The thesis addresses primarily the conflict between the protection of personality and another constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right - the freedom of expression. These rights, that happen to be often in a conflict, are rights of an equal legal protection, one does not have a priority over the other one and so it is a challenge for the courts to decide which one to prefer in particular cases while taking the specific circumstances of the each case into account. The thesis aims to examine this conflict in detail and to analyse it. The first chapter focuses on general questions related to personality rights, addresses the term "personality", the historic development of the personality rights regulation within the area of the Czech Republic and its presence in the current legal system with the accent to the recodification of the civil law, which has taken place hand in hand with the act no. 89/2012 Coll., Civil code, entering into force, while an assessment of the changes that the new regulation of the civil law has brought is one of the partial aims of the thesis. In the second chapter is discussed the unlawful interference with the personality rights that constitutes a private law tort. In the same time this chapter addresses the circumstances excluding the unlawfulness and deals with the...

The principle of autonomy of will is considered to be the crucial principle controlling all private relationships of human life. People in the sense of individuals of private law have opportunity to form their private relationships according to their free will thanks to the autonomy of will, even while within certain predetermined limits. The principle of autonomy of will is closely related to the principle of non-mandatory rule in private law and to the principle of equality, the principle of pacta sunt servanda and to the principle according to a person acts lawfully unless there is a legal rule prohibiting or curtailing that behaviour. The purpose of my thesis is to classify the term autonomy of will in its historical context and its definition in the context of other principles and institutions of private law. The importance of this principle is further illustrated by the specific expressions autonomy of will in our legal system. My thesis is composed of a general part and a special part. The general part is divided into three chapters. Chapter One deals with the historical appearance of autonomy of will from ancient times to modern history, ie from primary manifestations of autonomy of will in the contractual relationships of people to its international establishment. In the chapter Two of the...

This thesis is aimed on the social phenomenon of conscientious objection, its theoretical perception as a legal concept and application in the real world, in particular by the supranational protection of human rights in the European area. Priority concern will be given to the transposition of the general assessments to the special "habitat" of EU law. The basis of the study is built on an analysis of definitions and categories refined by the doctrine and reinforced by the roots of natural law, both of which also serve to determine the methodology and legal perception of conscientious objection. A short study of the Czech law then follows to "pump the theory in legal veins". Large part of the thesis addresses the case law adopted by the European Court of Human Rights which serves as an inspiration and authority for the Union and its Member States. Abstracting the main trends in ECtHR reasoning the thesis draws basic limits laid down by the international protection. It also concludes that the Convention (ECHR) does not preclude developing its own pro or contra- objection approach by the EU institutions. It is, however, supposed to have a great impact on the Unions' legal "technique" in the field of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. In the context of EU law the special nature of the...

Thesis (LL.M.)--University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Law, 1998. / This thesis explores the democratic legitimacy of the power of judicial review. It discounts the countermajoritarian dilemma on the basis that constitutional democracy means more than majoritarianism, it entails judicial protection of other characteristics fundamental to democracy from invasion even by a majority government. Such characteristics include political processes and values which ensure the continuation of democratic rule. The Court may, however, be criticised if it exercises its power of judicial review in a manner which is undemocratic. I argue that the Court is obliged to exercise its power in a manner which respects the doctrine of separation of powers. In interpreting the Constitution, the Court is therefore obliged to show deference to Parliament by giving effect to the purpose of a constitutional provision. I conclude that the Court may only have recourse to the values which the legislature chose to include in the Constitution, except when the Court protects those political processes and values which ensure the survival of constitutional democracy.

