This paper discusses the puzzle introduced by Jennifer Saul, which involves swapping coreferential proper names in simple sentences such as (1) Benito dresses as Clark Kent, and (1*) Benito dresses as Superman. While the traditional Frege's puzzle suggests that such substitutions do not change the truth value of a sentence, Saul's puzzle suggests otherwise. My paper explains Saul's proposed solution based on conversational implicatures and argues against it. Then I introduce a different solution called the Shifty-Fregean solution, which states that proper names in some contexts refer to their senses rather than the reference. The paper argues that this solution is better than Saul's and outlines a new approach to Saul's puzzle. The paper is divided into three sections. First, I will provide an overview of Saul's puzzle and Frege's puzzle. Second, I will discuss Saul's solution and its rejection. Finally, I will develop the Shifty-Fregean solution. / Master of Arts / This paper discusses the puzzle introduced by Jennifer Saul, which involves swapping coreferential proper names (i.e. names that refer to the same object) in simple sentences such as (1) Benito dresses as Clark Kent, and (1*) Benito dresses as Superman. While the traditional Frege's puzzle suggests that such substitutions do not change the truth value of a sentence, Saul's puzzle suggests that they do. My paper explains Saul's proposed solution based on conversational implicatures (i.e. inferences that speakers make based on the literal meaning and the context of the conversation) and argues against it. Then I introduce a different solution called the Shifty-Fregean solution, which states that proper names in some contexts refer to their senses rather than the reference. The paper argues that this solution is better than Saul's and outlines a new approach to Saul's puzzle. The paper is divided into three sections. First, I will provide an overview of Saul's puzzle and Frege's puzzle. Second, I will discuss Saul's solution and its rejection. Finally, I will develop the Shifty-Fregean solution.

Selon Asher (2013), la cohérence discursive force l’inférence de (1c) dans les exemples (1a)-(1b), expliquant ainsi l’(in)acceptabilité des exemples. (1) a. ‘John a un nombre pair d’enfants. Il en a 4.’ b. ‘ ? ?John a un nombre pair d’enfants. Il en a 3.’ c. +> John a n enfants et pas plus Nous avons tenté de déterminer si les implicatures nécessaires au maintien de la cohérence discursive sont systématiquement inférées en nous appuyant sur les théories de la RST et de la SDRT. Des tests linguistiques et la vérification du respect des contraintes sémantiques associées aux relations de discours ont mis en évidence deux catégories d’exemples contenant le quantificateur certains : ceux de type- RenfNA, dont les implicatures ne sont pas nécessaires à la cohérence et ceux de typeRenfA dans lesquels elles le sont. Nos tests ayant révélé que le renforcement est nécessaire dans les exemples de typeRenfA, nous avons conclu que les implicatures ne sont pas systématiquement inférées. Nous avons tenté d’apporter une explication à ce phénomène en effectuant des analyses de la structure discursive de nos exemples et avons démontré que dans les exemples de typeRenfNA, les relations de discours visent le constituant π∃ (certains), tandis que dans ceux de typeRenfA, le constituant π¬∀ (mais pas tous) est visé. Nos travaux ont démontré que les implicatures scalaires ne sont pas systématiquement inférées rendant parfois leur renforcement obligatoire. Nous avons également proposé un modèle à granularité fine prenant en compte la structure discursive et la pragmatique afin d’expliquer ce phénomène. / According to Asher (2013), discourse coherence forces the inference of (2c) in examples (2a)-(2b), thus explaining the (in)acceptability of these examples. (2) a. ‘John has an even number of children. He has 4.’ b. ‘??John has an even number of children. He has 3.’ c. +> John has n children and not more We attempted to determine whether the implicatures that are necessary to maintain discourse coherence are systematically inferred by drawing on the theories of RST and SDRT. Through linguistic tests and checking the respect of semantic constraints associated with discourse relations, we identified two categories of examples containing the quantifier some: typeRenfNA examples, in which implicatures are not necessary for discourse coherence, and typeRenfA examples in which they are. As our tests revealed that reinforcement is necessary in typeRenfA examples, we concluded that implicatures are not systematically inferred. We then attempted to explain this phenomenon. We performed analyses of the discourse structure of our examples and showed that in typeRenfNA examples, the discourse relations target the π∃ (some) constituent, while in typeRenfA examples, the π¬∀ (but not all) constituent is targeted. Thus, our work has shown that scalar implicatures are not systematically inferred, making implicature reinforcement sometimes mandatory. We also proposed a fine-grained model taking discourse structure and pragmatics into account to explain this phenomenon.

