Submitted by Érica Diniz (ericadiniz@gmail.com) on 2015-01-12T19:03:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 versaodigital_tesedoutorado_EricaDiniz.pdf: 3599824 bytes, checksum: b9f58b1c27e6f83606dfd16d6c2e165d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by BRUNA BARROS (bruna.barros@fgv.br) on 2015-01-15T11:48:49Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 versaodigital_tesedoutorado_EricaDiniz.pdf: 3599824 bytes, checksum: b9f58b1c27e6f83606dfd16d6c2e165d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2015-02-05T12:01:45Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 versaodigital_tesedoutorado_EricaDiniz.pdf: 3599824 bytes, checksum: b9f58b1c27e6f83606dfd16d6c2e165d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-02-05T12:02:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 versaodigital_tesedoutorado_EricaDiniz.pdf: 3599824 bytes, checksum: b9f58b1c27e6f83606dfd16d6c2e165d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-10-28 / Essa tese é constituída por três artigos: 'Tax Filing Choices for the Household', 'Optimal Tax for the Household: Collective and Unitary Approaches' e 'Vertical Differentiation and Heterogeneous Firms'.

Submitted by Daniella Santos (daniella.santos@fgv.br) on 2010-03-23T12:06:11Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Erica_Diniz.pdf: 328909 bytes, checksum: 1fb57ef9f720ee93e22f116f1b459033 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Virginio Machado(andrea.machado@fgv.br) on 2010-03-23T12:37:36Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Erica_Diniz.pdf: 328909 bytes, checksum: 1fb57ef9f720ee93e22f116f1b459033 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2010-03-24T13:37:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_Erica_Diniz.pdf: 328909 bytes, checksum: 1fb57ef9f720ee93e22f116f1b459033 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-11-21 / This paper presents a duopolist model with heterogeneous firms (different marginal costs) and assimetric information about the vertical preferences of the consumers. We find that the asymmetry of information on the vertical dimension and the difference in costs greatly influences the pricing and the structures for market equilibrium. An important result arising from these two aspects is the existence of a mass of consumers that can buy from both firms. It is also observed that the greater the heterogeneity of costs, the greater the market power of the most efficient firm. / O trabalho apresenta um modelo de competição duopolista, com firmas heterogêneas (custos marginais diferentes), produtos espacialmente diferenciados quanto a dimensão vertical e horizontal, e informação privada sobre as preferências por qualidade dos consumidores. Identifica-se que a assimetria de informação sobre a dimensão vertical e a diferença de custos exercem grande relevância sobre a decisão de apreçamento das firmas e sobre as estruturas de mercado de equilíbrio. Um resultado relevante decorrente desses dois aspectos é a existência de uma massa de consumidores que, em equilíbrio, pode demandar de qualquer uma das firmas, sendo essa decisão pautada sobre o real parâmetro de preferência por qualidade de cada consumidor. Observa-se também que quanto maior a heterogeneidade dos custos, maior é o poder de mercado da firma de menor custo.

We set up a trade model with heterogeneous firms and a worker population that is heterogeneous in two dimensions: workers are either skilled or unskilled, and within each skill category there is a continuum of abilities. Workers with high abilities, both skilled and unskilled, are matched to firms with high productivities, and this leads to wage differentials within each skill category across firms. Self-selection of the most productive firms into exporting generates an exporter wage premium, and our framework with skilled and unskilled workers allows us to decompose this premium into its skill-specific components. We employ linked employer-employee data from Germany to structurally estimate the parameters of the model. Using these parameter estimates, we compute an average exporter wage premium of 5 percent. The decomposition by skill turns out to be quantitatively highly relevant, with exporting firms paying no wage premium at all to their unskilled workers, while the premium for skilled workers is 12 percent.

L'objectif de cette thèse est double. Premièrement, elle vise à proposer une revue de la littérature économique s'intéressant à l'exposition au taux de change de la profitabilité des entreprises non-financières, et à fournir de nouveaux enseignements sur son hétérogénéité intra et inter-sectorielle. Deuxièmement, cette thèse analyse les stratégies de production et de produits mises en œuvre par les firmes pour se prémunir des effets de ces variations de change. Puisque l'éventail de telles stratégies est large, le dernier chapitre se concentre sur la stratégie de montée en gamme. / This thesis follows a dual objective. First, it aims to summarize previous evidence on the magnitude and channels underpinning a non-financial firm’s operating exposure, i.e. the extent to which currency fluctuations can alter a company's future operating cash flow, and to provide new highlights on the heterogeneity of this exposure across firms. Second, this thesis investigates the product and production strategies that are appropriate for coping with the economic consequences of exchange rate changes on firms’ operating profits. Since the range of these strategies is large, it focuses on providing theoretical and empirical evidence for the strategy of up-market positioning.

