Orientador: Simone Silva de Deos / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-25T16:06:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ramos_LumaSouza_M.pdf: 2334727 bytes, checksum: f53346f9edf5549c88e52ec74363fe6e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Resumo: A partir de 2003-2004, inaugurou-se um novo ciclo conjuntural virtuoso na economia brasileira. Ao longo da conjuntura de expansão, as perspectivas e performances dos agentes nacionais se diferenciaram, aproveitando um leque mais amplo de oportunidades que se abriu. As corporações brasileiras utilizaram as melhorias no cenário interno e externo para aprimorar os seus parques industriais, os modelos de gestão, as estratégias concorrenciais e as estruturas patrimoniais. Elas também intensificaram os investimentos em participação e aquisição de outras corporações; direcionaram seus esforços rumo ao crescimento das operações, à diversificação, à sofisticação das aplicações financeiras e à internacionalização das plantas produtivas. Nesse cenário, destaca-se um episódio singular para a economia do Brasil: um conjunto de empresas não-financeiras nacionais apresentaram perdas importantes e se encontraram em situações de de ausência de liquidez e, em alguns casos, insolvência e que, por conseguinte, deram origem à reestruturações organizacionais. Aproximadamente duzentas empresas, segundo dados do BNDES (2011), estavam operando com alta alavancagem no mercado de câmbio e especulando por uma apreciação do real frente ao dólar, em operações target forward. A partir desse entendimento, o objetivo desse trabalho é, com base no arcabouço teórico minskyano, em especial sua hipótese da instabilidade financeira, e tendo como referência as características específicas da economia brasileira, analisar o caso das corporações brasileiras envolvidas em especulação com derivativos cambiais, em 2008. Usar-se-á, nesse intuito, um episódio representativo, o da Sadia (SADIA S.A.). A tipificação deste caso pode ora se contrapor às mudanças nos instrumentos de atuação e opções estratégicas do empresariado nacional, ora comprovar a existência de um capitalismo brasileiro contraditório que leva a sequentes crises e flutuações econômicas. A hipótese que permeará a discussão é que certas empresas brasileiras no momento de bonança e relativa estabilidade macroeconômica, aproveitando-se das demais características existentes no período compreendido entre 2003-2008, passaram a se posicionar, crescentemente, de forma alavancada e especulativa no mercado financeiro, a fim de obterem maiores rendimentos não operacionais no curto prazo, fenômeno este que pode ser enquadrado na perspectiva da Hipótese da Instabilidade Financeira (HIF) de Minsky. Tal comportamento pode ser associado à idéia minskyana de que em períodos de relativa estabilidade e/ou de crescimento econômico, os agentes, ao terem suas expectativas concretizadas e, com consequente, aumento de lucratividade, tendem a diminuir suas percepções de risco, a se alavancarem e, por conseguinte, a deteriorarem suas margens de segurança. Desta forma, períodos de relativa estabilidade conduzem e germinam as sementes para a instabilidade e para as crises. Logo, as conjunturas econômicas, internas e externas, influenciam na tomada de decisão e na alocação dos portfólios dos agentes / Abstract: From 2003-2004, started a new virtuous economic cycle in the Brazilian economy. Along the scenario of expansion, the prospects and performance of national officials differed by leveraging a wide range of opportunities opened. Brazilian corporations used the improvements in the internal and external environment to enhance its industrial parks, business models, competitive strategies and equity structures. They also stepped up investments in participation and acquiring other corporations; directed their operations towards growth, diversification, sophistication of financial investments and internationalization of production plant's efforts. In this scenario, there is a unique episode for Brazil's economy: a set of national non-financial companies reported major losses and found themselves in situations of lack of liquidity and, sometimes, insolvency and therefore gave rise to organizational restructuring. Approximately two hundred companies, according to data from BNDES (2011), were operating with high leverage in the foreign exchange market and speculating on the real appreciation against the dollar in target forward operations. The aim of this work is with a minskian theoretical framework, in particular his financial instability hypothesis, and with reference to the specific characteristics of the Brazilian economy, consider the case of Brazilian corporations involved in speculation on currency derivatives, in 2008. In this order, this study will analyze a representative episode, the Sadia (Sadia SA). This case interpretation can sometimes counteract the changes in the instruments of action and strategic options of the national business, now prove the existence of an adversarial Brazilian capitalism that leads to sequential crises and economic fluctuations. The hypothesis