The law too often avoids or misuses statistical evidence. This problem is partially explained by the absence of a shared normative framework for working with such evidence. There is considerable disagreement within the legal community about how statistical evidence relates to legal inquiry. It is proposed that the first step to addressing the problem is to accept Bayesianism as a normative framework that leads to outcomes that largely align with legal intuitions. It is only once this has been accepted that we can proceed to encourage education about common conceptual errors involving statistical evidence as well as techniques to limit their occurrence. Objections to using Bayesianism in the legal context are addressed. It is argued that the objection based on the irrelevance of statistical evidence is fundamentally incoherent in its failure to identify most evidence as statistical. Second, objections to the incompleteness of a Bayesian approach in accounting for non-truth-related values do place legitimate limits on the use of Bayesianism in the law but in no way undermine its normative usefulness. Lastly, many criticisms of the role of Bayesianism in the law rest on misunderstandings of the meaning and manipulation of statistical evidence and are best addressed by presenting statistical evidence in ways that encourage correct understanding. Once it is accepted that, put in its proper place, a Bayesian approach to understanding statistical evidence can align with most fundamental legal intuitions, a less fearful approach to the use of statistical evidence in the law can emerge.

The law too often avoids or misuses statistical evidence. This problem is partially explained by the absence of a shared normative framework for working with such evidence. There is considerable disagreement within the legal community about how statistical evidence relates to legal inquiry. It is proposed that the first step to addressing the problem is to accept Bayesianism as a normative framework that leads to outcomes that largely align with legal intuitions. It is only once this has been accepted that we can proceed to encourage education about common conceptual errors involving statistical evidence as well as techniques to limit their occurrence. Objections to using Bayesianism in the legal context are addressed. It is argued that the objection based on the irrelevance of statistical evidence is fundamentally incoherent in its failure to identify most evidence as statistical. Second, objections to the incompleteness of a Bayesian approach in accounting for non-truth-related values do place legitimate limits on the use of Bayesianism in the law but in no way undermine its normative usefulness. Lastly, many criticisms of the role of Bayesianism in the law rest on misunderstandings of the meaning and manipulation of statistical evidence and are best addressed by presenting statistical evidence in ways that encourage correct understanding. Once it is accepted that, put in its proper place, a Bayesian approach to understanding statistical evidence can align with most fundamental legal intuitions, a less fearful approach to the use of statistical evidence in the law can emerge.

Neste estudo, temos por proposta observar o debate político eleitoral, de modo a caracterizá-lo como um evento polêmico em que as opiniões não configuram o objeto principal do discurso dos interlocutores. Acreditamos que os participantes de tal gênero discursivo utilizam manobras argumentativas, que constituem falácias, como uma estratégia; entretanto, tal prática pode acarretar consequências ou efeitos diferentes daquelas tradicionalmente decorrentes de tal manobra. Como fundamentação teórica, aplicamos os conceitos da Teoria Pragmadialética da Argumentação (van Eemeren e Grootendorst: 1984, 1992, 2004), de certa forma conectada à Dialética, mas que apresenta diferenças importantes, principalmente por meio da dicotomia entre os termos Formal e Pragma (derivada de Pragmática). Os elementos pragmáticos que esse termo pressupõe referem-se à Teoria dos Atos de Fala e à Análise do discurso, inspiradas pelas descobertas dos filósofos que analisam a linguagem do cotidiano. Tratamos do emprego da falácia como uma espécie de inobservância às Regras de Discussão Crítica - regras que fazem referência a um comportamento, ou ação, pelo qual os interlocutores são responsáveis. Cada tipo de falácia pode ocorrer em um determinado estágio de discussão crítica, a qual corresponde a um modelo que apresenta estágios distintos, analiticamente, no processo de solucionar uma discussão, e cada violação às regras da discussão crítica pode tornar a resolução da diferença de opinião mais difícil ou mesmo impossível, configurando-se uma falácia. Tais violações são realizadas por meio de atos de fala dos tipos assertivo, comissivo, diretivo, declarativo ou declarativo de uso. A metodologia a ser utilizada constitui-se da observação das unidades de análise (os turnos de fala dos participantes), de modo a classificar a ocorrência das falácias. O corpus selecionado refere-se a debates políticos eleitorais exibidos pela mídia televisiva, no ano de 2008, referentes às eleições à prefeitura da cidade São Paulo-SP. / This paper deals with political debate, in order to analyze if the opinions are truly the aim of this kind of discourse and some of the strategic arguments, that can be understand as fallacies, would be find. At the Pragma-dialectical approach of argumentation (van Eemeren e Grootendorst: 1984, 1992, 2004) the concept of fallacies could be better understood as one impediment to the resolution of a disagreement. The theory proposes ten rules for the conduct of an ideal model of a critical discussion. A fallacy is a violation of one of the ten rules. Generically, such fallacies are moves which disrupt or derail the process of rationally resolving an expressed difference of opinion. A fallacy can happen in the various stages of a critical discussion by the performance of speech acts: comissives, directives, expressive and declaratives. The methodology is the observation of the speech acts of the participants on a debate in order to verify the fallacies that can occur. Political debates from 2008, for the mayor of Sao Paulo election is the corpus selected.

