Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-10-03T12:32:14Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Lucíola Maria de Sousa Brandes.pdf: 1006890 bytes, checksum: efac1c10aa9cf55e9628af6de3ad0ad0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-03T12:32:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lucíola Maria de Sousa Brandes.pdf: 1006890 bytes, checksum: efac1c10aa9cf55e9628af6de3ad0ad0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-09-18 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The present work tries to interpret the concept of intentionality treated in the Fifth Investigation of the work Logical Investigations, of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). In order to do so, it aims at three objectives: to show that intentionality is not an external relation; prove that intentionality does not presuppose the existence of two different entities; and explicit aspects necessary for the occurrence of intentionality. The development of this study is organized in three chapters. The first takes care of the conception of intentionality in Franz Brentano (1838-1917) and Kasimir Twardowski (1866-1938). In this section, questions about the structure of psychic phenomena and their classification are contemplated, including the characteristics of the representation, the represented object and the content. The second, which constitutes the core of the dissertation, exposes Husserl's concept of intentionality, elaborated in the Fifth Research, based on the central conceptual analyzes and distinctions of this author. This chapter clarifies the structure of intentional living; displays the classification of acts and their fundamental relationships; and provides the four senses of representation. The third examines Husserl's criticisms of Brentano and Twardowski's conceptions of intentional phenomena. The result of this philosophical study indicates that: intentionality, according to Husserl, is based on an inner moment of the experience itself. Husserl distinguishes consciousness from actual objects and representations of fantasy, predictions, memories, and so on; and the object intentionally visualized is neither part of consciousness and is not contained in it, i.e. intentionality is characterized by its independence from existence / O presente trabalho procura discernir o conceito de intencionalidade tratado na Quinta Investigação da obra Investigações Lógicas, de Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Para tanto, tem em vista três objetivos: mostrar que a intencionalidade não é uma relação externa; provar que a intencionalidade não pressupõe a existência de duas entidades diferentes e; explicitar aspectos necessários para a ocorrência da intencionalidade. O desenvolvimento do estudo está organizado em três capítulos. O primeiro cuida da concepção de intencionalidade em Franz Brentano (1838-1917) e Kasimir Twardowski (1866-1938). Nessa seção, estão contempladas questões sobre a estrutura dos fenômenos psíquicos e a classificação desses fenômenos psíquicos, assim como são assinaladas características da representação, do objeto representado e do conteúdo. O segundo, que constitui o núcleo da dissertação, expõe o conceito de intencionalidade de Husserl, elaborado na Quinta Investigação, alicerçado nas análises e distinções conceituais centrais desse autor. Esse capítulo clarifica a estrutura da vivência intencional; exibe a classificação dos atos e das relações de fundação entre eles e; fornece os quatros sentidos de representação. O terceiro examina as críticas de Husserl às concepções do fenômeno intencional concebidas por Brentano e Twardowski. O resultado desse estudo filosófico indica que: (1) a intencionalidade husserliana tem por fundamento um momento interior da própria vivência; Husserl distingue a consciência dos objetos efetivamente existentes e das representações da fantasia, predições, lembranças etc. (2) o objeto visado intencionalmente não é parte da consciência e nem está contido nela, ou seja, a intencionalidade é caracterizada por sua independência da existência

Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of the metaphysical priority of the present simultaneously validates presence as the absolute form of meaning. In order to succeed, deconstruction is bound to offer the most robust defence of transcendental phenomenology's systematic articulation of the very constitution of experience in its absolute and irrecusably present form. Edmund Husserl's late philosophy of history accounts for the contradiction of atemporal truth—how it is created in time, and how it is possible for the historical investigation of this truth to determine its meaning with absolute certainty. Through the necessity of an ideal and phenomenologically reduced history—not only for the work of historical investigation in its own right, but as a constituent of the meaning of any truth— Derrida explains why Husserl devotes so much effort to explicating the structure and process of the formation of ideal objects in the course of what is ostensively an explanation of the origination of the geometrical science itself out of subjective experience. The purpose of this is only ever implied in Husserl's own work “The Origin of Geometry”, and the implications are subtle. The purpose of this thesis is to detail how the structures of Husserl's system serve the end clearly elucidated by Derrida. It first explains how objective truth is constituted and an ideal history made possible through Husserl's examination of their appearance in the living present, and following this it examines the problems raised by Derrida's deconstruction itself.

No description available.

