It has been suggested that mental health professionals are insufficiently trained to assess and manage suicide risk (U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs and Defense [USDVA/DOD], 2013; Goldsmith, Pellmar, Kleinman, & Burney, 2002; Jobes, Rudd, Overholser, & Joiner, 2008; Mirick, McCauley, Bridger, & Berkowitz, 2015; Silverman & Berman, 2014) and this problem may originate during graduate training (Feldman & Freedenthal, 2006; Mackelprang, Karle, Reighl, & Cash, 2014; Rudd, Cukrowicz, & Bryan, 2008; Schmitz et al., 2012). Unfortunately, however, this area has been inadequately studied (Battista, 2007; Cramer, Johnson, McLaughlin, Rausch, & Conroy, 2013; Department of Health and Human Services, 2012; Stuber & Quinnett, 2013), precluding a full understanding of this problem. The present study surveyed clinical psychology doctoral students’ behavioral competency in responding to suicidal clients, attitudes toward suicide prevention, perceived ability to engage in appropriate practices, subjective norms surrounding SRA behaviors, intentions to engage in these behaviors, and the relationship of amount of graduate training in suicide risk assessment (SRA) core competencies to the aforementioned constructs. It was hypothesized that amount of training in SRA competencies would be significantly related to participants’ attitudes, perceived behavioral control, and subjective norms related to SRA behaviors. Further, it was hypothesized that the aforementioned variables would be significantly related to participant intentions to engage in these behaviors. Finally, it was hypothesized that intentions to engage in SRA behaviors would be positively related to participants’ behavioral competency in SRA. Study participants were 167 students from 46 clinical psychology doctoral programs. Hypotheses were tested using path analysis. Results provided partial support for significant relationships between attitudes, PBC, subjective norms, and intentions (Hypothesis 1a). Implications of this research include advancing the training practices of clinical psychology doctoral programs so as to help increase the number of mental health practitioners competent in suicide risk assessment and management practices.

Det har under en tid diskuterats huruvida den princip som i amerikansk rätt kallas the business judgment rule även förekommer i svensk rätt. Frågan har varit föremål för diskussion i flertalet artiklar och det är därför relevant att utreda huruvida principen förekommer i svensk rätt samt om en sådan princip kan anses vara förenlig med det skadeståndsansvar som styrelseledamöter har enligt 29 kap. 1 § ABL. Denna framställning syftar därför till att ge ett svar på om en princip likt the business judgment rule som förkommer i amerikansk rätt även förekommer i det svenska rättssystemet och om en sådan princip kan anses vara förenlig med 29 kap. 1 § ABL. För att utreda rättsläget har två metoder använts, den rättsdogmatiska metoden och den komparativa metoden, och den juridiska argumentationen i framställningen bygger på lagstiftning, förarbeten, rättspraxis och doktrin. The business judgment rule förekommer i den amerikanska aktiebolagsrätten och principen är en presumtion om att bolagsledningen vid beslutsfattande agerat utifrån en väl informerade grund, i god tro samt i övertygelsen om att beslutet fattats för aktiebolagets bästa. Principen har kommit att ta sin form genom the Supreme Courts i USA och inte direkt genom skriven lag vilket beror på att USA är ett s.k. common law land där rättstillämparen även är skaparen av rättsreglerna. För att principen ska vara tillämplig krävs att fyra rekvisit uppfylls, dessa är att det ska röra sig om ett beslut som fattats av en styrelseledamot och the triads of fiduciary duties. I svensk rätt regleras styrelseledamöters skadeståndsansvar i 29 kap. 1 § ABL och av paragrafen framkommer att en styrelseledamot som inom sitt uppdrag bringar skada till aktiebolaget, aktieägare eller tredje man genom uppsåt eller av oaktsamhet ska ersätta denna skada. Inom ramen för styrelseledamöters skadeståndsansvar enligt 29 kap. 1 § ABL finns såväl ett externt som ett internt skadeståndsansvar. För att en styrelseledamot ska kunna ställas ansvarig för en skada krävs att styrelseledamoten agerat oaktsamt, eller genom uppsåt, samt att det föreligger adekvat kausalitet mellan handlandet och den uppkomna skadan. Efter en genomgång av lagstiftning, förarbeten, prejudikat och doktrin på såväl det amerikanska som det svenska området kan konstateras att the business judgment rule som presumtion inte förekommer i de svenska regleringarna på området, varken i den allmänna skadeståndsrätten eller i ABL. Vissa rekvisit som förekommer i the business judgment rule kan däremot anses förekomma i såväl 29 kap. 1 § ABL som i rättstillämparens bedömningar. Rekvisitet för duty of care kan liknas med den culpabedömning som sker vid utredningen av om en person varit oaktsam i sitt handlande. Högsta domstolen har även i några rättsfall framfört att om en person fattar ett beslut som varit väl motiverat och med en informerad basis bör inte beslutet ifrågasättas, vilket även detta kan liknas med rekvisitet för duty of care samt det tankesätt som finns gällande the business judgment rule. Det kan även konstateras att om en princip likt the business judgment rule skulle komma att bli allmänt vedertagen i svensk rätt torde detta inte stå i strid med 29 kap. 1 § ABL.