Ao encontrar o conteúdo de probabilidade e estatística no ensino médio no Brasil, o aluno se depara com uma abordagem matemática da teoria, fruto de uma tradição escolar onde a matemática sempre foi ensinada de forma determinística, fornecendo resultados e resoluções de problemas como se fossem exatos dentro de diversos contextos. É o que verificamos em um referencial dos livros didáticos utilizados pelos professores nas escolas, em que encontramos um destaque para uma abordagem permeada por formalismos e excessivas fórmulas com notações da teoria dos conjuntos, com pouca ou por vezes ausência total de discussões que permitam uma visão consistente da teoria referente às disciplinas de probabilidade e estatística. Diante de tal cenário, muitos vieses de raciocínio são encontrados e citados frequentemente em trabalhos voltados para a formação de professores com foco na educação estatística, como erros e dificuldades na concepção de conceitos de probabilidade e estatística. Vamos abordar o trabalho de alguns autores sobre o raciocínio humano no que se refere a erros, vieses e falácias em uma variedade de padrões mentais. Os padrões são identificados como heurísticas utilizadas pelas pessoas ao julgar sob incerteza, em que elas se apoiam em um número limitado de princípios que reduzem o trabalho complexo mental de fornecer probabilidade e predizer valores por simples julgamentos de forma sistemática. Utilizaremos estes próprios princípios heurísticos em uma sondagem destes possíveis modelos mentais para, em seguida, serem aplicadas na forma de ações em sala de aula. A finalidade é tentar ampliar o espectro do raciocínio do aluno para que ele tenha mais embasamento ao fazer estimativas e previsões em diferentes contextos. Finalmente, estas atividades foram testadas para verificarmos sua efetividade diante de modelos mentais que podem persistir, como apontam as referências, mesmo em estudantes e profissionais suficientemente treinados em estatística. / To find the contents of probability and statistics in high school in Brazil, the student is faced with a mathematical approach to the theory, the result of a school tradition in which mathematics has always been taught in a deterministic way, providing results and troubleshooting as if they were accurate within different contexts. It is what we see in a reference textbooks used by teachers in schools, where we find a highlight for permeated approach formalities and excessive formulas with notations of set theory, with little or sometimes total lack of discussions to enable a consistent view theory related to the disciplines of probability and statistics. Faced with such a scenario, many reasoning biases are found and often cited in studies related to teacher education with a focus on statistics education, such as errors and difficulties in designing concepts of probability and statistics. We will address the work of some authors on human reasoning which concentrates errors, biases and fallacies in a variety of mental patterns. The patterns are identified as heuristics that people use in judging under uncertainty, where they rely on a limited number of principles that reduce complex mental work to provide probability and predict values for simple trials systematically. We will use these very principles heuristic in a survey of these possible mental models to then be applied, in a second step, actions in the classroom. The purpose is to try to broaden the spectrum of student reasoning so that it has more basis to make estimates and forecasts in different contexts. Finally, these activities were tested in order to verify its effectiveness before mental models that may persist, as shown by the references, even for students and sufficiently trained in statistical professionals.

Ao encontrar o conteúdo de probabilidade e estatística no ensino médio no Brasil, o aluno se depara com uma abordagem matemática da teoria, fruto de uma tradição escolar onde a matemática sempre foi ensinada de forma determinística, fornecendo resultados e resoluções de problemas como se fossem exatos dentro de diversos contextos. É o que verificamos em um referencial dos livros didáticos utilizados pelos professores nas escolas, em que encontramos um destaque para uma abordagem permeada por formalismos e excessivas fórmulas com notações da teoria dos conjuntos, com pouca ou por vezes ausência total de discussões que permitam uma visão consistente da teoria referente às disciplinas de probabilidade e estatística. Diante de tal cenário, muitos vieses de raciocínio são encontrados e citados frequentemente em trabalhos voltados para a formação de professores com foco na educação estatística, como erros e dificuldades na concepção de conceitos de probabilidade e estatística. Vamos abordar o trabalho de alguns autores sobre o raciocínio humano no que se refere a erros, vieses e falácias em uma variedade de padrões mentais. Os padrões são identificados como heurísticas utilizadas pelas pessoas ao julgar sob incerteza, em que elas se apoiam em um número limitado de princípios que reduzem o trabalho complexo mental de fornecer probabilidade e predizer valores por simples julgamentos de forma sistemática. Utilizaremos estes próprios princípios heurísticos em uma sondagem destes possíveis modelos mentais para, em seguida, serem aplicadas na forma de ações em sala de aula. A finalidade é tentar ampliar o espectro do raciocínio do aluno para que ele tenha mais embasamento ao fazer estimativas e previsões em diferentes contextos. Finalmente, estas atividades foram testadas para verificarmos sua efetividade diante de modelos mentais que podem persistir, como apontam as referências, mesmo em estudantes e profissionais suficientemente treinados em estatística. / To find the contents of probability and statistics in high school in Brazil, the student is faced with a mathematical approach to the theory, the result of a school tradition in which mathematics has always been taught in a deterministic way, providing results and troubleshooting as if they were accurate within different contexts. It is what we see in a reference textbooks used by teachers in schools, where we find a highlight for permeated approach formalities and excessive formulas with notations of set theory, with little or sometimes total lack of discussions to enable a consistent view theory related to the disciplines of probability and statistics. Faced with such a scenario, many reasoning biases are found and often cited in studies related to teacher education with a focus on statistics education, such as errors and difficulties in designing concepts of probability and statistics. We will address the work of some authors on human reasoning which concentrates errors, biases and fallacies in a variety of mental patterns. The patterns are identified as heuristics that people use in judging under uncertainty, where they rely on a limited number of principles that reduce complex mental work to provide probability and predict values for simple trials systematically. We will use these very principles heuristic in a survey of these possible mental models to then be applied, in a second step, actions in the classroom. The purpose is to try to broaden the spectrum of student reasoning so that it has more basis to make estimates and forecasts in different contexts. Finally, these activities were tested in order to verify its effectiveness before mental models that may persist, as shown by the references, even for students and sufficiently trained in statistical professionals.