This thesis analyses in depth the seminal cases of the Court of Justice, namely C-341/05 Laval, C-438/05 Viking Line and C-346/06 Ruffert. The analysis starts with description of the decisions. Those are laid out both from the perspectives of the Advocates General and of the Court of Justice (chapter 2). Central aspects of the decisions are analysed in chapter 3. First, it is the decision to apply Community law (now EU law) to national social policy. This is not new in itself, but it is taken to unusual depth. Second, the Court of Justice decided to apply Community law to trade unions. This horizontal application of Community law has crucial implications on the human rights discourse of the Court. Third, we analyse how the Court viewed the issue whether the strike action violated the Treaty, and the issues of justification and proportionality. Chapter 4 focuses on human rights aspect of the decisions. The very use of human rights in Community law is briefly sketched. In more detail the implications of the likely accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human rights are considered. Finally, the human rights discourse of the Court of Justice in the Laval and Viking cases is put to critical scrutiny. One of the determining elements in Laval and Viking is application of the Treaty...

Les minorités religieuses représentent souvent une composante de la population et se caractérisent par leur différence religieuse qui peut les rendre vulnérables à diverses menaces. Assurer la sécurité et la stabilité des sociétés comportant des minorités religieuses impose l’adoption de dispositions spécifiques. La protection pénale représente ici le moyen juridique le plus efficace, à travers la dissuasion réalisée par les sanctions et les mesures adoptées. Cette étude vise à déterminer le fondement et la portée de ladite protection accordée à des minorités et ce, en établissant une comparaison entre deux systèmes différents devant la religion, le système religieux (libyen et égyptien) et le système laïc (français). Le Statut de la Cour pénale internationale en tant qu’axe complémentaire sera ici un élément neutre par sa position ni laïque, ni religieuse. Cette comparaison s’attachera à l’impact du système juridique adopté quant aux droits des minorités religieuses. / Religious minorities are often a component of the population and are characterized by their religious difference that can make them vulnerable to various threats. Ensuring security and stability of societies with religious minorities requires the adoption of specific provisions. The criminal protection, here, represents the most effective legal means, through deterrence achieved by sanctions and measures adopted. This study aims to determine the effectiveness of that protection extended to minorities in terms of foundation and reach, by making a comparison between two different systems in front of religion: the religious system (Libya and Egypt) and the secular system (French). The Statute of the International Criminal Court as a complementary axis, here, is a neutral element in its position nor secular or religious. This comparison will focus on the impact of the legal system adopted regarding the rights of religious minorities.

Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit einem der gewinnbringendsten Zweige der Internetbranche, der Mainstream- Internetpornografie und ihren Rahmenbedingungen im Kontext der Politik der Europäischen Union zu illegalen und schädigenden Internetinhalten. Basierend auf dem Framing-Ansatz wird der Politikprozess zum "Mehrjährigen Aktionsplan zur sichereren Nutzung des Internets" aus grundrechtlicher und feministischer Perspektive untersucht. Dabei wird das Policy Framing der beteiligten EU-AkteurInnen insbesondere hinsichtlich geschlechtersensibler Herangehensweisen und den ihnen zugrunde liegenden theoretischen Zugängen analysiert. Die dominanten Policy Frames der AkteurInnen werden aus unterschiedlichen Schwerpunkten in der Zielsetzung und Definition illegaler und schädigender Internetinhalte und deren grundrechtlichen Implikationen sowie der strategischen Positionierung der AkteurInnen zwischen "möglichen Grundrechtseingriffen" oder der "Betonung liberaler Abwehrrechte" abgeleitet.

