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Misslyckande trots numerär överlägsenhet : en teorikonsumerande studie om luftoperativ kontroll under FalklandskrigetKarlberg, Gustav January 2020 (has links)
This study examines how Argentina’s failure to obtain control of the air during the Falklands war can be explained based on the theories of John A. Warden and Philip S. Meilinger. The failure is problematic due to the numerical superiority and geographical advantage of the Argentinian Air Force. Previous studies have focused on the absence of airborne early warning, air-to-sea warfare and the perspective of Clausewitz theories. The purpose of this study is therefore the to develop a theory-based explanation of the Argentinian failure from the perspective of two air-warfare theories. The first day of the war (May 1) and the landing on the shores of San Carlos constitute crucial parts of the air war. The paper utilizes a theory consuming approach to explain the two cases and then comparing them to develop an aggregated explanation of the Argentinian failure. The result of the analysis is that Argentinian failure to identify and attack Britain’s aircraft carriers/landing ships, failure to concentrate the offensive operations and selective British air defence are key parts of the explanation. The results contributes to a deeper understanding of a perspective of the Falklands air war that has not been analysed in previously analysed in earlier academic studies.
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Kriget i luften under Operation Sutton : När Storbritannien var underdogGilgen, Gabriel January 2024 (has links)
This study examines how Great Britain fared so well against the Fuerza Aérea Argentina during Operation Sutton of the Falklands war in 1982. This operation is problematic and interesting due to the fact that despite being severely outnumbered, the British managed very well and emerged victorious. The purpose of the operation was to land British materiel and personnel on the beach of San Carlos. Since the Argentines could only contest using its aerial forces, the battle was decided in the air. The study was conducted using the newly-released Underdog’s Model, a theory of asymmetric air power, as a theoretical lattice. The theory consists of six categories in which the underdog should seek to outperform its opponent in order to maximize its chances of winning. The purpose of the study is to gain a deeper understanding of how the British managed to win against a numerically superior opponent. There exists a research gap regarding the topic of the air war over the Falklands, and rarely has it been examined using a pair of theoretical spectacles. Therefore, this study would contribute to the current research field of military studies regarding asymmetric air power and the Falklands war. The general results of this study imply that the British managed to outperform the Argentines in basically all the categories. The category in which this was perhaps most evident was in “Engage vulnerable military targets”, while the one category where it was unclear was the one of “Creativity”.
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Kombinerad bekämpning som metod för verkan : Lätt infanteritaktik under brittiska markoperationerna i FalklandskrigetBlysa, Gustav January 2013 (has links)
Denna undersökning har studerat ett lätt infanteriförbands användning av kombinerad bekämpning som metod för verkan under en amfibieoperation samt vilka aspekter som påverkade möjligheten till kombinerad bekämpning p.g.a. operationens amfibiska karaktär. Fallet har utgjorts av Parachute Regiments två bataljoner som under Falklandskriget utkämpade tre slag vid Darwin – Goose Green, Mount Longdon och Wireless Ridge. Som analysverktyg har använts Robert Leonhards teori om den kombinerade bekämpningens tre principer. Indikatorer på principerna har varit syften med verkan hämtade ur teorin om de grundläggande förmågorna. Två av slagen befanns endast delvis kännetecknas av Leonhards två första principer, principerna om kompletterande system och dilemman. Den tredje principen om fördelaktig terräng uppfylldes inte. Det tredje slaget regementet utkämpade kännetecknades helt igenom av Leonhards två första principer medan den tredje delvis beaktades. Undersökningen konstaterar att kombinerad bekämpning som metod för verkan kan utvecklas av ett lätt infanteriförband under en amfibieoperation. Dock ledde ofördelaktig disponering av förbandet i de aktuella fallen till att kombinerad bekämpning tidvis omöjliggjordes. Leonhards tredje princip tenderade att förringas. De specifikt amfibiska aspekterna avseende möjligheten till kombinerad bekämpning utgjordes främst av tillgången till fartygsartilleri, kraven på helikoptertransporterbart fältartilleri samt bristen på lätta trossfordon. / This dissertation has investigated how a light infantry force has used combined arms during an amphibious operation, specific factors related to the operations character affecting the possibility to develop combined arms have also been highlighted. The case chosen for the study was Parachute Regiments actions during the three battles of Darwin – Goose Green, Mount Longdon and Wireless Ridge during the Falklands War. As a analytical tool Robert Leonhard’s theory about the three principles of combined arms was used together with indicators borrowed from the theory about the warfighting functions purposes of fires. Two of the battles were found to be only partially characterized by Leonhard’s first two principles, complementary systems and dilemmas. The third principle about favorable terrain was neglected. The third battle was throughout characterized by the first two principles and to a larger extent than the former by the third principle. The dissertation concludes that light infantry can use combined arms during amphibious operations. The battles studied were, however, often characterized by unfavorable disposition of the force which affected the possibilities to use combined arms. Leonhard´s third principle was usually neglected. The most important amphibious aspects affecting the possibilities to combined arms were found to be naval gunfire support, light field artillery and the scarcity of light all-terrain vehicles.
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