Thesis (M. A. (Clinical Psychology)) --University of Limpopo, 2018 / Current understandings of mental illness are deeply rooted in a predominantly westernised paradigms of mental health. Constructs such as mental illness have been found to be socially constructed and rooted in historical contexts and informed by cultural and societal influences. Most of the existing research conducted on the knowledge and perceptions of tertiary-educated individuals towards mental illness have been quantitative in nature. The aim of this study was to qualitatively explore the knowledge and perceptions of undergraduates using Social Representation Theory as a theoretical framework. Purposive sampling was utilised to draw a sample of 16 undergraduate students between the ages of 18-25 years, at the University of Limpopo (Turfloop Campus). Thematic Content Analysis (TCA) was used to analyse the semi-structured interviews which were used to collect data. The results of this study found that negative views and perceptions existed amongst the sample pertaining to mental illness and the mentally ill. It was also found that participants conceptualisations of mental illness were not wholly western or traditionally African. Participants perceptions were informed through their cultural and social experiences with the mentally ill. Generally, the study pointed towards a greater need for psycho-education on mental illness.

Ad hominem argument is an argument that attacks the defender of a claim rather than the claim in dispute. The purpose of my dissertation is to answer the question of whether ad hominem argument is fallacious. I search for the answer by exploring several areas of philosophy and discussing ad hominem argument from historical, logical, epistemological, and linguistic perspectives. I reach the following conclusions: First, since the conclusion of an ad hominem argument does not appear explicitly in actual argumentation, how to formulate the conclusion plays a crucial role in judging the legitimacy of ad hominem argument; Second, there is no type of logical fallacy unified under the name of “ad hominem” because, at least, some instances of so-called ad hominem fallacy are epistemically justifiable arguments; Third, since an ad hominem argument is used to refute a person’s testimony by attacking his trustworthiness, an ad hominem argument playing a role of undercutting defeater of a speaker’s testimony is legitimate from the perspective of epistemology of testimony; Fourth, since ad hominem argument can be treated as a speech act of argumentation, an ad hominem argument that satisfies the felicity conditions for argumentation is legitimate from the perspective of speech act theory and an ad hominem argument can be legitimately used to reveal the infelicity of the opponent’s argument. / text

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2008. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 148-156).

No description available.

Process-based arguments aim at demonstrating that a process, compliant with a standard, has been followed during the development of a safety-critical system. Compliance with these processes is mandatory for certification purposes, so the generation of process-based arguments is essential, but also a very costly and time-consuming task. In addition, inappropriate reasoning in the argumentation such as insufficient evidence (i.e. a fallacious argumentation), may result in a loss of quality of the system, leading to safety-related failures. Therefore, avoiding or detecting fallacies in process-based arguments is crucial. However, the process of reviewing such arguments is currently done manually and is based on the expert’s knowledge, so it is a very laborious and error-prone task.In this thesis, an approach to automatically generate fallacy-free process-based arguments is proposed and implemented. This solution is composed of two parts; (i) detecting omission of key evidence fallacies on the modelled processes, and (ii) transforming them into process-based safety arguments. The former checks automatically if the process model, compliant with the Software & Systems Process Engineering Metamodel (SPEM) 2.0, contains the sufficient information for not committing an omission of key evidence fallacy. If fallacies are detected, the functionality provides the proper recommendation to resolve them. Once the safety engineers/process engineers modify the process model following the provided recommendations, the second part of the solution can be applied. This one generates automatically the process-based argument, compliant with the Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM), and displays it –rendered via Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)– into the OpenCert assurance case editor within the AMASS platform. The applicability of the solution is validated in the context of the ECSS-E-ST-40C standard.