service. The analysis indicates that EUNAVFOR Atalanta was primarily deployed due to French impetus at the level of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), but also due to a convincing call of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to the international community to act against the significant increase of piracy activity in the Gulf of Aden in 2008. The EUTM Somalia mission was primarily deployed due to a convincing strategy from the strategic planners at the EEAS, as well as the commitment of the United States (US) to a partnership with the EU to train recruits of the Somali Security Forces (SSF). Finally, the analysis of the third case study reveals even greater impact from the strategic planners at the EEAS and the acceptance at all levels of the EU s Comprehensive Approach to crisis management, and in particular due to the influential Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa document. The overall interpretation of the findings conclude that the foreign policy of the EU is a moving target, constantly changing, as is exemplified by both the historic overview and the analysis of the three case studies, and that the analysts of EU foreign policy must remain open to these changes when choosing modes of studying EU foreign policy.

Bátora alleges that political accountability has been “almost entirely overlooked” (2010, 2) in studies of the European External Action Service. An examination of the subject that extends previous studies on agency design, the co-decision procedure, the “democratic deficit,” and European Union foreign policy would resolve the neglect. As a result, the study derives a hypothesis from an established theory of bureaucratic structure. Findings suggest that during the design of EU agencies co-decision power improves the ability of the European Parliament to institutionalize methods of accountability to it.

The primary aim of this essay and qualitative case study is to identify different explanations of why the European External Action Service (EEAS) was organised and why it resulted in today’s organisation. Existing research not entirely updated highlighted the need for new information. Furthermore, since existing research mostly focuses on other aspects, such as the character of EU foreign policy or the role of the EU internationally, this motivated an alternative approach. Three main branches of New Institutionalism (rational choice, historical and sociological) constitute a theoretical framework, aimed at identifying explanations perhaps not earlier contemplated. Findings suggest for example that a major reason for the organisation of this service is due to self-interest maximising, increasing the EUs political and economic influence by acting more coherent. The need to attain legitimacy and resemble other established actors by adopting institutionalised practices and structures in the homogeneous diplomatic field is another explanation. The Service is partially organised the way it is because of the successes of major EU institutions and the member states in ‘locking-in’ their preferences. Organisational characteristics can also be explained as results of several historical, institutional upgrades in relation to earlier treaties and debates on the future of Europe.

Le renforcement de la dimension internationale de l'action de l'Union européenne est fondamentalement lié à l'exercice d'affirmation identitaire. La consécration de l'Union en tant que véritable acteur international exige qu'elle démontre sa capacité d'influencer les relations internationales conformément à ses éléments fondamentaux. Son développement institutionnel et matériel doit donc permettre de déterminer et de projeter les traits essentiels de son identité sur la scène internationale. Le développement institutionnel de la politique internationale de l'Union implique de concilier sa dualité juridique, historique et politique. L'évolution de la dimension externe de l'action de l'Union européenne est, en ce sens, marquée par la perspective d'unification de son action extérieure. Ce processus repose sur un effort d'identification et de détermination identitaire quant à l'image que l'Union entend projeter sur la scène internationale. L'exécution matérielle de la politique internationale de l'Union s'inscrit dans le prolongement de ces réalisations et confirme la réussite de l'Union européenne à faire accepter son existence au plan international. Elle met en relief l'affirmation de sa singularité identitaire dans la prise en compte de sa nature et dans le modèle d'acteur international qu'elle entend incarner. Dans ce cadre, son adhésion à un modèle d'acteur civil des relations internationales s'appuie sur le travail identitaire réalisé au plan interne. Son affiliation à ce modèle se confond avec la recherche d'une adhésion universelle à sa politique internationale et demeure limitée par la nécessaire sauvegarde de l'originalité identitaire de l'Union européenne. / The enforcement of the international dimension of the European Union's action is fundamentally bound to the assertion of its identity. Its recognition as a true international actor request that it shows its ability to influence international relations in accordance with its fundamentals elements. The framework of its institutional and material development must help to determine and project its identity essential features in the international system. The institutional development of the EU's international politic involves to reconcile its institutional, historic and politic duality. Within this context, the perspective of unify EU's external action leave its mark on the development of its external dimension. This process rest upon a work on identity identification and determination as for the picture European Union intend to project on international scene. Material execution of EU's international politic follows on from these fulfillments and confirms EU's success to impose its international existence. This execution emphasizes assertion of its identity singularity trough the way its nature is taking into consideration and through the model of international actor EU intends to become. In this context, EU's commitment to a model of a civilian actor in international relations is based on an identity determination work made in its internal framework. EU's affiliation to this model is merged with the search of a universal support to its international politics and is limited by the necessary preservation of its identity originality.