O reconhecimento da presunção de inocência não se mostra incompatível com a admissão da prisão e de outras medidas de caráter pessoal no curso da persecução penal. Assim como os demais direitos fundamentais, a presunção de inocência não se mostra absoluta ou insuscetível de restrições. O ordenamento jurídico brasileiro admite intervenções legítimas no âmbito de proteção da presunção de inocência, submetendo-as ao controle da proporcionalidade e do conteúdo essencial dos direitos fundamentais. A proporcionalidade serve como limite das intervenções e desdobra-se nos pressupostos, requisitos extrínsecos e requisitos intrínsecos já explorados. O descumprimento de qualquer destes pontos revela a desobediência à regra da proporcionalidade e, com isto, o caráter ilegítimo da intervenção no âmbito de proteção da presunção de inocência. Esta análise pode ocorrer tanto da perspectiva abstrata, examinando-se a previsão normativa, como da perspectiva concreta, analisando a aplicação e a execução da norma / The recognition of the presumption of innocence is inconsistent with the admission of the prison and other measures of personal character in the course of criminal prosecution. Like other fundamental rights, the presumption of innocence does not show absolute and subject to no restrictions. The Brazilian legal system admits intervention legitimate in the context of protection of the presumption of innocence, places them under the control of proportionality and the essential content of fundamental rights. Proportionality serves as a limit of interventions and unfolds in the assumptions, requirements extrinsic and intrinsic requirements already explored. The breach of any of these seven elements reveals the disobedience to the rule of proportionality and, thus, the illegitimate nature of the intervention under protection of the presumption of innocence. This analysis can occur from both the abstract perspective, examining the legislative provision, as the concrete perspective, examining the implementation and enforcement of the standard.

O ponto de partida desta dissertação são os aspectos metodológicos, quais sejam: (i) contextualização do ordenamento jurídico brasileiro; (ii) emersão da problemática do conflito entre princípios (positivismo versus pós-positivismo ou neoconstitucionalismo); e (iii) relevância da análise do método de sopesamento de princípios proposto por Robert Alexy. Em seguida, o estudo apresenta a discussão sobre teorias do conhecimento travada entre os filósofos Henri Poincaré e Pierre Duhem, demonstrando que a mesma discussão pode ser aplicada ao direito, e, nesse sentido, faz um paralelo com Herbert Hart, Ronald Dworkin e Robert Alexy. Passando pelo determinante Período Iluminista (incluindo os filósofos Jean-Jacques Rousseau e Cesare di Beccaria), a pesquisa evidencia sua influência nos princípios e nos direitos fundamentais consagrados atualmente pelo direito penal brasileiro. Em seguida, a pesquisa expõe os direitos fundamentais, apresenta a teoria do sopesamento ou balanceamento de princípios proposta por Robert Alexy e analisa, na jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal, como os ministros recorrem a esse método para solução de casos nos quais existe conflito entre os direitos fundamentais. A finalidade é evidenciar que o recurso, pelos juristas brasileiros, não introduziu uma nova maneira de interpretação ou um novo método de tomada de decisões, já que os ministros do STF recorrem à doutrina de Robert Alexy somente para demonstrar erudição; sem de fato aplicar o método proposto por ele, o mencionam para justificar qualquer decisão que já tenha sido tomada com base na subjetividade. Por fim, este estudo apresenta exercícios de aplicação do que a autora entende ser o método do sopesamento aos casos sob análise, e a conclusão foi que há distorções nos resultados em cerca de 30% deles, porcentagem relevante, considerando a importância dos casos analisados pelo STF. A aplicação do método do sopesamento consiste em três sub-regras subsequentes e ordenadas: adequação, necessidade e proporcionalidade em sentido estrito. A proporcionalidade apenas é analisada se a questão não puder ser solucionada pela necessidade e, por sua vez, a necessidade só é analisada se a adequação não for suficiente para solucionar a questão. O estudo demonstra que, quando a análise atinge a sub-regra necessidade, ocorrem os resultados divergentes. / This dissertation starts by the methodological aspects, which are: (i) contextualization of the Brazilian legal system; (ii) emergence of the conflict between principles (positivism versus postpositivism or neoconstitutionalism); and (iii) relevance of the analysis of the balancing of principles proposed by Robert Alexy. Subsequently, we presented the discussion of knowledge theories between the philosophers Henri Poincaré and Pierre Duhem, showing that the same discussion can be applied to law, in this sense we drew a parallel with Herbert Hart, Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy. Passing through the determinant Enlightenment Period (including the philosophers Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Cesare di Beccaria), we demonstrate its influence to principles and rights currently consecrated on the Brazilian criminal law. We analyzed on the jurisprudence of the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal) the application of Robert Alexys theory, known as sopesamento or balancing of principles, to case laws on which are conflict of fundamental rights (including the rights previously presented). The purpose is highlight that the recourse, by Brazilian jurists, did not insert a new interpretation technique or method of decision-making, since the ministers of STF invoke Robert Alexy doctrine solely to show erudition, without in fact apply the method proposed by him and mention him to justify whatsoever decision already taken based on subjectivity. Finally, we made an exercise of apply our understanding of the balancing method to cases under study and the conclusion was for 30% of distortions in the results, percentage relevant considering the importance of the cases analyzed by STF. The application of the balancing method consist on three sub-rules subsequent and ordered: adequacy, need and proportionality in strict sense. The proportionality is only analyzed if the case cannot be solved by need, and, in turn, need is only analyzed if adequacy is insufficient to solved the question. We ascertain that when the analysis achieves the sub-rule of need occurs the divergent results.