This thesis investigates the implications of positive polarity for grammar. The empirical focus is on two positive polarity particles in Sinhala, an Indo-Aryan language spoken in Sri Lanka. Sinhala has two particles -hari and -da that systematically appear across disjunction, indefinite and question constructions. Traditionally, these particles have been called Q-particles (i.e. Hagstrom (1998); Cable (2010); Slade (2011); a.m.o). They have so far been analyzed in terms of either Q-question/-uantifier operators (Kishimoto (2005)) or choice function variables (cf. Hagstrom (1998); Cable (2010); Slade (2011)). This thesis presents new data pertaining to the distribution and interpretation of disjunctions and indefinites formed with the two particles in contexts of negation, modals, quantifiers and intensional operators, that none of the previous accounts has captured. It proposes to analyze the grammar of the two particles based on their positive polarity character associated with exhaustivity (cf. Spector (2014); Nicolae (2017)). It claims that we can account for a wide range of grammatical phenomena such as ignorance inferences, scope or non/specificity effects, free/no choice implicatures and de re/dicto readings of -hari and -da disjunctions/indefinites in matrix and overt modal/quantifier contexts based on a distribution requirement (DR) derived by way of exhaustification with respect to alternatives of a disjunction or indefinite. The thesis casts its proposal in a hybrid system of lexical (cf. Levinson (2000); Chierchia (2004)) and grammatical (cf. Fox (2007); Chierchia et al. (2012)) approaches borrowing insights from both approaches. It also utilizes a hybrid framework of Hamblin semantics (cf. Hamblin (1973); Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002); Alonso-Ovalle (2006)) to keep domain alternatives separated and application of an alternative sensitive exhaustivity (Exh) operator (cf. the grammatical approach) to derive implicatures. Obligatory exhaustivity is treated as a morphological requirement/ lexical property of the particles -hari and -da represented by an uninterpretable exhaustivity [unExh] feature. Then, this lexical property is factored into the grammar by way of the Exh operator carrying an equivalent interpretable exhaustivity [inExh] feature placed in the syntactic structure of a -hari and -da disjunction/indefinite construction at LF. “Inclusivity” and “exclusivity” components of the particles -hari and -da that have consequences for distribution requirements are derived by way of different morpho-syntactic requirements of the particles -hari and -da. Thus, this thesis proposes a fully compositional/grammatical account all the way from the bottom to the top in the derivations.