Domaine d’action récent, la dimension externe de l’ELSJ a connu un développement fulgurant et apparaît aujourd’hui comme une composante essentielle de l’action extérieure de l’Union européenne. Il s’agit toutefois d’une composante particulière en raison de la sensibilité des domaines en cause, qui entraîne d’importantes réticences de la part des Etats membres. L’objet de cette recherche consiste à analyser la question de la façon dont la dimension externe de l’ELSJ s’intègre au cadre juridique de l’action extérieure de l’Union, lequel a été largement rénové par le traité de Lisbonne, et ce, sous deux angles : institutionnel et matériel. Sous l’angle institutionnel, la dimension externe de l’ELSJ s’inscrit pleinement dans la systémique des compétences de l’Union. En raison des lacunes des traités concernant cette dimension externe, une dynamique de compensation des fondements juridiques apparaît en effet nécessaire et les institutions font donc appel aux diverses solutions découlant du système des compétences de l’action extérieure pour adopter les instruments souhaités. Confronté aux caractéristiques de l’ELSJ, ce recours au système des compétences de l’action extérieure engendre toutefois une accumulation de contraintes auxquelles les institutions doivent faire face. Certaines de ces contraintes, celles liées à la répartition des compétences, sont classiques mais se voient renouvelées et démultipliées dans le cadre de cette dimension externe. D’autres contraintes, celles liées à la différenciation, sont plus spécifiques et nécessitent d’avoir recours à des solutions innovantes. Sous l’angle matériel, l’intégration de la dimension extérieure de l’ELSJ à l’action extérieure de l’Union se mesure à l’aune du respect des exigences applicables à toute action de l’Union sur la scène internationale : les principes sur lesquels elle repose et les objectifs qu’elle poursuit, précisés à l’article 21 TUE. Concernant les objectifs de l’action extérieure, leur prise en compte dans le développement de la dimension externe de l’ELSJ demeure encore graduée. L’intégration apparait quasi-naturelle concernant l’objectif de sécurité pour lequel il existe une coïncidence avec les objectifs de l’ELSJ, mais pour les objectifs de soutien au multilatéralisme ou au développement, leur prise en compte nécessite davantage d’ajustements. Concernant les principes de l’action extérieure, leur valorisation apparait encore imparfaite. Auprès des tiers, l’Union utilise la conditionnalité de façon trop erratique, et en son sein, le contrôle demeure perfectible. / As a recent domain of action, the external dimension of the AFSJ has developed with lightning speed and is currently emerging as an essential component of the European Union’s external action. This is, however, a specific component owing to the sensitivity of the areas concerned, and one which arouses considerable reticence on the part of Member States. The question then arises as to how it is to be fitted into the legal framework of the Union’s external action, which has been extensively renovated by the Lisbon Treaty. The ensuing analysis needs to be conducted from two distinct and complementary perspectives: an institutional one and a material one. From an institutional perspective, the external dimension of AFSJ is totally in keeping with the Union’s competence system. Indeed, because of the loopholes in the treaties regarding this external action, a compensation scheme taking account of the diverse legal bases appears to be necessary. Therefore, institutions have recourse to the various solutions arising out of the external action’s competence system, in order to adopt the required instruments. Nevertheless, when confronted with the AFSJ’s characteristics, this recourse to the external action’s competence system generates a build-up of constraints which institutions have to face up to. Some of these constraints are familiar but are renewed and sometimes multiplied within the framework of this external dimension of the AFSJ. The constraints in question are related to the sharing out of competences. Other constraints are more specific and make it necessary to resort to innovative solutions, and such constraints are linked to differentiation. From a material perspective, integration of the AFSJ’s external dimension into the external action of the Union has to be measured in light of the respect for the exigencies applicable to any action by the Union on the international stage, namely the principles on which it is based and the objectives that it pursues, as specified in Article 21 of TEU. Regarding the goals of the external action, the role they play in the development of the AFSJ’s external dimension remains gradual. Integration appears to be a quasi natural objective as regards security, a domain in which it happens to coincide with the objectives of the AFSJ. However, regarding the desirable support for multilateralism or development, achieving coherence requires further adjustments. Concerning the principles underlying the external action, results are more mixed. With third parties, the EU makes an erratic use of conditionality, and within the Union, control could be improved.

