In this paper I discuss retributivist justifications for legal punishment. I argue that the main moral retributivist theories advanced so far fail to support a plausible system of legal punishment. As an alternative, I suggest, with some reservations, the legal retributivism advanced by Alan Brudner in his Punishment and Freedom.

Robert Kane asserts that some decisions and actions which are made by an agent are undetermined. These undetermined decisions are what allow an agent to have free will and ultimate responsibility for her decisions and actions. Kane appeals to probabilistic causation in order to argue that these undetermined decisions are not arbitrary or random. I argue that Woodward’s interventionist approach to causation can be used by Kane to make his theory of free will more plausible by illustrating how the agent causes her decision. Woodward’s account can link an agent’s reasons with her decision, activity in her self-network with her decision, and can render undetermined decisions plural rational, plural voluntary, and plural voluntarily controlled.

In pursuit of a just political order, Will Kymlicka has defended a liberal conception of multiculturalism. The persuasive appeal of his argument, like that of secular-liberalism more generally, is due to presenting liberalism as a neutral and universal political project. Utilizing Charles Taylor’s genealogy of ‘exclusive humanism’ in A Secular Age, this thesis attempts to re-read Kymlicka in order to make certain theological commitments in his work explicit. Here I argue that Kymlicka, in order to make his conception of multiculturalism plausible, relies on a theologically-thick and controversial humanism operating under secular conditions of belief. By committing himself to a particular conception of the human and specific conditions of belief, Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism is rendered provincially incoherent because it fails to treat in a neutral manner certain theological commitments.

Brian Leiter is one of the few Nietzsche interpreters who argue that Nietzsche rejects all forms of free will. Leiter argues that Nietzsche is an incompatibilist and rejects libertarian free will. He further argues that since Nietzsche is an epiphenomenalist about conscious willing, his philosophy of action cannot support any conception of free will. Leiter also offers deflationary readings of those passages where Nietzsche seemingly ascribes free will to historical figures or types. In this paper I argue against all of these conclusions. In the first section I show that, on the most charitable interpretation, Nietzsche is not an epiphenomenalist. In the second section I trace Nietzsche’s alleged incompatibilism through three of his works and offer reasons to be skeptical of the claim that Nietzsche was a committed incompatibilist. Finally, I argue that Nietzsche is not being sarcastic or unacceptably revisionary when he makes positive ascriptions of free will.

This thesis compares philosophers Ken Wilber (Integralism) and Leonard Peikoff (Objectivism), who argue that Western philosophy is saturated with a fallacious mind/body dichotomy, which they trace historically and psychologically. Wilber’s and Peikoff’s agendas, worldviews and starting points are contrasted, specifically, Wilber’s holons, Kosmos model, the Big Three Value Spheres and Peikoff’s metaphysical axioms. Their definitions of consciousness are reviewed, along with their mutual epistemological emphasis on knowledge as contextual. Wilber makes mystical validity claims supported by stages of cognitive development. Discussed attributes of the mind/body dualism are: regression and repression; control versus chaos; hedonism, uniformity and authoritarianism; Subjectivism and Intrinsicism; Ego-agency versus Eco-communion. Both philosophers maintain that each partial strategy collapses into the dysfunctions of the opposite strategy. Their respective models of resolution through integration are presented in conclusion, particularly Wilber’s case for nondual Self-realization.

The world’s human population is presently politically organized into an international system of territorially-defined nation-states. Each nation-state claims sovereign rights to non-interference and self-determination which minimize the legitimate influence of all other nation-states on the conduct of its internal affairs. International political discourse using the concept of human rights has become increasingly influential in addressing the regulation and restrictions of coercive activity that governing institutions can exact upon citizen populations. If there are universal human rights that all persons possess regardless of national affiliation, does this include basic economic rights that should insure all persons the basic economic goods necessary for healthy subsistence? Philosophers working within the state of nature contractual theory of government philosophical tradition, including Hobbes, Locke, Nozick, and Rawls, reach contradictory conclusions regarding the existence of universal basic economic rights. More recently, Shue has provided arguments affirming the existence of universal basic economic rights.

In contemporary philosophy of mind, the issue of consciousness has taken center stage. Broadly speaking, those who deal with consciousness fall into two camps: those who prioritize empirical work and those who favor conceptual investigation. One prominent argument has served to deepen the divide: the argument for the possibility of zombies. In this paper I intend to examine closely this argument, as it’s presented by David Chalmers, and some of the attempts to discredit it. In so doing, I present some of my own arguments against it, as well as the claim that if it’s sound, then materialism is false. Finally, I present a sketch of a new way of thinking about consciousness that would, I argue, guard against the threat—real or merely apparent—of arguments such as the zombie-argument.

Rossian moral pluralism’s rejection of a founding moral principle and use of ‘prima facie duties’ as opposed to absolute duties makes it unique from most other major ethical theories. It has been attacked in a myriad of different ways because of this. Brad Hooker has proposed two objections based on these ideas. The first is that moral pluralism is lacking justification because of its rejection of a founding moral principle. The second is that because of this, and its lack of absolute duties, moral pluralism is an indeterminate theory. In this paper I will look at Hooker’s objections as well as two responses that have been proposed as solutions. Having shown these solutions to be insufficient I will then propose a way to look at Ross’ moral pluralism that saves it from Hooker’s objections and clearly lays out Ross’ understanding of how we should deliberate about moral matters.

This thesis addresses the historic debate between natural law theorists and positivists. After providing a foundation for the debate by discussing the thirteenth century natural law theory of St. Thomas Aquinas and the criticisms of it by positivist philosopher John Austin, this thesis turns to the theory of H.L.A. Hart. My primary aim is to outline a defense of the soft positivism of H.L.A. Hart in face of the criticisms of Ronald Dworkin by appealing to two nonexclusive roots of moral principles in the law: justice and criminal law.

Lucretius’ symmetry argument is always understood as a simple addition to Epicurus’ deprivation argument. Both are based on same presuppositions and both are referring to the state of being dead. However, by closer examination, we can see that they are using different perspectives. The symmetry argument adopts a first-person perspective, whereas the deprivation argument adopts a third-person perspective. According to this difference, it can be further inferred that the symmetry argument actually provides a very important supplemental argument for the deprivation argument by trying to bridge the potential gap in the deprivation argument.