In 1898, H G Wells published The War of the Worlds, a scathing indictment of colonialism from the perspective of the colonized. The following year, Rudyard Kipling penned The White Man’s Burden, describing colonial conquest as driven by duty, for the sake of the subjugated. They shared a vantage point from the literary pedestal of fin-de-siècle London, but what they saw was very different.            The War of the Worlds can be read as an allegory of colonialism where the tables are turned and the colonial masters are suddenly exposed to a ruthless and technologically superior power. What can be inferred about the Martians’ motives? Can they be perceived as driven by duty, by wishing to take care of or serve their captives’ needs? With the information provided in the The War of the Worlds, could a Martian Kipling write “The Green Man’s Burden” to motivate the invasion of the Earth?           Using postcolonial tools of analysis, this essay digs into the britishness of Wells’ colonizers and colonized, as well as into the britishness of Wells’ own perspective. Some postcolonial theorists argue that representatives of the colonial powers cannot represent the subjugated. Does his background and nationality disqualify Wells to describe the effects of colonialism? I argue that it does not. Staying in the social space of the West helped Wells erode the ideology of colonialism by tailoring it to be received and understood by his target audience, his contemporary countrymen.

This thesis addresses primary concepts in the humanitarian intervention debates. I argue that humanitarian intervention is a perfect duty. The global community has a moral obligation to act decisively in the face of extreme human rights abuses. There are two contrasting theoretical perspectives regarding international relations and humanitarian intervention: statism and cosmopolitanism. These contrasting perspectives contest the relative value of state sovereignty and human rights. Some of the most prominent ethicists in the debate have determined states have a “right” to intervene militarily in the internal affairs of other states to halt severe human rights abuses but there is no “duty”to intervene. These conclusions are largely based upon consequentialist considerations. This thesis argues a deontological perspective is essential. References to events Rwanda, Darfur, and Kosovo are made. There is a critical role for preemptive actions to play in addressing humanitarian crises and calls for global justice.

Ce travail a pour but de montrer quelles logiques de la finalité sont en jeu dans le travail du manager. Nous avons distingué deux façons d’aborder la finalité. La première, proche des notions d’objectif, d’intérêt, d’utilité, constitue le soubassement des façons d’aborder classiquement le travail du manager. Nous avons fait émerger, en nous appuyant sur la pensée d’Aristote, Thomas d’Aquin, et Spaemann, une conception alternative de la finalité, qui diffère de l’objectif et de l’intérêt en ce qu’elle n’est pas construite. Ce concept de finalité permet de voir autrement trois dimensions essentielles du travail du manager : le management par objectif, le faisceau d’exigences contradictoires dont le manager est le point focal, et le dilemme qui se pose à lui entre éthique et efficacité. Enfin, une enquête de terrain permet de montrer que cette logique alternative de la finalité, rattachée à l’éthique des vertus, trouve une certaine place dans le discours des managers de la FDJ, aux côtés du conséquentialisme, qui consacre l’acception utilitaire de la finalité, et du déontologisme qui évacue le recours à la finalité. / This thesis aim is to show which notion of purpose is at stake in the manager’s work. It differentiates two ways to address the concept of purpose. The first one, close to the notions of objective, interest, utility, forms the foundations of a classical vision of the manager’s work. However, a second one, based on Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Spaemann’s philosophies, arose. This alternative conception differs from objective and interest as it is not elaborated by the subject. It allows a different view on three essential dimensions of the manager’s work: the management by objectives, the body of contradictory requirements that built up on the manager and the dilemma between ethics and efficiency. Finally, a field survey showed that this alternative conception of purpose, linked to virtue-based ethics, has a certain place in the FDJ’s managers’ message, together with consequentialism, which expresses the utilitarian conception of purpose, and deontological ethics, which evacuates any purpose.

This essay focus on the normative debate between cosmopolitanism and statism in the context of global distributive justice. The notion of basic structure and negative rights examines separately in two questions to understand distributive justice as a global subject rather than only national. Statists as Rawls holds the position that global distributive justice prerequisite a basic structure with coercive instrument. Pogge as cosmopolitan arguments for the existence of global basic structure, by addressing inequalities in real-world politics, in the form of negative rights violation. The aim of this study is to justify global distributive justice on cosmopolitan duties, based on normative political theory, reflective equilibrium, and conceptual analysis. The main issue is formulated into two questions in the following: • Does reciprocity constitute a global basic structure that presupposes resource distribution? • Can self-respect as foundation of rights justify global distributive justice? I do this first by analyzing the concept of basic structure, based on the notion reciprocity. This is to identify the basic structure of the global system that prerequisite global distributive justice. Second, I analyze Pogge’s formulation of negative rights as cosmopolitan rights, to modify them to a positive concept of rights. This is in purpose to avoid the libertarian counterargument presented by Narveson, that negative rights fail as a ground of cosmopolitan duties. I show first that coercion is not a necessary condition, but only sufficient for the basic structure. Thus, the global basic structure exists and prerequisite distributive justice, based on reciprocity. Unlike the national basic structure of coercive instrument, the global basic structure grounds on several global threats and challenges that tie all nations as alternative concept of coercion. Second, I show that cosmopolitan duties can be grounded on positive rights. I do this through the notion of self-respect and deontological ethics, which success to avoid the libertarian critique of cosmopolitan duties.