Réinscrivant le processus d’intégration européenne dans une Histoire de la Guerre froide et post-Guerre froide et plus généralement dans une histoire européenne plus longue que le seul XXe siècle, cette thèse explore l’histoire des relations de la Commission européenne avec la périphérie sud-orientale du continent. La longue période chronologique étudiée permets de mettre en exergue les « forces profondes » qui se tiennent derrières les actions de l’exécutif de la CEE/UE dans une région critique pour l’Europe. Pour se faire, nous nous sommes basés sur les archives de la Commission européenne, du Conseil, du Département d’État américain, des Ministères des affaires étrangères français et britannique, de la bibliothèque de Cluj-Napoca en Roumanie et d’entretiens.Divisée en quatre parties, chacune se centrant sur une période chronologique, ce travail analyse l’action de la Commission face aux changements qui ont bouleversé l’Europe du Sud-est entre 1960 et 2010. L’adaptation constante de la politique de la Commission, de la « doctrine de l’Association » à la Synergie de la Mer Noire, nous ont amené à développer l’idée d’une Süd-ost politik qui se met en place dès le début des années 1960. Cependant, contrairement à l’Ostpolitik de Bonn, il ne s’agit pas pour Bruxelles d’aller vers les États communistes du Sud-est européen ou l’Union soviétique, mais plutôt de lutter contre leur influence. La Süd-Ost politik communautaire est clairement anticommuniste et antirusse.La Communauté fait barrage à Moscou en étendant le modèle de la démocratie libérale capitaliste dans la zone autour des Détroits. La situation stratégique d’Athènes, d’Ankara et plus tard de Tbilissi ou Kiev n’est pas oubliée par Bruxelles. Ainsi, la Commission s’inscrit dans une plus longue histoire, son action fait écho à la lutte entre Paris, Londres et Saint-Pétersbourg pour le contrôle des Détroits, aux tentatives des États de la région de copier les modèles nationaux d’Europe de l’Ouest et à la politique orientale des Puissances occidentales après 1918.Cependant, la Commission doit ménager des État membres qui lui rappellent sans cesse que ces actions doivent rester limitées aux traités. L’Avis sur la Grèce en 1976 marque le point culminant de ce débat entre Conseil et Commission. Parallèlement, au cours des années 1970, Bruxelles veille à ne pas laisser émerger dans sa périphérie des organisations qui pourraient la concurrencer. Il en sera ainsi de la Conférence pour la coopération et la sécurité en Europe et de son volet méditerranéen mais aussi de la Coopération Balkanique.Si la chute de l’Union soviétique fait naitre des hésitations sur la conduite à suivre vis-à-vis de l’Europe du Sud-est et sa nouvelle extension vers le Caucase et dans les anciennes républiques soviétiques. Bien vite la Commission revient à sa politique d’extension du modèle européen. Cependant, le centre des préoccupations communautaire n’est plus la Grèce ou la Turquie. Avec l’effondrement de l’Empire soviétique, le champ d’action de la Communauté -devenue Union- s’est élargi à l’ensemble de la Région Mer Noire.Pourtant, la non résolution du problème de Chypre, l’instabilité financière de la Grèce, les crises politiques turques, le maintien hors de Schengen de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie sont des exemples des difficultés rencontrées par la Communauté dans la région.La guerre en Géorgie et l’annexion de la Crimée par la Russie à la suite de la révolution à Kiev illustrent que le processus « doux » d’inoculation des valeurs du Traité de Rome ne va pas de soi du moment que celui-ci rencontre une opposition « dure ». Nous achevons notre réflexion en nous posant la question de la capacité de l’Union et de la Commission à absorber à terme l’ensemble de la Mer Noire ce qui mettrait la Mésopotamie et l’Asie centrale en contact direct avec le processus d’intégration européenne.Il s’agit maintenant de savoir si la Mer Noire deviendra un " lac Européen". / Fitting the European integration process into the history of the Cold War and post-Cold War and more generally in European history longer than the “short” twentieth century, this thesis explores the history of relations between the European Commission and the South-Eastern outskirts of the continent. The long period studied allows to highlight the "deep forces" that stand behind the actions of the executive of the EEC / EU in such a critical region for Europe. To do so, we relied on the archives of the European Commission, the Council, the U.S. State Department, the British and French Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the library of Cluj-Napoca University in Romania and interviews.Divided into four parts, each focusing on a period of time, this work analyses the actions of the Commission to address the changes that have transformed the region between 1960 and 2010. The continuous adaptation of the policy of the Commission, from the "doctrine of Association” to the Black Sea Synergy, led us to develop the idea of a Süd-ost politik that was already designed in the early 1960s. However, unlike the Ostpolitik of Bonn, Brussels did not go toward the communist states of South-Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union, but rather prevent their influence. The Community’ Süd-Ost politik was clearly anti-communist and anti-Russian.This is the main continuity: the European Community had to block Moscow by extending the model of capitalist liberal democracy in the area around the Straits. The particular strategic situation of Athens, Ankara and later Tbilisi or Kiev is never forgotten by Brussels. In this, the Commission is part of a longer history, its action echoes the struggle between Paris, London and St. Petersburg for the control of the Turkish Straits, attempts by states in the region to copy Western European domestic models and the Eastern policy of the Western powers after the First World War.However, the Commission had to deal with the Member States that constantly reminded Brussels that its actions should remain within the framework of the Treaties. The Opinion on Greece in 1976 marks the culmination of the debate between the Council and Commission. Meanwhile, during the 1970s, the EEC executive carefully took care to stop the emergence of organizations in its periphery that could compete with the Community. This will be the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe and its Mediterranean component but also the Balkan Cooperation.In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, the Commission was uncertain of what to do with South Eastern Europe and its new extension to the Caucasus and the former Soviet republics. The Commission quickly returned to its systematic policy of extending the European model. However, the centre of community concerns was not Greece or Turkey. With the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the scope of the Community –became Union- expanded to the entire Black Sea region.However, the failure to resolve the Cyprus problem, the financial instability of Greece that threatens the entire euro zone, political crises in Turkey, the decision to keep out of Schengen space Romania and Bulgaria are examples of the difficulties faced by the Community in the region.The war in Georgia and the annexation of Crimea by Russia following the revolution in Kiev illustrate that the “soft” inoculation process of the values of the Rome Treaty does not come by itself as long as it meets a “hard” opposition.We conclude our discussion by asking the question of the capacity of the Union and its Commission to absorb eventually the whole Black Sea basin, which would put Mesopotamia and Central Asia in direct contact with the European integration process.The question is now whether the Black Sea will eventually become a “European lake