O estudo de diferentes línguas tem permitido observar a existência de pronomes indefinidos e de determinantes indefinidos que podem ser associados ao estado de conhecimento ou desconhecimento do falante, ou de outro agente saliente (como o sujeito da sentença), em relação ao referente do sintagma determinante (constituído pelo pronome ou pelo determinante e um nome). Muitos estudiosos (cf. ABUSCH; ROOTH, 1997; ALONI, 2007; ALONI; VAN ROOIJ, 2007; ALONSO-OVALLE; MENÉNDEZ-BENITO, 2010; BECKER, 1999; CHIERCHIA, 2006; CONDORAVDI, 2008; EBERT; EBERT; HINTERWIMMER, no prelo; FARKAS, 2006; HINTERWIMMER; UMBACH, no prelo; HASPELMATH, 1997; IONIN, 2008; JAYEZ; TOVENA, 2006; KRATZER; SHIMOYAMA, 2002; ZAMPARELLI, 2007; entre outros) têm se dedicado à descrição e à análise desses indefinidos. O objetivo deste trabalho é descrever e explicar, a partir do aparato teórico da Semântica Formal, as contribuições semânticas e pragmáticas que algum e (um) certo e trazem para o significado das sentenças em que aparecem. Defende-se que, no que diz respeito à marcação da identificabilidade do referente, esses indefinidos estão em posições opostas, pois, enquanto algum combinado com nomes contáveis e massivos marca que o falante (ou outro agente saliente) não está em condições de identificar o referente do DP, (um) certo, por sua vez, marca que o falante deve identificar o referente. No entanto, quando combinados com nomes como charme, ambos marcam imprecisão em relação a uma escala grau presente no nome. Este trabalho pretende ser uma contribuição para o entendimento da semântica de determinantes indefinidos no português brasileiro. Ao descrever e analisar o comportamento semântico e pragmático de algum e (um) certo, este texto contribui, de maneira mais abrangente, para o estudo que tem se desenvolvido em várias línguas com o objetivo de construir uma tipologia para os indefinidos associados ao estado epistêmico do falante. / The study of languages has allowed to observe the existence of indefinite pronouns and indefinite determiners that can be associated with the speakers state of acknowledgement or ignorance, or another prominent agents (such as the subject of the sentence) with respect to determining the referent of the phrase (constituted by a pronoun or a determiner and a name). Many scholars (cf. ABUSCH; ROOTH, 1997; ALONI, 2007; ALONI; VAN ROOIJ, 2007; ALONSO-OVALLE; MENÉNDEZ-BENITO, 2010; BECKER, 1999; CHIERCHIA, 2006; CONDORAVDI, 2008; EBERT; EBERT; HINTERWIMMER, no prelo; FARKAS, 2006; HINTERWIMMER; UMBACH, no prelo; HASPELMATH, 1997; IONIN, 2008; JAYEZ; TOVENA, 2006; KRATZER; SHIMOYAMA, 2002; ZAMPARELLI, 2007; among others) have been devoted to the description and analysis of such indefinites. The aim of this paper is to describe and explain, from the theoretical apparatus of Formal Semantics, the semantic as well as pragmatic contributions of algum (some) and (um) certo (a certain) and show those contributions each of them brings to the meaning of sentences in which they appear. It is argued that, regarding the marcation of identifiability of the referent, these indefinites are in opposite positions, because whereas algum (some) combined with countable and mass nouns marks that the speaker (or another prominent agent) is not able to identify the referent of DP, (um) certo, (a certain) marks instead that the speaker is able to identify the referent. Nonetheless, when they are combined with nouns such as charme (charm) both mark the imprecision in relation to a scale present in the noun. This work intends to be a contribution to the understanding of the semantics in indefinite determinants in Brazilian Portuguese. By describing and analyzing the semantic and pragmatic behaviors of algum (some) and (um) certo (a certain), this text contributes, in a broader way, to the studies which have been carried out in several languages with the goal of build a typology for the indefinites associates to the speakers epistemic state.