A inclusão digital tem sido um tema muito difundido nos discursos políticos e econômicos por conta da penetração das tecnologias de informação e comunicação, que conectam o mundo todo em segundos. Com a internet, rede mais visível destas tecnologias, o ser humano tem acesso a dados, informações e conhecimentos que jamais ocorreu na história. A inclusão digital tornou-se uma necessidade humana por suas possibilidades infinitas e benéficas de uso. Todos precisam estar conectados. Contudo, em decorrência destas possibilidades, há uma profusão de discursos que se entrecruzam e não necessariamente atendem a perspectiva da inclusão, visto que a maioria da população mundial está excluída digitalmente. Diante disto, há que se pensar a inclusão digital para além do simples acesso a uma tecnologia de informação e comunicação. A inclusão digital, como necessidade histórica, possui um valor que deve ser transformado em direito a ser utilizado pelo ser humano contra esta exclusão. A inclusão digital como um direito deve se questionar desde a utilização do conceito de inclusão digital e sua relevância acadêmica até como inserir a inclusão digital dentro do mundo jurídico. Para percorrer este caminho, percebeu-se um distanciamento entre os discursos que proferem a inclusão digital e as práticas que geram a exclusão. Assim, a construção da inclusão digital, para não gerar exclusão, tem de ser associada a um direito. Mais que um simples direito, um direito fundamental. Os direitos fundamentais são frutos das lutas contra o absolutismo e ferramentas de transformação social. É somente nesta perspectiva que a inclusão digital se tornará relevante no enfrentamento das exclusões atuais e virtuais. A inclusão digital como direito fundamental tem de ser apropriada pelo ser humano, a fim de combater as práticas exclusivas. / The digital inclusion has been a theme much spread in politics and economics speeches, because the penetration of the information and communication technologies, who connected the whole world in seconds. With the internet, the net most visible in this technologies, the human being have access to datas, informations and knowledges that ever occurred in the History. The digital inclusion became a human need on account of his possibilities. Everyone must be connected. However, in result of this possibilities, there is a exuberance of speeches that intercrosses and not necessarily answers the perspective of digital inclusion, due to the fact that the most of the world population is excluded. In this matter, must be rethinked the digital inclusion beyond to the simple access a some information e communication technologies. The digital inclusion, as a historical need, possess a value that must be transformed in right to be used by human being against this exclusion. Therefore, the digital inclusion as a right must to question itself since the usability of the concept and his relevance until how to insert itself in the legal frame. So, to trespass this path, it was noticed that exist a gap between the speeches which pronounces the digital inclusion with practices that created exclusion. Therefore, the digital inclusion construction must be, to not generate exclusion, associated to a right. More than a simple right, to a fundamental right. The fundamental rights are product of fights against absolutism and are the tools of social transformation. It\'s only in this perspective that a digital inclusion will become relevant against exclusions actual and virtual as well. The digital inclusion as a fundamental right must be appropriated by human being to fight the exclusive practices.