Le Service Européen pour l'Action Extérieure (SEAE ou Service) est une des innovations les plus importantes introduites par le Traité de Lisbonne. Il est également l'une des plus controversées, étant donné l'importance symbolique du premier service diplomatique métanational. Cette analyse vise à démontrer que le SEAE ne sert ni à mettre en place, ni à démonter une politique étrangère monolithique pour toute l'Union. Il devrait plutôt chercher à promouvoir l'harmonie entre les différentes actions externes qui existent déjà. Le Service, en d'autres termes, est l'expression d'une nouvelle approche de l'intégration européenne, qui ne propose pas la renonciation aux compétences des États Membres, mais vise à coordonner les politiques des institutions de l'UE et de ses membres, afin d'assurer leur cohérence. / The European External Action Service (EEAS or Service) is one of the most significant innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. It is also one of the most debated, given the symbolic importance attached to this unprecedented non-national diplomatic service. This analysis intends to demonstrate that the EEAS is not a champion of the traditional approaches to European integration. The Service is functional neither to set up, nor to dismantle, a monolithic foreign policy of the Union, but it should rather seek to promote harmony between the different external actions that already exist. In other words, the Service is the expression of a novel approach to European integration, which does not postulate the renounce to the Member States' sovereignty, but rather seeks the coordination of the different European external actions.

Aux termes des traités, l'UE développe une politique commune en matière d'asile, d'immigration et de contrôle aux frontières, fondée sur la solidarité et sur le respect des droits fondamentaux. Objectif qu'elle poursuit, en amorçant des relations stratégiques avec les Pays tiers. Toutefois, l'action extérieure de l'UE dans ce domaine doit aborder des défis importants. En premier lieu, elle doit promouvoir la collaboration des Pays tiers d'origine et de transit, en renforçant sa crédibilitéinternationales et, donc, la diffusion d'un esprit de confiance mutuelle. En deuxième lieu, l'UE est appelée à rendre effective ladite collaboration, en assurant que la compétence externe soit exercée par le niveau politique apportant la valeur ajoutée et en utilisant tout instrument disponible, contraignant ou non. En somme, la dimension extérieure de la politique migratoire de l'UE doit s'appuyer sur une stratégie cohérente et souple, apte à garantir la gestion efficace des flux migratoires. / According to the Treaties, the EU shall frame a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control, based on solidarity and on the respect for fundamental rights, whose achievement clearly relies on the establishment of strategic relations with Third Countries. However, the EU external action in this policy field faces various challenges. Primarily, the EUshall make any efforts to promote the collaboration of Third Countries of origin and transit, by strengthening its international reliability and, accordingly, the spread of a spirit of mutual trust. Secondarily, the EU shall strive to make effective such a collaboration, by ensuring that the external competence is exercised by the political level providing the added value and by making use of any available cooperation tool, binding or not. Conclusively, the external dimension of EU migration policy shall be backed by a coherent and flexible strategy, apt to guarantee the effective management of migration flows.

EU is today one of the largest aid donors in the world and the debate regarding their intentions is well nuanced. This study’s main focus lies in examining the motives within the action plan between the EU and Morocco, and was conducted with the intention to contribute to the debate of EU’s external actions. By using key-terms from neoliberalism and neoliberalism and applying it on the actions by using a motive-analysis, they can be defined and tied to one of the theories state, as well as represent the generalized idea of the theories external action. The results of the study shows that EU, in cooperation with Morocco, though the ENP acts with the means of absolute gain.