O estudo de diferentes línguas tem permitido observar a existência de pronomes indefinidos e de determinantes indefinidos que podem ser associados ao estado de conhecimento ou desconhecimento do falante, ou de outro agente saliente (como o sujeito da sentença), em relação ao referente do sintagma determinante (constituído pelo pronome ou pelo determinante e um nome). Muitos estudiosos (cf. ABUSCH; ROOTH, 1997; ALONI, 2007; ALONI; VAN ROOIJ, 2007; ALONSO-OVALLE; MENÉNDEZ-BENITO, 2010; BECKER, 1999; CHIERCHIA, 2006; CONDORAVDI, 2008; EBERT; EBERT; HINTERWIMMER, no prelo; FARKAS, 2006; HINTERWIMMER; UMBACH, no prelo; HASPELMATH, 1997; IONIN, 2008; JAYEZ; TOVENA, 2006; KRATZER; SHIMOYAMA, 2002; ZAMPARELLI, 2007; entre outros) têm se dedicado à descrição e à análise desses indefinidos. O objetivo deste trabalho é descrever e explicar, a partir do aparato teórico da Semântica Formal, as contribuições semânticas e pragmáticas que algum e (um) certo e trazem para o significado das sentenças em que aparecem. Defende-se que, no que diz respeito à marcação da identificabilidade do referente, esses indefinidos estão em posições opostas, pois, enquanto algum combinado com nomes contáveis e massivos marca que o falante (ou outro agente saliente) não está em condições de identificar o referente do DP, (um) certo, por sua vez, marca que o falante deve identificar o referente. No entanto, quando combinados com nomes como charme, ambos marcam imprecisão em relação a uma escala grau presente no nome. Este trabalho pretende ser uma contribuição para o entendimento da semântica de determinantes indefinidos no português brasileiro. Ao descrever e analisar o comportamento semântico e pragmático de algum e (um) certo, este texto contribui, de maneira mais abrangente, para o estudo que tem se desenvolvido em várias línguas com o objetivo de construir uma tipologia para os indefinidos associados ao estado epistêmico do falante. / The study of languages has allowed to observe the existence of indefinite pronouns and indefinite determiners that can be associated with the speakers state of acknowledgement or ignorance, or another prominent agents (such as the subject of the sentence) with respect to determining the referent of the phrase (constituted by a pronoun or a determiner and a name). Many scholars (cf. ABUSCH; ROOTH, 1997; ALONI, 2007; ALONI; VAN ROOIJ, 2007; ALONSO-OVALLE; MENÉNDEZ-BENITO, 2010; BECKER, 1999; CHIERCHIA, 2006; CONDORAVDI, 2008; EBERT; EBERT; HINTERWIMMER, no prelo; FARKAS, 2006; HINTERWIMMER; UMBACH, no prelo; HASPELMATH, 1997; IONIN, 2008; JAYEZ; TOVENA, 2006; KRATZER; SHIMOYAMA, 2002; ZAMPARELLI, 2007; among others) have been devoted to the description and analysis of such indefinites. The aim of this paper is to describe and explain, from the theoretical apparatus of Formal Semantics, the semantic as well as pragmatic contributions of algum (some) and (um) certo (a certain) and show those contributions each of them brings to the meaning of sentences in which they appear. It is argued that, regarding the marcation of identifiability of the referent, these indefinites are in opposite positions, because whereas algum (some) combined with countable and mass nouns marks that the speaker (or another prominent agent) is not able to identify the referent of DP, (um) certo, (a certain) marks instead that the speaker is able to identify the referent. Nonetheless, when they are combined with nouns such as charme (charm) both mark the imprecision in relation to a scale present in the noun. This work intends to be a contribution to the understanding of the semantics in indefinite determinants in Brazilian Portuguese. By describing and analyzing the semantic and pragmatic behaviors of algum (some) and (um) certo (a certain), this text contributes, in a broader way, to the studies which have been carried out in several languages with the goal of build a typology for the indefinites associates to the speakers epistemic state.

In this thesis, I focus on scalar implicatures, presuppositions and their connections. In chapter 2, I propose a scalar implicature-based account of neg-raising inferences, standardly analyzed as a presuppositional phenomenon (Gajewski 2005, 2007). I show that an approach based on scalar implicatures can straightforwardly account for the differences and similarities between neg-raising predicates and presuppositional triggers. In chapters 3 and 4, I extend this account to “soft” presuppositions, a class of presuppositions that are easily suspendable (Abusch 2002, 2010). I show how such account can explain the differences and similarities between this class of presuppositions and other presuppositions on the one hand, and scalar implicatures on the other. Furthermore, I discuss various consequences that it has with respect to the behavior of soft presuppositions in quantificational sentences, their interactions with scalar implicatures, and their effects on the licensing of negative polarity items. In chapter 5, I show that by looking at the interaction between presuppositions and scalar implicatures we can solve a notorious problem which arises with conditional sentences like (1) (Soames 1982, Karttunen and Peters 1979). The main issue with (1) is that it is intuitively not presuppositional and this is not predicted by any major theory of presupposition projection. (1) I’ll go, if you go too. Finally, I explore in more detail the question of which alternatives should we consider in the computation of scalar implicatures (chapter 6). Traditionally, the answer has been to consider the subset of logically stronger alternatives than the assertion. Recently, however, arguments have been put forward in the literature for including also logically independent alternatives. I support this move by presenting some novel arguments in its favor and I show that while allowing new alternatives makes the right predictions in various cases, it also causes an under- and an over-generation problem. I propose a solution to each problem, based on a novel recursive algorithm for checking which alternatives are to be considered in the computation of scalar implicatures and the role of focus (Rooth 1992, Fox and Katzir 2011). / Linguistics

