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191	Motivating Emotional Content Sheredos, Benjamin 20 April 2009 (has links) Among philosophers of the emotions, it is common to view emotional content as purely descriptive – that is, belief-like or perception-like. I argue that this is a mistake. The intentionality of the emotions cannot be understood in isolation from their motivational character, and emotional content is also inherently directive – that is, desire-like. This view’s strength is its ability to explain a class of emotional behaviors that I argue, the common view fails to explain adequately. I claim that it is already implicit in leading theories of emotion elicitation in cognitive psychology – “appraisal theories.” The result is a deeper understanding of emotional intentionality. Employing Peter Goldie’s “Feeling Theory” of the emotions as an example of the common view, I suggest that emotional feelings, too, should be understood on this model: emotional feelings toward items in the world cannot be disentangled from felt motivation. Causal self-reference Intentions-in-action Emotional motivation Action tendencies Besires Pushmi-pullyu representations Action Phenomenology Intentionality Emotional content Direction of fit Feeling toward Feelings Emotions Philosophy
192	The Proper Metric of Justice in Justice as Fairness Carmichael, Charles Benjamin 08 May 2009 (has links) I explore the problem of using primary goods as the index for determining the least-advantaged members in a society in Rawls’s theory of justice. I look at the problems presented to Rawls by Amartya Sen and his capabilities approach. I discuss the solutions to Sen’s problems given by Norman Daniels, who argues that primary goods are able to take capabilities into account. Finally, I supplement Daniels, arguing that the parameters Rawls uses to define his theory limit Sen’s objection and that primary goods are the appropriate metric of justice in Rawls’s theory. Amartya Sen Metric of justice John Rawls Justice as fairness Capabilities Disabled Theory of justice Norman Daniels Philosophy
193	Kantian Conceptualism and Apperception Miller, Raleigh S 08 May 2009 (has links) In this paper I argue, with many leading commentators, that Kant is a conceptualist. I support this conclusion, argued for independently by Hannah Ginsborg and John McDowell, by appeal to the analyticity of Kant’s apperception principle in the transcendental deduction. I argue that the apperception principle, if taken as an analytic proposition, implies that any mental representation that figures into discursive cognition is the product of a priori synthesis. I further argue that making a priori synthesis a condition for the possibility of any mental representation is sufficient to make mental representation conceptual in the relevant sense. This, I argue, strongly suggests that Kant is a conceptualist. Conceptualism Immanuel Kant Apperception Wilfrid Sellars John McDowell Philosophy
194	The Role of Afterlife Myths in Plato's Moral Arguments Issler, Daniel William 18 May 2009 (has links) I will address the issue of Plato’s use of myths concerning the afterlife in the context of the ethical arguments of the Gorgias, Phaedo and Republic, and I will contend that while the arguments in each dialogue are aimed at convincing the rational part of the self, the myths are aimed at persuading the non-rational part of the self. In support of this interpretation, I will examine Plato’s views on the relation between the different parts of the soul and the relationship that poetry and myth have to philosophy. I will argue that Plato’s use of myth is a legitimate tactic in his project of moral education, given his views concerning the role that the non-rational parts of the self play in one’s moral life. Republic Phaedo Rhetoric Afterlife Myth Gorgias Socrates Plato Philosophy
195	Drug Addiction and Personal Responsibility Reagan, Andrew Shawn 04 April 2009 (has links) This project examines drug addiction and personal responsibility from the perspective of three different types of theories of addiction: full responsibility, diminished responsibility, and no responsibility. The rational theory of addiction is the fully responsibility theory. The philosophical insights by R. Jay Wallace and George Graham are the diminished responsibility theories. Berridge and Robinson’s Incentive Salience theory of drug addiction is the no responsibility theory examined. My conclusion is that diminished responsibility frameworks are the most suitable in a therapeutic context because they are most sensitive to relevant normative aspects. drug addiction personal responsibility Philosophy