In this thesis, I investigate the nature of geometric knowledge and its relationship to spatial intuition. My goal is to rehabilitate the Kantian view that Euclid's geometry is a mathematical practice, which is grounded in spatial intuition, yet, nevertheless, yields a type of a priori knowledge about the structure of visual space. I argue for this by showing that Euclid's geometry allows us to derive knowledge from idealized visual objects, i.e., idealized diagrams by means of non-formal logical inferences. By developing such an account of Euclid's geometry, I complete the "standard view" that geometry is either a formal system (pure geometry) or an empirical science (applied geometry), which was developed mainly by the logical positivists and which is currently accepted by many mathematicians and philosophers. My thesis is divided into three parts. I use Hans Reichenbach's arguments against Kant and Edmund Husserl's genetic approach to the concept of space as a means of arguing that the "standard view" has to be supplemented by a concept of a geometry whose propositions have genuine spatial content. I then develop a coherent interpretation of Euclid's method by investigating both the subject matter of Euclid's geometry and the nature of geometric inferences. In the final part of this thesis, I modify Husserl's phenomenological analysis of the constitution of visual space in order to define a concept of spatial intuition that allows me not only to explain how Euclid's practice is grounded in visual space, but also to account for the apriority of its results.

No description available.

Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades / Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Filosofía / El presente escrito contiene los resultados de un trabajo de investigación destinado al cierre de un primer ciclo de estudios de postgrado, en el cual se realizó una filiación entre los filósofos contemporáneos Edith Stein (1891-1942) y Emmanuel Lévinas (1906-1995), a través de la aclaración de su mutua vinculación con la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), pensador crucial en la vida y obra de ambos autores. Esto, con el objetivo de comprender la aparente contradicción entre filosofías que cuentan con la premisa de Dios y filosofías que no lo hacen; contradicción encarnada tanto en Stein como en Lévinas, por cuanto ambos autores, nacidos en familias judías, realizan, cada uno de maneras diversas, una apología del ateísmo, pero manteniendo hasta el fin de sus vidas una fuerte religiosidad. Esta paradoja o indecisión entre ateísmo y religión haría eco de una falta de univocidad general de la filosofía occidental contemporánea en lo que respecta a su pronunciamiento acerca del tema de Dios, por cuanto se trata de una época de cara a una serie de acontecimientos históricos imperdonables que es preciso prevenir definitivamente, pero cuyas fuentes son ambiguas. Ésta, se desarrolla así, como indagadora de las causas de eventos que quiebran el sentido común, que ponen a prueba el pensamiento y cuestionan el que se creía el curso regular de la historia, aquello que se podía esperar y tolerar.

Submitted by Estanislau Santana (estanislaufaustodantas@gmail.com) on 2017-10-03T04:59:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação de Estanislau Fausto.pdf: 968753 bytes, checksum: d7305c6ddcbbc9c38311d04f3b69703b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Biblioteca Isaías Alves (reposiufbat@hotmail.com) on 2017-10-03T13:22:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação de Estanislau Fausto.pdf: 968753 bytes, checksum: d7305c6ddcbbc9c38311d04f3b69703b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-03T13:22:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação de Estanislau Fausto.pdf: 968753 bytes, checksum: d7305c6ddcbbc9c38311d04f3b69703b (MD5) / CAPES / Pretendemos analisar como a estrutura da alma na obra de Descartes, a crítica humeana ao eu e a concepção husserliana da consciência podem estar interligados. Com mais exatidão, queremos averiguar qual foi a resolução dada por Husserl para o conflito entre a posição cartesiana e a humeana sobre a concepção do eu. / We intend to analyze how the structure of the soul in the Descartes´ work, the Hume´s critique about the self and the Husserlian conception of consciousness are intertwined. With more precision, we want to find out what was the solution given by Husserl to the conflict between the positions of Descartes and Hume about the self.

No description available.