that will permeate the discussion is that certain Brazilian companies at the time of prosperity and relative macroeconomic stability, taking advantage of other existing features in the period 2003-2008, began to put themselves, increasingly so leveraged and speculative financial market to get higher non-operating income in the short-term, a phenomenon that can fix in the context of the Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) Minsky. Such behavior could be associated with minskian idea that during periods of relative stability and / or economic growth, the agents when they realized their expectations and, so, increased profitability, tend to decrease their risk perceptions, to leverage and therefore, the safety margins deteriorate. Therefore, periods of relative stability and lead germinate the seeds of instability and seizures. So, economically, internal and external contexts influence in decision-making and allocation of portfolios of agents / Mestrado / Teoria Economica / Mestra em Ciências Econômicas

Through the study's analysis with background to theories and previous research, it turns out that financial instability is hidden in boom and economic stability. Where causes are speculation, optimism, risk-taking and credit expansion. Minsky (1982a) pointed out, among other things, that high debt ratio increases the risk of financial instability, which is an effect of the lavish lending, partly as a result of global financing. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether there was a state of financial instability prior to Sweden's crises, focusing on Sweden's three most recent crises: the financial crisis of 1990, the IT bubble of 2000 and the financial crisis of 2008. The study illustrates how Minsky's financial instability hypothesis that "stability breeds instability" also can explain the emergence of Swedish crises. The result shows that there is a clear link between increased debt before crises. / Genom studiens analys med bakgrund till teorier och tidigare forskning visar det sig att finansiell instabilitet döljer sig i högkonjunktur och ekonomisk stabilitet. Där orsaker som ligger till grund är spekulation, optimism, risktagning och kreditexpansion. Minsky (1982a) pekade bland annat på att hög skuldkvot ökar risken för finansiell instabilitet, något som är en effekt av den frikostiga kreditgivningen, bland annat som en följd av den globala finansieringen. Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka om där funnits ett tillstånd av finansiell instabilitet innan Sveriges kriser, med fokus på Sveriges tre senaste kriser: finanskrisen 1990, it-bubblan 2000 och finanskrisen 2008. Studien åskådliggör hur Minskys finansiella instabilitetshypotes om att "stability breeds instability" även kan förklara uppkomsten av svenska kriser. Resultatet visar på att det finns ett tydligt samband mellan ökad skuldsättning innan kriser.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-01-13T13:27:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2015-09-22. Added 1 bitstream(s) on 2016-01-13T13:31:09Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 000856006.pdf: 1011962 bytes, checksum: ae9cc4f639460c8cca986610b4227af7 (MD5) / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) / O capitalismo se reproduz através de processos contraditórios. O sistema, em sua fase mais moderna, de acumulação financeirizada, tende a crises especulativas que os mecanismos de mercado não são capazes de regular. Esse é o argumento de teóricos da corrente pós-keynesiana que se propõem a investigar quais comportamentos geram e agravam crises financeiras. Depois da crise iniciada no sistema financeiro norte-americano, Hyman Minsky (1919-1996), pouco abordado até então, voltou ao debate sobre o funcionamento do sistema financeiro e sua regulamentação. Para muitos, a trajetória percorrida pela economia mundial e a ruptura do sistema financeiro se enquadram nas análises do autor, a ponto de ser possível considerar ter havido um Momento Minsky: um profundo e repentino colapso precedido por calmaria e bonança. Através da caracterização da abordagem de Minsky, essa dissertação se propõe a avançar no entendimento do sistema financeiro à procura das causas e corretivos da fragilidade financeira ilustrada pela crise subprime recente / Capitalism reproduces itself through contradictory processes. The system, in its latest phase of financialized accumulation tends to speculative crisis that market mechanisms are not able to regulate. This is the post-Keynesians theoretical argument that intend to investigate what behaviors determine and aggravate the crisis. After the crisis that had trigger in the US financial system, the Post Keynesian Hyman Minsky (1919 - 1996), little explored so far, returned to the discourses of the function of the financial system and its regulation. For many, the road taken by the world economy and the breakdown of the financial system fit into the analysis of the author as to be possible to consider that there was a Minsky moment: a deep and sudden collapse preceded by lull and calm. Through the characterization of Minsky's methodology, this dissertation aims to advance the understanding of the financial system in search for the causes and remedies of Minsky fragility illustrated by the recent subprime crisis