196	Moral Injury and the Puzzle of Immunity-Violation Gero, Jesse 18 August 2010 (has links) The First Amendment gives U.S. citizens a Hohfeldian legal immunity that disables Congress from removing citizens’ legal liberty to criticize the government. Any attempt by Congress to remove this liberty would fail, but such an attempt would still wrong citizens. The familiar concept of claim-violation does not fully account for this wrong. Claims name actions that ought not be performed and are violated when those actions are performed. Immunities names actions that cannot be performed. Congress would wrong citizens not by doing something it ought not do but by attempting and failing to do something it cannot do. Using elements of Jean Hampton’s expressive theory of punishment, I analyze Congress’ attempt (and other similar acts) as an expressive act that denies the existence of immunities. Congress’ immunity-“contradiction” would wrong U.S. citizens by denying the value that generates the immunity, by causing damage to the acknowledgement of the citizens’ value, and by threatening the existence of the immunity. Expressive wrong First amendment Hampton Hohfeld Rights Moral injury Philosophy
197	Mindreading, Language and Simulation DeChant, Ryan C 01 August 2010 (has links) Mindreading is the capacity to attribute psychological states to others and to use those attributions to explain, predict, and understand others’ behaviors. In the past thirty years, mindreading has become the topic of substantial interdisciplinary research and theorizing, with philosophers, psychologists and, more recently, neuroscientists, all contributing to the debate about the nature of the neuropsychological mechanisms that constitute the capacity for mindreading. In this thesis I push this debate forward by using recent results from developmental psychology as the basis for critiques of two prominent views of mindreading. First, I argue that the developmental studies provide evidence of infant mindreading and therefore expose a flaw in José Bermúdez’s view that certain forms of mindreading require language possession. Second, I argue that the evidence of infant mindreading can also be used to undermine Alvin Goldman’s version of Simulation Theory. Mindreading Theory of mind Social cognition Propositional attitudes False-belief tasks Non-verbal false-belief tasks Violation-of-expectation paradigm Concept possession Non-linguistic cognition Second-order cognitive dynamics Access consciousness Metarepresentation Simulation theory Executive function Inhibitory control Philosophy
198	The Promise and Limits of Natural Normativity in a Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics Clewell, Timothy J. 15 April 2011 (has links) In this thesis I distinguish between two conceptions of naturalism that have been offered as possible starting points for a virtue based ethics. The first version of naturalism is characterized by Philippa Foot’s project in Natural Goodness. The second version of naturalism can be found, in various forms, among the works of John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, and Rosalind Hursthouse. I argue that neither naturalistic approach is entirely successful on its own, but that we can fruitfully carve a path between both approaches that points the way to a positive ethical account. I then conclude with a brief sketch of what such a positive account of a virtue ethics may look like. Philippa Foot John McDowell Martha Nussbaum Rosalind Hursthouse Aristotle Virtue ethics Naturalism. Philosophy
199	Nietzsche on Copernicus Callahan, Shane C 19 April 2011 (has links) I show that we have reason to believe a view on scientific theory change can be discerned in what I call the “Copernicus passages” of Nietzsche’s published work—specifically, the incommensurability thesis. Since this view denies what Maudemarie Clark calls the “equivalence principle,” she claims incommensurability cannot reasonably be attributed to Nietzsche. I argue, however, that we can reasonably attribute incommensurability to Nietzsche in the Copernicus passages, so my reading should not be ruled out. The first upshot to this project is that I provide a reading of passages that have received no scholarly attention to date. The second upshot is that we can understand Copernicus in light of the broader, better-known themes in Nietzsche’s published work: Nietzsche’s moral skepticism about the value of self-denial motivates his opposition to the ascetic ideal and to the emerging dogmas of scientists. Nietzsche Immanuel Kant Maudemarie Clark Thomas Kuhn Science Ascetic ideals Philosophy
200	Friends with Benefits: Other Regard in Epicurean Ethics Baird, William P 11 August 2011 (has links) Friendship and hedonism are both major components of Epicureanism. I attempt to relieve the tension that seems to follow from endorsing both of these. I argue that Epicurean friendships require valuing a friend’s well-being in the same way as one’s own and that embarking on such friendships is what David Schmidtz terms a maieutic end – one that is achieved by taking on a new set of ends. This conception fits with other-regarding concern that is espoused throughout the Epicurean texts discussing friendship and, as I argue, remains consistent with other psychological and ethical commitments of Epicureanism. Friendship Epicureanism Epicurus Hedonism Ethical egoism Maieutic ends Philosophy

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