La question du temps marque profondément notre siècle. Elle est implicitement et explicitement au cœur des thématiques les plus importantes de notre époque. Traversant toutes les sphères du savoir, le "souci pour Je temps" est présent dans les sciences physiques, avec la théorie de la relativité, dans la philosophie et les sciences humaines, en tant que sciences de l'histoire. Le projet de Husserl n'est pas une exception a cette règle. Au contraire, sa doctrine sur la temporalité est au cœur de sa phénoménologie. À plusieurs égards, c'est sa contribution historique la plus importante et ceci pour plusieurs raisons. D'abord, c'est sa méthode phénoménologique qui permettait pour la première fois l'élucidation systématique de la temporalité immanente et de ses profondes implications sur la connaissance que nous avons de nous-mêmes. De même, la nouveauté radicale de ses vues conduisit à l'existentialisme d'ordre ontologique, où la temporalité joue un rôle primordial ainsi qu'au renouveau de la philosophie de l'histoire. Il est donc essentiel de "retrouver", de repenser ces études sur le temps car, comme nous le verrons elles révèlent une richesse thématique et une profondeur de sens que seules les plus grandes philosophies savent nous offrir. Dans ce travail, nous nous efforcerons d'exposer l'essentiel des recherches phénoménologiques de Husserl sur la temporalité, surtout à travers ses leçons pour une phénoménologie de la conscience du temps œuvre maîtresse en ce domaine. Nous aborderons l'horizon pré-phénoménologique des recherches sur le temps de conscience. Ensuite nous exposerons l'a priori du temps comme structure immanente, pour finalement montrer comment ce temps premier est la source du concept de temps objectif.

Nuestra investigación no solo revisa el contenido implícito en la categoría Sumac Kawsay, la cual implica el holismo cósmico, el respeto por el ecosistema, el equilibrio y el flujo de las recursos naturales y de más elementos, sino además nos es necesario establecer la revisión fenomenológica de este concepto andino en relación a la fenomenología intercultural, desarrollada en la primer capítulo “Mundo de la Vida, cultura e interculturalidad en la fenomenología de E. Husserl”, y en relación al pensamiento intercultural latinoamericano expuesto en nuestro segundo capítulo “La interculturalidad de la filosofía en perspectiva latinoamericana”. Por este motivo revisaremos los contenidos del Sumac Kawsay según el siguiente criterio: elegiremos un conjunto de categorías implícitas en este concepto andino las cuales se revisarán desde la visión fenomenológica e intercultural. En el tercer capítulo se descubre la analogía entre la noción de naturaleza entendida de modo andino como Pachamama y la experiencia fenomenológica de la tierra concebida no como objeto sino como horizonte y hogar; otra analogía se nos descubre entre el relacionismo cósmico de los seres, concebido así entre las comunidades andinas y no menos las amazónicas, y el relacionismo horizóntico entre los mundos familiares y mundos extraños estudiados por Husserl, los cuales conforman un único “hogar”. A su vez, en la experiencia andina se nos ofrece el relieve del conocimiento ancestral, adquirido a través de múltiples experiencias sensoriales, generación tras generación, y ella es análoga a la visión fenomenológica de la historia en Husserl a través de sus desarrollos genéticos y generativos, donde la habitualidad, la pasividad y la asociación constituyen el fundamento de la tradición, la historia y del conocimiento en general. La tesis descubre en el concepto Sumac Kawsay la presencia del multiperspectivismo. A través del auxilio de estudios antropológicos con dirección postestructuralista, observamos entre las comunidades amerindias esta facultad de ver no sólo una exclusiva realidad sino varias realidades y ello según la posición de experiencia de los individuos. / Our research not only reviews the implicit content in the Sumac Kawsay category, which implies cosmic holism, respect for the ecosystem, balance and the flow of natural resources and more elements, but it is also necessary to establish the phenomenological review of this Andean concept in relation to intercultural phenomenology, developed in the first chapter “World of Life, Culture and Interculturality in the Phenomenology of E. Husserl”, and in relation to Latin American intercultural thought exposed in our second chapter “Interculturality of philosophy in Latin American perspective”. For this reason we will review the contents of the Sumac Kawsay according to the following criteria: we will choose a set of categories implicit in this Andean concept which will be reviewed from the phenomenological and intercultural view. In the third chapter we discover the analogy between the notion of nature understood in an Andean way as Pachamama and the phenomenological experience of the earth conceived not as an object but as a horizon and a home; Another analogy is discovered between the cosmic relationism of beings, conceived as such between the Andean communities and no less the Amazonian, and the horizontal relationism between the familiar worlds and strange worlds studied by Husserl, which make up a single “home”. In turn, in the Andean experience we are offered the relief of ancestral knowledge, acquired through multiple sensory experiences, generation after generation, and it is analogous to the phenomenological vision of history in Husserl through its genetic and generative developments , where the habituality, the passivity and the association constitute the foundation of the tradition, the history and the knowledge in general. The thesis discovers in the Sumac Kawsay concept the presence of multiperspectivism. Through the help of anthropological studies with post-structuralist direction, we observe among Amerindian communities this faculty of seeing not only an exclusive reality but several realities and this according to the position of experience of the individuals.