The focus of the current dissertation was on the construction and validation of a situational judgment test (SJT) assessing lying/dishonesty in the workplace. The scale was designed to have two dimensions corresponding to two needs based on Socioanalytic Theory: (1) the need to get along and (2) the need to get ahead. Three studies were undertaken in order to create items, pilot test items, and assess both the construct and criterion-related validity of the scale. The result of Study 1 was a pilot-tested scale with six SJT items corresponding to each of the two SJT dimension (12 items total). The dimensions of the new SJT are referred to in the paper as LAl (lying to get along) and LAh (lying to get ahead). Study 2 examined convergent and discriminant validity as well as the nomological network of other individual difference variables expected to be related to LAl and/or LAh. The results of Study 2 largely supported the construct validity of the overall scale but many of the personality constructs based on the Five Factor Model (FFM) were not related to LAl or LAh. In Study 3, LAl and LAh were unrelated to several aspects of supervisor rated performance as well turnover intentions and objective career outcomes (e.g., promotions). The primary contribution of the dissertation was the creation of a construct valid SJT measuring lying in organizations whose dimensions could be assessed reliably using coefficient alpha as opposed to test-retest reliability. Future research directions and limitations of the study are discussed in the final section of the dissertation.

No description available.

No description available.

The primary aim of this research was to examine the influence of temporary mood states on factual and interpersonal skepticism. Based on recent affect-cognition theorising and research on credibility judgment, 7 studies predicted that negative moods increase and positive moods decrease skepticism, because of the information-processing consequences of these affective states. First, three studies examined the influence of mood on factual skepticism toward urban myths and legends (Study 1) and novel and familiar general knowledge claims (Studies 2-3). Contrary to predictions, Study 1 found that sad participants were less skeptical than happy participants towards urban legends, possibly due to the negative valence of the claims. Because the feeling of familiarity has been shown to be an important determinant of truth, Studies 2-3 examined the influence of mood and familiarity on skepticism. Consistent with information processing theories of mood, happy participants were more likely than sad participants to give credence to familiar general knowledge claims (Study 2), even when given explicit feedback about their actual truth or falsity during initial exposure to claims (Study 3). The remainder of this thesis extended these findings to interpersonal judgments. Studies 4-5 found that sad participants were more skeptical of the genuineness of facial expressions of emotion compared to happy participants. Studies 6-7 examined whether sad participants might also show greater lie detection accuracy. In Study 6, happy, sad and neutral-mood participants judged the credibility of targets honestly or deceptively describing their emotional reaction to an affectively-laden film, but no evidence was found of mood induced differences in deception detection accuracy. However, in Study 7, sad participants were more skeptical than happy participants about the veracity of videotaped individuals honestly or deceptively denying their involvement in a mock crime (a theft), and showed greater accuracy at discerning lies from truths. This dissertation contributes to the affect-cognition literature by demonstrating that not only may sad moods lead people to be more skeptical, but they may also confer an advantage at detecting deception. The implications of these findings for everyday credibility judgment and for contemporary theories of affect and cognition are considered.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / New scoring and test construction methods for emotional intelligence (EI) are suggested as alternatives for current practice, where most tests are scored by group judgment and are in ratings-based format. Both the ratings-based format and the proportion-based scores resulting from group judgments may act as method effects, obscuring relationships between EI tests, and between EI and intelligence. In addition, scoring based on standards rather than group judgments add clarity to the meaning of test scores. For these reasons, two new measures of emotional intelligence (EI) are constructed: (1) the Situational Test of Emotional Understanding (STEU); and (2) the Situational Test of Emotion Management (STEM). Following test construction, validity evidence is collected from four multi-variate studies. The STEU’s items and a standards-based scoring system are developed according to empirically derived appraisal theory concerning the structure of emotion [Roseman, 2001]. The STEM is developed as a Situational Judgment Test (SJT) with situations representing sadness, fear and anger in work life and personal life settings. Two qualitative studies form the basis for the STEM’s item development: (1) content analysis of responses to semi-structured interviews with 31 psychology undergraduates and 19 community volunteers; and (2) content analysis of free responses to targeted vignettes created from these semi-structured interviews (N = 99). The STEM may be scored according to two expert panels of emotions researchers, psychologists, therapists and life coaches (N = 12 and N = 6). In the first multi-variate study (N = 207 psychology undergraduates), both STEU and STEM scores relate strongly to vocabulary test scores and moderately to Agreeableness but no other dimension from the five-factor model of personality. STEU scores predict psychology grade and an emotionally-oriented thinking style after controlling vocabulary and personality test scores (ΔR2 = .08 and .06 respectively). STEM scores did not predict academic achievement but did predict emotionally-oriented thinking and life satisfaction (ΔR2 = .07 and .05 for emotionally-oriented thinking and .04 for life satisfaction). In the second multi-variate study, STEU scores predict lower levels of state anxiety, and STEM scores predict lower levels of state anxiety, depression, and stress among 149 community volunteers from Sydney, Australia. In the third multi-variate study (N = 181 psychology undergraduates), Strategic EI, fluid intelligence (Gf) and crystallized intelligence (Gc) were each measured with three indicators, allowing these constructs to be assessed at the latent variable level. Nested structural equation models show that Strategic EI and Gc form separate latent factors (Δχ2(1) = 12.44, p < .001). However, these factors relate very strongly (r = .73), indicating that Strategic EI may be a primary mental ability underlying Gc. In this study, STEM scores relate to emotionally-oriented thinking but not loneliness, life satisfaction or state stress, and STEU scores do not relate to any of these. STEM scores are significantly and meaningfully higher for females (d = .80), irrespective of gender differences in verbal ability or personality, or whether expert scores are derived from male or female experts. The fourth multi-variate study (N = 118 psychology undergraduates) distinguishes an EI latent factor (indicated by scores on the STEU, STEM and two emotion recognition ability measures) from a general cognitive ability factor (indicated by three intelligence measures; Δχ2(1) = 10.49, p < .001), although again cognitive ability and EI factors were strongly related (r = .66). Again, STEM scores were significantly higher for females (d = .44) and both STEU and STEM relate to Agreeableness but not to any other dimension from the five-factor model of personality. Taken together, results suggest that: (1) STEU and STEM scores are reasonably reliable and valid tests of EI; (2) EI tests assess slightly different constructs to existing measures of Gc, but more likely form a new primary mental ability within Gc than an entirely separate construct; and (3) the female superiority for EI tests may prove useful for addressing adverse impact in applied settings (e.g., selection for employment, promotion or educational opportunities), particularly given that many current assessment tools result in a male advantage.

Diss. (sammanfattning) Umeå : Umeå universitet, 2007. / Härtill 4 uppsatser.

<p>This study examined if social distance, i.e. in- vs. out-group membership, had an effect on moral judgments of acts vs. omissions. 164 participants judged the morality of acts vs. omissions of lethal harm, that affected an in- vs. out-group member of the participant, in order to save five other people. The results showed that acts of lethal, but utilitarian, harm were judged more immoral than omissions of equivalent harm. It was also shown that if the victim was an in- group member of the participant the behavior was judged more immoral than if the victim was an out-group member of the participant. However, the acts and omissions of harm were not judged differently when the victim was an in.- vs. out-group member of the participant, indicating that this kind of social distance might not influence the moral judgment of acts and omissions.</p><p> </p>

The objective of this thesis is to examine and analyze the presentation of spaces, figures, and the processes of judgment in afterlife films. American and foreign titles as well as television series are assessed as afterlife films by two criteria: (1) A character has clinically died yet continues to exist and (2) a living character finds his or her self in an afterlife space. Films with characters that have near-death experiences (NDEs) are included in relation to the above three qualities. After screening nearly one hundred and thirty titles, I have found there is a basic formula structure that has been expanded and transformed into seven other structures, plus those that are combined for a unique narrative. The afterlife corpus is divided into five distinct eras by the quantity of releases that fluctuate in accordance with 20th and early 21st century cultural anxieties and technological advances. A secondary argument proposes why the afterlife story is perfectly suited to the film medium plus why the industry and audiences are incessantly drawn to the afterlife film premise. The afterlife film perpetuates universal and age-old questions on the significance of life and death in the guise of enticing sights and stories. Each afterlife film may have its own identifiable design and theme but they are connected to higher concerns of mortality and second chances.