Cette thèse se propose d’étudier le rôle de l’hétérogénéité des entreprises multinationales dans leurs stratégies d’investissements directs à l’étranger (IDE). Si de précédents travaux soulignent l’importance de la productivité individuelle des entreprises dans le fait de devenir une multinationale, peu évoquent l’hétérogénéité restante entre ces entreprises pour expliquer les différences de choix de mode d’entrée ou de motif d’implantation à l’étranger. A travers des approches théoriques et empiriques innovantes, basées sur l’utilisation de données confidentielles d’entreprises françaises, nous montrons que l’hétérogénéité des entreprises détermine chacun des trois aspects stratégiques détaillés dans cette thèse : Le taux de contrôle à l’étranger, le motif d’implantation et la structure du réseau de filiales. Plus précisément, la productivité et l'expérience de la firme favorisent un contrôle accru des filiales étrangères, leur importance relative dépendant du pays hôte. Ces caractéristiques sont également associées à une intégration plus profonde dans les chaînes de valeur mondiales, ainsi qu’à la constitution d'un réseau d’implantations plus original. Ces résultats permettent une meilleure compréhension des choix des multinationales, au-delà de l’apparente complexité des flux d’IDE. / This thesis examines the role of firms´ heterogeneity in the Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) strategies. We already know firms’ heterogeneity to sharply distinguish between domestic firms, exporters and multinationals (MNEs). Yet, to what extent it impacts their foreign direct investments (FDIs) strategies among MNEs is rarely evoked, while several entry mode choices and FDI motives coexist. Mixing both theoretical and empirical innovating approaches using French firm-level data, the four chapters of this PhD dissertation reveal that the firm heterogeneity influences all of the three dimensions of strategies we review: foreign ownership mode, FDI motive and structure of the overall network of affiliates. Specifically, firm-level productivity and international experience foster deeper integration with a changing relative importance according to the host country. They are also associated with production motives and vertical integration into the global value chains. The more productive firms also display original affiliates’ network structure. These findings allow a better understanding of multinationals’ choices underneath the ``complex’’ global picture of FDI flows

We set up a general equilibrium model, in which offshoring to a low-wage country can lead to job polarisation in the high-wage country. Job polarisation is the result of a reallocation of labour across firms that differ in productivity and pay wages that are positively linked to their profits by a rent-sharing mechanism. Offshoring involves fixed and task-specific variable costs, and as a consequence it is chosen only by the most productive firms, and only for those tasks with the lowest variable offshoring costs. A reduction in those variable costs increases offshoring at the intensive and at the extensive margin, with domestic employment shifted from the newly offshoring firms in the middle of the productivity distribution to firms at the tails of this distribution, paying either very low or very high wages. We also study how the reallocation of labour across firms affects economy-wide unemployment. Offshoring reduces unemployment when it is confined to high-productivity firms, while this outcome is not guaranteed when offshoring is also chosen by low-productivity firms.

This paper investigates the effects of international trade in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms where a welfare state redistributes income. We look at a very stylised progressive non-distortionary redistribution scheme. We show that for a given tax rate international trade increases income per capita, but also leads to higher income inequality. Two aspects of income inequality are examined. First, inter-group inequality between managers and workers is considered. Second, intra-group inequality within the group of managers is investigated. For a given tax rate the size of the welfare state and therefore the transfer per capita increases when going from autarky to trade. This second-round effect counteracts the primary increase in inequality, yet cannot outweigh it. Since the redistribution scheme is non-distortionary, it is possible to decrease trade-induced inequality by increasing the tax rate without jeopardising the gains from trade.

This paper examines the distributional effects of international trade in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and a welfare state redistributing income. The redistribution scheme is financed by a progressive income tax and gives the same absolute transfer to all individuals. Ceteris paribus, international trade leads to an increase in income per capita but also to higher income inequality on two fronts. Inter-group inequality between managers and workers increases, and intra-group inequality within the group of managers goes up as well. We show that for constant tax rates, there is an endogenous increase in the size of the welfare state that works against the increase in inequality, yet cannot offset it. The paper also sheds light on the conditions under which trade can actually lead to a Pareto improvement.

In this paper, we analyse the effects of a unilateral change in an emissions tax in a model of international trade with heterogeneous firms. We find a positive effect of tighter environmental policy on average productivity in the reforming country through reallocation of labour towards exporting firms. Domestic aggregate emissions fall, due to both a scale and a technique effect, but we show that the reduction in emissions following the tax increase is smaller than in autarky. Moreover, general equilibrium effects through changes in the foreign wage rate lead to a reduction in foreign emissions and, hence, to negative emissions leakage in case of transboundary pollution.

Expanding on a general equilibrium model of offshoring, we analyze the effects of a unilateral emissions tax increase on the environment, income, and inequality. Heterogeneous firms allocate labor across production tasks and emissions abatement, while only the most productive can benefit from lower labor and/or emissions costs abroad and offshore. We find a non-monotonic effect on global emissions, which decline if the initial difference in emissions taxes is small. For a sufficiently large difference, global emissions rise, implying emissions leakage of more than 100%. The underlying driver is a global technique effect: While the emissions intensity of incumbent non-offshoring firms declines, the cleanest firms start offshoring. Moreover, offshoring firms become dirtier, induced by a reduction in the foreign effective emissions tax in general equilibrium. Implementing a BCA prevents emissions leakage, reduces income inequality in the reforming country, but raises inequality across countries.