This thesis develops a pragmatic theory of metaphors and slurs. In the pragmatic literature, theorists mostly hold the view that the framework developed by Grice is only applicable to the sentence-level pragmatic phenomena, whereas the subsentential pragmatic phenomena require a different approach. In this thesis, I argue against this view and claim that the Gricean framework, after some plausible revisions, can explain subsentential pragmatic phenomena, such as metaphors and slurs. In the first chapter, I introduce three basic theses I will defend and give an outline of the argument I will develop. The second chapter discusses three claims on metaphor that are widely discussed in the literature. There I state my aim to present a theory of metaphor which can accommodate these three claims. Chapter 3 introduces the notion of "phrasal implicature", which will be used to explain phrase-level pragmatic phenomena with a Gricean approach. In Chapter 4, I present my theory of metaphor, which I call "phrasal implicature theory of metaphor" and discuss certain aspects of the theory. The notion of phrasal implicature enables a new conception of what-is-said and a different approach to the semantics-pragmatics distinction. Chapter 5 looks into these issues. In Chapter 6, I compare my theory of metaphor with three other theories. Finally, in Chapter 7, I develop a phrasal implicature theory of slurs, which I argue outperforms its rivals in explaining various uses of slurs.

This doctoral thesis explores the question of how much people’s ability to reflect on another person’s intentions and perspectives contributes to their success in understanding language, and further how children acquire these communication skills during development. This aim is achieved by focusing on a specific linguistic phenomenon, scalar implicatures, by which listeners enrich the meaning of a given utterance to implicate more than what is explicitly said. Such implicatures arise when a speaker uses a less informative term, such as “some”, when a more informative term like “all” is also available, thus leading the listener to the conclusion that the more informative alternative must be false. For instance, if a speaker says that some of her friends are curly, the listener will enrich the statement and assume that not all of them are. The first part of the thesis is focused on scalar implicature derivation during adulthood, to delineate the role of understanding communicative intention and reasoning about people’s epistemic state in the derivation process. The second part of the thesis investigates theoretical and methodological aspects of the acquisition of scalar implicatures, both through reviews of the literature and experimental studies investigating the role of inhibitory control, intention-reading and perspective-taking in implicature derivation between the ages of 2 and 17.

Cette thèse développe un formalisme théorique pour la sémantique du discours. Il s'appuie sur l'extension des grammaires de Montague, sur la notion de continuation et sur les mécanismes de levée et de traitement des exceptions. Le formalisme permet de traiter des phénomènes dynamiques tels que les anaphores d'une phrase à l'autre, les présuppositions déclenchées par des référents et les projections présuppositions. / This thesis develops a theoretical formalism that takes into account semantical discourse dynamics. It focuses on the extension of Montague semantic with the notion of continuation and an exception handling and raising mechanism. The formalism allows to handle dynamic phenomena such as cross-sentential anaphora, presuppositions triggered by referring expressions and presupposition projection.

This thesis develops a theoretical formalism of formal semantics of natural language in the spirit of Montague semantics. The developed framework satisfies the principle of compositionality in a simple and elegant way, by being as parsimonious as possible: completely new formalisms or extensions of existing formalisms with even more complex constructions to fit particular linguistic phenomena have been avoided; instead, the framework handles these linguistic phenomena using only basic and well-established formalisms, such as simply-typed lambda calculus and classical logic. Dynamics is achieved by employing a continuation-passing technique and an exception raising and handling mechanism. The context is explicitly represented by a term, and, therefore, can be easily accessed and manipulated. The framework successfully handles cross-sentential anaphora and presuppositions triggered by referring expressions and has potential to be extended for dealing with more complex dynamic phenomena, such as presuppositions triggered by factive verbs and conversational implicatures.