Esta dissertação pretende mostrar que a tese de Hume de que nós estamos inevitavelmente determinados a crer na existência de objetos externos tem a circunscrição de seu significado condicionada à identificação e à resolução de uma inconsistência presente na teoria humeana da crença inevitável em objetos externos. Essa inconsistência se expressa pela incompatibilidade entre a tese de que (P1) nós inevitavelmente cremos em objetos externos e a tese de que (P2) não podemos conceber objetos externos. Essas teses são incompatíveis se se considera que, para Hume, (P4) não podemos crer em algo que não podemos conceber. Esse problema só emerge se se supõe um uso unívoco da expressão "objeto externo" por parte de Hume em (P1) e (P2), e se se supõe que (P4) é o caso para Hume, o que se mostra ser um ponto de partida razoável. Os resultados indicam que as duas interpretações gerais do significado da tese de que nós inevitavelmente cremos em objetos externos, o naturalismo cético e o realismo cético, chegam a conclusões insatisfatórias porque ignoram esse problema. Por fim, conclui que não há, de fato, uma inconsistência na teoria humeana da crença em objetos externos porque não é o caso que não possamos ter uma concepção de objetos externos para Hume. Essa concepção se origina de um sentimento ou instinto original da mente. / This paper aims to show that Hume's claim that we are unavoidably determined to believe in the existence of external objects has the delimitation of our meaning conditioned to the identification and resolution of an inconsistency present in Hume's theory of the unavoidable belief in external objects. This inconsistency expresses itself by the incompatibility between the claim that (P1) we unavoidably believe in external objects and the claim that (P2) we can't conceive external objects. These claims are incompatible if we recognize that Hume claims as well that (P4) we can't believe in something that we can't conceive. This problem arises only if we suppose that Hume univocally uses the expression "external object" in (P1) and (P2), and if we suppose that (P4) is the case, a reasonable starting point. The results indicate that both general views of the meaning of the claim that we unavoidably believe in external objects, the skeptical naturalism and the skeptical realism, arrives at unsatisfactory outcomes because they ignore that problem. Finally, concludes that there's not, actually, an inconsistency in Hume's theory of belief in external objects because it's not the case that we can't conceive external objects. This conception of external existences arises out of a sentiment or natural instinct of the mind.

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Si l'histoire des sexualités marginales est bien abordée du point de vue de l'histoire culturelle depuis les années 1970, peu de travaux philosophiques s'attachent aujourd'hui à fournir une élucidation épistémologique critique du concept de perversion sexuelle. Ce dernier est pourtant un objet tout à fait étrange. C'est une catégorie médico-psychologique présente depuis plus d'un siècle et demi dans l'univers psychopathologique. Elle présente cependant des aspects indéniablement moraux, dont il semble que la simple présence aurait du la disqualifier depuis longtemps aux yeux des savoirs de l'esprit malade. Comment rendre compte de la stabilité historique et épistémologique d'un concept au sein duquel convergent deux dimensions en apparence contradictoires ? Cette thèse se propose d'explorer cette articulation du discours moral et du discours psychopathologique sur la sexualité, à travers la généalogie du concept de perversion sexuelle dans la psychiatrie française durant le long XIXème siècle (1797-1912). Deux questions traversent l'histoire de cette catégorie : quelle est la relation de la perversion sexuelle avec les écarts individuels aux normes morales, sociales, et juridiques, c'est à dire à la déviance ? Et quelles sont les images de la relation du sexe et du mal produites par le discours psychopathologique ? Ces deux problématiques engagent alors un questionnement plus large sur la fonction et les effets politiques du concept de perversion sexuelle, interrogation relative à la gestion sécuritaire des écarts sociaux, mais aussi à la place de la jouissance dans la civilisation occidentale contemporaine.

The paper thematizes the concept of science in mid- and late thinking of Friedrich Nietzsche in the context of his understanding of scientific cognition of both: human and its world. The study introduces the problem of science and cognition in general in connection with significant motives of Nietzsche's thinking: morality, the revaluation of all values, thinking and living "beyond good and evil", freedom, human body, the superhuman motive, ascetic ideals, and more. Emphasis is put on the problem of veracity in the context of Nietzsche's attitude to idealism. Keywords Human; Superhuman; Nietzsche; Moral Philosophy; Cognition; Truth; Error; Intelect; Body; The Will to Power; Drive and Instinct; Evolution; Idealism; Nihilism; Amor fati; Beyond Good and Evil; Freedom; Ascetic ideals

Does the individual really matter in the post-modern world, brimming with countless signs and signifiers? My main objective in this writing is to demonstrate how this happens in Verhoeven's films, exploring his central themes and subtext and doing what science fiction does: hold a mirror up to the contemporary world and critique it, asking whether our species' current trajectory is beneficial or hazardous.; Dutch director Paul Verhoeven is a polarizing figure. Although many of his American made films have received considerable praise and financial success, he has been lambasted on countless occasions for his gratuitous use of sex, violence, and contentious symbolism--1995s Showgirls was overwhelmingly dubbed the worst film of all time and 1997s Starship Troopers earned him a reputation as a fascist. Regardless of the controversy surrounding him, his science fiction films are a move beyond the conventions of the big blockbuster science fiction films of the 1980s (E.T. and the Star Wars trilogy are prime examples), revealing a deeper exploration of both sociopolitical issues and the human condition. Much like the novels of Philip K. Dick (and Verhoeven's 1990 film Total Recall--an adaptation of a Dick short story), Verhoeven's science fiction work explores worlds where paranoia is a constant and determining whether an individual maintains any liberty is regularly questionable. In this thesis I am basically exploring issues regarding power. Although I barely bring up the term power in it, I feel it is central. Power is an ambiguous term; are we discussing physical power, state power, objective power, subjective power, or any of the other possible manifestations of the word? The original Anglo-French version of power means "to be able," asking whether it is possible for one to do something. In relation to Verhoeven's science fiction work each demonstrates the limitations placed upon an individual's autonomy, asking are the protagonists capable of independent agency or rather just environmental constructs reflecting the myriad influences surrounding them.