In the past several years, the impact of intellectual property rights (IPRs) on access to medicines and medical technologies has come under increased scrutiny. Motivating this are highly publicized cases where IPRs appear the threaten access to particular medicines and diagnostics. As IPRs become globalized, so does the controversy: In 1998, nearly forty pharmaceutical companies filed a lawsuit against South Africa, citing (among other issues) deprivation of intellectual property. This followed South Africa’s implementation of various measures to enable and encourage the use of generic medicines – a move that was particularly controversial for the newly available (and still patented) HIV medicines. While many historical, legal, economic, and policy analyses of these cases and issues exist, few explicitly normative projects have been undertaken. This thesis utilizes interdisciplinary and explicitly normative philosophical methods to fill this normative void, engaging theoretical work on intellectual property and global distributive justice with each other, and with empirical work on IPR reform. In doing so, it explicitly rejects three mistaken assumptions about the debate over IPRs and access to essential medicines: (i) that this debate reduces to a disagreement about empirical facts; (ii) that intellectual property is normatively justified solely by its ability to “maximize innovation”; and (iii) that this controversy reduces to irresolvable disagreement about global distributive justice. Calling upon the best contemporary approaches to human rights, it argues that these approaches lend normative weight in favor of reforming IPRs – both that they should be reformed, and how – to better enable access to essential medicines. Such reforms might include modifying the present global IPR regime or creating new alternatives to the exclusivity of IPRs, both of which are considered in light of a human right to access to essential medicines. Future work will be needed, however, to better specify the content of a right to “essential medicines” and determine a fair distribution of the costs of fulfilling it. / Dissertation

Family reunification for unaccompanied refugee minors is one of the most debatable issues when it comes to deciding whether it should be viewed as a right or it can be justifiable for states to completely prevent it and rather provide it only as a privilege. The discussion in the legal sphere proved that the issue is still problematic in both international and European laws. In this thesis, I have analyzed this issue through assessing the three claims that were provided by the United Kingdom for its negative position on the case. Through the lens of the child’s best interests’ principle, the non-discrimination principle, and the global distributive justice theory, I argued for considering family reunification as a right rather than a privilege. Children should always be treated as children. It cannot be justifiable for states to completely prevent them from being reunited with their families for being refugees.

This essay focus on the normative debate between cosmopolitanism and statism in the context of global distributive justice. The notion of basic structure and negative rights examines separately in two questions to understand distributive justice as a global subject rather than only national. Statists as Rawls holds the position that global distributive justice prerequisite a basic structure with coercive instrument. Pogge as cosmopolitan arguments for the existence of global basic structure, by addressing inequalities in real-world politics, in the form of negative rights violation. The aim of this study is to justify global distributive justice on cosmopolitan duties, based on normative political theory, reflective equilibrium, and conceptual analysis. The main issue is formulated into two questions in the following: • Does reciprocity constitute a global basic structure that presupposes resource distribution? • Can self-respect as foundation of rights justify global distributive justice? I do this first by analyzing the concept of basic structure, based on the notion reciprocity. This is to identify the basic structure of the global system that prerequisite global distributive justice. Second, I analyze Pogge’s formulation of negative rights as cosmopolitan rights, to modify them to a positive concept of rights. This is in purpose to avoid the libertarian counterargument presented by Narveson, that negative rights fail as a ground of cosmopolitan duties. I show first that coercion is not a necessary condition, but only sufficient for the basic structure. Thus, the global basic structure exists and prerequisite distributive justice, based on reciprocity. Unlike the national basic structure of coercive instrument, the global basic structure grounds on several global threats and challenges that tie all nations as alternative concept of coercion. Second, I show that cosmopolitan duties can be grounded on positive rights. I do this through the notion of self-respect and deontological ethics, which success to avoid the libertarian critique of cosmopolitan duties.