Orientador: Otaviano Canuto dos Santos Filho / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-23T18:17:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 FerreiraJunior_ReynaldoRubem_D.pdf: 5042618 bytes, checksum: 5534d34883098b2356ebb937bccc1c57 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1998 / Resumo: Não informado / Abstract: Not informed. / Doutorado / Doutor em Economia

Orientador: Antonio Carlos Macedo e Silva / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-24T20:54:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lourenco_AndreLuisCabralde_M.pdf: 568765 bytes, checksum: ac09978322f35dcea2694233897347d2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1999 / Mestrado

Submitted by Maykon Nascimento (maykon.albani@hotmail.com) on 2014-09-29T18:22:11Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Dissertacao.Alysson.texto.pdf: 2231272 bytes, checksum: e5edb7bcb5adb822f037f33c3fef9aab (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Elizabete Silva (elizabete.silva@ufes.br) on 2014-11-17T18:51:57Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Dissertacao.Alysson.texto.pdf: 2231272 bytes, checksum: e5edb7bcb5adb822f037f33c3fef9aab (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-11-17T18:51:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23148 bytes, checksum: 9da0b6dfac957114c6a7714714b86306 (MD5) Dissertacao.Alysson.texto.pdf: 2231272 bytes, checksum: e5edb7bcb5adb822f037f33c3fef9aab (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Diante do colapso financeiro de 2008, este trabalho retoma a teoria econômica proposta por Hyman P. Minsky com o objetivo de esclarecer as circunstâncias que propiciaram uma crise financeira tão profunda. A estrutura analítica de Minsky é marcada pela Hipótese da Instabilidade Financeira, a qual aponta para fatores endógenos ao próprio sistema capitalista como o principal causador de instabilidades financeiras. Este processo, caracterizado principalmente por um avanço desfavorável no nível de endividamento dos agentes, constrói um ciclo de estágios que pode se desenvolver para uma crise financeira ou um colapso sistêmico, definidos como “Momento Minsky” e “Colapso Minsky”. Este cenário descrito por Minsky, também analisado à luz de teorias mais recentes como as de Gary A. Dymski e Alessandro Vercelli, é conhecido por “ciclo minskyano”. Ao adotar estes preceitos da análise teórica de Minsky, é possível visualizar como o processo de desregulamentação e fragilização financeira dos Estados Unidos nas décadas de 1980 e 1990 proveram condições para a crise do subprime e, posteriormente, o colapso financeiro de 2008. De maneira similar, é possível observar que a análise teórica de Minsky também é aplicável à crise que afeta a economia brasileira no final de 2008. A fragilização financeira que se inicia no Brasil poucos anos antes da crise, acentuada no setor exportador de commodities, cria a condição para o “momento Minsky brasileiro”, demonstrando que apesar das falhas da análise teórica de Minsky, que supõe uma economia fechada com características da economia estadunidense, é possível visualizar uma relação de causa e efeito da recente crise financeira com a teoria minskyana. / Having in sight the world's financial collapse of 2008, this dissertation takes up the economic theory proposed by Hyman P. Minsky aiming to clarify the circumstances that led to so deep financial crisis. Minsky’s analytical framework was built on the Financial Instability Hypothesis, which identifies in the internal dynamics of the capitalistic system as the main cause of its financial upswings and downturns. This process, characterized by the progressive indebtedness of economic agents, builds itself in a cycle of predefined stages that often reach the apex of a financial crisis or a systemic collapse, best known in the literature, respectively, as “Minsky Moment” and “Minsky Collapse”. Minsky's overall approach to the financial modus operandi of modern economies was complemented by the more recent contributions of Gary A. Dymski and Alessandro Vercelli, who explored the idea of a Miskian cycle. By reviewing these theories in some detail, it is possible to see how the process of the deregulation and financial weakness of the United States in the 1980s and 1990s paved the way to the subprime crisis and, later, of the 2008 financial collapse. Similarly, is possible to observe that Minsky’s theory is also applicable to the Brazilian financial crisis in 2008. The financial fragility that began to develop in Brazil some years prior to the crisis, mainly in the commodities export sector, created the conditions for the “Brazilian Minsky’s moment”, demonstrating that despite some limitations of Minsky's analysis, such as the assumption of a closed economy, his theory offers important insights not only into the operation of financial markets in fully advanced economies but also in the emerging ones as well.

