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The number of climate litigations brought to court by non-governmental organ-izations promoting environmental protection have increased. In Sweden such organizations can challenge the decisions of public authorities through chapter 16 section 13 of the environmental code. The implementation of art. 9(2) and art. 9(3) of the Aarhus convention in different directives of the EU, but especially through the case-law of court of justice of the European Union has led to a sig-nificant increase of the impact of the Aarhus convention in Swedish law mostly led by EU-consistent interpretation of the right to challenge the decisions of the authorities in Swedish case law. This have been achieved by connection the con-vention with primary union law and by concluding that art. 9(3) of the conven-tion is part of union law. The effects of this have largely been to ensure the mem-ber states lives up the environmental standards of the union. In Sweden what constitutes an environmental organization is determined by if it has publicsupport. Further the Swedish courts have tended to allow envi-ronmental organizations to challenge most decisions by the authorities, even out-side of the environmental code, even when the link to union law has not been entirely clear. The exception to thishas been a decision about consultation be-tween a public authority and an individual regarding logging. The case has on the other hand lead to some unwanted consequences and might not be in line with union law and the Aarhus convention.According to the function theory of law the aims of administrative and envi-ronmental procedural law is to as far as possible ensure that the aim of environ-mental law gets realized through the court procedure. This is mostly ensured by affects individuals and institutions ways of acting in broader society. Another important function of procedural and especially environmental law is to allow the courts to clarify vague laws. The theory falls in that conceptualizes common interests as a collection of “smaller” individual interests rather than, such in en-vironmental law, actual common interests. In a procedural order where physical and legal individuals are the only ones who can challenge a decision a contradic-tion between the common interest and the individual form of the litigant is inev-itable. This contradiction would not be alleviated by letting individuals use com-mon interests-arguments when arguing for a personal interest or through a public interest agency. Letting a public authority challenge decisions in line with the common interests leads to among others, problems other with the law-making function of the court. The thesis concludes by stating that environmental organ-izations have a vide ability to challenge decisions and that this order is flawed but the least flawed option.

In cases where a child's guardian's actions entail a significant risk of the child's health or development being harmed, the public may in certain cases forcibly care for the child. In these cases, it is no longer the guardians who decide what is best for the child, but that responsibility has been taken over by the public. A question that arises concerning public responsibility in these cases, is how and to what extent children's own opinions and provided information should be taken into account when the issue of forcible care is to be decided in court? The purpose of the thesis is, therefore, to investigate how children's right to express their opinions and provide information has an impact on the administrative courts' handling of applications for preparation of care according to § 2 the law (1990:52) with special regulations on the care of young people (LVU), and how this relates to the regulation regarding these rights. The regulations and guidelines that exist regarding children's right to express opinions and provide information in cases concerning the preparation of care according to LVU, are therefore established and to some extent analyzed within the theses. These frameworks will therefore be the yardstick against which an empirical study will be measured. The empirical study examines to what extent and in what way children aged 12–14 years present opinions and provide information to the Administrative Court's judgment, in cases where the social welfare board has applied for care based on § 2 LVU. It also examines the extent to which these opinions and this information appear in the court's reasons for judgment. A comparison between the applicable law regarding children's right to express opinions and provide information in cases concerning the preparation of care according to LVU, and the application of it in administrative law when the court has to decide on the issue of caring for a 12–14-year-old according to § 2 LVU can now be done. Through the comparison, the purpose of the thesis is achieved. In general, it can be said that children's right to be heard, both by expressing opinions and providing information, is fulfilled in the practical application of the legal regulation of this right. This also seems to be the general case of how the court treats information provided by a child in the reasons for the judgment. On the other hand, the statutory obligation for a court to deal with children's ex- pressed views and attitudes does not seem to be maintained in the administrative court's handling of applications for the provision of care under § 2 LVU. Further, it should also be noticed that children more often provide information, than express their opinions.

En av de mest ingripande åtgärder det offentliga kan vidta mot en enskild är att omhänderta ett barn. Det krävs därför omfattande skyddsmekanismer för att beslutet om omhändertagande inte blir fattat utan rättslig grund. Saknas samtycke från vårdnadshavare eller den unge om denne är över 15 år, krävs att domstol fattar beslut om omhändertagande i enlighet med lagen (1990:52) med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga [cit. LVU]. Processen i förvaltningsrätten är en flerpartsprocess som är upplagd kontradiktoriskt, vilket innebär att socialnämnden går in som part mot barnet eller den unge och/eller vårdnadshavaren, och var och en av parterna ska ha tillfälle att yttra sig över allt material som motparten inger till domstolen, samt ha samma möjligheter att utveckla sin talan och åberopa bevisning. Den enskilde ska därmed tillförsäkras en likvärdig partsställning som socialnämnden. För att säkerhetsställa detta tillförordnas den enskilde ett offentligt biträde, vars huvudsakliga uppgift är att garantera den enskildes rättsliga ställning genom att ge barnet eller den unge och/eller vårdnadshavaren den hjälp som krävs för att utredningen ska bli så fullständig som möjligt. Uppsatsen syftar huvudsakligen till att utreda och analysera på vilket sätt processen i LVU-mål tillgodoser kraven på en likställd process - där parterna får samma möjligheter att utveckla sin talan och åberopa bevisning. För att finna ett svar måste utredningsskyldighet, beviskrav och bevisbördan samt det offentliga biträdets roll i processen utredas. Utgångspunkten är att söka svar genom en rättsdogmatisk metod och undersöka rättskällor såsom lagstiftning, förarbeten, prejudikat och doktrin. Den utförda analysen påvisar att en långtgående utredningsskyldighet för både socialnämnden och domstolen finns, men att det inte förekommer samma möjlighet för parterna att utreda omständigheterna i målet. Det finns ett högt ställt beviskrav, dock ges parternas utsagor olika bevisvärde. Där sakkunniga och utsagor från det offentliga värderas generellt högt, jämfört med utsagor från enskilda och i synnerlighet barn som värderas lågt. Bevisbördan åligger på socialnämnden. Slutsatsen är att den enskilde parten inte tillförsäkras en likställd partsställning i processen, utan den enskilde partens rätt bör stärkas genom att det offentliga biträdets uppdrag specificeras i lag och att deras befogenheter utökas, samt att sakkunniga används i större utsträckning för att öka domstolens kompetens angående barn och unga.

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