Orientadores: Daniela Magalhães Prates, Rogério Pereira de Andrade / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-25T08:01:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Hatto_Bruno_M.pdf: 2532131 bytes, checksum: 7a4520719a17340411607fc2243a07f2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Resumo: A crise econômica que atingiu o Japão durante os anos 1990 interrompeu uma trajetória de quarenta anos de forte crescimento, que conduziu o país de um cenário destruído pela guerra à posição de segunda maior economia do mundo nos anos 1960. O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar os determinantes e consequências dessa crise, utilizando-se como referencial teórico a Hipótese da Instabilidade Financeira desenvolvida por Hyman Minsky. Procura-se argumentar que a forma de atuação dos principais agentes econômicos japoneses (empresas, bancos e famílias) após as mudanças verificadas nos contextos doméstico e externo nos anos 1970 e 1980, cuja interação culminou na crise, pode ser compreendida a partir da teoria minskyana, embora sejam necessárias algumas adaptações para sua aplicação a este caso específico Os argumentos estão organizados da seguinte forma. No primeiro capítulo, apresenta-se a perspectiva teórica utilizada, com base na contribuição original de Minsky e nas análises dessa contribuição realizadas por outros autores pós-keynesianos. No segundo capítulo, descreve-se as principais características do arranjo institucional liderado pelo Estado japonês para estimular o investimento e recuperar a economia do país após a segunda guerra mundial, implantado entre 1950 e o primeiro choque do petróleo em 1973. No terceiro capítulo, analisa-se a desestruturação desse arranjo durante os anos 1970 e 1980, mostrando seus reflexos sobre o comportamento dos agentes e o processo de formação da bolha especulativa no final da década de 1980. Apresenta-se ainda os impactos da desaceleração dos preços dos principais ativos no desempenho da economia japonesa ao longo dos anos 1990, bem como as medidas implementadas pelas autoridades econômicas com o intuito de estimular sua recuperação / Abstract: The economic crisis that stroke Japan during the 1990s broke the growth trajectory that had started forty years earlier and transformed a country destroyed by the Second World War into the second biggest economy in the planet in the 1960s. This paper analyses the causes and consequences of this crisis, using Hyman Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis. It argues that the behavior of the main economic agents (enterprises, banks and families) after the changes in the world and domestic economies occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, whose interaction led to the crisis, can be understood under the Minskyan theory, with a few adaptations to this specific case. The paper is separated into three chapters: in the first chapter, it presents the main aspects of Minsky's theory used in the analysis with the contributions of other post-Keynesian authors. In the second chapter, it describes the institutional arrangement commanded by the Japan State that stimulated the economy's recovery between the 1950s and the first oil shock in 1973. In the third chapter, it analyzes how this arrangement was broken during the 1970s and the 1980s, showing the reflexes of this process in the agents' behavior and the formation of the economic bubble in the end of the decade. It also presents the impacts of the deceleration of the asset's prices in the Japanese economy in the 1990s and the actions taken by the economic authorities looking to stimulate the recovery / Mestrado / Teoria Economica / Mestre em Ciências Econômicas

Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis is used to construct two different indices for financial instability: a long-term index (Long Term Financial Instability) and a short-term index (Short Term Financial Instability). The former focuses on the underlying fragility of financial structures of units in the economy while the latter focuses on more immediate developments and manages to follow turmoil – “a financial crisis” – in the economy. The interplay of the indices with each other, with economic growth and with Foreign Direct Investment, both in general and in the financial industry, is probed. In short, we find that long term financial stability, i.e. secure financial structures in the economy or a low level of Long Term Financial Instability, is sacrificed for maintaining short term financial stability. However, more Long Term Financial Instability is associated, as Minsky expected, with more fluctuations in Short Term Financial Instability: market turmoil is more common the more fragile underlying financial structures of units in the economy are. This signals that markets are ruled by short-termism. Economic growth is harmed by Short Term Financial Instability but the effects of Long Term Financial Instability are weaker. The common expectation that FDI activities strengthen financial stability is not confirmed. The relationship found hints rather in the opposite direction: FDI activities seem to cause financial instability. Based on the those investigations and a further empirical work using data from Iceland, Leigh Harkness’s Optimum Exchange Rate System (OERS) is developed further with the intention of solving “The Policy Problem” as described by Minsky. Insights from control theory are used. The OERS, along with public debt management as carried out by Keynes, is argued to have the ability to keep economic activity in the state of a permanent “quasi-boom”. The policy implications are that the OERS should be considered as a monetary policy as it permits a free flow of capital, thereby allowing economies to reap the possible positive benefits of foreign direct investment, while still conserving financial stability.

The phenomenal financial expansion of the last decades has been characterised by an exacerbation of systemic instability and an increase in the frequency of financial crises, culminating in the recent meltdown in the US financial sector. The literature on financial crises has developed concomitantly, but despite a large number of papers written on this subject, economists are still struggling to understand the underlying determinants of these phenomena. In this dissertation, I argue that one of the reasons for this apparent failure is the way agents, as well as the environment in which they evolve, are modelled in this literature. After reviewing the existing literature on international financial crises, I outline an alternative framework, drawing from Post-Keynesian and Behavioural insights. In this framework, international financial crises are seen as being a direct consequence of the way agents formulate expectations in an environment of fundamental uncertainty and the investment and financial decisions they subsequently take. I argue that the psychological heuristics agents use in formulating expectations under fundamental uncertainty can lead to decisions which fragilise the economy and can thus be conducive to financial crises. I then apply this framework to the study of the 2000-2001 financial crisis in Turkey, which is notorious for not lending itself easily to explanations based on the existing theoretical literature on international financial crises. After outlining the crisis and reviewing the main existing accounts, I identify two moments prior to the crisis: A phase of increasing financial fragility, lasting from a previous crisis in 1994 to 1999, and a financial bubble in 2000 during the implementation of an IMF stabilisation program, partly predicated on the previous increase in financial fragility. My framework can account for both periods; it fits particularly well the first one and enhances the explanatory content of existing stories about the events that took place in 2000.

本文以Minsky金融不穩定假說 (Financial Instability Hypothesis) 為基礎，闡述Minsky對於資本經濟不穩定現象的理論，並且對於Minsky強調不穩定情況下的大政府 (Big Government) 做一更詳細的說明。 金融不穩定假說反應著資本經濟體系的不穩定是一種內生、而且是常態的現象，透過制度結構的改變、法令與經濟單位的外生性反應將經濟維持在穩定的狀況。不穩定的情況始於對經濟前景的過份樂觀態度，隨著危機記憶的過去，風險趨避的態度也逐漸消逝，融通態度變得更為投機，因此提升經濟發生不穩定的機率。 在不穩定一蹴可幾的情形下，Minsky認為，唯有大政府的存在，適當的介入不穩定危機中，不穩定情況才能逐漸趨緩。大政府的存在是透過政府赤字的利潤效果、政府公債的資產負債效果，以及移轉性支付的所得效果來穩定金融、經濟的不穩定。因此，本文以台灣在民國87~88年間發生的金融危機為例，為Minsky的假說做一驗證。實證結果顯示，支持Minsky的假說，並且政府在驗證期間內，的確發揮上述的三效果。